Jobs Interventions for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

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*Kirsten Schuettler¹ and Laura Caron²*

**Abstract**

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) often struggle to integrate the labor market. Even where they have the unrestricted right to work their labor market outcomes lag behind those of other groups, at least in the short- to medium-term. This literature review brings together two strands of research to inform the design of successful job interventions in this context: the evidence on how forced displacement impacts those forcibly displaced in their economic lives and the existing knowledge on jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs. The specific challenges that those forcibly displaced face on the labor market are linked to the loss of assets and separation from family members; the lack of skills required on the host labor market; the impacts of forced displacement on their physical and mental health and their economic behavior (in terms of prospects and aspirations, risk-aversion and time horizon); their legal situation; a lack of social networks and discrimination as well as a high likelihood of excess supply on the labor market at destination. Rigorous quasi-experimental or experimental evidence on jobs interventions for this target group is scarce and mainly focused on high-income countries. A review of the existing literature points to the importance of conducting thorough assessments of the demand and supply side of the labor market, including the legal situation of those forcibly displaced and their perceptions and aspirations, before designing interventions. Making up for lost assets through cash injections seems particularly important, together with other interventions that tackle specific challenges that refugees and IDPs face. Changing when and how the right to work, residency status and freedom of movement are granted has important impacts on labor market outcomes. Intensive coaching and individualized assistance seem to help with matching. Even more so than other groups, those forcibly displaced face several constraints to access the labor market that call for combined interventions. More rigorous research is needed in the future, notably on low- and middle-income host countries, IDPs, demand side interventions and longer-term impacts.

**JEL:** D01; D19; E24; F22; F66; J08; J1; J2; J3; J4; J6; J7; J8; N3; O15; P46; R2

**Keywords:** Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Forced Migration, Forced Displacement, Host Communities, Labor Markets, Wages, Employment, Unemployment, Livelihoods, Jobs, Jobs Interventions, Active Labor Market Policies.

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1. Introduction

Having a job allows individuals to obtain an income and meet their needs and the needs of their dependents, offering a pathway out of poverty. Even more than that, it also gives a sense of purpose and allows one to feel part of the community and contribute to it. This is also true for those forcibly displaced by conflict, violence, persecution and human rights violations. Currently, there are 70.8 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, of which 41.3 million are internally displaced, 25.9 million are refugees (including 5.5 million Palestinian refugees), and 3.5 million asylum seekers (UNHCR 2019). Many are in protracted displacement situations, which have lasted more than five years. Accessing the labor market allows them to become self-reliant, re-build their lives, integrate into the host communities and contribute to the economy.

Evidence, however, shows that refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) face specific challenges to integrate into the labor market. Even where they have the unrestricted right to work, their labor market outcomes lag behind those of other groups. Given the long-term nature of many displacement situations and a policy shift from humanitarian to development interventions in situations of forced displacement, the number of jobs interventions, notably for refugees, has recently increased. It is important that new interventions be designed considering the existing evidence and lessons learnt from previous interventions. Moreover, to understand how impacts of interventions might differ in the context of forced displacement as opposed to other contexts and which specific challenges these interventions must tackle, we need to understand how refugees and IDPs might differ from the host population and other migrants.

Against this background, this literature review aims to bring together the evidence on how forced displacement impacts the economic lives of those forcibly displaced with the existing knowledge on jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs. The key questions we seek to answer are:

- What are specific challenges that refugees and IDPs face on the labor market compared to the host population and other migrants? In how far do these challenges differ between refugees and IDPs?
- What impacts do different types of interventions have in the context of forced displacement? What do we know about what works and what doesn’t?
- How are these impacts different in non-forced displacement settings? How are refugees and IDPs different as a target group?
- How can interventions be tweaked to increase the positive impacts?
- What are knowledge gaps that need to be filled?

We aim to present an overview of the specific jobs-related challenges faced by those forcibly displaced and then systematically review the existing studies of interventions which aim to address these challenges. We focus on quantitative experimental and quasi-experimental studies and triangulate them with existing qualitative studies to build a richer understanding of impact. Gray literature was included to broaden the evidence base.

The literature on the impacts of jobs interventions in the context of forced displacement is scarce, notably in terms of high-quality quantitative evidence. The majority of the literature is qualitative. The quantitative literature is often limited to descriptive post or pre-post evaluations. Few studies use counterfactuals. Randomized control trials (RCTs) exist but are rare. The quality of the existing evidence also varies between the different types of jobs interventions. As we do not have enough rigorous evidence for many types of interventions to credibly demonstrate impacts, we present first emerging lessons, factors that need to be taken into account as well as ideas, hypotheses and interventions that might be useful to test in the future.
The literature review aims to focus on low- and middle income countries (LMIC), where 85 percent of refugees and 72 percent of IDPs live (UNHCR 2019). However, even if most refugees and IDPs live in low- and middle-income countries, much of the existing literature, notably the more rigorous evaluations, is on high-income countries. We include this research on high-income countries but supplement the findings with descriptive and qualitative work from low- and middle-income countries that suggests if and how the results might translate to a context with a different economic situation and labor market structures. We also frame the results with what we know about the impacts of each type of intervention in LMICs in general and in fragility, conflict and violence situations more particularly.

This review focuses on those forcibly displaced due to conflict, violence, persecution and human rights violations. The literature on labor market interventions for migrants in general is richer (see reviews by Bilgili 2015; Butschek and Walter 2014). Sometimes, refugees are part of the target group looked at in these studies, but often they are not clearly acknowledged as a separate group. We include these studies in particular if they look at groups of migrants that might have comparable challenges to integrate the labor market. The focus of the literature clearly is on those moving internationally; studies on jobs interventions for those internally displaced make up less than a fifth of the studies included in this review.

We use a broad definition of jobs as any income source, formal or informal, including employment and self-employment (World Bank 2012). Notably in low-income countries but also in middle-income countries self-employment is an important source of income. In low-income settings it is useful to think about jobs as a “portfolio of work” as people obtain income from several activities simultaneously or over time (Blattman and Ralston 2015). We classify jobs interventions by type of support provided. We focus on direct jobs interventions which aim at immediate job outcomes as well as policy interventions specific to refugees and IDPs, but do not include other macro-economic and private sector development interventions on the demand side which aim to create jobs in general (like improvements in the business and investment climate).

Although reviews on similar topics exist, they have not adequately addressed the issues of interventions focusing on labor market integration of those forcibly displaced in low- and middle-income contexts. Some reviews look at migrants in general and focus only on OECD countries, without considering how the findings might translate to low- and middle income settings (Ö. Bilgili 2015; Butschek and Walter 2014). The reviews that focus on refugees look broader beyond labor market integration at many types of integration measures (Shaw and Funk 2019), focus on only one type of intervention, like microfinance (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2016), or are limited to interventions by humanitarians (Fratzke and Jacobsen 2016). Other reviews focus on resettled refugees only (Ott 2013; Ott and Montgomery 2013) but none also includes IDPs. The reviews also do not link the results to the literature on specific obstacles for refugees and IDPs that these interventions need to tackle.

