230 Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building September 2003 Findings reports on ongoing operational, economic, and sector work carried out by the World Bank and its member governments in the Africa Region. It is published periodically by the Knowledge and Learning Center on behalf of the Region. The views expressed in Findings are those of the author/s and should not be attributed to the World Bank Group. http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings Strengthening oversight by legislatures Legislative oversight of the executive branch is increasingly important for government transparency and accountability, and is receiving more support from the World Bank and other donors. A bout 90 percent of the world's Transcending these formal func- nearly 200 sovereign states tions, legislatures also provide an have national legislatures or arena where competing political parliaments. With the spread of de- forces can debate and reach con- mocracy and the rise of multiparty sensus on national policies and political systems, these bodies are laws. playing larger roles in government. This note addresses the over- Increasingly, legislatures and their sight function because of its sig- members perform four important nificance for government transpar- functions of governance: ency and accountability, and be- · Making policies and laws. Legis- cause the Bank has initiated pilot latures are representative bod- projects to support this function. ies for collective decision-mak- ing, working with the executive Holding the executive branch branch to deliberate policies and accountable make laws. · Representing citizens. Legislators Legislatures can hold the execu- give voice to individual citizens, tive branch accountable through civil society organizations, and several means, such as question- business groups, representing ing senior government officials (in- the needs of local constituents in cluding ministers), reviewing or policymaking. confirming executive appoint- ments, and impeaching (dismiss- · Overseeing the executive. Legisla- ing) officials or even the entire tures oversee policy implemen- executive branch. Accountability tation by the executive branch, mechanisms vary by country based scrutinizing its work and holding Findings on constitutionally defined powers it accountable. · Recruiting future of the legislature, institutional ar- leaders. Legislatures are step- rangements between government ping stones and training grounds branches, divisions of authority for senior positions in the execu- between national, regional, and tive branch. local governments, and the degree of legitimacy conferred on the leg- islature (Dubrow 2001). In parliamentary systems (such States) the legislature and the ex- est groups and corporate influ- as those in Canada, Latvia, and the ecutive are separate branches of ences often lock legislatures into United Kingdom) the legislature-- government. In these systems agreed positions, preventing flex- commonly referred to as parlia- presidents are elected for fixed ibility despite frequent consulta- ment--helps hold the executive terms and can be removed (im- tions (Schick 2001). branch accountable (Mulgan and peached) only if they violate the Some legislatures are respond- Uhr 2000) but also helps form it. In constitution or break the law. ing to their weakened positions these systems some or all minis- There are no periodic votes of no with a burst of activism on budget ters (including the prime minister) confidence, and presidents and matters. A recent study of legisla- are first elected as members of their cabinets normally serve out tures in OECD countries found that parliament. They hold executive their terms. The president ap- more than half were playing a branch positions because they are points cabinet ministers, but these larger role in budget development leaders of the majority party or ministers are not members of the than they had 10 years earlier majority coalition of parties in par- legislature--though in some coun- (OECD 1998). Legislators have also liament. In Westminster parlia- tries their appointments must be found new approaches to oversight. mentary systems all ministers are confirmed by the legislature. Other Ministerial questioning, commit- first elected to parliament; in other ministerial appointments are also tee hearings, and other procedures systems some ministers are ap- subject to review by the legisla- once used to foster accountability pointed by the executive branch ture, usually by specialized com- can also be used to attract media and do not sit in parliament. A par- mittees created to scrutinize the attention and to pressure the ex- liamentary vote of "no confidence" policies and operations of a single ecutive branch. results in the immediate resigna- ministry or department. A strong, well-developed civil so- tion of the executive branch and A distinguishing feature of presi- ciety can help hold government in some case in the holding of new dential systems is that the major- accountable as well as contribute elections. ity party in the legislature may dif- to the capacity and knowledge of In parliamentary systems the fer from the party of the president the legislative branch. Civil soci- executive branch is also held ac- and thus the party that controls the ety organizations are sources of countable by opposition parties. executive branch. When the presi- technical expertise and can pro- Ministers--especially the prime dent and the majority of legislators vide specialized legislative com- minister--are subject to question- are members ofthe same party, leg- mittees with information about ing by members of opposition par- islative oversight is often modest the effects of public policies and ties as well as by members of their or weak. policy alternatives. The combined own party not in government. Par- efforts of legislative committees liaments typically do not review the New roles for legislatures--and and outside interest groups are selection of ministers, though par- civil society especially important for ensuring liamentary committees review the legislative oversight during the appointments of some senior offi- Three developments have reduced long intervals between elections. cials. Specialized committees over- the independence and authority of But in many developing coun- see sector policies and government legislatures in some OECD coun- tries civil society is weak. There operations. But because these com- tries. First, political parties are are far fewer civil society organi- mittees are dominated by mem- increasingly well organized and zations than in OECD countries, bers of the governing party, such disciplined, and so able to deter- most are in urban areas, and they oversight is often weak. Public ac- mine the legislative agenda and have less knowledge and skills to counts committees in most Com- compel legislators to toe the party contribute to legislative oversight. monwealth countries are an excep- line. Second, higher public