SOCIAL COHESION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: A Synthesis of New Research
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 100 million people around the world were forcibly displaced as of May 2022 (UNHCR 2022).¹ This includes over 25 million refugees and over 50 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNHCR 2021). The share of the world’s population that has been forcibly displaced because of conflict, political violence, persecution, and political, economic, and environmental crises grew from 1 in 167 in 2012, to 1 in 88 in 2021 (UNHCR 2021).² While conflict is a major cause of forced displacement, the climate crisis is increasingly forcing people to leave their homes. In the last 11 years, disasters such as floods and droughts have driven a larger proportion of internal displacement than conflict (IDMC 2021).

Forced displacement can profoundly affect social cohesion among and between displaced persons, host communities, and communities to which displaced persons return. World Bank (forthcoming) defines social cohesion as “a sense of shared purpose, trust and willingness to cooperate among members of a given group, between members of different groups, and between people and the state.”³ This report focuses on social cohesion between forcibly displaced persons and host communities. Forced displacement may undermine or strengthen social cohesion through several mechanisms, including the trauma or mobilization effects of the displacement experience, its impact on social ties and economic and human capital accumulation, and the perception or reality of the impacts of population inflows on goods, services, markets, jobs, and the environment. Despite the clear connection between forced displacement and social cohesion, more research on the topic is needed to better inform policies and development investments.

This report presents new evidence from 26 background studies on forced displacement and social cohesion to expand the knowledge base on how to prevent social conflict and promote social cohesion in forced displacement contexts. Building on this new evidence, it provides lessons on how development investments and policies can reduce inequalities, alleviate social tensions, and promote

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¹ This number includes refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, Venezuelans displaced abroad, as well as refugees and other displaced people not covered by UNHCR’s mandate. It excludes other categories such as returnees and non-displaced stateless people.

² This report uses the definition of refugees from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and a broader definition of IDPs that includes disasters as one of many driving factors of displacement. See Box 3 for more details on the definitions used in this report.

³ Although each paper is ultimately concerned with how forced displacement impacts social cohesion, the authors define social cohesion in different ways and explore distinct outcomes.
social cohesion between and within displaced populations and host communities. The background studies and report are part of a joint research program led by the World Bank, the United Kingdom (UK) Government, and UNHCR that seeks to expand global knowledge on forced displacement.

The background studies are geographically and methodologically diverse. They examine social cohesion in a variety of low-, middle-, and high-income countries across Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and Europe. The studies also employ a wide range of research designs including rich, qualitative case studies, natural experiments, survey experiments, and cross-national quantitative analyses.

This report employs a framework centered on five broad themes to synthesize the diverse findings of the background studies. The first four themes explain how forced displacement affects social cohesion. First, forced displacement directly affects social cohesion outcomes among the displaced by reshaping their lives, including their socioeconomic status, educational outcomes, civic engagement, and psychological experiences. Second, displacement affects social cohesion by shaping the attitudes and behavior of host communities. Third, host communities’ social, economic, and political landscapes influence how displaced populations affect social cohesion. Fourth, the arrival of displaced populations can influence socioeconomic conditions (e.g., economic inequality) and behavior (e.g., job search, interpersonal engagement, conflict) in ways that affect social cohesion. The fifth theme focuses on specific policy interventions to help socially and economically integrate refugees into host communities. These five themes are useful for policy makers and practitioners working to design context-specific policies and interventions. For instance, a practitioner who is planning an intervention to ease the integration of refugees into host communities would benefit from insights in Theme 1 concerning how displacement affects refugees’ attitudes and behaviors. Or, if the mechanism for that reintegration intervention was, for example, a job training program, the practitioner could look to Theme 5 for new findings on the effects of policy interventions in these areas. In sum, the five themes give practitioners a way to efficiently identify new insights that cover a wide range of situations they might encounter in their work.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that, while displacement can exacerbate inequalities and create new inequalities and the potential for conflict, especially in areas with strained services and limited economic opportunities, inclusive policies and development investments can effectively mitigate the negative effects of displacement and promote social cohesion. Population inflows can raise food and housing prices (Rozo and Sviatschi 2021), intensify environmental pressure (Black 2018), and strain public services such as health care and education (Zhou et al. 2022a), which can negatively impact service delivery for poor host community members in contexts where services were already limited prior to the arrival of displaced people. Population inflows can also increase the competition for scarce jobs, especially in low-skilled and lower-wage jobs (Šedová et al. 2021; Groeger et al. 2022). However, these effects are not inevitable (Aksoy and Ginn 2022); they are shaped by the socioeconomic

4. This report uses the term “displaced” to refer to those who are “forcibly” displaced. Refugees and IDPs do not always face the same challenges, and this report uses the expressions “refugee,” “IDP,” and “forcibly displaced” as appropriate to best reflect the research findings.
context as well as the humanitarian and development response and policies. Several of the studies illustrate that policies that grant the right to work, freedom of movement, access to social services, and the right to own or rent property can promote social and economic integration while preventing or mitigating backlash (Aksoy and Ginn 2022).

Humanitarian assistance and multi-sectoral development investments directed to refugees, IDPs, and host communities can improve refugees’ and IDPs’ welfare, mitigate the negative effects of displacement, generate positive externalities for host communities, and promote social cohesion. Population inflows can improve economic conditions in host communities, either directly through the contributions to the host economy or indirectly through refugee aid and development programs (Coniglio et al. 2022; Zhou and Shaver 2021). However, these positive effects may take time to emerge. Conflict between refugees and host communities can occur in the interim. To pre-empt social tensions, governments and humanitarian and development agencies should direct short- and long-term assistance to both the displaced and host communities. This can help reduce real and perceived inequalities in access to a variety of services and prevent host communities from forming negative attitudes about newly arriving displaced persons (Zhou et al. 2022a).

Multi-sectoral investments paired with participatory decision-making involving both the displaced and host communities can help ensure that the investments address the highest priorities and promote social cohesion. Approaches that bring displaced persons and hosts together to identify, implement, and oversee investments can deliver essential infrastructure and services and foster positive interactions. Recent evidence provides at least three reasons why these participatory approaches may be especially effective in forced displacement contexts. First, refugee–host interactions during everyday activities can improve host community perceptions of the displaced (Betts et al. 2022; Allen et al. 2022; Pham et al. 2022). Second, refugees and IDPs often exhibit high levels of social capital upon which participatory approaches can draw (Tellez and Balcells 2022; Denny et al. 2022; Vinck et al. 2022). Third, there is growing evidence that trained facilitators can promote empathy among host residents and the displaced through perspective-getting exercises that involve sharing information about each other’s situations (Kalla and Broockman 2021; Audette et al. 2020). Community-driven development is one possible approach to deliver multi-sectoral investments using facilitated, participatory decision-making that involves both host community members and the displaced.

Finally, the findings emphasize the importance of both short- and long-term investments, and of tailoring multi-sectoral operations to address the different needs in urban and rural contexts and in camp and non-camp settings. The provision of social assistance, health care and education services, and economic opportunities immediately following displacement may help mitigate some of the long-term impacts on forcibly displaced persons and host communities (Foltz and Shibuya 2022; Zhou et al. 2022a). Yet in the medium- to long-term, forcibly displaced and host community members may require ongoing mental health services, social support, and legal assistance (e.g., Denny et al. 2022; Kovac et al. 2022; Šedová et al. 2022; Tellez and Balcells 2022). Policy and development responses can address the specific needs
of the displaced persons and host community members most likely to be negatively affected by population inflows in urban areas (tenants, employees) through labor market integration, increased housing supply, and social assistance. Policy and development investment responses can address concerns about land scarcity and insecurity in rural areas by making land available for use by forcibly displaced persons and non-landowning host members, and by using participatory approaches to deliver income-generating opportunities and infrastructure and services.

**Key Recommendations**

1. In line with the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees, provide refugees the right to work, freedom of movement, access to social services, civil and birth registration, and right to accommodation.

2. Ensure that humanitarian assistance and development investments target both displaced persons and host communities.

3. Invest in infrastructure and services to meet the increased demand due to population shocks and use these investments to also address existing vulnerabilities in host communities.

4. Near-term relief and assistance should be provided to both host communities and displaced persons following displacement to offset negative externalities on prices and jobs.

5. Provide relevant support such as mental health services for the trauma endured during displacement, ongoing social assistance to address hardships, and legal assistance to recover property and obtain documents to address displaced persons’ longer-term well-being and self-reliance.

6. Tailor investments to the unique needs of urban and rural areas hosting the displaced, which may include labor market integration and housing support in urban areas and access to land, income-generating opportunities, infrastructure, and services in rural areas.

7. Employ participatory approaches, trained facilitators, and public messaging to promote positive interactions and empathy between host residents and displaced persons.

8. Pair multisectoral investments with participatory approaches to ensure investments address the needs of displaced persons and host communities.

*See Section 3 for a full discussion of the policy recommendations.*
## CONTENTS

**Executive Summary** ................................................................. I

**Abbreviations and Acronyms** ................................................. VII

**Acknowledgements** ............................................................... VIII

**Dedication** ............................................................................. IX

**Introduction** .......................................................................... 1

1. **The State of Forced Displacement** ........................................ 9
   - Global Trends ........................................................................ 9
   - The Causes of Forced Displacement ....................................... 17
   - Forced Displacement and Social Cohesion ............................. 18

2. **New Research on Displacement and Social Cohesion** ............ 23
   - Introduction to the Themes .................................................. 23
   - Overview of Papers and Findings ......................................... 25
     - Theme 1: Displacement Directly Affects Social Cohesion Outcomes Among the Displaced ......................................... 25
     - Theme 2: Displacement Directly Affects Social Cohesion Outcomes by Shaping the Attitudes and Behavior of Host Communities ........................................ 30
     - Theme 3: Pre-existing Socioeconomic Conditions and Attitudes in Host Communities Moderate the Effect of Displacement on Social Cohesion .................. 33
     - Theme 4: The Presence of Displaced Populations in Host Communities Drives Socioeconomic Conditions and Behavior that Affect Social Cohesion ............. 38
     - Theme 5: Policy Interventions to Shape Economic and Security Conditions ................................................................. 42

3. **Discussion and Policy Recommendations** ............................ 50

**References** ............................................................................. 61

**Annex: List of Commissioned Papers** .................................... 75

**Annex: Summary of Background Papers** ................................. 78
TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Countries Covered in the Background Papers ............................................. 3
Figure 2. Global Displacement Trends ........................................................................ 10
Figure 3. New Internal Displacements Over Time, By Cause .................................... 12
Figure 4. The Geography of Displacement ................................................................. 15

TABLE OF BOXES

Box 1. Research on Displacement and Social Cohesion: Ethical and
Methodological Challenges ......................................................................................... 4
Box 2. Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project ............................... 8
Box 3. Definitions ......................................................................................................... 11
Box 4. Mixed Migration and Climate Change-Induced Forced Displacement .......... 13
Box 5. Ukrainian Refugees and IDPs .......................................................................... 16
Box 6. Creating Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and
Syrian Refugees ........................................................................................................... 35
Box 7. Colombia: Social and Economic Inclusion of Migrants
Development Policy Financing .................................................................................... 44
Box 8. Policies to Support Social Cohesion in Contexts Affected by
Fragility and Conflict ................................................................................................. 46
Box 9. The Role of Targeting Mechanisms for Social Assistance ............................. 54

TABLES

Table 1. Themes of Background Papers ..................................................................... 24
Table 2. Summary of Background Papers .................................................................. 78
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DiD</td>
<td>Difference-in-Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRDIP</td>
<td>Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCDO</td>
<td>UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCFF</td>
<td>Global Concessional Financing Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDELT</td>
<td>Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Instrumental Variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDP</td>
<td>National Participatory Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDD</td>
<td>Regression Discontinuity Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPRF</td>
<td>Refugee Policy Review Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Temporary Protection Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHR</td>
<td>Window for Host Communities and Refugees</td>
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DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to the refugees and internally displaced people around the world and the communities that host them. We hope it will provide useful insights for hosting countries to put in place inclusive policies and programs to safeguard the social, human, and economic capital of the forcibly displaced and their host communities and engender social inclusion and cohesion.
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 100 million people around the world were forcibly displaced as of May 2022 (UNHCR 2022). Roughly one percent of the world’s population has, at some point in their lives, been forced to flee because of conflict, persecution, or other sources of insecurity (UNHCR 2021). This form of mass migration can radically transform social relations both among those who are displaced, and within the host communities where they settle (or the communities they return to). In some cases, the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) can create social tensions and grievances within host communities, while in other cases their arrival can reduce conflict, increase local development, and improve the quality of public services (Zhou et al. 2022a; Assaad et al. 2019; Bilgili et al. 2019). There is thus a great need to understand the wide-ranging ramifications of forced displacement for social cohesion so that policies can be designed to alleviate the suffering of displaced people, while enhancing socioeconomic opportunities for host communities and mitigating the risk of exacerbating local tensions or producing other negative outcomes.

This report concentrates on social cohesion between forcibly displaced persons and host communities. It defines social cohesion as “a sense of shared purpose, trust and willingness to cooperate among members of a given group, between members of different groups, and between people and the state” (World Bank forthcoming). It thus focuses on the normatively “good” dimensions of social cohesion (e.g., those related to cooperation and shared prosperity), and conceptualizes it in connection with other development outcomes such as interpersonal trust, norms surrounding collective action for the common good (i.e., material welfare or public goods provision), the extent to which a community shares a common objective, and civic engagement. However, as discussed below, the lack of conceptual clarity on social cohesion remains a major challenge for scholars and practitioners.

Social cohesion constitutes a broad yet important set of development outcomes that merit study, particularly in the forced displacement context. The dimensions of social cohesion covered in the papers commissioned for this report—including norms of cooperation, interpersonal trust, collective action, and civic engagement—are important to development because they have direct and indirect implications for the functioning of political and economic life. These downstream implications include institutional quality (Easterly et al. 2006), communities’ capacity to resolve conflicts (Blair et. al. 2021) and manage common pool resources (Paler et al.

5. This report uses the term “displaced” to mean “forced” displacement.
6. The definition used in this report does not assume that displaced persons seek full integration into host societies.
7. One example of the challenge posed by this lack of conceptual clarity is the inconsistent approaches to measuring social cohesion. The papers included in this report also employ different approaches to measuring social cohesion, but they focus on the normatively “good” dimensions such as trust and norms of collective action. Kim et al. (2020) provide a framework and tool for measuring social cohesion.
2015), and the functioning of markets, especially informal ones (Jaffe et. al. 2007). As a result, promoting strong, inclusive development outcomes for the forcibly displaced and host communities requires understanding the factors that foster and undermine social cohesion in displacement contexts.

**Despite its importance, the ways in which forced displacement affects social cohesion remain understudied.** A 2018 World Bank desk review concludes that there has been little research on the connection between forced displacement and social cohesion (World Bank 2018a, 8). Yet there is reason to expect displacement to affect social cohesion through a variety of mechanisms, including the trauma or mobilization effects of the displacement experience (i.e., where individuals respond to trauma with an increased desire to engage more actively in their community), its impact on social ties and economic and human capital accumulation, and the real or perceived impacts of population inflows on goods, services, markets, jobs, and the environment in host communities.

**This report synthesizes the findings of 26 background papers commissioned by the World Bank to expand the knowledge base on how to promote social cohesion and prevent social conflict in forced displacement contexts.** It highlights practical and operationally useful lessons from this new body of research to inform policy and development programming. The background papers (which were published separately and are listed in Annex 1) were prepared as part of a joint research program titled “Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership.” This program was established in 2016 by the UK Government, the World Bank, and the UNHCR with the objective of improving global knowledge on forced displacement. It has financed global sector studies, policy studies, impact evaluations, fellowships for young researchers, and the generation of new data.
The background papers are geographically and methodologically diverse and provide a range of insights. These include detailed, granular patterns observed on the ground in specific settings as well as larger-scale estimates of the impacts of displacement and policies that shape interactions between displaced persons and host communities. They span a variety of low-income (e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo), middle-income (e.g., Colombia), and high-income (e.g., Switzerland) countries, and highlight how displacement and social cohesion dynamics vary around the world (see Figure 1). The papers use diverse methods including rich, qualitative data collection, ethnographic fieldwork, quasi-experimental approaches, experiments, and econometric analyses. Table 2 in Annex 2 summarizes the methods and data used in each background paper. Box 1 provides an overview of the ethical and methodological challenges associated with conducting research on displacement and social cohesion.

Figure 1. Countries Covered in the Background Papers
Conducting research on displacement and social cohesion can be ethically and methodologically challenging. Most research should satisfy two sets of questions. First, are the scholar’s analysis and conclusions based on sound principles of descriptive and causal inference and robust data collection practices such that they generate generalizable and valid results? Second, has the research (including field research) been conducted ethically? The latter requires being attentive to issues of agency, as well as power hierarchies between researchers in affected settings and those in resource-rich settings, where funding is often concentrated (Singh et al. 2021; Cronin-Furman and Lake 2018). This includes ensuring that the process and results do not place research subjects in physical or other forms of danger. Data collection efforts must also consider that research and policy making often involve making the displaced ‘visible’ to humanitarian, development, and government institutions, while displaced individuals may prefer to remain invisible to negotiate hostile or unknown political, social, and economic contexts (Polzer and Hammond 2008). Some of the papers in this study use innovative methodological approaches to overcome the ethical and methodological issues associated with data collection in conflict and displacement contexts.