The literature on the impacts of forced displacement on those forcibly displaced is nascent but growing. While the reviews by Kondylis and Mueller (2014) and Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013) were only able to cover few papers, the more recent review by Becker and Ferrara (2019) builds on a larger number of papers. They do, however, not link the results to labor market integration and jobs interventions. As with the literature on jobs interventions, the literature on the impacts of forced displacement on those forcibly displaced has mainly focused on refugees. With the exception of Colombia, there is a lack of research on IDPs. The literature is limited by data availability, as even in high income contexts data allowing to

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4 The definition of developing countries is based on the United Nations Statistics Division Classification.

5 We use the terms forcibly displaced persons and forced migrants interchangeably.
differentiate between immigrants by entry category are scarce and it is usually impossible to obtain data on individuals before displacement (Bevelander 2016).  

The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background on the impacts of forced displacement on those forcibly displaced and the specific challenges they face integrating into the labor market. This is followed by an overview of the literature on jobs interventions in the context of forced displacement in section 3. Sections 4 summarize the results for the different types of interventions. Section 5 concludes by summarizing results, pointing to gaps in the literature that need to be closed, and distilling first policy recommendations.

2. Specific challenges for the labor market integration of refugees and IDPs

Rigorous studies on high-income host countries consistently show that labor market outcomes of refugees lag behind locals and economic migrants. Even if results vary between different host countries and groups of forced migrants, studies using survey, census or register data consistently show that refugees have lower employment rates than locals and take longer to integrate into the labor market than economic migrants. Their income also lags behind. The gap remains, even if different individual characteristics between refugees, locals and economic migrants (like mental and physical health, lower level of education and language skills, gender and age) are accounted for. Female refugees have particularly low employment rates. Refugee employment rates and wages also vary by country of origin and destination. Over time, however, refugees can manage to close the employment gap and might even perform better than economic migrants after six to ten years, as found by a multitude of studies for host countries in Europe and the US. Norway and Denmark are the only countries where results based on longitudinal registry data point in the opposite direction, as they find that after five to ten years social insurance dependency begins rising and employment rates declining again (Bratsberg et al. 2014; 2017 and Schultz-Nielsen 2017). Studies show that historic examples of forced displacement in Europe also led to consistent differences between those forcibly displaced and the local population over time. The only exception are those who left the agricultural sector after their displacement for whom studies have found more favorable labor market outcomes compared to those non-displaced (Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka 2013; Sarvimäki, Uusitalo, and Jäntti 2009).

Descriptive statistics from representative cross-sectional surveys among refugees in low- and middle-income countries appear to support the patterns found in high-income settings. In Uganda, 54 percent of refugees report aid as their main source of income. In Kampala, 74 percent depend on remittances as their main source of income. Even if the legal and policy framework is very conducive in Uganda, 3 out of 4 refugees are unemployed, twice the rate of hosts. The unemployment rate for those who have been in the country for over 5 years, however, is over 20 percent lower than for those who

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6 A promising approach to overcome this gap has been to link social security records with migration registry data (e.g. Spadarotto et al. 2014 for Switzerland).


8 Until we have further studies based on longitudinal registry data it is unclear if this difference in results is due to the higher quality of the data available for Norway and Denmark or due to imminent differences between the host countries in terms of refugee characteristics and labor market structure.
arrived more recently (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019). In Ethiopia, aid is the major source of livelihood for over 80 percent of refugees after displacement, compared to less than 10 percent before their displacement, and only 22 percent of working-age refugees are employed (Pape, Petrini, and Iqbal 2018). Refugee women have even lower labor force participation and employment rates than refugee men in Kalobei refugee camp in Kenya (World Bank and UNHCR 2020). In Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, large employment and wage gaps exist as well between refugees and hosts, which are even larger for refugee women (Kabir and Klugman 2019). The refugees that work are more likely to be active in the informal labor market than their host counterparts in countries like Jordan and Lebanon (Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019; Srour and Chaaban 2017).

Evidence on IDPs also shows a negative association between forced displacement, employment rates and wages. Using propensity score matching, Gimenez-Nadal, Molina, and Silva-Quintero (2019) find that internally displaced persons in Colombia are faced with a significant decrease in wages, compared to those who moved due to reasons other than violence (10-29 percent for male, and 18-37 percent for female workers, depending on the matching method used). Ibáñez and Moya (2007) provide descriptive statistics showing that the rate of unemployment of those internally displaced in Colombia increases from 1.7 percent in the places of origin to 53 percent in the first three months in the places of destination and is still around 16 percent a year after displacement, greater than for the extreme poor urban population. The labor income per adult declines to less than half of the previous income. In Georgia, compared to local residents IDPs are less likely to be in the labor force and more likely to be unemployed and receive lower wages, many years after their displacement (Torosyan, Pignatti, and Obrizan 2018). A survey covering nine countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and including a small number of IDP households in the sample, suggests worse labor market outcomes for IDPs compared to the rest of the population (Ivlevs and Veliziotis 2018; Torosyan, Pignatti, and Obrizan 2018).

The worse labor market outcomes reflect specific obstacles that refugees and IDPs face compared to local workers but also economic migrants. Overall, the existing evidence for high-income as well as low- and middle-income countries clearly shows that refugees and IDPs struggle more than other groups to integrate into the labor market and are faced with worse labor market outcomes, at least in the short- to medium-term. These outcomes reflect specific challenges that refugees and IDPs face compared to hosts and economic migrants (see Table 1 for a summary). Like economic migrants, forced migrants need to adjust to a different labor market, for example, if they moved internally from rural to urban areas and even more so if they crossed borders, which makes them face additional challenges compared to hosts. However, even if the lines between economic migration and forced displacement can be blurred at times, forced migrants typically do face additional challenges compared to economic migrants. These challenges are linked to selection effects, impacts of the displacement experience itself and the conditions at destination (Ibáñez 2014). As violence is the major determinant of the decision to leave, forced migrants

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9 More analysis is needed to understand if the lower unemployment rate is the result of a better integration into the labor market over time or stems from different characteristics of the newly arrived refugees from South Sudan compared to earlier refugee cohorts mainly from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Refugees might also become discouraged workers over time.