spend- Still, the 1990s saw rapid growth tion, because they are usually ing--especially on entitlements and increasing sophistication in chaired by a member of the oppo- and income support--has led leg- civil society in many developing sition. islatures to finance transfer ar- countries-- reflecting broader pro- In presidential systems (such as rangements through legislation cesses of political liberalization and those in Mexico and the United that does not require periodic reapproval. Third, powerful inter- democratization. Lessons from donor assistance to ronments in which assistance pro- duction Strategy Papers is enabling legislatures grams occur. parliamentarians to play a key role A review of donor program evalu- in the Bank's country dialogue. Rough estimates indicate that dur- ations suggests that: In lending operations, support for ing the1990s the Inter-American legislative committees is the most Development Bank, World Bank, · Stand-alone projects are less suc- obvious way to involve legislators. and other donors provided more cessful. Legislative assistance Specialized sectoral and other com- than $200 million in loans and programs are increasingly un- mittees that shadow government grants for legislative assistance derstood as complements to other ministries and agencies can en- projects. Such projects focused on governance improvements, in- sure effective oversight. Such com- strengthening lawmaking, proce- cluding efforts to promote partici- mittees must have sufficient pro- dural rules, bill drafting, and com- pation and legal reform. fessional staff as well as a support- mittee structures, and on improv- · Domestic political support is ive infrastructure, including re- ing relations with constituents, the needed to ensure acceptance of search capacity, reference and li- executive branch, opposition par- the legislature's role in demo- brary facilities, and communica- ties, and external actors (includ- cratic development. tion facilities, including access to ing civil society organizations and · Legislative assistance will continue the Internet. The Bank can provide political parties). Assistance to evolve, with growing emphasis valuable support in all these areas. ranged from supplying office and on extending assistance to It can also encourage institutional other equipment to providing infor- subnational legislatures, devel- links between parliaments and mation and training (Messick and oping ethics codes and asset dec- policy research institutes and uni- Stapenhurst forthcoming). laration procedures, strengthen- versities. In 1998 the U.S. Agency for In- ing political parties, training leg- The Bank has both a fiduciary ternational Development commis- islators on budget processes and and a developmental interest in sioned case studies of legislative bill drafting, and improving re- improving accountability. Thus it strengthening projects in Bolivia, search and information capabili- should also help build the capacity El Salvador, Nepal, the Philippines, ties (Messick and Stapenhurst of finance and budget committees, and Poland. It concluded that such forthcoming). public accounts committees, and assistance offers much promise Implications for the Bank other financial oversight commit- but poses many challenges. The tees. These committees can sig- projects reviewed had improved leg- Future World Bank work to nificantly influence the allocation islative performance and fostered strengthen legislatures should fo- of resources for poverty reduction more democratic approaches. But cus on developing them as insti- and promote monitoring and evalu- such efforts can be weakened or tutions that can achieve cross-par- ation of government results even nullified by electoral pro- tisan goals in the national inter- through the Poverty Reduction cesses, shifts in institutional lead- est. Areas of particular interest to Strategy Paper process. ership, and sudden social or cul- the Bank include reducing poverty, tural changes. The World Bank Institute is improving financial oversight, and working with a number of bodies-- Similarly, a recent analysis of giving voice to voters and civil so- including the Commonwealth Par- U.S. government programs to ciety. liamentary Association, Inter-Par- strengthen foreign legislatures Nearly every respondent to a re- liamentary Union, and Parliamen- acknowledged successes but iden- cent survey of World Bank country tary Centre (which is helping to tified weaknesses (Carothers directors and resident representa- form the Global Organization of 1999). The programs rarely tives reported at least some inter- Parliamentarians Against Corrup- changed the behavior of legisla- action with legislatures and legis- tion)--to facilitate exchanges tors, and the public hearings they lators, with many reporting sub- among legislators and share les- inspired were held largely for show, stantial contact. In addition, by sons. Complementing this net- to please donors. These findings holding public hearings and estab- working is a joint World Bank In- highlight the need for donors to be lishing special committees, the stitute­Parliamentary Centre intimately familiar with the envi- process for developing Poverty Re- project, supported by the Dutch Governance Knowledge Sharing Messick, Rick, and Rick USAID (U.S. Agency for Interna- Program trust fund, which seeks Stapenhurst. Forthcoming. tional Development). 1998. "As- to develop indicators of parliamen- "World Bank and Parliaments." sessment Report on Assisting tary performance and an interac- Concept note. World Bank, Wash- Legislatures in Developing tive Website to aid research on ington, D.C. Countries." Washington, D.C. parliaments and dissemination of Mulgan, Richard, and John Uhr. best practices. In addition, the 2001. "Accountability and Gover- Bank's Europe and Central Asia nance." In Glyn Davis and Vice Presidency has supported the Patrick Weller, eds., Are You Be- development of the Parliamentary ing Served? State, Citizens and Network, comprising more than Governance. Sydney, Australia: 120 parliamentarians, to increase This article was first published Allen and Unwin. dialogue between Bank managers as PREM Note No. 74, October 2002. OECD (Organisation for Economic and parliamentarians. Cooperation and Development). 1998. Role of the Legislature. Further reading Paris. Carothers, Thomas. 1999. "Aiding Schick, Allen. 2001. "Can National Democracy Abroad: The Learning Legislatures Regain an Effective Curve." Carnegie Endowment for Voice in Budget Policy?" Paper International Peace, Washing- prepared for the Organisation for ton, D.C. Economic Co-operation and Development's First Symposium Dubrow, Geoff. 2001. "Systems of of the Chairpersons of Parlia- Governance and Parliamentary mentary Budget Committees of Accountability." In World Bank OECD Member Countries--The Institute and Parliamentary Cen- Changing Role of Parliament in tre, Parliamentary Accountability the Budget Process, 24­25 Janu- and Good Governance. Washing- ary, Paris. ton, D.C.