In their study on eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pham et al. (2022) consult with participants to develop a contextually appropriate definition of social cohesion that consists of three elements: relationships, solidarity, and governance. The relationships dimension centers on the nature of relationships between individuals and between groups. The defining characteristic of a group is a shared geographic origin, shared ethnicity, or shared religion; the first two are much more common. While closely related to relationships, participants emphasize the separate dimension of solidarity consisting of collaboration, sharing, and support across groups. Governance refers to leaders’ accountability to the population.

Researchers are also developing new ways to measure exposure to displaced persons. For example, Zhou et al. (2022a) develop a measure of refugee presence that incorporates both proximity to refugees and their population size. Previous work measures presence as the share of refugees in a given administrative unit, such as a municipality or district. This approach can be misleading because it ignores the physical proximity to refugees that occurs regardless of administrative boundaries. Other research uses arbitrary cutoffs, such as 5 kilometers from a refugee settlement, that inform a binary variable that may ignore the size of the refugee population. Zhou et al.’s (2022b) measure is a continuous variable that incorporates information on both the distance to and size of refugee settlements and allows localities to be affected by more than one nearby settlement.

(continued)
Box 1. Research on Displacement and Social Cohesion: Ethical and Methodological Challenges (continued)

Walk et al. (2022) address data availability challenges in Syrian Arab Republic through the innovative use of social media data. They collect social media data from Syria in areas where refugees have and have not returned following displacement. They create a dataset of 3,586,469 messages on Telegram, 1,787,552 messages on Twitter, and 1,793,444 messages on Facebook from October 2017 to December 2020. They use textual analysis and image clustering to obtain visual or textual topics. Working with local researchers, they identify key topics and keywords for additional analysis and cross-checked the data with that from the REACH resource center and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs before generating their findings.

In other contexts, researchers use methodological innovations to understand host community preferences for policies that replicate those in the real world. In Allen et al.’s (2022) paper on Colombia, conjoint surveys test host community preferences between hypothetical pairs of packages comprising policies toward Venezuelans that reflect current Colombian policy as well as plausible alternatives. They also collect data on host community concerns related to economic or humanitarian issues, as well as data on the respondents’ level of meaningful social contact with displaced persons. This data is used to generate compelling findings on host community responses to displacement.

Although many spend years or even decades in protracted displacement, few quantitative empirical studies consider how displacement effects change over the short, medium, and long term. This gap is partly due to the lack of high-quality panel data for refugee and IDP populations. Collecting representative data on refugees in hosting locations is challenging. For instance, refugee populations can be highly mobile and therefore difficult to locate for follow-up surveys. They may also be reluctant to share their information due to fears of deportation. Two recent studies utilize longitudinal data to track refugees over time. Müller et al. (2022) follow the same refugees in Switzerland over 20 years to examine how the pattern of economic integration changes over time in the short, medium, and long term. Miguel et al. (2022) present descriptive characteristics of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Their Syrian Refugee Life Survey (S-RLS) is one of the first longitudinal studies of a representative sample of refugees.

The papers demonstrate that displacement can exacerbate existing inequalities and create new inequalities and the potential for conflict, particularly when economic conditions are strained. Inclusive policies and development investments can mitigate the negative effects of displacement and promote social cohesion. Host communities with inclusive policies tend to experience positive economic and social cohesion outcomes over the long term. Several papers highlight how governments can adopt inclusive policies for
refugees (such as the right to work, freedom of movement, access to social services, and own or rent property) while preventing or mitigating backlash (Aksoy and Ginn 2022). Inclusive policies help refugees provide for themselves and their communities with dignity and foster mutual gains and positive relationships between refugees and host communities.

**Humanitarian assistance and development investments directed to both refugees and host communities can improve refugees’ welfare, mitigate the negative effects of displacement, generate positive externalities for host communities, and promote social cohesion.** Population inflows can improve economic conditions in host communities, either directly through refugees’ participation in the host economy or indirectly through refugee aid and development programs (Coniglio et al. 2022; Zhou and Shaver 2021). However, these positive effects may take time to emerge; conflict between refugees and host communities can occur in the interim. To pre-empt tensions between the forcibly displaced and host communities and prevent conflict, governments and humanitarian and development agencies should channel social assistance to both groups. The perceived fairness of social assistance among hosts and the forcibly displaced influences whether social assistance creates social cohesion or generates tensions (see Box 9). Development responses to forced displacement often require investments to expand infrastructure and services to meet the sharp increase in demand. Allowing host communities to access investments in services and humanitarian assistance is critical for preventing tensions and generating positive externalities (Zhou et al. 2022a). In many contexts, refugees and hosts face multi-dimensional poverty. Multi-sectoral development investments are therefore needed to span across basic services, economic opportunities, environmental management, and shelter (see Box 2 for an example of a World Bank-financed, multi-sectoral project that was designed to benefit both groups). The background papers also point to the importance of tailoring multi-sectoral development projects to address the unique needs in urban and rural contexts and in-camp and non-camp settings.

**Forcibly displaced persons experience both short-term trauma and long-term disadvantages that can last for decades due to changes in their human, social, and physical capital.** Several of the background papers highlight the inequalities and trauma that persist among the forcibly displaced decades after their displacement (Tellez and Balcells 2022; Kovak et al. 2022; Denny et al. 2022). Providing social assistance, health care services, and economic opportunities to refugees and IDPs and vulnerable host community members immediately following the displacement event may help mitigate some of the long-term impacts. In the medium to long term, refugees, IDPs, and host community members may require ongoing mental health services, social support, and legal assistance with recovering property and obtaining vital documents, which can improve human capital and returns to labor market participation in the host country.

**Finally, multi-sectoral investments paired with participatory decision-making approaches among the displaced and host communities can help ensure that investments address the highest priorities and promote social cohesion.** Approaches like community-driven development (CDD) that bring displaced and host residents together for

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8. Perceptions of fairness are often linked to an individual’s sense of well-being relative to their community. This account of how fairness perceptions are formulated is often referred to in the social sciences as “relative deprivation theory.” For an overview, see Smith and Pettigrew (2011).
joint community-based planning, decision-making, and oversight of investments can deliver relatively high-quality and low-cost infrastructure and services and foster positive interactions. These participatory approaches exploit the high level of social capital among refugees and IDPs noted in several of the background papers (Tellez and Balcells 2022; Denny et al. 2022; Vinck et al. 2022). There is growing evidence that trained facilitators can also build empathy among host residents and the displaced and ease social tensions (Audette et al. 2020).

This report begins by providing an overview of the global displacement crisis and outlining the current state of knowledge on forced displacement and social cohesion. It then proceeds using a theoretical framework that groups the papers into five thematic categories. The findings, contributions, and limitations of the papers in each category are then discussed. The report concludes by highlighting broader lessons and areas for future work, as well as policy and program recommendations.
Box 2. Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project

The World Bank’s Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) is focused on addressing the impact of the protracted presence of refugees on host communities in four countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. The project was developed based on the results of a 2015 World Bank report titled “Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa” (World Bank 2015). The study finds that in this region, refugee camps and settlements are in relatively underdeveloped and underserved areas compared to the rest of the host country. The refugee-hosting communities are in a precarious socioeconomic situation with high levels of food insecurity, limited access to basic social services and economic infrastructure, few livelihood opportunities, and a rapidly degrading natural resource base. The study highlights that the protracted displacement of refugees has further exacerbated the situation of host communities, and that the competition over scarce social services and economic infrastructure, livelihood opportunities, and environmental and natural resources leads to increased conflict. It also emphasizes that refugees represent an opportunity for governments to promote local economic development and that the development response must maximize positive impacts and minimize negative externalities.

In response, the project is investing in historically under-resourced, marginal refugee-hosting areas by promoting shared prosperity focused on human capital, resilience, income enhancement, access to basic services and infrastructure, and rehabilitated environments. It has been conceived as more holistic and sustainable than a purely humanitarian approach that creates parallel service delivery systems. The DRDIP recognizes the protracted nature of the refugee situation by adopting an area-based CDD approach led by local governments and communities. Beneficiaries belong to both refugee and host communities. Local communities, including refugees, meet regularly to identify and prioritize investments, discuss outstanding issues, resolve problems, and monitor progress. DRDIP is extending its operations into a second phase, which entails additional financing from the International Development Association (IDA) IDA-18 Regional Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities⁹ for Uganda, and an enhanced focus on strengthening livelihoods for displaced and host communities (World Bank 2020).

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⁹ The IDA-18 sub-window provides US $2 billion to help low-income countries hosting large numbers of refugees. This funding recognizes the significant challenge that these countries face in pursuing their own development goals while accommodating refugees, often in areas where local communities lack basic services and resources.
THE STATE OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Global Trends

The share of the world’s population that has been forcibly displaced because of conflict, political violence, persecution, and political, economic, and environmental crises grew from 1 in 167 in 2012 to 1 in 88 in 2021 (UNHCR 2021). As of May 2022, 13 million people have been displaced because of the war in Ukraine.\(^{10}\) IDPs (people who have been forced to flee their home but never cross an international border) make up the majority of the world’s forcibly displaced people—an estimated 55 million people at the end of 2020 (IDMC 2021). In late 2020 there were also over 20 million refugees (UNHCR 2020). While there are significant methodological challenges and political sensitivities associated with counting displaced populations, the scale of the global displacement crisis is clearly increasing.\(^{11}\)

While IDPs and refugees comprise the bulk of the world’s forcibly displaced population, another form of forced displacement—deportation—is rising. In 2020, European Union countries deported nearly 400,000 migrants (or those deemed to have moved “purely for economic reasons”) (Eurostat 2021). The United States forcibly removed 185,884 migrants in 2020, and just under 242,000 in 2019 (ICE 2021). Figure 2 illustrates the rise in displacement over time and the changes in the proportion of groups comprising the global displaced population.

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10. This includes over 6 million refugees and 7 million IDPs. [https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ukraine-emergency.html](https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ukraine-emergency.html)
There is a broad and ongoing debate in the literature on the strict bifurcation between forced displacement and other forms of mobility. Some scholars argue that most migrants make decisions about whether to migrate in response to a complex set of external constraints and predisposing events. These constraints and events vary in their significance and impact, but there are elements of both compulsion and choice in most migrants’ decision-making processes. Those classed as refugees, IDPs, or asylum seekers (that is, “forced migrants”) may also seek to expand their socioeconomic opportunities, especially once they have reached a place of relative safety. In a sense, they may therefore shift from refugees to economic migrants. Poverty, inequality, and conflict often co-exist; those who flee a country where conflict, persecution, discrimination, and human rights abuses are rife, for example, may also be trying to escape dire economic circumstances that may exacerbate these problems. The debate that the legal definitions (including those in Box 3) do not always conform to social reality is beyond the scope of this report (see Turton 2003; Bakewell 2010; Verme and Schuettler 2021 for a discussion).
Box 3. Definitions

Refugee: The most common definition comes from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: “a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.” Regional frameworks in Africa and Latin America recognize broader grounds for refugee status, including wars of aggression, disturbances of public order, violence, and massive human rights violations. Poverty, famine, and environmental catastrophes are not generally recognized as grounds for refugee status (World Bank 2017, 34–35).

IDP: IDPs are not recognized by any international legal framework, but the UN Guiding Principles on internal displacement define them as: “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (World Bank 2017, 34–35).

Returnee: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines “return” as: “In a general sense, the act or process of going back or being taken back to the point of departure. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country, as in the case of returning IDPs and demobilized combatants; or between a country of destination or transit and a country of origin, as in the case of migrant workers, refugees, or asylum seekers” (Sironi et al. 2019, 186).

Migrant: There is no internationally recognized legal definition of a migrant. According to the IOM, it is: “An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose particular types of movements are legally defined, such as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, such as international students.” Narrower definitions exclude, for example, refugees (Sironi et al. 2019, 132–33).

12. Some IDPs may have crossed a border at some point in their lives, but for the period of consideration, they are displaced within their country of origin. For more on these definitional challenges, see World Bank (2021b).
**Deportation:** The more widely used term is “expulsion,” defined by the IOM as “[a] formal act or conduct attributable to a State by which a non-national is compelled to leave the territory of that State.” Deportation often refers more narrowly to the forcible implementation of such a legal order (Sironi et al. 2019, 68–69).

**Social cohesion:** “A sense of shared purpose, trust, and willingness to cooperate among members of a given group, between members of different groups, and between people and the state,” (World Bank forthcoming). This report focuses on social cohesion between forcibly displaced persons and host communities, and therefore excludes the element of trust between people and the state.

While **conflict is a major cause of forced displacement, the climate crisis is increasingly forcing people to leave their homes.** Between 2009 and 2020, disasters—such as floods, droughts, earthquakes, and extreme temperatures—drove a larger proportion of internal displacement than conflict (see Figure 3). The World Bank’s Groundswell report projects that climate change could force 216 million people to move within their countries by 2050 (Clement et al. 2021). Yet the global figures conceal significant national-level variations as conflict remains the most significant driver of internal displacement in many countries. Box 4 provides an overview of the academic debates around mixed migration and climate change-induced forced displacement and the practical challenges of defining migrants as voluntary or forced irrespective of the legal definition.

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**Figure 3. New Internal Displacements Over Time, By Cause**

Estimated number of internal displacements to have taken place in a given year. Figures include individuals displaced more than once.

[Graph showing new internal displacements over time by cause (Conflict and Disaster)]

**Source:** IDMC, 2021.

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13. Regionally by 2050, Sub-Saharan Africa could have as many as 86 million internal climate migrants; East Asia and the Pacific, 49 million; South Asia, 40 million; North Africa, 19 million; Latin America, 17 million; and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 5 million (Clement et al. 2021).
Box 4. Mixed Migration and Climate Change-Induced Forced Displacement

While some argue that climate crises play a primary role in causing displacement, others suggest that environmental factors are closely linked to economic, social, and political factors, and are part of complex patterns of multiple drivers (including conflict) of migration and displacement (Castles 2002). More recent studies, such as the World Bank’s Groundswell report, support the latter argument and acknowledge that climate change impacts are shifting mobility patterns, and that these effects are increasing over time (Rigaud et al. 2018). Disasters and slow-onset climate change affect mobility in different ways. While the evidence of disasters’ precise impact on mobility is mixed (Mbaye and Zimmermann 2015), scholars argue that factors such as variability and anomalies in rainfall, extreme precipitation and temperature, and temperature fluctuations and droughts can increase migration, especially in agriculture-dependent countries (Šedová at al. 2021).

While the relationship between disasters, other climate change impacts, and forced displacement remains a major gap in the literature, vulnerable people are clearly more often induced to move due to climate change and other environmental impacts (Clement et al. 2021). This includes individuals who are internally displaced due to climate change, such as those who are no longer able to sustain their pastoral life and must settle in camps. These groups are often poorer, less educated, and less able to find work in their new homes (Hornbeck 2020). Conflict and fragility can act as a compounding shock for the complex and interconnected drivers of mobility.

Policies and institutional architectures often treat “voluntary” migrants (who choose to move) as conceptually distinct from “forced” migrants (who are compelled to move) (Van Hear 2011). For instance, UNHCR’s mandate is restricted to refugees and similar populations in need of protection, whereas the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) mandate is more focused on migrant workers. Yet in practice, and as the discussion on climate-induced migration suggests, this distinction is far from clear-cut. The notion of “mixed migration” reflects the fact that, irrespective of the legal definition, it is extremely difficult to separate “voluntary” and “forced” migrants. Many migrants decide to migrate in response to a complex set of external constraints and predisposing events (Turton 2003) that entail varying degrees of compulsion and choice.

(continued)
Box 4. Mixed Migration and Climate Change-Induced Forced Displacement (continued)

Migration can be mixed in terms of both the motivation and character of flows: people may leave their homes for both economic reasons and a fear of persecution, and refugees and economic migrants may travel together along the same routes, use the same forms of transport, and seek shelter or asylum in the same places. The reasons for movement are also dynamic and can change while people are on the move. In some of the contexts in the background papers, poverty, inequality, climate crises, and conflict co-exist. Those who flee a country where conflict, persecution, discrimination, and human rights abuses are rife, for example, may also be trying to escape dire economic circumstances and environmental degradation that may exacerbate these problems (Van Hear et al. 2018; Van Hear et al. 2009). Scholars of mixed migration argue that “voluntary” migrants from low-income backgrounds (such as those employed in agriculture in countries facing significant slow-onset climate crises) may have little choice but to migrate. Conversely, those classified as refugees or asylum seekers (“forced migrants”) may look to expand their life opportunities, especially once they have reached a place of relative safety. In a sense, they may therefore shift from refugees to economic migrants. Yet the legal distinctions and post-displacement experiences between forced displacement and other forms of mobility remain salient.