10 A handful of studies look at the situation of those forcibly displaced after they return to their origin communities. Given the scarcity of literature on low- and middle-income host countries, these studies could help shed some light on the situation of the displaced in such countries during displacement. They do, however, add another layer of selection and issues of reintegration, lack of recovery of assets, and loss of home country specific human and social capital. While a study on Rwanda finds that returnees have higher returns to on-farm labor, likely due to higher motivation (Kondylis 2008), studies on displacement in Burundi, Sudan, Uganda and Bosnia show that returnees are worse off compared to those who stayed (Verwimp and Muñoz-Mora 2018; Fransen, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2017; Abdel-Rahim, Jaimovich, and Ylönen 2018; Fiala 2015; Kondylis 2010). Some studies do show, however, that those forcibly displaced might have gained human capital and adopted beneficial new habits while abroad (Fransen, Vargas-Silva, and Siegel 2018; Abdel-Rahim, Jaimovich, and Ylönen 2018).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraint</th>
<th>Why it binds more for those forcibly displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affects hosts as well, albeit less strongly</td>
<td><strong>Lack of skills</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Do not choose destination primarily based on need for their skills and are less economically selected than economic migrants&lt;br&gt;• Disruption of education and work experience and long periods of inactivity through conflict and displacement&lt;br&gt;• Qualifications often not recognized at destination, often cannot take certificates with them</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of labor demand</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Do not choose destination primarily based on available labor market opportunities&lt;br&gt;• Are often not allowed to move to and settle where economic opportunities are&lt;br&gt;• Tend to move together in large groups, suddenly increasing labor supply</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of language proficiency</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Have less time to prepare and start learning the language before departure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of social networks and information on labor markets</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Decision on where to go is more driven by violence as a push factor than by networks as a pull factor&lt;br&gt;• Lack of freedom to choose where to move and settle might isolate them from social networks&lt;br&gt;• Lack information on labor markets at destination</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Uncertain or short time horizon</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Often stay in intermediate destinations before secondary movement or resettlement&lt;br&gt;• Uncertainty about recognition of status and duration of residence permit&lt;br&gt;• Might expect unexpected changes to happen again anytime</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Legal challenges and discrimination</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Often do not have the right to work or move freely&lt;br&gt;• Restrictions on ability to own property, open a business, and access financial services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affects mainly those forcibly displaced</td>
<td><strong>Lack of assets</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Have to leave assets behind and usually cannot access them anymore; have to deplete assets to make up for income loss and to finance movements&lt;br&gt;• Higher dependency ratios due to separation from or loss of family income earners; higher likelihood of female-headed households</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lower levels of health; Higher prevalence of depression and PTSD</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Refugees tend to have lower levels of health than hosts and economic migrants due to selection effects and experiences before and during displacement&lt;br&gt;• Experience of violence, traumatic experiences during displacement and post-migration stressors</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Risk aversion</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Negative effects of violence and forced displacement experience on risk appetite</td>
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are less economically selected than economic migrants. Their first move is less likely to be the result of an economic cost-benefit analysis and might aim to minimize losses rather than to maximize income. They are thus more likely to face skills mismatches and lack of labor demand at destination. On average, forced migrants had less time to prepare for their move, learn skills needed at destination, and take certificates with them. They often face the loss of physical assets and human capital. The forced displacement experience is likely to have impacts on their physical and mental health and economic behavior. The legal situation of forced migrants at destination differs from economic migrants. The choice of their destination is more likely to be based on safety than economic reasoning. They usually move in groups of people, often arriving at destination together with many others, but they are still less likely to have an established social network at arrival.

The importance of different types of obstacles depends on the context and needs to be understood and addressed by job interventions. The obstacles for labor market integration vary between different groups of forced migrants. They depend on the context in the host country as well as the situation in the origin country and the causes of the displacement. They might also change with length of displacement and differ between groups of forced migrants in the same host country, varying by age, gender, skill-level, and country of origin. The remainder of this chapter will look closer at the specific challenges that have an impact on the labor market integration of forced migrants and that need to be understood and addressed when designing jobs interventions in the context of forced displacement: the loss of assets, the lack of skills and language proficiency, psychological health and economic behavior, the legal situation and discrimination, as well as lack of social networks, information on the labor market and labor demand.

2.1. Financial capital: Loss of assets

Due to conflict and violence or the displacement itself, those forcibly displaced are often confronted with the loss of assets, which may hamper their economic activities. A number of studies for low- and middle-income countries show a negative association between forced displacement and the level of household assets. Running different regressions, Ibanez and Moya (2007) show that even if the extent of asset loss varies, IDP households in Colombia are mostly left with an insufficient asset base to escape poverty and stay on a low-level economic trajectory through time. Using cross-sectional data from northern Uganda, Fiala (2009) finds an association between internal displacement and a decrease in the value of assets, with the exception of those households that had little or no assets before being forced to move. A representative survey among refugees living in camps in Ethiopia finds that, while over 60% of refugees had agricultural land, productive assets, and livestock before displacement, after displacement only around 20 percent had productive assets and livestock, the quantity held declined, and even fewer had access to land (Pape, Petrini, and Iqbal 2018). In Uganda only 15 percent of refugee households own agricultural land (compared to 73 percent of hosts) and 11 percent of refugee households own livestock (compared to 38 percent of the hosts) (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019). Due to Uganda’s policy, however, over half of the refugees have access to agricultural land (compared to around 80 percent of the hosts), mostly through use rights. Interventions need to consider that households are likely to need transfers of assets or capital to allow them to successfully develop productive activities and re-accumulate assets. This includes access to land for farmers, which (besides the financial capital to buy or lease land) requires the availability of land that can be purchased or used.

Negative effects of physical asset loss are reinforced if households are separated from family members during displacement or face the death of a breadwinner. In Ethiopia, more than a quarter of refugees report having been separated from their household members due to displacement, mostly because they stayed behind in the country of origin (Pape, Petrini, and Iqbal 2018). Dependency ratios are higher on average among refugees in Kalobeyei camp in Kenya (1.9), compared to Kenya as a whole (0.8), Turkana county, where the camp is located (1.18), and the dependency rates in the refugees’
countries of origin, suggesting a larger economic burden for refugee working age adults (World Bank and UNHCR 2020). A much higher percentage of households are female-headed (66 percent), differing substantially from the 42 percent of households nationally in Kenya, and 52 percent in Turkana County, notably due to refugee households from South Sudan. In Uganda over half of the refugee households are female-headed, compared to less than a third of host community households (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019). Women might also participate in the labor market for the first time after displacement, because of the loss of assets or the inability of the male breadwinner to assure sufficient income for the household. For example, the probability of entering the labor force rose significantly from 8 percent to 54 percent and from 12 percent to 47 percent for female Syrian refugees aged between 15-24 years and 24-34 years, respectively, after arriving in Lebanon (World Bank 2013). Besides taking general gender-relevant aspects into account, like gender-barriers to access certain jobs or social norms that make it difficult for women to leave the house, jobs interventions need to adapt to a potentially increased number of female-headed households and higher dependency ratios (e.g. through including childcare in the interventions). The loss of assets and the inability of adults in the household to gain sufficient income can also lead to negative coping strategies like child labor (Habib 2019; DRC 2016; UNHCR 2018b; UNICEF and IDMC 2019).

2.2 Human capital: Lack of skills and language proficiency

Forced migrants often lack the skills or qualifications required on the new labor market. Compared to economic migrants, forced migrants usually have less choice over their destination, which means that they more often face a mismatch between the skills they have and those that are needed in the labor market. One example are agricultural workers being internally displaced to urban areas. Pape et al. (2019) show that IDP households whose primary source of livelihood was own-account agriculture before displacement face greater challenges finding livelihoods in the largely urban camps in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Refugees and IDPs are also often forced to change occupation after their displacement. More than two-thirds of IDPs surveyed in Iraq reported working in a different sector after their displacement (Al-Shami et al. 2019). Half of refugees that are economically active reported changing occupations since they arrived in Uganda (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019). This is corroborated by qualitative research, for example among refugees from Central African Republic in Cameroon (Barbelet 2017). Obtaining the new skills needed is likely to be easier for younger than for older refugees and IDPs. Acquisition of education and skills as well as work experience are likely to have been disrupted through conflict and forced displacement. In Colombia, for example, Wharton and Uwaifo Oyelere (2011) find significant education accumulation and enrollment gaps for IDP children and youth compared to other migrants and non-migrants. The formal or informal qualifications of those displaced are often not recognized at their destination, especially if they cross borders. Refugees surveyed in Uganda, for example, mentioned the lack of evidence of education and experience as the second most important obstacle for finding a job (18 percent) (Vemuru et al. 2016). In general, the returns to education obtained in the host country might be different from those obtained abroad.