There is also a practical problem. It is often difficult to distinguish refugees from migrants in standard data sources, including censuses and surveys, without expensive and targeted data collection. Consequently, it is challenging to design policies to improve social cohesion (or intermediate outcomes such as inequality) between refugees and host communities while excluding migrants from the beneficiary group.

As of mid-2021, more than two-thirds of all refugees (68 percent) originated from just five countries; 86 percent were hosted in low- to middle-income countries, and 73 percent were hosted in a country neighboring their country of origin (UNHCR 2020, 2). The largest numbers of refugees fled from Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while Colombia, Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Yemen, and Somalia have the largest IDP populations (though Ethiopia has moved in and out of this group of countries in the recent past). The ongoing war in Ukraine has already caused millions of refugees to flee the country, and many more are internally displaced (Box 5). Following the US departure from Afghanistan and the subsequent crisis, the number of people forcibly displaced in that country is also growing. As of March 31, 2022 there were 2,069,767 registered refugees from Afghanistan in Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan alone.14 Countries do not host refugees at equal rates. Most refugees have settled in Türkiye, Pakistan, Uganda, Germany, and Sudan (Figure 4).

Figure 4. The Geography of Displacement

Top five countries in terms of number of refugees abroad, refugees seeking asylum, and internally displaced people. Year: 2020.

Refugees: Origin country

- Syrian Arab Rep.
- Afghanistan
- South Sudan
- Myanmar

Refugees: Asylum country

- Türkiye
- Pakistan
- Uganda
- Germany
- Sudan

Internally displaced people

- Colombia
- Syrian Arab Rep.
- Yemen
- Somalia

Data source: The UN Refugee Agency.
https://www.unhcr.org/60b638e37/unhcr-global-trends-2020
Once refugees arrive in asylum countries, the vast majority (approximately 78 percent) live in urban or peri-urban areas; only about 22 percent live in refugee camps. Estimates suggest that about half of IDPs in low- and middle-income countries reside in urban areas. Moreover, displacement tends to be a long-term experience. At the end of 2021, 15.9 million refugees were in a protracted situation (UNHCR 2021). This represents 74 percent of the global refugee population. As of 2018, 5.8 million refugees have spent 20 years or more living outside their country of origin (UNHCR 2018).

Box 5. Ukrainian Refugees and IDPs

The war in Ukraine has forced over one-third of the population to flee their homes. Despite an increasing number of returnees since early May 2022, about 6.9 million Ukrainians have left the country and are still residing in other European countries as of August 2022. Most have fled to Poland, Germany, and Czechia, and some are outside Europe, including in Canada, the United States, and Japan. Many of these individuals will experience a deterioration in socioeconomic conditions; women, those over 30, and those who fled violent locales may take longer to recover from these negative impacts (Section 2.2.1). An estimated 90% of the refugees from Ukraine are women and children and 12% are 60 years or older. Access to education and childcare is therefore critical, especially to enable women to find jobs. Older refugees may require additional social assistance and integration support. Inclusive policies towards Ukrainian refugees, such as granting them the right to work, freedom of movement, and access to social services and property, will help displaced individuals provide for themselves and integrate with host communities and decrease the risk of backlash (Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.5). Development investments directed to both refugees and host communities can also mitigate the negative effects of population inflows and improve long-term economic conditions in host communities (Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5).

(continued)

16. This estimate is based on data that covers 17 countries and 9.3 million conflict-displaced IDPs. The sample only covers 17 percent of the estimated number of IDPs as of 2020 due to the global data gaps in the locations of IDPs (Huang and Graham 2019).
17. UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in each host country (UNHCR 2021). This definition should be seen as a reflection of the refugee situation as a whole and does not refer to circumstances of individual refugees.
18. This does not mean that individuals have necessarily been displaced for 20 years as there may have been departures, new arrivals, births and deaths.
19. UNHCR Ukraine Situation Flash Update #27 https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/3097
An additional 6.98 million people were displaced within Ukraine as of August 2022 (IOM 2022). Increasingly cold weather is likely to displace additional people, especially those near the front line who will not have access to reliable heating services. These individuals require immediate support to address basic needs such as shelter and food. Many internally displaced households have experienced substantial declines in household income due to lost jobs, medical reasons, or parental leave. Among IDPs who were employed before the war, 60% have lost their jobs due to displacement, and according to the IOM General Population Survey, cash (financial support) remains the most frequently mentioned need in all rounds of the survey. Medicine and health services, clothes, food, and hygiene items are other important needs mentioned by over 25 percent of IDPs (IOM 2022). In addition to the support needed for temporary accommodation and livelihoods, many IDPs will also require support in repairing or replacing their homes as well as re-establishing employment and business activities once the conditions are safe for their return. There is mixed evidence on how IDPs affect inequality and cohesion in host communities, but development investments and assistance can offset the negative impacts on prices, services, housing, and employment (Section 2.2.4).

Over the long term, the unique displacement experiences of Ukrainian refugees, IDPs, and returnees may create different socioeconomic outcomes between these groups that require tailored responses (Section 2.2.1).

The Causes of Forced Displacement

There are two broad strands of literature on the causes of displacement. The first treats it as the indirect result of war or insecurity, in which civilians flee to avoid being caught in the crossfire of armed actors, while the second considers displacement to be a direct, intentional tactic of war in which combatants deliberately displace civilians, either individually or en masse. Studies in the first strand borrow from models of non-conflict migration (Kunz 1973) and explain the decision to flee as a function of “push” and “pull” factors at the origin and destination. These factors include the relative risk of violence and the density of social networks in each location, the intensity of political persecution, and the economic costs of migration (Davenport et al. 2003; Engel and Ibañez 2007; Ibañez 2009; Vinck and Pham 2009; Adhikari 2013; Betts 2013; Betts et al. 2017). More recent work in this area has focused on the role of climate change, drought, and other environmental factors in displacement (Piguet 2013). Research in the second strand examines the problem that combatants face in governing populations with unknown loyalties (though there is significant variation between the mechanisms at play in different contexts). These studies indicate that combatants and states force civilians out of areas they suspect are enemy strongholds based on voting...
patterns, identity markers, enemy activity, and other heuristics (Steele 2018; Balcells and Steele 2016). Combatants have also been found to forcibly resettle enemy-supporting populations to facilitate monitoring (Zhukov 2015) or identify the enemy-supporting population (Lichtenheld 2020). Other work has considered how combatants and non-combatants can intentionally displace civilians to capture valuable resources or property (Vargas Reina 2021; Tellez and Balcells 2022).

In sum, displacement can be indirectly caused by conflict, crime, insecurity, persecution, and other sources of hardship. It can also be the direct result of states and combatants forcibly removing people they suspect of supporting their opponents. The factors that affect each type of displacement can help explain where (and from where) the forcibly displaced go—and why.

### Forced Displacement and Social Cohesion

The global trends in forced displacement underscore the importance of understanding the relationship between forced displacement and social cohesion. Key points that emerged from a World Bank desk review (World Bank 2018a) help frame the broader discussion of social cohesion and forced displacement that follows.

There is no conceptual consensus on what constitutes social cohesion in the various analytical frameworks and definitions of social cohesion used in the background papers discussed here. This lack of consensus affects how researchers and organizations assess how to best address social cohesion in the context of forced displacement. A major gap identified in this desk review and addressed in several of the background papers is that prior studies have concentrated on “the social nexus between displaced persons and host communities, with little consideration of the potential social fissures and changes within groups of displaced persons, within the hosting society, or in the context of the return of displaced persons back to their places of origin” (World Bank 2018a, 26). However, a new World Bank paper helps provide clarity on the definition and concept of social cohesion and its links to development outcomes (World Bank forthcoming).

Social cohesion is always context specific. History is crucial to understanding cohesion in a displacement context regardless of the geographical location, as it plays an important role in the formation of inter-communal attitudes and perceptions that are measured during assessments of social cohesion or other community dynamics. Context can include the local, subnational, country, or regional setting as well as historical narratives, state capacity, institutional configuration, governance mechanisms, and service delivery. Therefore, the upstream sociopolitical context, political economy analysis, and conflict and demographic analysis are important for better understanding the concept and utilizing it in policy and programming. Too often this level of analysis is not performed.
Neither the “hosts” nor the “displaced” are homogenous groups, and intra-group dynamics play a critical role in social cohesion. The composition of both groups can change over time. The term “hosts” could refer to the native-born population or long-term residents but may also include previous refugees and earlier immigrants. Moreover, the ethnic composition of host community members and the displaced can also change over time as group boundaries are malleable and often the result of political processes (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). A recent World Bank report on refugee–host relationships concludes that the host community could have emerged after refugees settled in an area and humanitarian operations were put in place in response to the displacement (World Bank 2020). This is in keeping with a long line of literature on refugee–host dynamics (Whitaker 1999, 2002; Waters 1999; Landau 2003). The same challenges apply to different groups of displaced persons. In some contexts, there are significant socioeconomic disparities between different groups of IDPs, which has implications for within-group and IDP–host social cohesion (World Bank 2019). Intragroup tensions between the hosts or between different groups of displaced people could be just as (or more) relevant to social cohesion dynamics as inter-group relationships (World Bank 2020, 23–25). The state of knowledge on forced displacement and social cohesion can be divided into three broad categories based on how displacement affects: (1) the displaced, (2) the “host” communities where refugees settle, and (3) the origin communities from which refugees flee and sometimes return to. Interactions between refugees and IDPs and host communities cut across these three categories.

Social Cohesion among the Displaced

The evidence on whether (and how) displacement affects the social cohesion of the displaced is mixed. Research on the topic mainly falls within a broader literature on the effects of wartime victimization, which has produced seemingly contradictory results.21 A large body of evidence points to the negative psychological changes that victimization produces in victims, such as increasing anger, undermining trust, and shaping other outcomes associated with low social cohesion (Beber et al. 2014; Vinck and Pham 2019; Vélez et al. 2016; Balcells 2017; De Luca and Verpoorten 2015). Other researchers document the existence of “post-traumatic growth” in victims, in which individuals and communities respond to victimization with increased cooperation, civic engagement, and other factors associated with social cohesion (Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman 2009; Gilligan et al. 2014; Hazlett 2020). In some cases, the mechanism underlying post-traumatic growth can be linked to victims mobilizing to receive reparations and other forms of state assistance.

21. An important but underexplored research area is how different sub-groups within displaced populations interact with one another. For example, a World Bank (2020) study on the impact of refugees on hosting communities in Ethiopia documents tensions between different groups of refugees depending on when they arrived in Ethiopia, their ethnicity, class, or perceived wealth.
Many studies on displacement as victimization do not distinguish between different forms of victimization; those that do rarely address displacement directly. Research that has focused on how displacement affects the displaced tends to emphasize the psychological effects (e.g., Vinck and Pham 2009); other social cohesion outcomes—including the capacity for collective action, trust, etc.—are largely overlooked. There is thus ample room to study how displacement changes various dimensions of social cohesion for those affected.

Social Cohesion among Host Communities

Past research has argued that increased ethnic and/or religious diversity is associated with a host of negative outcomes, ranging from poor economic growth to civil conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). One implication of this work is that refugee inflows are likely to undermine social cohesion in host communities given that refugees often alter the level of ethnic and religious diversity. Yet these studies have often suffered from significant methodological problems. The measures used were not sufficiently sensitive to be employed at the scale at which they were used, and there was at times a mismatch between national diversity measures and the everyday, individual- and group-level interactions that ostensibly
impact attitudes and behaviors between diverse communities. More recent work, often based on more fine-grained data, concludes that diversity has a heterogenous effect on social cohesion that varies with the scale and quality of inter-group interactions (Spater 2022; Enos 2017; Pettigrew et al. 2011).

There is mixed evidence regarding whether refugee flows generate insecurity in host communities. A long-standing finding in the literature points to a correlation between refugee flows and the “spread” of civil war to neighboring host countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), yet more recent work suggests that refugees can reduce the likelihood of conflict via increases in economic activity and humanitarian aid (Zhou and Shaver 2021). There is also evidence that IDP flows may exacerbate crime in some host communities (Depetris-Chauvin and Santos 2018). Though causal identification in this literature is weak, some research points to the contrary—that inflows of displaced people may reduce crime (Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2021)—and other work suggests the overall impact might depend on the characteristics of the refugee community (Dehos 2021). Thus, an important gap in the literature concerns identifying the conditions under which refugee flows increase, decrease, or leave security unaffected.

Refugee arrivals can also affect other elements of a host community’s social cohesion, including their sense of shared identity and political preferences. Some studies have documented that refugee arrivals can harden in-group identification among host communities and increase support for ideologically extreme, far-right parties (Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann et al. 2019). However, others argue the contrary—that direct and increased contact with refugees reduces support for far-right parties by increasing sympathy for the plight of the displaced (Steinmayr 2016). The mechanisms linking forced displacement to changes in social cohesion within host communities are varied, but typically point to host population fears of increased labor market competition or impacts on services (“self-interest” concerns), bias against refugee cultures (“sociotropic” concerns or xenophobia), or conversely, the potential for inter-group contact to increase trust and cooperation. An important moderating factor in this research is the level of cultural distance between the refugee and host communities: large gulfs have been shown to undermine refugee integration (Alisic and Kartal 2019; World Bank 2020).

Research on refugees’ impact on host community social cohesion is relatively new and overshadowed by studies of how refugee inflows affect public services and the labor market. The impact of refugee flows on the quality of public services in host communities (or groups within them) depends on the type of service, as well as national and multilateral organizations’ humanitarian and developmental responses to displacement. Aid and public assistance in response to displacement could have large positive externalities for host communities. For instance, host communities with greater levels of refugee presence in Uganda experience substantial improvements in access to health, education, and roads (Zhou et al. 2022a). Other scholars have similarly noted

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22. Relative to the amount of research on social cohesion, there is substantially more work on how refugee arrival affects the economic outcomes (wages, prices, employment levels, etc.) of host communities. This body of evidence also exhibits significant heterogeneity in the direction and magnitude of effects (Verme and Schuettler 2021).
improvements in access to education for host communities (Assaad et al. 2019; Bilgili et al. 2019). Still other studies point to a balance of positive and negative effects. For instance, proximity to refugee camps is associated with worse health outcomes but improved educational outcomes for host community children (Kebede and Ozden 2021).

Research on how refugees affect the labor market builds on studies of the impact of economic immigration on host communities, which have focused on identifying effects on local labor markets (Piyapromdee 2021) and host community attitudes (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Work that specifically evaluates the impact of forced displacement is dominated by a focus on the economic effect of refugee arrivals (e.g., Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013; Verme and Schuettler 2021). In some cases, refugees can have negative impacts on the employment and wages of low-skilled workers (Morales and Pierola 2020; Del Carpio and Wagner 2015; Tumen 2016; Ceritoglu et al. 2017). Yet sometimes the arrival of displaced persons increases the prices of food and housing (Rozo and Sviatschi 2021). In other cases, irrespective of the actual impact, the presence of displaced persons is perceived to cause economic hardship (Segatti and Landau 2011; World Bank 2018b). Nonetheless, a meta-analysis of 17 major forced displacement crises that occurred between 1922 and 2015 finds overall positive effects on household well-being (income and consumption) in host communities and positive or neutral effects of refugee inflows on employment and wages (World Bank 2019).23 The limited negative results on employment and wages are related to young and informal workers in middle-income countries, a particularly vulnerable segment of the labor market. This body of research leaves open the question of how forced displacement affects social cohesion differently than migration through its impacts on the labor market, prices, and services.24

Finally, much of the literature on the impact of forced displacement on host community social cohesion focuses on refugee inflows and not on other types of forcibly displaced peoples. Research on other types of forcibly displaced peoples, such as IDPs, is less common and typically does not conceptually distinguish IDPs from refugees (see, e.g., Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) on the impact of IDPs on host communities). One notable exception is Rozo and Vargas (2021), who show that in Colombia, refugee inflows (from Venezuela) trigger political backlash among the host community though the same is not true for IDPs. The authors hypothesize that the difference is a function of the relative cultural distance between host communities, refugees, and IDPs.

23. Roughly half (45–52 percent) of the results are positive and significant, indicating a net improvement in household well-being; 34–42 percent of the results are neutral and only 6–20 percent show a decrease in household well-being. The analyses on employment and wages show positive and significant improvements for 12–20 percent, neutral results for 63 percent, and negative and significant results for 22–25 percent.

24. There is little evidence of how displacement changes the social cohesion of the communities that IDPs and refugees leave behind. Historical accounts and qualitative data have documented how communities affected by displacement can be completely transformed by the experience (e.g., Steele 2018), yet there are few estimates of these effects.
2. NEW RESEARCH ON DISPLACEMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION

Introduction to the Themes

The 26 background papers commissioned for this report examine the relationship between conflict- and crisis-driven forced displacement and social cohesion in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and Europe, using a wide range of research designs, including natural experiments, survey experiments, and qualitative case studies. Their analysis seeks to establish both correlational and causal relationships. Overall, the papers provide strong, credible estimates of the relationship between displacement and social cohesion. While this report evaluates the internal validity of each paper, it is, of course, only possible to extrapolate each paper’s findings to the extent that they generalize outside the particular setting. This ambiguity about external validity is inherent given how little research there is in this area. Moreover, although each paper is ultimately concerned with how forced displacement impacts social cohesion, the authors define social cohesion in different ways and explore distinct outcomes. These differences are partly driven by the authors’ arguments regarding the mechanisms through which forced displacement influences social cohesion.