11 Dependency ratios are lowest for Sudanese refugees which arrived over a decade ago and highest for South Sudanese refugees, which arrived in the last five years. Panel data would be needed to understand if and how dependency ratios change over time.

12 The numbers are, however, very similar to those of the host community for households that arrived more than 5 years ago (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019). Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is unclear if this means that family members reunite over time or earlier cohorts were less separated during displacement. As for the dependency ratios panel data would be needed.

13 Before the conflict in Syria, female labor participation rates in Syria were among the lowest in the region and worldwide.
Long periods of forced inactivity have a toll on human capital. In many settings, those forcibly displaced have low labor force participation rates and have to mainly rely on aid, social welfare or remittances, often for a long period of time. Over 95% of the working-age refugees in Ethiopia who did not participate in the labor force in the last 7 days did not undertake any economic activity for over a year (Pape et al. 2019). Longer periods of economic inactivity or unemployment diminish human capital, discourage workers, and make it more difficult to find employment due to negative signaling to employers and limited information about available jobs. Jobs interventions need to address the consequences of these scarring effects of unemployment and beneficiaries not being used to work anymore.

Forced migrants may also not speak the language of the host community and may thus have difficulties finding employment or earning high wages. A lack of language skills may decrease the types of jobs those forcibly displaced can do and also be a barrier to the formation of social networks in the host country that would aid with finding employment (discussed further below). The importance of language as a constraint will likely depend on the skills-level and sector. The existing literature on the linkages between language proficiency and labor market outcomes is mainly focused on high-income countries. An exception is Kayaoglu and Erdogan (2019), who find that Syrian refugees with better Turkish language proficiency have a higher likelihood of being employed. Refugees surveyed in Uganda, identified language as the main obstacle to access employment (19 percent) (Vemuru et al. 2016). In the UK, Cebulla et al. find that refugees with stronger host-country language skills were more likely to be employed or to gain employment over the course of the study (Cebulla et al. 2010). Similarly, in an econometric evaluation of a random-assignment refugee placement program in Switzerland, Auer finds that, controlling for other observable characteristics, refugees placed in areas (cantons) with languages most similar to their own were more likely to find employment (Auer 2018). Also for Switzerland, Slotwinski and Uhlig (2019) show that the greater the language distance between the country of origin and the canton asylum seekers were assigned to, the lower the positive impact of an open labor market access policy on asylum seekers’ employment rate. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) also find that language proficiency, along with mental health, explains part of the differences in employment rates between natives/non-refugee migrants and refugees in the UK. The findings of a positive relationship between language proficiency and labor market outcomes are corroborated by the literature on migrants in OECD countries in general (Chiswick and Miller 2007; Chiswick 2009; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003).

2.3 Human capital: Psychological health and economic behavior

A nascent literature shows how violence and forced displacement have an impact on psychological health and economic behavior, which in turn impacts labor market outcomes. Data on refugees in high-income countries shows, that they are more likely to have lower levels of health than economic migrants (Giuntella et al. 2018; Chin and Cortes 2015). The experience of forced displacement is likely to also impact the psychological health and change the economic behavior of forced migrants. The existing research on this issue is still nascent but suggests that these factors may play an important role in shaping the labor market outcomes of those forcibly displaced. Before jobs interventions are designed which target forced migrants, these changes in mental health and economic behavior need to be analyzed and intervention designs be adapted accordingly.

Refugees and IDPs are more likely than the host population to suffer from poor mental health. Refugees and IDPs who experienced violence, lost relatives and friends or had to leave them behind, or otherwise went through traumatic experiences during their flight to safety, are likely to suffer from the psychological effects, including depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Post-migration stressors like campment, stay in asylum group accommodations, insecurity about legal status
and income, forced idleness due to the inability to integrate the labor market as well as social isolation also have an impact on their mental health. Studies vary greatly in the levels of incidence and prevalence of symptoms they report, due likely to context as well as different measures and methods used (see the literature reviews and meta-analyses by Hollifield et al. 2002; Porter and Haslam 2005; Steel et al. 2009; Bocquého et al. 2018). A study on Malian refugees in a camp in Burkina Faso, for example, found that 60 percent met the criteria for PTSD (Carta et al. 2013). Similarly for IDPs, a household survey in El Salvador oversampling those internally displaced due to violence found that 70 percent were suffering from emotional and psychological consequences, due to direct family members being victims of violence, the loss of assets and separation from family members (Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública 2018). Analyzing 20 surveys from seven Western countries, Fazel, Wheeler, and Danesh (2005) find that resettled refugees could be about ten times more likely to have PTSD compared to the local population.

**Poor mental health might prevent refugees and IDPs from working and successfully participating in jobs interventions.** Stress and trauma have negative impacts on cognitive and socio-emotional functioning (McEwen and Sapolsky 1995). Mental health issues might add to potential physical health issues incurred through forced displacement and have a negative impact on the labor force participation of forced migrants.14 There might also be a vicious circle, with mental health issues preventing refugees and IDPs from participating in the labor market, which then exacerbates their mental health issues. Mental health issues might also make it difficult for them to successfully participate in jobs interventions, but we did not find any literature exploring this link. An exception is ongoing work by Moya, Duryea, and González-Velosa (2018) who find strong patterns of association between the symptoms of trauma, skill deficiencies, labor market outcomes and performance in a job-training program among young IDPs in Colombia.

The experience of violence and forced displacement might also lead to a negative outlook on life and lower hope and aspirations, which can have a negative impact on the economic activities undertaken and create a vicious cycle. Controlling for current level of wellbeing and the loss of assets, Moya and Carter (2019) find that internally displaced households in Colombia who had been exposed to more severe forms of violence have lower perceived prospects of upward mobility relative to the mean of sampled IDPs. In addition, discrimination and stereotypes in the host country can lead to expectancy effects and self-fulfilling prophecies (Bertrand and Duflo 2016). Qualitative work with young refugees in Kampala, Uganda, for example, suggested linkages between discrimination, low self-worth and low educational attainment and labor market participation (Stark et al. 2015).

In line with creating more negative expectations about the future, the experience of conflict has an impact on risk-aversion, which in turn impacts the level of economic risks that people are ready to take (Moya 2018; Jakiela and Ozier 2018; Voors et al. 2012; Callen et al. 2014). The impacts seem to be different if someone was directly exposed to violence or not, and if they were forced to leave or not, and might change over time (Ibáñez and Moya 2016). Moya (2018) finds that internally displaced persons in Colombia who had been exposed to more severe forms of violence are more risk-averse. Forced migrants might also be selected based on their risk-attitude. Using panel data from Nigeria, Ceriani and Verme (2018) show that those risk averse have a higher preference for fleeing while those that are more risk-tolerant have a preference for staying. On the other hand, an experimental study with asylum seekers in Luxembourg finds that they are significantly less risk-averse compared to non-migrant groups in other countries (Bocquého et al. 2018). They seem to have characteristics closer to economic migrants, which tend to be less risk-averse. This can be explained with selection effects given the high risks of a flight

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from Syria or Iraq to Europe. Lower hopes and aspirations as well as higher risk aversion can have particularly negative impacts on entrepreneurship, as entrepreneurs should ideally be self-confident, have higher risk appetite, and rebound quickly after failures (Levine and Rubinstein 2017).

On the other hand, those forcibly displaced might also have a high determination to rebuild their lives, but evidence is missing. People who have lost everything can also be even more determined to rebuild their lives with determination and resilience. Parents may put a lot of pressure on their children to succeed in order to make up for what has been lost. We have not found any literature on this aspect but the increase of education among youth might point in this direction (see last paragraph of this section).

The time horizon of forced migrants will influence their willingness to make host-country specific investments. Compared to economic migrants, the time horizon of forced migrants can be (i) longer if they do not think that they will be able to return or be resettled elsewhere; (ii) uncertain if they are waiting for resettlement, preparing another form of secondary movement, or waiting for the processing of their asylum application, if they plan on returning, or their residence permit is temporary and will be withdrawn once the conflict is over; or (iii) shorter because based on their experiences they expect unexpected changes to happen again in the future. Depending on the situation and their time horizon, they might be less willing or more willing to make investments in terms of language, other skills and assets that are specific to their new location. Qualitative evidence from Colombia, for example, shows that a group of internally displaced persons who received new plots of land did not invest in the land and only grew subsistence crops, out of fear of being displaced again (Matijasevic et al. 2007 via Ibáñez and Moya 2007). In Burundi, the experience of violence also seems to lead to a higher discount rate of future earnings (Voors et al. 2012). In Uganda, refugees planning to go back to their country of origin seem less interested in looking for jobs in Uganda (Loiacono and Vargas 2019). For refugees who are resettled in the US, Cortes (2004) finds that they are more willing to make country-specific skills investments, because they have a longer time horizon compared to economic migrants, who plan to return to their country of origin. Dustmann et al. (2017) note that the pay-off period for these investments plays a role, and if permanent status is only granted after a long period of uncertainty, these specific investments may not be optimal anymore.

Forced migrants might also take the portability of an asset into consideration when thinking about an investment (Brenner and Kiefer 1981 via Becker and Ferrara 2019). They might, for example, prefer investments in human capital to investments in physical capital, and make sure that their human capital is transferrable (e.g. studying engineering instead of law). Supporting this, Becker et al. (2018) found that three generations later, Polish people whose family had been forcibly displaced after World War II, had on average one more year of schooling. Survey results confirm a shift in their investment preferences from material assets to mobile human capital. Similarly, results from a survey in nine countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia suggest that those aged 18-34 who have been affected by conflict (displaced and non-displaced) are more willing to obtain further education and training (Ivlevs and Veliziotis 2018).

2.4 Legal situation and discrimination

A complex set of laws and regulations influences labor market access of refugees. As citizens, IDPs are usually not confronted with these legal challenges, but there are exceptions.15 A growing number of studies study the effects of these laws and regulations in high-income countries by exploiting changes in these laws and regulations and finds that they have sizable impacts on labor market outcomes (see section

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15 One example is Azerbaijan, where legal restrictions to the employment, accommodation and schooling of IDPs continue to exist (World Bank 2017).
4.3). The existing literature for low- and middle-income countries is mainly descriptive. Two new indices are currently being developed to codify existing obstacles in low- and middle-income countries. The causal impact of these legal limitations on the actual labor market access of refugees in low- and middle-income countries and their importance compared to other factors mentioned in the sections above still needs to be studied. Future research will be able to exploit changes in legislation in Jordan, Ethiopia, and Colombia to broaden our understanding.

Even if the 1951 Refugee Convention grants refugees the right to work, be it as employees, self-employed or in liberal professions, the right to work of refugees is often limited, with obstacles not only existing de jure but also de facto. Of the 145 countries that have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, nearly half declare reservations, often in full, to these Articles. Only 75 signatory countries formally grant the right through accession to Articles 17-19 or through domestic employment laws but may impose conditions or reservations to this right (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). The same limitations apply to many of the 48 states that are not parties to the Convention, including many major refugee host countries. Some countries completely legally ban refugees from working, be it as an employee or starting a business. Many countries that in principle allow refugees to work place restrictions on their right to work. They, for example, limit the sectors and geographical areas in which refugees can work, or the number of refugees who can be employed by a certain firm, and require them to have a local partner when setting up a business. Refugees also often must first apply for a work permit. Even if refugees are de jure allowed to work, de facto processes to obtain work permits and register a business are often confusing and costs can be exorbitantly high. If work permits are only temporary, procedures to obtain the work permits are cumbersome for employers and employers need to prove there is no local, equally qualified person for the job they might be less inclined to hire refugees.

Besides the right to work per se, access to protection is a key factor. How, when, and if refugees can access protection and how temporary or permanent their refugee status is, is a key determinant of their ability to obtain the right to work and integrate into the labor market (Zetter, Ruaudel, and Schuettler 2017). In some countries, the number of undocumented refugees is much higher than the number of registered refugees, and these nonregistered refugees do not have the right to work. In other countries, asylum seekers may have to wait for certain periods before they can work, if at all, while their asylum claim is being processed. In OECD countries, the wait time before asylum seekers can enter the labor market varies between zero and twelve months (OECD 2016a, 22). In some cases, their legal status is not stable, even after they have obtained protection, which might deter employers from hiring them.

Restrictions on the freedom of movement limits refugee access to employment in another way, by preventing them from moving to where the economic opportunities are. Refugees are often not allowed to choose freely where to settle in the host country, and placed in geographically remote areas with few economic opportunities, which adds to their difficulties to integrate the labor market. A study collecting data on IDPs in camps and outside of camps in Nigeria and Somalia also found that IDP camps are further away from markets and services (Pape et al. 2019). Worldwide, over a third of refugees still live in camps (UNHCR 2019), even if there is a trend towards liberalization of movement in low- and middle-income countries (Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein 2020). A number of OECD countries, notably in Europe, have implemented settlement policies for refugees based on criteria like housing availability

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16 The dataset by Blair, Grossman and Weinstein (2020) covers de jure asylum and refugee policies in over 90 developing countries and includes the ability to work and own property as well as the ease of entrance and security of status, and encampment policies. A so-called Refugee Opportunity Index is currently being developed by the Refugee Investment Network and the Economist Intelligence Unit. It will built on 45 sub-indices targeting three broad policy and market segments: (1) Refugee admissions, integration, and resettlement policy; (2) Basic rights and access to services, and (3) Employment conditions.

17 For examples see 20 country case studies in Zetter and Ruaudel 2016, Part II.
and geographical dispersal instead of labor market opportunities (OECD 2016a, Tables 3a and 3b). In Turkey, for example, non-Syrian refugees are assigned to live in one of 62 cities, a list which excludes the first-tier cities Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (Leghtas and Hollingsworth 2017). Even if not formally de jure in place, encampment policies or other geographical restrictions on the place of residence are de facto in place if access to services and assistance is restricted to a certain place of residence. Where economic opportunities exist, if there are restrictions on travel or if police and military checks deter refugees from moving around, they might also not be able to commute to work. Movement restrictions also limit self-employment and entrepreneurship, making it for example difficult and more expensive to access inputs and goods, as a market assessment in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya showed (UNHCR and ILO 2019). Refugees are often unable to leave the country on work-related travel and return. Restrictions on the place of residence and travel also limit contacts with networks that could facilitate access to employment.