To synthesize the findings, this report employs a framework centered on five broad themes that emerge from the 26 papers. Grouping papers that share common conjectures about how forced displacement affects social cohesion highlights the implications of convergence and divergence across papers (see Table 1). The first four themes focus on different explanations of how displacement affects social cohesion. The fifth theme addresses policies targeting refugees and/or host communities. These are not mutually exclusive categories; some papers engage multiple themes.

These five themes are useful for policy makers and practitioners working to design context-specific policies and interventions. For instance, a practitioner who is designing an intervention to ease the integration of refugees into host communities would benefit from insights in Theme 1 concerning how their attitudes and behaviors are affected by displacement. If the envisioned mechanism for that integration intervention was, for example, a job training program, the practitioner could look to Theme 5 for new findings on the effects of policy interventions in these areas. Finally, if refugees are spread out over very different contexts—some in rural areas, others in urban; some living among...
co-ethnics, others living in very dissimilar communities—Theme 3 evaluates how pre-existing local conditions moderate the impact of refugee arrival on host communities. In sum, the five themes allow practitioners to efficiently identify new insights that cover a wide range of situations that they might encounter in their work.

Table 1. Themes of Background Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Papers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Displacement directly affects social cohesion outcomes among the displaced</td>
<td>Tellez &amp; Balcells; Denny et al.; Müller et al.; Kaplan; Vinck et al.; Kovac et al.; Walk et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Displacement affects social cohesion outcomes by shaping the attitudes and behavior of host communities</td>
<td>Aksoy &amp; Ginn; Betts et al.; Allen et al.; Walk, Murard; Garimella, &amp; Christia; Pham et al.; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva; Zhou et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pre-existing socioeconomic conditions and attitudes in host communities moderate how displacement affects social cohesion</td>
<td>Albarosa &amp; Esner; Hoseini &amp; Dideh; Allen et al.; Groeger et al.; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva; Müller et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The presence of displaced populations in host communities drives socioeconomic conditions and behavior that affect social cohesion</td>
<td>Foltz &amp; Shibuya; Bertinilli et al.; Coniglio et al.; Šedová et al.; Groeger et al.; Betts et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Policy interventions designed to influence the economic and security conditions of refugees and host populations affect social cohesion</td>
<td>Agüero &amp; Fasola; Aksoy &amp; Ginn; Bove et al.; Ferguson et al.; Blanco, Murard; Meneses, &amp; Villamizar-Chaparro; Parry &amp; Aymerich; Zhou et al.; Allen et al.; Betts et al; Pham et al.</td>
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Basic approaches vary across the 26 background papers. Table 2 in Annex 2 summarizes the countries studied, the population(s) examined, the type of data and methodological approach deployed, and the key policy area or independent variable(s) in each paper.
Overview of Papers and Findings

Theme 1: Displacement Directly Affects Social Cohesion Outcomes Among the Displaced

Displacement and related experiences affect social cohesion outcomes among the displaced by shaping their lives, including their socioeconomic status, educational outcomes, civic engagement, and psychological experience. The papers in this category argue that change takes place through the experience of displacement (including the diverse experiences of different groups of displaced persons) and impacts the socioeconomic status of the displaced.

Changes (and deterioration) in the socioeconomic status of displaced persons, especially over the long term, can be an intermediate outcome that influences social cohesion outcomes. Some of the background papers suggest that refugees and IDPs incur steep and long-lasting economic costs, though they do not always trace the implications of such welfare shocks on the social cohesion of the displaced and their communities. Rising inequality is linked to the erosion of general trust in other people among the poor (Gallego 2016), and economic downturns are found to reduce interest in risky collective action (Owens and Cook 2013). Yet some of the background papers find that the displaced sometimes demonstrate high levels of collective mobilization and action (Denny et al. 2022; Tellez and Balcells 2022; Vinck et al. 2022).

Even decades after displacement, IDPs in Colombia are still markedly worse off in socioeconomic terms than host residents with lower incomes; they face a higher risk of hunger and more tenuous access to housing but can exhibit higher levels of collective action (Tellez and Balcells 2022). A survey of rural households in Colombia (supplemented by data collection and fieldwork) that includes both IDPs and non-IDPs demonstrates these longer-term economic impacts and highlights the barriers associated with the return and recovery of property that many IDPs face. While the authors do not speculate on how these economic effects might impact social cohesion, they note increased levels of collective action and mobilization among the displaced (including engagement in peace building), perhaps attesting to the need for self-advocacy in the face of State failures in post-conflict policy making. This finding contradicts the broader literature, which suggests that a substantial and negative economic shock such as displacement may reduce positive forms of collective action among the displaced (e.g., Bogliacino et al. 2022). Causal identification in this case is difficult, however, given that displacement is likely endogenous to factors related to social cohesion (Gilligan et al. 2014).25

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25. The study controls for observables through propensity score weighting, sample selection, and robustness tests to estimate the effects.
The long-term negative impacts on the displaced vary across groups of displaced persons and depend on their displacement experience, where they are displaced from, their socioeconomic situation prior to displacement, and where they settle. Using data from a large and unique sample of people deported from the United States to Guatemala, one study finds that those who were extorted by smugglers during their migration journey (a substantial negative economic shock) are more likely to report experiencing economic hardship than those who were not (Denny et al. 2022). Müller et al. (2022) analyze a longitudinal dataset of the population of refugees in Switzerland from 1998 to 2018 to test how initial conditions (including refugees’ age at arrival and sex) shape their integration into labor markets. Refugees who are younger when they arrive integrate more rapidly into the labor market. Specifically, the employment rates of refugees who are 18 to 20 years old at arrival increases rapidly and attains long-run levels only slightly below those of comparable natives. The employment gap for refugees who come when they are 30 years of age or older is initially higher and remains around 20 percentage points even in the long run. The employment gap between men and women is similar for hosts and refugees over the long term. While they begin at a lower level, the employment rates of male refugees increase more rapidly than those of female refugees. After seven to eight years, male refugees reach employment rates that are 15 percentage points lower than those of male natives, while it takes female refugees more than 15 years to attain a similar gap. There is no evidence that settling in locations with a sizeable co-ethnic network consistently helps refugees integrate more quickly into the labor market.

The experience of displacement not only affects the displaced differently depending on their age and sex; it also depends on their level of exposure to conflict and whether they fled abroad or stayed behind. Kovac et al. (2022) explore differences in educational performance and income between four groups—migrants, IDPs, refugees (including returnees), and individuals who did not move—in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia. They use a large survey from BiH and educational registries from Croatia to show that in both countries individuals with greater exposure to conflict have systematically worse educational performance and, in BiH, worse earnings, even two decades later. Their analysis demonstrates that individual and community conflict exposure can (but does not always) worsen inequalities among the four groups. In BiH, refugees and migrants who have gone abroad and later returned experienced better economic and educational outcomes than IDPs and those who had never moved. This suggests that where displaced people decide to relocate matters, though the authors cannot rule out the possibility that families that are better able to afford further education are also more likely to flee abroad. Those who left the country and later returned have lower levels of income and educational achievement than former external migrants, which illustrates that the additional educational and labor market opportunities abroad could not fully make-up for the disadvantages of forced

26. With respect to identification, the authors argue that extortion is effectively as-if random, but the claim is difficult to evaluate without an account of how smugglers choose whether to extort.

27. Conceptually and empirically, the relationship between co-ethnic networks and labor market integration is mixed. On one hand, co-ethnic networks can reduce transaction costs and help refugees gain faster access to the labor market. On the other hand, such networks may reduce refugees’ incentives to invest in their human capital, which could lead to better labor market outcomes in the long-run (see Müller et al. 2022 for an overview of this literature).
displacement. It is possible that such heterogeneity may undermine social cohesion by heightening inequities between different “categories” of displaced persons. In Croatia, internal migrants outperform their hosts in school, and hosts and internal migrants outperform refugees from BiH and IDPs. However, these effects do not vary based on the locality’s level of conflict exposure. They also tend to disappear over time; within refugee and IDP families, younger siblings perform better than older siblings who have longer exposure to conflict and forced displacement.\textsuperscript{28} While the authors do not analyze why individual- and community-level conflict exposure seems to condition inequality across groups in BiH but not in Croatia, the divergent findings suggest that heterogeneity in localities’ economic and political conditions matters.

**Displacement may also be associated with economic activity motivated by economic distress and interest in accessing public services** (Walk et al. 2022). Many of these effects follow from the consequences of negative economic shocks induced by displacement. Walk et al. (2022) employ text-as-data and image-as-data methods to make inferences about life in conflict-afflicted and inaccessible regions of Syria during the civil war. They find that social media posts from areas with large numbers of IDPs or returnees are more likely to contain discussions of economic activity (e.g., the sale of motorcycles) and access to public services (e.g., schools, hospitals) than those from areas without IDPs or returnees. Although it is difficult to precisely identify the reason for this difference, it may be because IDPs and returnees seek out services and sell (and buy when they are able) goods at higher rates to compensate for their losses during displacement.

\textsuperscript{28} To explain this finding, the authors speculate that forced migrants suffer disadvantages stemming from a combination of short-run trauma and long-term changes due to human capital losses suffered during the move.
Under some circumstances and depending on the context, displacement and related experiences can improve social cohesion among the displaced. Denny et al. (2022) study Guatemalan deportees, for instance, and find that exposure to extortion during migration is associated with a greater expressed willingness to participate in civic engagement, including community meetings, protests, and volunteer work. Although migratory extortion takes place prior to deportation (which can be considered a form of displacement), it can be conceptualized as one of the many unexpected economic shocks that refugees experience during displacement. This finding is in line with studies which conclude that individuals who have personally experienced wartime violence vote at higher rates and more frequently engage in other forms of civic and political participation in the aftermath of civil wars than those who have not (see Bauer et al. 2016 for a summary). Tellez and Balcells (2022) similarly note that Colombian IDPs are more supportive of collective action and more likely to attend community meetings than host community members. Finally, a study of displacement drawing on survey data from Uganda, the Philippines, Iraq, and Colombia finds that in some cases displacement is associated with increases in subsequent political and social empowerment and engagement—which are important prerequisites for social cohesion (Vinck et al. 2022). However, these results vary substantially across contexts. In addition to differences in personal experiences driven by chance, gender, age, and other demographic characteristics, an individual’s experience of displacement and the impact of displacement on social and political empowerment vary according to the institutional and regional context in which their displacement occurs.

Although displacement might have some positive effects on social cohesion, there are disagreements about which mechanisms drive these changes. One set of papers proposes that increases in social cohesion are a function of psychological changes, such as an increased sense of resilience or ambition for social change; this mechanism is in line with prior work on post-traumatic growth (Denny et al. 2022; Vinck et al. 2022). Others attribute the rise in social cohesion among IDPs to more material motivations—such as needing to petition for wartime reparations from the state (Tellez and Balcells 2022). As noted above, context plays a critical role in shaping social cohesion: the effects of displacement are not consistent across or within countries (or even within subregional areas). For instance, those displaced to urban areas may experience a greater capacity for collective action than those who end up in rural areas due to differences in public infrastructure and social density (Vinck et al. 2022).

Wartime victimization can shape a community’s culture in ways that impact displacement patterns as well as their resilience during war (Kaplan 2022). A study of wartime victims in Colombia, for instance, uses a large survey and qualitative data to show that a substantial share of the conflict-affected population holds a variety of conflict-related superstitious beliefs. For instance, residents of the town of Pensilvania in the western department of Caldas believe a heroic priest continued to protect the

29. The authors do not suggest that such shocks are a normatively “good” outcome; they merely demonstrate an empirical relationship.
town and cure the sick even after his death (Kaplan 2022). Such beliefs influence key displacement-related outcomes. For example, conflict-affected populations may be less likely to flee from danger, may have increased social cohesion outcomes, and may even encourage others to return, believing the situation is likely to improve.

The results from several papers in this theme broadly demonstrate that displacement is associated with the loss of assets, economic dislocation, and disrupted educational attainment for children (Kovac et al. 2022, Denny et al. 2022; Tellez and Balcells 2022). These findings are in line with prior work showing steep economic deficits among IDPs and refugees, even years after displacement (Ibañez and Vélez 2008). An open question in this body of work is: which of these factors has the greatest impact on a household’s overall economic security, particularly in the long term?

**Theme 1: Key Findings**

- **Displacement negatively affects the socioeconomic conditions of the displaced (e.g., lower incomes, increased risk of hunger, less housing and property access).** This can generate inequalities that contribute to social tension.

- **Displacement’s impacts on labor market integration vary depending on refugees’ socioeconomic characteristics at arrival, including age and sex.** Refugees who arrive at a younger age in a host country are likely to integrate faster into the labor market, and male refugees integrate more quickly than female refugees.

- **Different displacement experiences are associated with variation in outcomes such as income and education levels.** Deportees who are extorted during their journey are especially likely to experience long-term economic hardships. Refugees who flee from more violent settings experience worse educational and income outcomes than those who escape less violent settings. Displaced persons who flee abroad report better educational outcomes than IDPs and those who did not move.

- **Displacement experiences can contribute to improved social cohesion by socially and politically empowering individuals and increasing civic engagement.**
Theme 2: Displacement Directly Affects Social Cohesion Outcomes by Shaping the Attitudes and Behavior of Host Communities

The papers in this second category consider how displacement affects social cohesion outcomes by changing the attitudes and behaviors of host communities. These papers conclude that displacement has highly heterogenous effects on host communities, which vary across contexts and host demographics.

People living in the same households and communities tend to have similar attitudes toward refugees; refugees’ impact on local economies can generate empathy in some groups and antipathy within others. Betts et al. (2022) use survey and qualitative data from Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya to explore whether (and how) host community and refugee interactions change host community members’ attitudes toward refugees. While their quantitative evidence suggests that attitudes are strongly correlated within households and communities, their rich qualitative data also highlights that ethno-linguistic proximity (particularly where refugees and hosts shared a Somali origin) could be a powerful source of sympathy among hosts; it is unclear to what extent these findings are generalizable across ethnic groups. However, the interviews and fieldwork suggest that refugees’ economic impact on local economies—whether real or perceived—creates sympathy among some groups (landlords and employers, who rent to and hire refugees) and antipathy among others (tenants and prospective employees). In other words, some hosts benefit from the presence of displaced groups (and the humanitarian operations that support them), while others do not. The study also finds important differences in attitudes between urban and rural areas (reflecting a long line of research, e.g., Landau 2014). Together, these findings suggest that the effect of refugee–host interactions is highly contextual and requires understanding the composition of the refugee and host community populations.

The relationship between displacement and social cohesion changes depending on the unit of analysis, how displacement is measured, the dimension of social cohesion being considered, as well as the host’s gender and whether they live in a rural or urban area. Research based on 11 separate surveys in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, comprising almost 50,000 individual responses, suggests that displacement is negatively associated with perceptions of social cohesion in aggregate, but at the individual level, those who report hosting displaced populations in their communities often have more positive perceptions of social cohesion (Pham et al. 2022). Further, perceptions of social cohesion vary depending on the type of displacement: they are stronger among those who self-report hosting IDPs rather than refugees. This is generally in keeping with other

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30. This analysis is descriptive and cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality; thus, host community members with positive attitudes toward displaced persons may be more likely to host displaced persons.
findings described above. The study is particularly innovative because it measures social cohesion in a way that is contextually appropriate by using qualitative data and fieldwork to produce a locally defined measure of social cohesion rather than using a pre-determined definition. The study’s findings highlight the importance of taking the context more seriously.\footnote{One limitation of using a locally led definition of social cohesion is that the findings may be less generalizable to other contexts.}

**The presence of refugees in a community does not always undermine social cohesion; nor does it have a consistently negative impact on host attitudes toward displacement.** Murard (2022) examines the longer-term effects of refugee flows from an exodus of Greek Orthodox citizens forcibly displaced from Türkiye to Greece in the 1920s and finds some evidence that areas that received a higher share of refugees a century ago are now more likely to have community organizations (sports associations were used as a proxy), but not higher levels of political fragmentation or crime. There are some challenges associated with the study’s causal identification and, as the author notes, the finding on sports associations only holds in towns with fewer than 1,100 inhabitants. Overall, however, it provides strong evidence in support of the proposition that refugees do not actively undermine social cohesion. Other research on Greece finds that refugees contribute to higher economic growth where they settle, notably by bringing new complementary skills and knowledge conducive to industrialization (Murard and Sakalli 2018). Aksoy and Ginn (2022) find similar evidence—that refugee inflows do not have a discernible effect on host community attitudes towards refugees, regardless of whether the host country allows them to work. They combine a cross-national panel of low- and middle-income countries with a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the effect of refugee shocks on changes in host attitudes.