In many countries, refugees are also faced with restrictions on their ability to own property, open a business or a bank account, and access other financial services like insurance and loans. These restrictions affect their ability to work or start their own business. If their legal status is uncertain, or their rights are curtailed, this will also determine what kind of investments they will make.

**Forced migrants also struggle with lack of information on their rights and are faced with discrimination.** Employers are not always aware that they can hire refugees. When asked if refugees in Uganda were allowed to move freely or to work, Loiacono and Silva Vargas (2019), for example, find that only 21 and 23 percent of employers surveyed gave the right answer. In focus group discussions with Congolese refugees in Rwanda they named employers’ lack of knowledge of refugees’ right to work as a major obstacle to their labor market integration (Bilgili and Loschmann 2018). Employers might also discriminate against refugees due to other reasons, including prejudices and stereotypes. In Uganda, refugees earn around 40 percent less than hosts, even after controlling for observable characteristics (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019). Conducting lab in the field experiments with a small sample of refugee jobs seekers and local firms in Uganda, Loiacono and Silva Vargas (2019) find evidence of discrimination. Discrimination against Colombian refugees in Ecuador hinders their ability to find employment, housing, and education (White 2011). Quantitative and qualitative work in Australia has pointed out that, for refugees from the former Yugoslavia, Africa, and the Middle East, there appears to be significant discrimination experienced by individuals in labor markets (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2007). If refugees are legally not allowed to work, they are even more prone to discrimination, harassment and exploitation in the workplace (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). As evidence for Colombia shows, discrimination against internally displaced persons might also exist (Ibáñez and Moya 2007).

### 2.5 Lack of social networks, information on labor markets, and labor demand

Social networks within the host community are important to integrate the labor market and can help forced migrants overcome information asymmetries. Refugees and IDPs often lack social networks in their place of destination. Social networks are, however, important to find jobs, including for those forcibly displaced. Studies focused on refugees in OECD countries show that social networks are positively correlated with the odds of employment and occupational status (for the Netherlands De Vroome and Van Tubergen 2010; for the UK Cheung and Phillimore 2014). This is corroborated by qualitative and descriptive evidence from low- and middle-income countries (Nichols and Jacobsen 2012a; 2012b; Loiacono and Vargas 2019; Barbelet 2017). There is a broader literature on the effects of social networks for international migrants in general (Patel and Vella 2013; Colussi 2015; Munshi 2003), but the limited access to networks is likely to be more constraining for forced migrants, as their decision on where to go is more driven by violence as a push factor than by networks as a pull factor. Social networks can inform about job openings or directly refer forced migrants to their employers. They can also provide important information about what is required by employers. Like other migrants, forced
migrants often lack information of how labor markets work at destination. When asking firms in Uganda what they usually ask job seekers to bring along when they apply for jobs, Loiacono, and Silva Vargas (2019) find that 67 percent of the firms sampled request an introductory letter produced by the local council (which they use to assess a job-seeker’s trustworthiness when they are not connected to them), but only 4 percent of refugees bring such a letter with them when applying for jobs. The lack of social networks not only makes it more difficult to overcome information asymmetries on the labor market, but also leads to a lack of informal risk-sharing mechanisms in the host country. Networks are also crucial for setting up a business, obtain market information, capital and clients.

Social networks with host communities can, however, be difficult to establish for forced migrants. Social networks with the host community may be particularly hard to form for forced migrants who do not speak the language of the host community. Cheung and Phillimore (2014) suggest both that lack of social networks hinders refugees’ employment prospects, and that language ability significantly increases refugees’ social networks in the UK. Besides a lack of language skills, living in remote areas, in camps, or in group accommodations combined with restrictions on freedom of movement increases social isolation and makes it difficult to build networks with hosts.

Contacts with certain groups of co-nationals or other refugees can be helpful for better labor market outcomes. A strand of research in high-income countries looks at the impacts of networks with people from the same country of origin or reason for migration and several studies focus specifically on refugees. Networks are usually defined as the number of refugees or co-nationals in the area of settlement. If there is sorting, i.e. people go to where economic opportunities are – it is difficult to assign the impacts to networks. This is why the literature studies cases where refugees are randomly placed based on dispersal policies. Exploiting a government settlement policy, Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) find a positive impact of living in ethnic enclaves on earnings for low-skilled refugees in Sweden. Damm (2009) corroborates these results for Denmark, finding a positive impact of existing ethnic enclaves on annual earnings of refugees, which she attributes to the fact that the job information obtained through ethnic networks leads to a better matching on the labor market. In a second article (2014) she also shows that the labor market outcomes of refugee men are not affected by the overall employment rate in their neighborhood, while an increase in the employment rate of men from the same country of origin raises their annual earnings. Similarly, refugees in Denmark who were resettled near other immigrants from their country of origin found their first job faster than those settled in areas with few others from their country, perhaps because of lower language barriers and better social networks (Damm and Rosholm 2010). Martén, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2019) show that refugees assigned to live in locations in Switzerland where many co-nationals reside are more likely to find employment, notably in the first years after arrival, and to have full-year employment.

However, others have suggested mixed or negative employment effects of contacts with co-nationals or other refugees, which might suggest that relying too exclusively on these networks might hamper long-term integration with hosts. In Germany, Battisti, Peri, and Romiti (2016) find that refugees in locations with more coethnics are more likely to be employed quickly, but also have a lower probability of investing in human capital and a higher probability of earning a lower wage. In the US, the impact of those with whom you arrive is negative, compared to those already established (Beaman 2011). Dagnelie, Mayda and Maystadt (2019) find a negative impact on the employment outcomes of refugees resettled in the US if other refugees in the network are employees and a positive impact if they are entrepreneurs and thus employers. These findings for Germany and the US show that the impacts of ethnic networks are not clear-cut. Some have argued that ethnic enclaves may also be detrimental by hindering language acquisition as well as social integration and networks with the host community (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003). The relationship between ethnic networks and labor market outcomes may be inverse U-shaped. Even if they facilitate economic integration at the beginning through overcoming information
asymmetries and discrimination on the labor market, relying too exclusively on networks of co-ethnics might hamper long-term economic assimilation with natives.

**Forced migrants often face a lack of demand on the labor market at destination, as they usually do not choose their first destination based on available labor market opportunities, and tend to move together in large groups, suddenly increasing labor supply.** This excess supply adds additional challenges to their labor market integration and might influence labor market outcomes not only in the short-term but also in the long-term. Evidence from OECD countries shows, that refugees who arrived during times of recession, have worse labor market outcomes which can persist over time (Aslund and Rooth 2007; Fasani, Frattini, and Minale 2018; Barth, Bratsberg, and Raaum 2004). The historical example of forced displacement flows to Germany after World War II shows that high inflows of those forcibly displaced and agrarian areas (which had lower labor demand compared to industrial areas) where highly negatively correlated with labor force participation rates of those forcibly displaced (Braun and Dwenger 2020). Together with other barriers to their labor market integration, this lack of demand might lead to higher rates of self-employment among those forcibly displaced in their host countries. For example, in Uganda, self-employment is preferred by refugees to avoid language barriers and exploitation, and they are less likely to lose their jobs when self-employed (Vemuru et al. 2016). In the UK, those who migrated for asylum (who face a much higher hourly earning gap compared to the UK-born population) are more likely to be self-employed than those who migrated for other reasons such as work (and face a lower payment gap) (Kone, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva 2020). Such higher rates of self-employment likely reflect necessity and not opportunity entrepreneurship.