Host communities exposed to displaced populations are not necessarily likely to have negative views of migrants; this may be due to the improvements in service delivery associated with the developmental/humanitarian response to displacement. Zhou et al. (2022a) use a DiD design and parish-level data to demonstrate that host communities in Uganda exposed to South Sudanese refugees are no more likely to support restrictive migration policies or to have less favorable views of migrants,\footnote{Zhou et al. (2022a) use Afrobarometer survey data to evaluate outcomes on attitudes and support for policies. The survey questions ask about attitudes regarding “immigrants or foreign workers” and support for policies related to “foreign migrants.”} although more exposed communities are marginally more fearful of crime. The authors hypothesize that refugees (particularly in Uganda) generate positive externalities for local communities in the form of improved service delivery, which ultimately balance out locals’ fears about the refugee population.

Community attitudes toward the displaced are generally inconsistent across policy areas: communities with large numbers of displaced persons may be sympathetic to their plight but favor stricter controls on asylum. Allen et al. (2022) employ a conjoint experiment to explore Colombian citizens’ preferences for migratory policy in response to the large migration inflows from neighboring Venezuela. They find that Colombians’ preferences constitute a mix of restrictive and open values: they are in favor of some level of support for Venezuelan migrants but coupled with more restrictive policies on migration and
asylum. Colombians who have stronger economic priorities are more likely to favor restrictive migration policies, while those with more humanitarian priorities favor less restrictive policies. Colombians who have more social contact with Venezuelan migrants—measured using an index of daily social interactions—tend to favor more open migratory policies.

The return of displaced persons has a mixed impact on social cohesion depending on which dimension is measured, but it does not appear to affect communities’ general levels of trust. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2022) analyze national survey data from Burundi in 2015, using distance to the Tanzanian border and altitude to instrument for the likelihood of displacement. They find that IDP and refugee returns decrease feelings that community members help each other, that one could borrow money from neighbors in an emergency, and that one’s community is peaceful. To explain these negative findings, the authors speculate that the return of refugees create new divisions within the communities (those that stay versus returnees). The return of refugees is not robustly associated with measures of trust, community participation, or views about post-conflict reconciliation.

In general, an increase in the presence of displaced persons does not appear to undermine social cohesion in host communities. The variety of findings in the background papers reflect tensions and contradictions in the literature. Four papers suggest that refugee flows may have: (1) weakly beneficial effects (Murard 2022) that are at worst benign (Aksoy and Ginn 2022; Zhou et al. 2022a); or (2) heterogeneous effects that are highly context specific, and thus yield inconclusive overall effects on host communities (Betts et al. 2022; Pham et al. 2022). The papers also point to the importance of cultural distance (broadly defined) in moderating host community reactions to refugee inflows. Pham et al. (2022), Betts et al. (2022), and Murard (2022) show that differences in urban–rural context, the demographics of the host communities, and (in the case of Murard) the culture of the refugee community can all matter in important ways.
Theme 2: Key Findings

- Host community attitudes toward refugees vary along dimensions such as socioeconomic class, ethno-linguistic and geographic proximity to refugees, urban versus camp settings, and prioritization of economic versus humanitarian concerns.

- Refugee inflows can generate positive effects such as improved services in host communities, which contribute to neutral or positive attitudes toward refugees.

- Large refugee returns to a community can diminish some aspects of social cohesion, especially where available land is scarce. However, refugee return has varying impacts on different aspects of social cohesion, suggesting that no single mechanism can explain the relationship between refugee return and social cohesion.

Theme 3: Pre-existing Socioeconomic Conditions and Attitudes in Host Communities Moderate the Effect of Displacement on Social Cohesion

Host communities’ social, economic, and political landscape affect how the presence of displaced populations impacts social cohesion. Specifically, they shape levels of violence and discrimination against displaced populations (Albarosa and Elsner 2022; Groeger et al. 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2022). Taken together, these papers suggest that poor economic conditions in host communities (and, according to Albarosa and Elsner 2022 and Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2022, lower base levels of acceptance of outsiders) decrease certain dimensions of social cohesion between host communities and displaced populations.

Hostile and violent reactions by host community members to the displaced, especially in high-income countries, may be linked to strained economic conditions and anti-refugee rhetoric from elites. One study examines how the settlement of refugees in Germany in 2015–16 influences attitudinal measures of social cohesion—including trust, perceived fairness, and attitudes toward immigrants as well as behavioral measures of social

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33. Specifically, this paper finds that the negative effect of refugee return on the feeling that community members help each other tends to be stronger in communities with less pre-war land availability.
cohesion—and anti-immigrant violence (Albarosa and Elsner 2022). Using a DiD approach that exploits the fact that Germany settles refugees in local areas based on their economic performance several years previously, the study finds that refugee inflows have little effect on attitudinal measures of social cohesion but increase the number of incidents of anti-immigrant violence per 100,000 residents. The latter effect is driven almost entirely by localities that display strong support for far-right parties and have high levels of unemployment prior to the arrival of refugees. This suggests that there is little reason to expect an uptick in anti-immigrant violence to always (or even usually) follow refugee inflows. Rather, these violent responses are likely in contexts with relatively poor economic conditions and pre-existing support for exclusionary policies. This finding is consistent with studies from other high-income countries that display a correlation between proximity to refugees and increased voting for extreme-right parties (Dinas et al. 2019) and hate crimes (Dipoppa et al. 2021), especially in times of crisis. Based on the findings from the 26 background papers, it is far from certain that these types of negative responses to refugees can be generalized to low- to middle-income countries, which host the majority of forcibly displaced populations (Zhou et al. 2022a). Regardless, public messaging around shared commonalities, including in the workplace, in religious and social rituals, and in other public forums, may help promote social cohesion between host communities and new arrivals.

Perceptions of economic opportunities shape host community responses to refugees. Groeger et al. (2022) study Venezuelan immigrants in Peru and find that improved economic conditions decrease anti-immigrant discrimination and crime, increase reported trust in neighbors, and improve the reported quality of local services. Their study uses survey data to explore: (1) how the arrival of Venezuelan immigrants impacts local labor market outcomes (specifically employment in the informal sector, where the majority of Peruvian jobs are located) in Peru; and (2) how labor market conditions shape Peruvians’ attitudes toward Venezuelans. Instrumenting labor market conditions with local exposure to exogenous national-level export shocks, the study reports that a 10 percent increase in employment in the informal sector decreases discrimination against Venezuelan immigrants by 2.3–3.0 percent. This effect is twice as large for men as for women. These findings suggest that under some circumstances, improved economic conditions might help increase social cohesion in communities, despite high levels of displacement. As discussed below, other papers find no evidence of this effect.

Host community anxiety surrounding the potentially negative effects of displacement-driven population shocks may adversely affect social cohesion (Allen et al. 2022). Allen et al. (2022) deploy a conjoint experiment to explore how Colombians respond to experimental manipulation of the generosity of specific parameters of broader policy packages that affect Venezuelan migrants, including labor market access, location restrictions, public service access, family reunification, numerical limits, and length of residency. The study concludes that individuals who are more concerned about economic issues are more likely to support policies that restrict Venezuelan migrants’ access to labor markets, length of stay, location, access to public services, and rights to family reunification. The theorized mechanism is that respondents who prioritize economic issues are more likely to want to protect the labor market from foreigners. See Box 6 for an example of a policy that promoted economic integration and opportunities for both refugees and hosts.
Box 6. Creating Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees

Several background papers note that competition in the labor market can be a source of friction between refugees and hosts. Seeking to alleviate such friction, the Jordanian government has enacted policies to promote refugees’ economic and social integration into host communities. In 2016, in partnership with the international community, it committed to improving the living conditions, prospects, and resilience of both Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities. The resulting Jordan Compact demonstrated the international community’s commitment to support Jordan in providing a regional and global public good by hosting refugees to the best of its ability, and to support Jordanian citizens and the economy as a whole. The World Bank and Government of Jordan designed the Program for Results (PforR): Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees in close cooperation with the ILO and UNHCR, as well as a set of development partners involved in Jordan. A $51 million grant provided by the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) enabled $200 million of concessional International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) financing out of the original $300 million. The GCFF enables eligible middle-income countries that are facing refugee crises to borrow from multilateral development banks on concessional terms. Since 2016, this program has supported Syrian refugees’ formal access to the Jordanian labor market to enable them to be self-reliant and contribute to the country’s economy. The program has also helped the government improve its investment climate to grow its economy and be able to offer jobs and entrepreneurship opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian refugees.34

The 4-year program received a 2-year extension and $100 million in additional financing in 2020. As part of this extension, the Jordanian Ministry of Labor extended the flexible work permit scheme for Syrians from the agriculture and construction sectors to all economic activities. Work permits should now be issued directly to a Syrian refugee: (a) without the restriction of working for a specific employer, (b) free of charge, and (c) allowing the permit holder to work in any occupation open to foreign workers. Starting in July 2021, flexible work permits were issued for major occupations and across all sectors. A record number (62,000) of work permits were issued to Syrian refugees in 2021. Such measures help the government provide Syrians with more flexible work permits to reduce informality and ensure they are covered under the labor law. Regarding other reform areas supported by the PforR, Syrians’ access to digital finance soared during the COVID-19 lockdowns through a set of new flexible measures opened to all refugees (Ait Ali Slimane et al. 2020).

**Pre-existing attitudes toward migrants, resource scarcity, and diversity also shape community responses to refugee returns.** Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2022) investigate the impact of refugee returns on social cohesion in Burundi and find that the extent of the observed trends (i.e., negative impacts on indicators of social cohesion, and no impact on trust or community participation) vary based on the socioeconomic conditions of communities prior to their return and across different dimensions of social cohesion. The negative impact of refugee returns on perceptions of likely community support, likelihood that one could borrow money, and perceptions that the community is peaceful is most pronounced in areas where land is scarce and pre-existing attitudes toward migrants are negative. Greater ethnic diversity mitigates the negative influence of refugee returns on measures of community support and perceptions of security but lowers the likelihood of borrowing money. Refugee returns positively influence trust in communities with greater pre-war land availability and more positive attitudes toward returns.

**Under certain conditions, more restrictive attitudes among host communities can lead to improved economic outcomes (higher employment) among the displaced.** While higher levels of employment may indicate that displaced persons are integrating into the labor market, they may not necessarily be a sign of improved social cohesion. In Switzerland, Müller et al. (2022) find, somewhat counterintuitively, that enacting more restrictive attitudes over time within a canton (as measured by popular vote tallies on asylum and migration referendums) leads to higher employment rates of successive refugee cohorts. The authors speculate that harsher initial conditions might spur refugees to integrate faster but could not directly test this conjecture.

**Improved economic conditions do not necessarily improve social cohesion, but they do not worsen refugee welfare.** Hoiseni and Dideh (2022) draw on representative survey data between 2011–2019 to study Afghan refugees in Islamic Republic of Iran. They use a matching approach that examines how economic downturns caused by shocks to the Iranian economy (driven by fluctuations in the U.S.–Iranian relationship) influence economic inequality and social cohesion (measured as charitable giving between households) between Iranians and Afghan refugees. The study finds that economic shocks increase refugees’ exit from Islamic Republic of Iran and disproportionately reduce their consumption expenditure and the aid they receive from the host community (compared to Iranians with similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics). However, Afghan refugees do not have significantly different labor market outcomes from similar Iranians and receive more aid from institutions. While economic recovery benefits refugees relatively more in terms of consumption and income, the impact on social cohesion measures is insignificant. In other words, while positive economic conditions do not significantly improve social cohesion between hosts and refugees, they do not worsen it and may enhance refugee welfare, suggesting there is minimal cost associated with pursuing policies that are generous toward refugees.

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35. For years in which vote tallies do not take place, the authors impute these missing values as the average of nearby values.

36. The authors use social security data and consider an individual to be “employed” if they contribute to an old-age provision from either salaried or independent work.
The heterogenous impacts of improving economic conditions on social cohesion in different contexts could be due to the use of different measures of social cohesion by the various papers or the fact that social cohesion indicators lag behind changes in economic conditions. While Groeger et al. (2022) find that labor market improvements in Peru improve cohesion between Peruvians and Venezuelan immigrants, Hoiseni and Dideh (2022) conclude that good economic shocks do not boost cohesion between Iranians and displaced Afghans. What accounts for this difference in findings? One potential explanation is that the authors measure different dimensions of social cohesion—Hoiseni and Dideh (2022) look at charitable giving between households, while Groeger et al. (2022) examine violence against immigrants—which may be strengthened or weakened by different mechanisms. Another possibility is that economic improvements may take time to shift attitudes and behavior toward refugees. Coniglio et al. (2022) (discussed in more detail in Theme 4) demonstrate that across Sub-Saharan Africa, refugees improve economic conditions, but these improvements take time. Therefore, violence against refugees increases initially, but drops off after economic improvements consolidate.

The collective findings from this group of papers suggest that the social and economic landscapes of host communities are important determinants of social cohesion between hosts and displaced populations. Where host community economic conditions are worse and attitudes toward outsiders are more hostile, there are weaker social cohesion between hosts and displaced populations. However, better economic conditions may improve (or at least not hinder) cohesion between host and displaced populations.

**Theme 3: Key Findings**

- **Negative economic conditions and pre-existing support for exclusionary policies are likely to result in weaker social cohesion between hosts and displaced populations.**

- **Better economic conditions reduce negative responses to refugee inflows but do not always improve social cohesion.**

- **Easier access to land, pre-existing support for migrants, and greater ethnic diversity can help refugees and returnees integrate into the community.**

- **Exposure to conflict during or prior to displacement can play a critical role in exacerbating socioeconomic inequality (worse education and economic outcomes) among displaced persons and can indirectly affect social cohesion.**

- **Host community members who are more worried about economic issues are more likely to support exclusionary policies that restrict migrants’ access to labor markets, length of stay, location, access to public services, and right to reunification.**
Theme 4: The Presence of Displaced Populations in Host Communities Drives Socioeconomic Conditions and Behavior that Affect Social Cohesion

The arrival of displaced populations can influence socioeconomic conditions (e.g., economic inequality, wealth) and behavior (e.g., job search, interpersonal engagement, conflict) in ways that affect social cohesion.

The presence of refugees may be associated with improvements in the local labor market and positive shifts in social cohesion outcomes. In Peru, the presence of Venezuelan immigrants helps improve local labor market conditions. Higher employment rates in the informal sector also reduce the level of discrimination reported by Venezuelan immigrants. There are several possible explanations for the positive association detected between the Venezuelans’ arrival and Peruvians’ labor market outcomes. The authors speculate that the arrival of Venezuelans may expand local economic opportunities because of their higher levels of potential productivity, due to higher human capital and a concentration of low-wage jobs in the Peruvian job market. Furthermore, most of these jobs are in the service sector, which could free up time (especially for Peruvian women) to work and lower the costs of these types of goods and services. Venezuelans might also expand opportunities by increasing the demand for certain goods and services. In addition, the inflow of Venezuelan immigrants to particular locations in Peru is associated with a reduction in local crime and corruption, an increase in the level of reported trust in neighbors, and improved satisfaction with public services (Groeger et al. 2022). These results are not necessarily generalizable across contexts. For instance, prior studies conclude that in South Africa, refugees and asylum seekers are perceived to increase levels of criminality and disease, even though migration to South Africa is associated with improvements in the local job market (World Bank 2018b). The Peru study does find that Peruvians who live in areas with high numbers of Venezuelan immigrants report that their community values diversity less than Peruvians living in areas with low numbers of Venezuelans, suggesting that the impact of displacement on social cohesion may vary depending on the metrics used to assess social cohesion.

While the arrival of displaced persons may be associated with improved economic conditions in host communities, these positive effects may take time to emerge (Coniglio et al. 2022). In the period between the arrival of displaced populations and the economic improvements, the population shock from displacement can worsen social cohesion between the hosts and the displaced. Geo-referenced panel data from a large sample of African countries between 2000 and 2014 suggests that once a refugee camp is established in a community, protest and violence surge in the short term because the population shock increases tensions, but this impact improves over time as displaced populations (and in some cases, associated humanitarian and development responses) advance the economy (Coniglio et al. 2022).
Some papers suggest that IDP-hosting communities may experience a decrease in aggregate wealth, especially among the poorest members, and that this can increase conflict over the long term. Šedová et al. (2022) examine the prominence of conflict in communities in north-eastern Nigeria that did and did not host IDPs to analyze how changes in the economic landscape of host communities following displacement impacts social cohesion. Their study is based on the logic that if displacement shocks increase local income inequality and reduce the economic welfare of disadvantaged members of the host community, conflict and violence between hosts and the displaced increases. The authors test their theory using two-way fixed effects and an instrumental variables (IV) approach that relies on historical ethnic ties between host communities and displaced populations’ home communities. They find that displacement decreases aggregate wealth, which primarily affects the poorest households. They also conclude that the distributional consequences of displacement shocks increase conflict, and that this effect increases over time.

Other papers note that wealth, inequality, and poverty are comparable across IDP-hosting and non-IDP-hosting households and communities, and that household consumption may even increase in IDP-hosting communes compared to non-IDP-hosting communes (Foltz and Shibuya 2022). A study in Mali (Foltz and Shibuya 2022) examining the impact of officially registered IDPs on poverty and inequality in host communities finds that the presence of IDPs has relatively consistent effects on household welfare regardless of occupation, and identifies few differences between the overall economic indicators in IDP-hosting and non-IDP-hosting communities. The study employs three empirical approaches (DiD, IV, and propensity score matching). Unlike the study in north-eastern Nigeria, which investigates how economic changes wrought by displacement shocks influence the level of conflict between hosts and IDPs (Šedová et al. 2022), the study in Mali does not examine a direct measure of social cohesion. It instead assumes that economic inequality and community wealth both affect social cohesion.
Divergent findings on the impact of displacement on poverty and inequality are not inherently incompatible, and may be attributable to the different contexts studied. The papers offer some insights into why displacement shocks may exacerbate inequality and poverty in Nigeria, but not in Mali. Foltz and Shibuya (2022) attribute their result in Mali to factors including effective development investments and humanitarian interventions, a culture that emphasizes hospitality to strangers, and a disproportionate number of well-connected government civil servants among the IDPs in the host communities, which lowered the burden on host communities to support IDPs. Šedová et al. (2022) note that when IDP welfare increases, there is suggestive evidence that inequality and subsequent conflict will lessen, which tracks with Foltz and Shibuya’s assertion that IDPs’ existing networks and access to resources might condition the impact of displacement on social cohesion.

The way in which displacement affects social cohesion may vary across urban and rural settings. Betts et al.’s (2022) research in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya find that host community attitudes towards refugees are overall more positive in (rural) camp contexts than in urban contexts. However, the mechanism driving these attitudes varies in each setting. In camp-like contexts, perceptions related to refugees’ economic contributions help drive positive attitudes, while those related to security threats drive negative attitudes. In urban areas, negative perceptions are mainly related to concerns about economic competition. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pham et al. (2022) similarly find higher levels of social cohesion in rural areas that host IDPs or refugees compared to host communities in cities. Focus group data suggests that this is because displaced persons in rural eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo have more sustained and positive contact and collaboration with host communities than those in urban settings. In some rural areas, for example, respondents cite examples of joint community participation in constructing community infrastructure, managing public goods (e.g., water), sustaining community associations, and organizing ceremonies for births, marriages, or funerals. Finally, in Burundi, land scarcity in rural areas contributes to increased tension over property rights in areas of refugee return (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2022).

In communities where refugee flows increase the level of ethnic polarization, there is likely to be an increased risk of violence; conversely, increases in ethnic fractionalization are likely to reduce the risk of violence. Bertinelli et al. (2022) draw from geo-referenced data on the location of refugee camps across 23 countries in Africa and individual-level Afrobarometer data to examine how changes in the ethnic composition of host communities condition the effect of forced displacement on host–displaced cohesion. Critically, they adjust the standard ethnic fractionalization and polarization measures to account for the inflow of refugees. Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two individuals drawn from the society at random will belong to two different ethnic groups and thus increases with the number of ethnic groups present. Ethnic polarization captures antagonism between individuals and is maximized when the society is divided into two equally-sized and distant ethnic groups. The authors find that where refugees increase ethnic...
fractionalization the level of violence decreases, but where they increase ethnic polarization violence increases. They also find that changes in ethnic fractionalization induced by refugees have no effect on non-violent conflict (e.g., protests and demonstrations), but that changes in ethnic polarization induced by refugees do increase the likelihood of this type of contentious politics, though the effect size is smaller than violent conflict.

Collectively, these background papers suggest that there is no reason to conclude that refugees and IDPs automatically and negatively impact aggregate wealth or distributional outcomes in host communities. In Mali, Foltz and Shibuya (2022) find that displacement has a minimal impact on inequality, and across Sub-Saharan Africa, Coniglio et al. (2022) demonstrate that displaced populations improve economic conditions in host communities, though these benefits take time to emerge. Only Šedová et al. (2022) find evidence that hosting IDPs exacerbates inequality and lowers aggregate wealth. However, they emphasize that there is suggestive evidence that improving IDP welfare may mitigate these impacts.

### Theme 4: Key Findings

- **The arrival of displaced persons can improve economic conditions in host communities over the long term.**

- **Evidence on the impact of displacement on income inequality in host communities (particularly the economic welfare of disadvantaged host community members) is mixed.**

- **IDPs’ short-term impact on conflict partly depends on the magnitude of negative externalities (prices, services, housing, and employment) and whether assistance offsets these externalities for impacted host community members.**

- **The way in which displacement affects social cohesion varies across urban and rural settings.** In rural areas, perceptions related to refugees’ economic contributions drive positive attitudes while perceptions related to security threats drive negative attitudes. In urban areas, negative perceptions are more likely to be driven by perceived economic competition.

- **The arrival of refugees is unlikely to increase violence in host communities where their presence increases the number of distinct ethnic groups in a host community, but can do so where it increases ethnic polarization, or equally-sized and distinct ethnic groups.**

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38. The challenge in all such research approaches is that ethnicity is taken as a static marker of identity, while the ethnic identity claimed or reported by an individual can depend on the context, and the particular social purpose for which it is being used.
Theme 5: Policy Interventions to Shape Economic and Security Conditions

Finally, the papers point to a diverse set of policy interventions that can help refugees integrate into host communities and promote social cohesion. Many of these interventions are premised on the notion that intergroup contact can reduce the social distance among members of different groups and facilitate positive attitudes, experiences, and outcomes. This notion reflects a broad interpretation of contact theory in social science (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Scacco and Warren 2018). The policy tools available to encourage such interactions range from decisions about whether to force refugees into separate camps (Coniglio et al. 2022), to integrated job training programs (Ferguson et al. 2022) to financial aid for college (Blanco et al. 2022), to the granting of land and building of schools (Murard 2022), and the creation of local peace agreements to facilitate the return of IDPs (Parry and Aymerich 2022).

In general, inclusive and generous policies towards displaced persons improve social cohesion and local development. Different papers—one focused on the Greek refugee crisis of 1919–22, and the other on contemporary Uganda (both contexts with generous policies toward refugees)—provide evidence of this. Murard (2022) evaluate the long-term impact of Greek efforts to integrate 1.2 million Greek Orthodox who were forcibly displaced from Türkiye between 1919 and 1922. Policies enacted in response to the crisis included access to land, building new schools to foster Greek identity, and offering citizenship to refugees. Using historic and contemporary census and survey data, Murard shows that the Greek Orthodox refugees successfully integrated, had high rates of intermarriage in the second generation, displayed similar voting behavior and levels of trust, and even showed higher levels of political and civic engagement than their host neighbors.

Zhou et al. (2022a) examine contemporary Uganda, where the government encourages refugees to settle in local communities rather than camps, promotes labor market participation, and invests in social service infrastructure (including schools and clinics) in refugee-rich areas. Using a DiD research design that examines the 2014 arrival of more than 1 million South Sudanese refugees and fine-grained, geo-coded data on refugee locations, schools, clinics, and road quality, they show that communities closer to refugee settlements experiences strong improvements in local development and social service provision. Despite having very different empirical settings and types of data, the two papers share a common message—that these kinds of integrative, generous policies may work. They also demonstrate that such policies come at no cost to local attitudes toward migrants or migration policy—which is consistent with Aksoy and Ginn’s (2022) global analysis discussed below.

39. Increased contact among different social groups may not always lead to improved attitudes and decreased discrimination (e.g., Blair et al. 2022).

40. The findings related to the impact of integrated job training programs on social cohesion are mixed.

41. The successful integration of Greek Orthodox refugees in 1923 contrasts with the social marginalization of more recent Albanian immigrants who neither spoke Greek nor had the same religion as locals upon arrival. The government has not extended the same inclusive policies toward these immigrants. The difference in policies and outcomes reflects the challenges some governments may face in instituting inclusion policies for migrants or refugees who have distinct linguistic, religious, and cultural profiles relative to those of the host community, or who lack official refugee or legal immigrant status.
At the broadest level, countries with more inclusive policies toward displaced populations do not demonstrate more significant anti-refugee sentiment than those with more exclusionary policies. Aksoy and Ginn (2022) examine a large dataset on citizen attitudes, government refugee policies, and refugee numbers and locations to assess how citizens respond to refugees in 34 low- and middle-income countries. They use subnational variation in the public opinion data and discontinuities associated with large, sudden refugee inflows to demonstrate that countries that have more inclusionary policies related to residence (i.e., not concentrating refugees in camps) and labor markets (i.e., laws facilitating refugees’ access to work) are no more anti-refugee than those with more exclusionary policies. Similarly, anti-immigrant attitudes are not more likely to emerge in places with inclusionary policies in response to large, unexpected refugee inflows. These findings must be interpreted with caution, given that refugees are likely to self-select into more tolerant places, and the authors rely on subnational analyses of survey data that is not subnationally representative. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that there is not necessarily a cost to pursuing policies that improve outcomes for refugees. See Box 7 for an example of how the World Bank is supporting such policies.
Box 7. Colombia: Social and Economic Inclusion of Migrants Development Policy Financing

Over 6 million people have left Venezuela since 2015, which represents one of the largest active exoduses of migrants and refugees in the world. As of August 2021, an estimated 1.8 million people from Venezuela are based in Colombia—approximately 30 percent of all Venezuelan migrants in Latin America. The fiscal impact of Venezuelan migration on Colombian government spending is estimated to average 0.4–0.5 percent of gross domestic product each year. However, Colombia recognizes that properly managed migration is a development opportunity. Official estimates show that the long-term economic benefits of Venezuelan migration to Colombia could increase the average annual growth rate by 0.7–0.9 percentage points in the medium to long term, mostly through the impact on the labor force. In recognizing these benefits, Colombia’s government has promoted the social and economic integration of Venezuelan migrants.

The World Bank has responded to the Venezuelan migration crisis by supporting the Government of Colombia with a total of $1.6 billion, including five approved projects to date. These operations mobilized $126 million from GCFF and Global Public Funds non-reimbursable concessional financing. These funds allow middle-income countries affected by an inflow of refugees to borrow at below-regular multilateral development bank rates to provide a global public good. The standalone “Colombia: Social and Economic Inclusion of Migrants Development Policy Financing” operation is the first Development Policy Loan ever approved by the World Bank that focuses solely on long-term integration policies. The project aims to support the social and economic integration of migrants from Venezuela into host areas. The operation is structured around two pillars: (1) legal and institutional basis for the protection and long-term social and economic integration of migrants from Venezuela into host areas; and (2) improved access to (and enhanced quality of) basic services for migrants from Venezuela. The project includes among its policy reforms the approval of the Temporary Protection Status (TPS) for Venezuelan migrants in 2021, which is a landmark measure that makes Colombia one of three countries to have such a broad policy framework for the inclusion of migrants. The TPS serves as an anchor policy that enables long-term regularization and expanding access to various services, including: (1) issuing work, transit, and stay permits; (2) extending access to health, education, social programs, and housing subsidies; (3) investments that benefit both host and migrant communities; and (4) protection of vulnerable populations, including family reunification, child protection, and protection against human trafficking.

The project also supports measures to alleviate tensions in host communities, including the establishment of local migratory roundtables as an ongoing coordination mechanism between host and migrant communities. Other policy reforms include improved registry and data collection of Venezuelans, granting Venezuelans access to rental subsidies, enabling contingent lines of credit to subnational governments, and extending the national COVID-19 vaccination program to Venezuelans in Colombia.

(continued)
Box 7. Colombia: Social and Economic Inclusion of Migrants Development Policy Financing (continued)

The Colombian approach marks a critical shift from short-term urgent responses to a longer-term framework for integration. It also marks a change in the way host countries approach this kind of crisis, seeing migration as a development opportunity. The Colombian strategy of integrating migrants provides four key lessons and best practices for other host countries:

1. It is important to develop a clear policy, regulatory, and operational framework to facilitate a shift from short-term humanitarian response to longer-term integration to maximize the development impact and enhance social welfare for migrants and host communities.

2. The administrative and operational systems associated with the large-scale registration and regularization of migrants under the TPS regime provide important benchmarks and opportunities for replication in other host countries.

3. The active and targeted anti-xenophobia campaign and program implemented by the Government of Colombia, with World Bank support, has mitigated negative public opinion related to the integration of migrants during a period of severe COVID-19 impacts.

4. It is important to strengthen national data systems and develop robust registry systems for migrants to manage migration flows and inform policy. Colombia is advancing in this area through a Migration Pulse survey and a registry system linked to the TPS, which can be considered a benchmark for other host countries.

However, policy makers should be cautious about implementing similar policies in all countries without accounting for contextual differences. The results reported above are based on a cross-national assessment and are consistent with promoting interactions between host communities and refugees. Other papers that directly address refugee–host interactions are more equivocal in their conclusions. As noted above, Betts et al. (2022) provide qualitative evidence from Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya that suggests the effects of host–refugee interactions depend on the extent to which host communities and refugees share ethno-linguistic similarities. Pham et al. (2022) find similarly divergent correlations depending on the local context and host community characteristics. For instance, their paper finds lower levels of social cohesion between refugees and host communities than between IDPs and host communities. Respondents in cities that host IDPs or refugees are less likely to report positive in-group or out-group relations than those in rural areas. Gender is found to be an important axis of variation: men in localities that host IDPs perceive higher levels of social cohesion for all subdimensions except access to basic needs, while women are more likely to have negative perceptions of
in-group and out-group relationships and less likely to participate in social activities with other ethnic groups. Jointly, these papers suggest that citizen–refugee interactions may not be one-size-fits-all solutions for promoting social cohesion. More causal research is needed to make broader, better-informed conclusions and recommendations.

Increased contact between hosts and refugees, especially in the absence of high-quality facilitation, may affect these groups differently and may not always enhance social cohesion. Ferguson et al. (2022) report on midline evidence from a quasi-random intervention that assigns refugees and hosts to mixed technical and vocational trainings in Lebanon and Jordan; topics are selected to balance the participants’ interests with local market demand. The results show that while exposure to treatment slightly improves optimism and out-group cooperativeness among refugees, it has no such effect on members of the host community. If anything, hosts become less optimistic in response to the treatment. These findings may not be applicable more generally, especially since this intervention treats refugee and host individuals who compete in the same labor market (and might therefore be particularly resistant to improving their perceptions of the out-group). However, they do raise the important possibility that contact (even meaningful contact) between members of two groups might have very different effects on each. Box 8 provides an example of development investments that promote facilitated interactions between refugees and host communities in fragile contexts.

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**Box 8. Policies to Support Social Cohesion in Contexts Affected by Fragility and Conflict**

Some countries that host significant numbers of refugees are themselves affected by fragility and conflict. Examples include Cameroon (which has a long-simmering conflict between the government and non-state armed groups from the English-speaking minority, as well as an Islamist insurgency in the far North region) and Chad (where armed rebellion and significant communal violence continue to take place in border regions, in addition to the regional security crisis in the Lake Chad basin). The policies enacted by these and similar conflict-affected countries with respect to displacement vary significantly, but most have maintained an open-door policy for refugee inflows (though these policies have been curtailed, in some cases, during the COVID-19 pandemic). In many of these countries, non-discrimination against refugees is enshrined in the law, but unevenly enforced. Some have policies to support social cohesion and prevent discrimination (IDA 2021).

*(continued)*
In Cameroon, there is a high level of interaction between refugees and host communities. Its political discourse is generally welcoming to refugees, although this is severely tested as displacement becomes protracted and crises in neighboring countries leads to new refugee arrivals. Most refugees (who are from the Central African Republic) live in host communities; refugees outnumber locals in some villages. Although localized issues arise relating to land, resource sharing, and access to livelihood opportunities, the shared language, cultural, and ethnic affinities between the hosts and the displaced—and the pre-emptive involvement of administrative and traditional authorities, as well as support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and World Bank-financed projects like Cameroon’s Community Development Program Support Project (Phase III) for coexistence activities—tend to ensure that disagreements are managed peacefully. Such projects increasingly benefit both refugees and host communities, which facilitates a peaceful coexistence. In rural areas, local authorities and religious and traditional leaders implement conflict resolution mechanisms involving both refugees and host community members to manage issues arising between them. In collaboration with UNHCR and NGOs, the government institutionalized joint community-based protection committees in the Far North region to foster dialogue and peaceful coexistence between refugees and host communities. In the East, village development committees set up by the local authorities to work on local development plans integrated refugees into participatory planning processes and activities implemented by the National Participatory Development Program (PNDP in French). Finally, refugee self-management committees are set up in refugee-hosting villages to facilitate interactions with the local authorities (IDA 2021).