### 3. Overview of literature on jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs

#### 3.1 Methodology

**Search Methods.** To form an initial stocktaking of the literature, searches were conducted in large databases (EconLit, Google Scholar, EconPapers, IDEAS/RePEc, and SSRN), the website of large international organizations (World Bank, UNHCR), repositories of recent impact evaluations (3ie, IPA, and JPAL) and other topic-specific research centers and repositories (Cash Learning Partnership, Center for Global Development, Overseas Development Institute, Center for Research and Analysis of Migration, Tufts Feinstein International Center, FinDev Gateway), and the websites of NGOs and programs that have published assessments of their programs. These sites were searched using keywords specific to forced displacement and employment or intervention type. Gray literature was included to broaden the evidence base, as much of the literature on these topics is very recent. Including gray literature also helps us reduce publication bias.

Since much of the literature is gray literature, simply ending the search after consulting these largely academic sources would have not given us a complete picture. In the next round of searching, we used snowball sampling from the papers found as well as discussions with other researchers and experts to broaden the search along the paths of the first search.

**Inclusion criteria.** This review focuses on literature that is quantitative, especially econometric, in nature, and puts less emphasis on papers that are based on qualitative or descriptive findings alone. We will attempt to use the literature to draw conclusions on jobs interventions for those forcibly displaced in middle- and low-income countries, using what has been found in high-income countries as support. Papers were included if they met one of the following criteria, in order of importance:
Main findings.
- Based on an econometric impact evaluation (notably those using experimental or quasi-experimental methods) evaluating programs or program effects on employment-related outcomes specifically for those forcibly displaced.
- Literature reviews compiling rigorous evidence regarding program effects on employment-related outcomes specifically for those forcibly displaced.

Supporting literature.
- Based on descriptive or qualitative evidence and focused on program impacts on employment-related outcomes specifically for those forcibly displaced in low- or middle-income countries.
- Based on descriptive quantitative evidence and focused on program impacts on employment-related outcomes specifically for forcibly displaced in high-income countries if there is no econometric literature available for this type of program.
- Review studies of qualitative results based on multiple countries including high-income countries.

We triangulated the results with evidence for other groups of migrants and the impacts of such types of interventions in low- and middle-income countries more broadly, including in situations of fragility, conflict or violence. The focus was on papers in English. Our inclusion criteria led us to include 115 papers on evaluations of jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs. The following section outlines the characteristics of this literature and points to gaps that may be considered in future research.

3.2 Description of the literature

Gray literature. Approximately 64% of the papers examined are not published in journals (yet) and exist either as working papers or as part of gray literature, such as an NGO’s internal evaluation. Including these papers that are not published gives us a richer picture of the evidence base and diminishes the risk of publication bias.

Region of study. Most papers considered in this review come from high-income host countries, especially from Europe and Central Asia (ECA) (Figure 1). Even so, 27 papers look at Sub-Saharan African host countries and 25 papers cover the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (most of which focus on Syrian refugees in the region). Where the econometric literature on low- and middle-income host countries is thin, we present findings from Europe and the United States and supplement them with descriptive and qualitative findings from LMICs that suggest how these interventions might translate to other contexts. The main countries of origin for refugees are Syria, Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The studies on IDPs largely focus on Uganda, Colombia, Somalia, and Democratic Republic of Congo.

Methodologies and research designs. The methodologies used in these papers vary across regions. For the purposes of this overview, “econometric” refers to papers that included any type of significance testing, including t-tests and multivariate regressions along with more rigorous quasi-experimental research designs such as matching, instrumental variables, regression discontinuity designs or difference-in-differences, as well as experimental methods/randomized controlled trials. “Descriptive” papers, on the other hand, are based on quantitative data but do not attempt to analyze statistical significance and are often post- or pre-post evaluations. “Qualitative” papers include papers without a quantitative element, which usually use key informant interviews, focus group discussions and/or semi-structured interviews to collect data. Finally, “review” papers are literature reviews or papers based heavily on previous literature rather than original data. Since we are especially interested in quantitative assessments in this review, papers with mixed methods are included as econometric or descriptive (as appropriate), rather than qualitative, although they include qualitative components.
The econometric work is concentrated in the Europe and Central Asia region (Figure 1). Among the econometric papers, 15 cover randomized controlled trials (RCTs) (3 in Europe and Central Asia, 1 in East Asia and the Pacific, 1 in the Middle East and North Africa, 3 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 8 in Sub-Saharan Africa) (Figure 2). Several of these papers are medical trials studying mental health outcomes. However, the most common type of econometric analysis was multivariate regression, sometimes exploiting some form of quasi-natural experiment.

**Figure 1: Region of study and methodology (multiple responses allowed)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Descriptive</th>
<th>Econometric</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

Types of outcomes studied. Although this review focuses on employment-related outcomes, studies consider several types of outcome variables. These include variables that are directly related to employment (such as employment rates, earnings, or sources of income) as well as variables that are indirectly related (ability to pay for basic needs, expenditure, health, education). Many studies considered multiple types of outcomes. Studies with only indirectly related outcome variables were included only if they examined a relevant job intervention type. The most common outcome that was studied is employment rates, followed by earnings, basic needs, and self-employment (Figure 3).
**Types of programs.** The majority of the studies considered focus on interventions aiming to increase forced migrants’ financial capital through transfers and their human capital through trainings and psychosocial support (Table 2). These have also been the most widely implemented types of interventions in the past. Many programs, especially those in high-income countries such as Denmark or Sweden and graduation-type of approaches in lower- and middle-income countries, include several of these types of interventions. A number of studies also look at the impacts of changes in the legal framework, but they are focused on HICs for now. Meanwhile, the evidence is thinner on other types of interventions, like subsidized employment in the private or public sector and interventions assuring access to markets. We build on indirect evidence, such as evaluations for migrants in general rather than forced migrants, in discussing these types of interventions. As these measures are increasingly becoming popular in the context of forced displacement it seems important to fill this gap in the future. In general, evaluations seem to be missing where the number of interventions is still very limited (like for tackling constraints linked to labor demand and lack of social networks). Interventions generating labor demand for refugees and IDPs are more difficult to implement in terms of the political economy in the host country than improving the quality of labor supply and supporting matching mechanisms in the market. Even where interventions have been more widely implemented, a prioritization of fast implementation in the forced displacement context might have limited the possibility of implementing experimental designs in program delivery.

**Income-level of the host country and interventions studied.** The studies on the different intervention types are not evenly dispersed by income level of the host country. The evidence on repeated and one-off transfer programs contains many studies on middle- and low-income contexts, while studies on language
training, matching, legal frameworks, and wage subsidies are more concentrated in high income countries (Figure 4). The only intervention type with exclusively high-income evidence is wage subsidies. Studies in upper middle contexts include many studies on Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon.

Figure 5 provides a detailed heatmap summarize the evidence and gaps by intervention type, outcome studied, and host country region.