Similar mechanisms are also being created in Chad—where, in some areas, refugees outnumber hosts by a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1. In addition to close ethnic and linguistic ties between the refugees and hosts, with UNHCR support, the government set up joint committees comprising of refugees and host community members in all the refugee camps and reception sites. Their objective is to promote and advocate peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution. They help sensitize communities to the importance of living together despite the challenges associated with sharing resources. They also help resolve local conflicts. In addition to these measures designed to increase social cohesion, removing restrictions on movement and settlement within Chad and allowing refugees to work (to the extent that they can access employment) have also helped improve social cohesion (IDA 2021).42

42. An exception is the Lake Chad region, where border closures and associated emergency measures in the context of an ongoing conflict jeopardize economic activities and livelihoods and restrict border trade and migration movements, thus fueling grievances and frustrations among the population (Vivekananda et al. 2019).
Several papers in different contexts echo that meaningful engagement between refugees and hosts helps improve perceptions of social cohesion. Based on their conjoint experiment that assesses Colombians’ attitudes toward policy packages that affect Venezuelan immigrants, Allen et al. (2022) find that while there is support for limiting the number of immigrants and the length of their stay, the typical respondent supports unrestricted location choices and access to social services, as well as conditional rights to family reunification. In line with most of the background papers, their study also finds that respondents with serious engagement with Venezuelan immigrants have more generous policy preferences, though their exploration of these heterogeneous effects suffers from the same selection concerns that plague most such work: those who engage with refugees probably support more generous policies to begin with.

Local peace agreements can facilitate return and promote social cohesion, although who is included in the peace agreements, and whether they address community concerns versus IDP rights, generates trade-offs. In Iraq, local peace agreements were signed in many communities to facilitate peaceful relations between IDP returnees accused of siding with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and their origin communities. These peace agreements play a key role in facilitating IDP returns, even though they often fail to meet “best practice” standards in peace agreement construction (Parry and Aymerich 2022). Using extensive qualitative data, the study demonstrates the value of these local agreements, and argues that provisions such as the inclusion of IDPs, civil society actors, and women generate various trade-offs in the sustainability of IDP returns. While the agreements are an effective tool for addressing community concerns about the return of IDPs, they typically prioritize community concerns over IDP rights, potentially creating new grievances.

A case study of South Sudan suggests that the presence of official peacekeepers encourages the return of displaced persons and mitigates host communities’ negative perceptions of IDPs. Bove et al. (2022) combine data on the spatial distribution of peacekeepers in South Sudan with surveys on host community attitudes toward IDPs and find that IDPs are more likely to return if peacekeepers are deployed in their home county. These peacekeepers also appear to mitigate host communities’ negative reactions to IDP inflows. However, these findings must be interpreted with caution due to at least four data and methodology limitations: (1) the survey used in the analysis excludes respondents from key states (Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei); (2) the survey questions do not distinguish between refugees and IDPs; (3) respondents’ assessments of the conditions of return and resettlement are not directly measured; and (4) the geographical areas of return are limited to two towns (Bentiu and Rubkona).

Research on migration (not forced displacement) provides mixed evidence of the effect of generous policies on social attitudes toward migrants and social cohesion more generally. Two papers examine policies that do not specifically target refugees or host communities, but which the authors believe have important implications for refugees. Blanco et al. (2022) assess rich individual-level data for all students in Chile from 2017–2018 to examine how the country’s financial aid policy impacts college attendance among Colombian and Venezuelan immigrants. They find that migrants are less successful in school and are

43. To mitigate concerns about the non-random subnational assignment of peacekeepers, Bove et al. (2022) used variations in the presence of previous infrastructures and information on the total supply of troops to African countries from each troop-contributing country.
less likely to apply for financial aid. Their study offers little evidence that forced migrants are more responsive to financial aid than non-migrants in terms of tertiary school enrollment. Nevertheless, these results should be treated with caution since the administrative data does not allow them to distinguish between voluntary and forced migrants from Colombia and Venezuela, so they treat all migrants from these countries as refugees. Agüero and Fasola (2022) evaluate the impact of a South African pension program on attitudes toward immigrants. Exploiting the discontinuity at the eligibility cutoff of 60 years, the authors use survey data to show that the generous transfer has no impact on attitudes toward immigrants. However, the survey data does not distinguish between refugees and immigrants.

A very broad reading of the papers suggests that more generous policies toward refugees that integrate them into their new settings, alongside measures to support host communities, can help offset local concerns regarding competition for public services and jobs. There is at least some evidence that these policy effects can also help facilitate positive contact between refugees and local citizens. At the very least, the evidence suggests that more generous policies that improve refugees’ well-being do not incur a social cost on inter-group attitudes or behaviors such as anti-immigrant voting or violence. Nevertheless, it is unclear which policy tools work best or how they are mediated by the cultural distance between refugees and host communities. Indeed, the generous policies in Uganda, Greece, and Colombia examined in the papers mostly occurred in settings where refugees and hosts share many cultural characteristics, including religion and language, though Uganda is likely exceptional in the generosity of its policies affecting a wide variety of refugees from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other countries in Central/East Africa.

### Theme 5: Key Findings

- **Inclusionary policies (e.g., access to work, integration into the community) are unlikely to generate anti-immigrant attitudes in response to large, unexpected refugee arrivals and can foster long-term social cohesion between displaced persons and hosts.**

- **Vocational training programs that promote interactions between refugees and hosts do not create more pro-social behavior among hosts but do slightly improve pro-social behavior and attitudes among refugees.**

- **Communities near refugee settlements experience improvements in local development and no change (positive or negative) in attitudes toward migrants or migration policy.**

- **Forced migrants experience worse education outcomes than their host counterparts and receiving financial aid does not reduce the barriers to education for migrants.**

- **Cash transfers, in the form of a pension plan, have no impact on attitudes toward migrants or migration.**
3. DISCUSSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The background papers reviewed in this report suggest that, under certain conditions, refugee and IDP inflows and returns can create negative externalities that undermine social cohesion, especially if host communities are already struggling to access basic services and economic opportunities. A sudden increase in demand for services may reduce the quality of public goods such as health care and education, especially if the host community is struggling to meet existing demand (Zhou et al. 2022a). Population inflows can lead to increased job competition, especially for informal low-skilled workers (Šedová et al. 2022; Groeger et al. 2022). High levels of pre-existing unemployment (Müller et al. 2022; Albarosa and Elsner 2022) and horizontal inequality (i.e., inequality between host communities and the displaced) (Hoseini and Dideh 2022; Šedová et al. 2022) contribute to negative attitudes toward refugees. However, these effects are not inevitable; they are shaped by policies, humanitarian and development responses, and the broader socioeconomic context. This section distills recommendations from the findings in the background papers.

What Is the Role of Policies?

In line with the United Nations’ Global Compact on Refugees, policies that entitle refugees the right to work, freedom of movement, access to social services (including identity documents and vital records), and accommodation, all facilitate refugees’ ability to provide for themselves and their communities with dignity (UN 2018). Granting these rights does not necessarily generate backlash from host communities (Aksoy and Ginn 2022, Murard 2022), as refugees can contribute physical, social, and human capital to local economies (Zhou and Shaver 2021; Taylor et al. 2016). Policies that allow refugees and migrants to work—paired with investments in human capital such as language courses, education programs, and vocational training—can support their successful integration into the labor market and reduce inequalities (Müller et al. 2022). In Peru, where Venezuelans have the right to work, the inflow of Venezuelans is associated with positive labor market effects for host community members, which has helped foster positive attitudes toward immigrants among host

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44. Policies can impact the displaced directly through their effects on the welfare of the displaced and indirectly in how the policies are implemented.

Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement
community members (Groeger et al. 2022). However, inclusive refugee policies do not guarantee that there will be no backlash.45 Migrant groups in rich democracies are too often the targets of violence (Albarosa and Elsner 2022), especially in times of crisis (Dipoppa et al. 2021).

When the inclusive policies described above are in place alongside development investments and assistance, host communities can benefit from the arrival of refugees regardless of whether refugees live in camps, settlements, or communities. Policies that enable refugees to settle in host communities—either through the provision of new homes or the establishment of camps or settlements46—can provide social and economic benefits to host communities. For example, granting citizenship, building new houses, and providing other assistance for arriving refugees in Greece contributes to economic growth and long-term social cohesion in host communities (Murard and Sakalli 2018; Murard 2022). The presence of refugee camps in host communities across Africa leads to economic benefits and reduces conflict over the medium to long term (Coniglio et al. 2022). Granting refugees plots of land (settlements) and allowing them to move freely in the community contributes to substantial improvements in local development and public goods provisions in nearby host communities (Zhou et al. 2022a). However, these positive effects may be more likely when host communities share cultural similarities or have empathy for their new neighbors.

These recommendations also align with the World Bank’s Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF), which was developed in collaboration with UNHCR to assess refugee policy in countries eligible for the IDA-19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) (World Bank 2021a). The RPRF identifies four policy dimensions as key to the socioeconomic development of refugees and host communities: (1) policies to help host communities reduce their own poverty levels; (2) regulatory environment and governance to ensure that refugees can enjoy basic rights conferred to them by international legal instruments; (3) access to economic opportunities to ensure that refugees can become self-reliant; and (4) access to public services to ensure that refugees can access national systems in conditions similar to nationals. The RPRF further articulates that gender and social inclusion should be considered across these four policy dimensions to ensure that policies are non-discriminatory and adapted to the needs of specific groups. A key principle of the RPRF is that refugee-related policies are unique to each hosting country’s situation and there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach.

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45. Implementing inclusive policies is also conditional on political support for such policies, which is often lacking in areas with existing social tensions. A large body of research examines the role of political entrepreneurs in inflaming opinions toward minority groups (Glaeser 2005; Lee and Roemer 2006). Dinas et al. (2021) show that such manipulation can also ease attitudes toward out-groups.

46. Refugee camps and settlements are commonly established to provide immediate protection and assistance to people fleeing conflict. Although they are meant to be temporary, in some protracted situations, camps have been the primary means through which relief operations, service delivery, and refugee identification is managed. Some concerns about establishing camps relate to the limitations imposed on refugees’ rights and freedoms that might restrict their interactions with the host community and have adverse socioeconomic effects for both refugees and host community members.
What Is the Role of Humanitarian and Development Investments?

Humanitarian assistance and development investments directed to both refugees and host communities can improve refugees' welfare, mitigate the negative effects of displacement, generate positive externalities for host communities, and promote social cohesion. Population inflows can improve economic conditions in host communities, either directly through the participation of refugees in the host economy or indirectly through refugee aid and development programs (Coniglio et al. 2022; Zhou and Shaver 2021). Yet these positive effects may take time to emerge. For instance, prior evidence indicates that even where refugee inflows initially produce negative economic effects, these effects often dissipate in the long run (Verme and Schuettler 2021). In the interim, however, conflict between refugees and host communities can materialize. To pre-empt tensions between refugees/IDPs and host communities and prevent conflict, governments and humanitarian and development agencies should channel social assistance to both refugees and host communities immediately following the inflows. This assistance can assume many forms including cash transfers, vouchers, grants to communities, workforce programs, and in-kind transfers such as food, school scholarships, livelihood tools and equipment (e.g., seeds, fertilizer, computers, wireless internet, greenhouses), as well as skills-training programs (World Bank 2017). The non-impact of Mercy Corps’ technical and vocational training program in Lebanon and Jordan on employment for host communities and refugees or host community attitudes toward refugees serve as a reminder that active labor market programs should be carefully tailored to the aspirations and skills of both refugee and host communities (Ferguson et al. 2022).

Investments in infrastructure and services are also critical to meet the increased demand due to population shocks and to prevent tensions that could arise over limited resources (Coniglio et al. 2022; Foltz and Shibuya 2022; Zhou et al. 2022a). Effective development responses go beyond addressing the population shocks to using the arrival of refugees and IDPs as an entry point to address vulnerability and investment deficits in the wider host community. Development responses to forced displacement contexts often require investments to expand health facilities, schools, markets, roads, water, energy, hygiene, banking, and sanitation services. Allowing host communities to access services and humanitarian assistance in camps and settlements will ensure that the investments benefit host communities and ease tensions between host communities and refugees. In Uganda, host communities near refugee settlements experience substantial improvements in local development and public goods provision without decreasing social cohesion (Zhou et al. 2022a). In Kenya, the presence of refugees in Kakuma contributes to improved access to food and increased employment rates that benefit both refugees and host communities (Sanghi et al. 2016; Vemuru et al. 2016). However, more evidence is needed on whether this finding replicates in other contexts. Where displaced persons are not concentrated in camps or settlements, government investments in infrastructure and services are needed to manage increased demand and advance development gains for the host residents. Development investments, like those made in Colombia (Box 7), can support governments in this response.
Programs like the IDA WHR and GCFF can help budget-constrained governments support these development investments. The WHR supports low-income IDA countries that host significant refugee populations to create medium- to long-term development opportunities for both the refugees and their host communities. The GCFF is the result of a partnership among the World Bank, the UN, and the Islamic Development Bank. It enables middle-income countries receiving large refugee inflows to borrow from multilateral development banks at below-regular rates. The GCFF represents a coordinated response by the international community that bridges the gap between humanitarian and development assistance and enhances coordination among the UN, donors, and multilateral development banks.

There is mixed evidence on the relationship between social assistance and social cohesion. Providing humanitarian aid to refugees and not host community members can provoke resentment (Jacobsen 2005) even though direct social assistance to refugees can benefit host communities by increasing expenditures on local goods and services (Lehman and Masterson 2020). Whether host community members and refugees perceive the targeting of social assistance to be fair influences whether social assistance triggers resentment or promotes social cohesion (see Box 9). A rigorous study of South Africa’s pension program suggests that cash transfers alone do not affect host community attitudes towards immigrants or social cohesion within the host community (Agüero and Fasola 2022). Yet in Lebanon, cash transfers to Syrian refugees improve social cohesion between beneficiaries and host community members (i.e., increases the likelihood of being helped and decreases the likelihood of being insulted by host community members) (Lehmann and Masterson 2020). More rigorous evidence is needed to understand how social assistance such as cash transfers impacts social cohesion among displaced persons and host community members (Doocy and Tappis 2017).
Box 9. The Role of Targeting Mechanisms for Social Assistance

Meaningful interactions—especially when built into targeting mechanisms—can help improve social cohesion, while incidental interactions can decrease it. The approach used to identify persons as recipients of social assistance can affect inter-group social cohesion. Seemingly trivial changes in interactions, such as the shared use of transfer registration or collection facilities, can affect cohesion. For instance, when refugees withdraw humanitarian cash transfers in Lebanon and register for and collected government-integrated cash transfers in Türkiye, crowding at ATMs, banks, and administrative offices reportedly increases tensions with the host community (Maunder et al. 2018; Samuels et al. 2020). In other cases, programs with well-designed intensive joint participation of host and displaced communities can create positive interactions that promote social cohesion. In Lebanon, joint participation in committee meetings and training sessions as part of an NGO-run integrated water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and protection program for Syrian refugees and local Lebanese increases interactions between residents, which helps enhance empathy and trust (Parker and Maynard 2018). In Jordan, cash-for-work programs targeting both refugees and locals increases cooperation between refugees and host community participants on joint public works projects, thus strengthening trust between participants and refugees’ sense of belonging to the local community (Loewe et al. 2020; Roxin et al. 2020).

As noted above, increased interactions can also have null or negative effects. In Afghanistan, joint host community and IDP participation in a (NGO-run) vocational training program generates extensive contacts between participants, but these increased interactions do not change locals’ attitudes toward IDPs (Zhou and Lyall 2020). Where targeting of social assistance is perceived to be inequitable, and poor locals are excluded from either humanitarian or developmental assistance, targeting can foster increased resentment and anti-refugee sentiment. Yet if the host community receives little support prior to the displacement inflows and is now included in assistance programs, this may generate positive perceptions of the displaced, particularly where there is messaging that links the program’s existence to the refugee inflows. In Uganda, when cash grants to microentrepreneurs in host communities are delivered with information that connects them to the country’s inclusive refugee policies and existing aid-sharing policy, this significantly increases support for inclusive policies including refugees’ right to work and hosting additional refugees (Baesler et al. 2021).

(continued)
Box 9. The Role of Targeting Mechanisms for Social Assistance (continued)

Social safety net programs can be reoriented to support displaced populations. This is notably easier if the displaced groups are IDPs rather than refugees. In many countries that host both refugees and IDPs, it is extremely difficult to design targeting mechanisms because of the dynamic context, the lack of data, and the challenges associated with accessing affected populations. In Ethiopia, for instance, after the beginning of the conflict in Tigray in 2020 (which later affected large parts of Northern Ethiopia) the need for safety nets to support displaced households became acute and prompted the adaptation of the World Bank-supported Urban Productive Safety Net Project. The project, designed to support the urban poor, was adapted to also support conflict-affected households in and around cities. Within three months of Government approval, the five-month unconditional cash transfer was disbursing to over 220,000 IDPs (Sarkar et al. forthcoming). The successor project (Ethiopia’s Urban Productive Safety Net and Jobs Project) already included a subcomponent focused on fostering “Refugee and Host Integration through the Safety Net,” including public works, livelihood development, and social cohesion building activities carried out jointly by refugees and host communities. While this sub-component was also progressing, the set-up time was considerably longer — approximately one and a half years.

How Do Needs Vary by Socioeconomic Context and Over Time?

Forcibly displaced persons experience both short-term trauma and long-term disadvantages that can last decades due to changes in human, social, and physical capital. For example, those forcibly displaced from BiH experience long-term inequities in education and income (Kovac et al. 2022). Likewise, even decades after being displaced within Colombia, IDPs are still markedly worse-off socioeconomically than their counterparts (Tellez and Balcells 2022). Experiencing extortion or other forms of coercion during migration journeys can also cause lasting trauma and economic hardship that affect displaced persons’ social and economic reintegration (Denny et al. 2022). Where services and economic opportunities are scarce, large refugee inflows can cause intergenerational impacts among host communities (Sonne et al. 2019). Providing social assistance (including health care, psychosocial services, and economic opportunities) to refugees and IDPs as well as vulnerable host community members immediately following displacement may help mitigate some of these long-term impacts. Further, early entry into the labor market helps ensure refugees’ economic integration (Müller et al. 2022). However, in the medium to long term, refugees, IDPs, and host community members may require mental health (including trauma support) services, access to health care, ongoing social assistance, and legal assistance to recover property and obtain vital documents. Qualitative interviews conducted by Denny et
al. (2022) suggest that providers of trauma support and mental health services may need to begin with basic familiarization and de-stigmatization of mental wellness conversations. Long-term support for adults and children in host and refugee communities, including for education, health care, and childcare, may be necessary to address these long-term impacts.

Multi-sectoral operations should be carefully tailored to address the unique needs in urban and rural contexts and in camp and non-camp settings. In urban areas, host communities’ negative attitudes about refugees are more likely to be driven by economic concerns such as labor force competition and increased rent prices. In rural areas, such attitudes are likely the result of security concerns and land scarcity (Betts et al. 2022; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2022). However, attitudes toward the displaced are also likely to vary across social classes (Allen et al. 2022), levels of social diversity (Betts et al. 2022), and gender (Pham et al. 2022) in all areas. Operations in urban areas can address these dynamics through labor market integration, increased housing supply, and social assistance to both refugees and the host community members most likely to be negatively affected. Operations in rural areas can address concerns about land scarcity and insecurity by granting land and shelter to refugees and non-landowning host members and by delivering humanitarian assistance, social assistance, and infrastructure and services in ways that are explicitly designed to ease tensions. Across all areas, assistance should take into consideration the social dynamics (including ethnic polarization) and target vulnerable groups such as women and the poor.

How Can Investments Also Be Used to Build Social Cohesion?

Investments paired with participatory approaches among the displaced and host communities can help ensure that the investments address high priorities and promote social cohesion. Refugee–host interactions can improve host communities’ perceptions of refugees (Betts et al. 2022; Allen at al. 2022) and IDPs (Pham et al. 2022). Approaches like the Social Entrepreneurship, Empowerment and Cohesion in Refugee and Host Communities in Türkiye project and the Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project in the Horn of Africa (see Box 2) that bring refugees and host residents together for joint community-based planning, decision-making, and oversight of investments in essential infrastructure and services can foster positive interactions. Doing so in a manner that does not reinforce their identities as primarily or only “refugees” or “hosts” may be helpful (Madhavan and Landau 2011). CDD is one possible approach to delivering multi-sectoral investments using facilitated, participatory decision-making that involves both host community members and the displaced. This approach allows communities to monitor the cost and quality of investments (Wong and Guggenheim 2018; Pomeroy 2016; World Bank 2014) and ensure they are responsive to local needs (Olken 2010; Labonne and Chase 2008) and benefit refugees, IDPs and host residents. These participatory approaches utilize the high level of social capital often found in post-conflict societies (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Gilligan et al. 2014) and among refugees and IDPs, as illustrated by the background papers on Colombia (Tellez and Balcells 2022), Guatemala (Denny et al. 2022), and the comparison of Philippines, Colombia, Iraq, and Uganda (Vinck et al. 2022).
There is growing evidence that trained facilitators can build empathy among host residents and refugees and ease social tensions. While contact between refugees and host community members is unlikely to foster social cohesion on its own, facilitators can promote empathy through perspective-getting exercises that describe the experiences of someone from an excluded group (Kalla and Broockman 2021). For example, hearing narratives about the hardships of Somali refugees in Kenya has a significant positive effect on host residents’ beliefs and policy attitudes about Somali refugees (Audette et al. 2020). This type of exercise generates similar positive effects among host residents in Uganda and the United States (Baseler et al. 2021; Adida et al. 2018). Public messaging that invokes humanitarian values including empathy and counters negative framing and xenophobia may also be an effective mechanism for eliciting broad support within host communities for inclusive refugee policies. In Colombia, partly due to the government’s inclusive refugee policies and rhetoric, there is evidence that COVID-19 elicited empathy, rather than xenophobia and anti-immigrant violence, from host communities toward Venezuelan migrants (Zhou et al. 2022b). Colombians who hold stronger humanitarian values or view the Venezuelan crisis as a humanitarian issue express more favorable preferences for family reunification and access to health care (Allen et al. 2022). This finding implies that public messaging that stresses the humanitarian aspect of a crisis could increase support for inclusive policies. Future work should investigate the extent to which support for refugee policies is sensitive to different frames and public messaging approaches.

**Key Recommendations**

1. In line with the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees, provide refugees the right to work, freedom of movement, access to social services, civil and birth registration, and right to accommodation.

2. Ensure that humanitarian assistance and development investments target both displaced persons and host communities.

3. Invest in infrastructure and services to meet the increased demand due to population shocks and use these investments to also address existing vulnerabilities in host communities.

4. Near-term relief and assistance should be provided to both host communities and displaced persons following displacement to offset negative externalities on prices and jobs.

5. Provide relevant support such as mental health services for the trauma endured during displacement, ongoing social assistance to address hardships, and legal assistance to recover property and obtain documents to address displaced persons’ longer-term well-being and self-reliance.

6. Tailor investments to the unique needs of urban and rural areas hosting the displaced, which may include labor market integration and housing support in urban areas and access to land, income-generating opportunities, infrastructure, and services in rural areas.

7. Employ participatory approaches, trained facilitators, and public messaging to promote positive interactions and empathy between host residents and displaced persons.

8. Pair multisectoral investments with participatory approaches to ensure investments address the needs of displaced persons and host communities.

See Section 3 for a full discussion of the policy recommendations.
Limitations and Directions for Future Work

Limitations

The papers reviewed here face at least five limitations, which are similar to those found in other research on forced displacement and social cohesion. First, it is conceptually difficult to precisely define social cohesion. The background papers use multiple definitions of this concept, which makes it difficult to draw generalizable and actionable conclusions across them. The finding that context matters is critically important but has limited utility for those planning interventions in areas hosting large numbers of displaced persons.

Second, the papers that highlight the most useful conclusions evaluate contexts where the cultural distance between refugees and host populations are relatively small (Greece, Uganda, Colombia, Peru). This limits the extent to which their findings can be generalized. Coniglio et al. (2022) find that over time, refugee camps across Africa (where cultural differences between refugees and hosts vary) improve local economies and reduce tensions between host communities and refugees. Policy makers would clearly benefit from more systematic analysis of how (and under what conditions) cultural distance influences both policy responses and citizens’ responses to those policies.

Third, the papers collectively point to the need for further analytical work on the treatment of refugees. Most of the 26 papers made a rough analytical distinction between “culture” (i.e., language/religion/ethnicity) and “economics” (i.e., economic threat via competition over jobs or congestion of services). Ethno-linguistic similarities between refugees and host communities may condition the impact of refugee arrivals on social cohesion (Betts et al. 2022). Yet in recent decades, a rather substantial body of analytical and empirical work on second-dimension politics suggests that politicians can exploit and exaggerate ethnic and cultural differences and/or economic threats when it is in their political interest to do so (Shayo 2009). Ethnic and cultural identities are highly malleable; thus, it is difficult to accurately measure on surveys (Marx 1998; Gaikwad and Nellis 2017). For example, the differences between host residents in Greece and the Greek Orthodox citizens who fled Türkiye in the 1920s were large enough to cause significant strife and prejudice at the time (Kontogiorgi 2006), but the ethnic boundaries between these two groups dissipated over time (Murard 2022). It is important to better understand how policy makers can generate empathy and feelings of similarities even when there are stark superficial ethno-linguistic differences between host community members and refugees. More broadly, understanding the dynamics of difference, how group identities are formed and sustained, and the strategies political leaders use to (re)define the nature of the boundaries and grievances between contending groups merits further research in forced displacement (Barron et al. 2007).

Fourth, overall, the papers underemphasize within-group differences and differences between refugees and IDPs when these groups settle in the same areas. However, several papers attempt to distinguish between groups based on their preferences and concerns, such as those related to economic and humanitarian policies (Allen et al. 2022) or the experience of displacement (Kovac et al. 2022). This is important
because past research demonstrates that within-group differences among hosts or refugees (e.g., based on class, ethnicity, or gender) can be a key determinant of social cohesion dynamics. For instance, the key axes of tension in Ethiopia’s Somali region are not always between Ethiopian citizens and refugees (though those tensions do exist); they are sometimes between ethnic Somalis and those perceived to be “highlanders” or “outsiders” (World Bank 2020).

Finally, it is often difficult to distinguish refugees from migrants in most standard data sources, including censuses and surveys. The papers vary, for instance, in the extent to which they try to distinguish preferences regarding immigration more generally from those specifically related to refugees (e.g., Agüero and Fasolo, Albarosa and Elsner, Blanco et al., and Groeger et al. all use measures related to immigrants rather than refugees specifically). Given that there could be important differences between the two, this suggests the value of original data collection focusing on refugees and the need for caution when interpreting evidence on attitudes to “immigrants” and “migration.”

Future Work

The papers highlight the opportunity for future work on how context (particularly intermediate outcomes) impacts social cohesion. Vinck et al. (2022) evaluate the differences across countries and suggest areas for theory development and empirical work on how context moderates the outcomes of those who are displaced. Kovac et al.’s (2022) observation of differences between migrants, IDPs, refugees, and those who do not move raises similar questions about the moderating effect of context. Future work might explore how context impacts outcomes for displaced people, and how these outcomes shape social cohesion. The latter line of research is promising: Šedová et al.’s (2022) and Foltz and Shibuya’s (2022) analyses suggest that increases in IDP welfare may ease tension between IDPs and host communities.

The reviewed works also lay the foundation for more theoretical and empirical work on how displacement-induced changes to social and economic conditions influence social cohesion. Šedová et al., Coniglio et al., and Comertpay and Maystadt examine how displacement shocks affect socioeconomic indicators and measures of social cohesion. Yet, the measurements of social cohesion they employ makes it challenging to interpret their findings. Šedová et al. as well as Comertpay and Maystadt include protests in their measure of reduced social cohesion. Yet given that collective action capacity may also indicate greater social cohesion, there is some ambiguity regarding the implications of their findings for the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and social cohesion. Moreover, though Foltz and Shibuya find that hosting IDPs is not detrimental to community welfare and does not exacerbate inequality, they do not test whether this drives greater social cohesion.

Future research should more systematically interrogate why (and how) displacement affects different dimensions of social cohesion. For example, future work might probe heterogeneity in displacement’s effects on attitudinal and behavioral measures of social cohesion. Albarosa and Elsner (2022) find that in areas that have
strong prior support for far-right parties and high unemployment, hosting refugees leads to an uptick in anti-immigrant violence but does not influence self-reported attitudes about trust, perceived fairness, or beliefs about immigrants. Groeger et al. (2022) find that improved socioeconomic conditions decrease discrimination against immigrants and improve perceptions of communal trust and quality but lead to lower appraisals of the value of diversity. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2022) demonstrate that land scarcity and more negative attitudes toward refugee returns deepen the negative impact of returns on perceptions of community support, security, trust, and the likelihood that one could borrow money from a neighbor. However, varying levels of ethnic diversity exert different substantive effects across these measures, which allows researchers to probe the theoretical foundations of these differences and their implications.

Finally, deportation merits consideration as a form of forced displacement, particularly given its growing relevance as a contentious policy tool and its parallels to other modalities of displacement. Hundreds of thousands of migrants are deported from host countries every year, but very little is known about how this form of displacement impacts the prospects for reintegration into home communities or intentions to remigrate. Denny et al. (2022) provide a roadmap for both how to collect data from this population as well as the kinds of questions that are relevant to the study of deportation.

47. Ethnic identity should not be treated as an immutable characteristic, as it is often the outcome of social and political processes (e.g., Green 2021).
REFERENCES


Paler, Laura, Cyrus Samii, Matthew Lisiecki, and Adrian Morel. 2015. Social and Environmental Impact of the Community Rangers Program in Aceh. World Bank, Washington, DC


ANNEX: LIST OF COMMISSIONED PAPERS


# ANNEX: SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND PAPERS

Table 2. Summary of Background Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper</th>
<th>Country/region</th>
<th>Population(s) studied</th>
<th>Methods and data</th>
<th>Issue or policy studied (main independent variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agüero &amp; Fasola</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Refugees &amp; immigrants</td>
<td>Regression discontinuity design (RDD) using survey data</td>
<td>Cash transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksoy &amp; Ginn</td>
<td>Low- and middle-income countries with large refugee populations</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>DID using data from numerous sources (Gallup World Poll, UNHCR data, etc.)</td>
<td>Exclusionary &amp; inclusionary refugee policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albarosa &amp; Eslner</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Refugees &amp; immigrants</td>
<td>DID using survey data and violent event data based on newspaper articles, police reports, etc.</td>
<td>Refugee inflow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen et al.</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Instrumental variables (IV) estimation using survey data</td>
<td>Refugee return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertinilli et al.</td>
<td>23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Ordinary least squares (OLS) and IV using multiple observational sources (ACLED, Afrobarometer, UNHCR data, etc.)</td>
<td>Refugee-driven ethnic polarization and ethnic fractionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betts et al.</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>OLS, IV, and qualitative methods using survey data</td>
<td>Host–refugee interactions; ethno-linguistic proximity between hosts and refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bove et al.</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>IV using survey data</td>
<td>Presence of UN peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coniglio et al.</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Matching using geo-coded event data from GDELT and geo-located data from UNHCR</td>
<td>Presence of refugee camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denny et al.</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Deportees</td>
<td>Natural experiment using survey data</td>
<td>Extortion during migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson et al.</td>
<td>Jordan and Lebanon</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Quasi-experimental data</td>
<td>Co-educational vocational training interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foltz &amp; Shibuya</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>DID, IV, propensity score matching using survey, census, and geo-located event data</td>
<td>IDP presence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
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<td>Population(s) studied</td>
<td>Methods and data</td>
<td>Issue or policy studied (main independent variable)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Groeger et al.</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Refugees &amp; immigrants</td>
<td>IV using multiple sources of data (surveys, census, Google trends, etc.)</td>
<td>Employment in the informal sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoseini &amp; Dideh</td>
<td>Iran, Islamic Rep.</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Natural experiment using survey data</td>
<td>Economic shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaplan</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>IDPs &amp; conflict-affected individuals</td>
<td>Regression, matching, interviews &amp; focus groups using surveys and interviews</td>
<td>Conflict exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovac et al.</td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Croatia</td>
<td>IDPs, refugees, migrants</td>
<td>OLS using survey data</td>
<td>Conflict exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meneses &amp; Villanizar-Chaparro</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>OLS and RDD using administrative data</td>
<td>Financial aid for education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Müller et al.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Natural experiment using administrative data</td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murard</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>OLS using survey and census data</td>
<td>Concerted policy efforts to integrate refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parry &amp; Aymerich</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Case study using semi-structured interview data</td>
<td>Local peace agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>Country/region</td>
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<td>Methods and data</td>
<td>Issue or policy studied (main independent variable)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pham et al.</td>
<td>Congo, Dem. Rep.</td>
<td>IDPs &amp; refugees</td>
<td>OLS using surveys and focus groups</td>
<td>Presence of refugees and IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruiz, &amp; Vargas-Silva</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Refugees &amp; immigrants</td>
<td>Conjoint experiment using survey data</td>
<td>Host–refugee interactions, host attitudes toward refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šedová et al.</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Two-way fixed effects and IV using numerous observational data sources (ACLED event data, World Bank data, etc.)</td>
<td>Presence of IDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tellez &amp; Balcells</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Matching on observables using survey data</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinck et al.</td>
<td>Colombia, Iraq, Philippines, Uganda</td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Logistic regression using survey data</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walk et al.</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>IDPs &amp; refugees</td>
<td>Seeded models and predictive model with machine learning using geo-located social media data and survey data</td>
<td>IDP and refugee return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou et al.</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>OLS using numerous sources of geo-located data (UNHCR refugee settlements, data on road quality, location of schools, health clinics, and health-related aid projects)</td>
<td>Exposure to refugee settlements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>