**Figure 4: Types of programs and income of country contexts (multiple responses allowed)**

- Repeated cash transfers, vouchers, and in-kind transfers: 6 | 1 | 1 | 7
- One-off transfers and complementary interventions: 3 | 6 | 4 | 8
- Vocational, business and other skills training: 10 | 6 | 1 | 5
- Language training: 17 | 1
- Healthcare and psychosocial support: 5 | 5 | 1 | 7
- Legal framework: 19 | 5 | 2 | 1
- Job search assistance and matching: 11 | 3 | 1
- Wage subsidies: 9
- Direct employment and cash for work: 1
- Market-based or value chains interventions: 1

**Refugees and IDPs.** Approximately 14 percent of the papers studied focus on the situation of IDPs. Another 4 percent cover both refugees and IDPs, which are mostly review studies. However, this still leaves the majority of the papers that cover only refugees. This points out a substantial gap in the literature, as most papers focus on those who have been forcibly displaced across borders and not internally.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Type</th>
<th>Specific challenges addressed (in order of importance)</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Number of papers; evidence of impact*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Repeated transfers                       | • Loss of assets and income  
• Lack of social networks                                                  | • allow households to cover their basic needs → improve their mental health, allow households to search for higher quality jobs and take more risks  
• indirectly increase social cohesion → decrease discrimination on the labor market  
• increase investments in education and health → improve labor market outcomes in the future / of the next generation | 27 papers***; Positive                |
| One-off transfers (grant or credit)       | • Loss of assets  
• Lack of labor demand                                                      | • Increase productive assets → increase income from self-employment or entrepreneurship                                                                                                             | 25 papers*; Promising when combined with other interventions                       |
| Vocational, business and other skills training, and recognition of skills | • Lack of skills                                                                                                           | • Diminish skills mismatch → increase income from employment and self-employment  
• Provide evidence for skills for employers                                                                                                    | 24 papers*; Mixed; more promising when combined with other interventions              |
| Language training                         | • Loss of skills  
• Lack of social networks and information on labor market                                                                 | • Better match employers’ needs ; increase income through self-employment and entrepreneurship  
• Allow to build up social networks → improve mental health, increase information on job opportunities                                     | 20 papers**; Promising, if well designed and combined with other interventions         |
| Healthcare and psychosocial support       | • Physical and psychological health                                                                                       | • Improve health → increase ability to participate in labor market and productivity                                                                                                               | 17 papers***; Positive                |
| Improve legal framework and information about rights | • Legal challenges                                                                                                         | • Grant right to work → increase employment and job quality, prevent exploitation  
• Reduce wait time for right to work → avoid delaying obtention of host-country specific work experience and demotivation → increase speed of employment, job quality and income trajectories | 25 papers**; Promising               |
| **Job search assistance, matching and coaching** | Increase certainty about prospects of stay → increase time horizon → increase incentive for host-country specific investments  
Grant freedom of movement and settlement → can move to where economic opportunities and their social networks are  
Remove other legal obstacles like access to financial services and ability to own property → increase self-employment / entrepreneurship  
Anti-discrimination laws and information about rights → increase employment and job quality, prevent exploitation |
|---|---|
| **Wage subsidies** | Overcome search and matching frictions including information asymmetries regarding the qualifications of those forcibly displaced  
Allow them to move to where economic opportunities and their social networks are  |
| **Subsidized public sector employment** | Overcome search and matching frictions including information asymmetries regarding the qualifications of those forcibly displaced due to language or other barriers  
Increase probability of future employment  |
| **Access to markets / value chain interventions** | Develop or strengthen links along the value chain, increase information → increase income from self-employment and micro-enterprises  |

**Job search assistance, matching and coaching**
- Lack of social networks and information

**Wage subsidies**
- Lack of skills
- Lack of social networks
- Lack of labor demand

**Subsidized public sector employment**
- Loss of assets
- Lack of skills
- Lack of social networks
- Lack of labor demand

**Access to markets / value chain interventions**
- Lack of social networks and information
- Lack of labor demand

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*** = rigorous quantitative evidence for LMIC; ** = rigorous quantitative evidence focused on HIC; * = qualitative and less rigorous quantitative evidence for LMIC; no star = lack of evidence

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16 papers**; Mixed
8 papers**; Promising but evidence limited to high-income settings
3 papers; Less promising
9 papers; Promising
Figure 5: Detailed heatmap of evidence and gaps by intervention, outcome, and region of study
4. Results of evaluations of jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs

4.1. Financial capital interventions

Providing forcibly displaced people with financial capital may help account for the loss of assets due to their displacement. Notably in low-income countries but also in middle-income countries self-employment is an important source of income which usually requires certain assets. It might also help them overcome liquidity constraints and offer a form of insurance, making up for the lack of networks in the host community that would provide informal risk-sharing, savings, and credit. These transfer programs may have two types: repeated conditional or unconditional transfers, which may occur weekly or monthly; or one-time grants or credits, which are more directly tied to asset-building and often combined with business training and coaching.

4.1.1. Repeated cash transfers, vouchers, and in-kind transfers

Regular transfer programs are frequently used in the forced displacement context but the fact that they might have (indirect) employment effects is often overlooked. Repeated-type programs may impact employment outcomes by (i) covering basic needs, improving mental health and sometimes allowing households to save, and, through this channel, (ii) giving them more freedom of choice, allowing them to search for higher-quality work and take more risks; (iii) allowing them to invest in education and health and avoid negative coping strategies like child labor which affect future labor market outcomes; and (iv) indirectly increasing social networks and decreasing discrimination, improving employment outcomes through lowering social barriers to labor market entry.

Transfer programs reduce poverty and help cover basic needs, improving mental health and sometimes allowing households to save. The emerging literature on refugees and IDPs suggests that, in line with previous literature on low- and middle-income countries (Bastagli et al. 2019), both unconditional and conditional cash transfer programs reduce poverty and increase spending on goods for basic needs. Several rigorous quasi-experimental and experimental studies have considered the effect of cash transfers in forced displacement contexts. Studying Syrian refugees preparing for winter conditions in Lebanon in 2014 using a regression discontinuity design, the International Rescue Committee found that unconditional cash transfers over five months lead to increased spending on food, clothing, and heating fuel (Lehmann and Masterson 2014). A second impact evaluation with a large sample using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to study cash transfers by the World Food Program and UNHCR also found increases in household expenditures notably in terms of food quality and quantity and a significant decrease in food insecurity (Chaaban et al. 2020). Evaluations of the impact of UNHCR cash transfers for Syrian refugees in Jordan also support this finding, suggesting increased expenditures for basic needs, especially paying rent (Abu Hamad et al. 2017; Giordano et al. 2017). Qualitative and descriptive work in this context suggests that the cash transfer especially helped refugees to access housing (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs, and Holmes 2018; UNHCR 2017b). An RCT among Colombian refugees in Ecuador finds that cash transfers significantly increased food security outcomes, including expenditures, caloric intake, and diet diversity (Hidrobo et al. 2014). Beneficiaries of cash transfers and food vouchers during the 2010 famine in Somalia, which included a high number of IDPs due to drought and conflict, also had improved food security outcomes, as monitoring data shows (Dunn, Brewin, and Seck 2013). An RCT in the Democratic Republic of Congo looking at the impacts of vouchers or fairs for

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18 Another impact evaluation using a regression discontinuity design (while having to correct for the fact that the two groups were not fully similar) also found that the Lebanon Cash Consortium (LCC) cash assistance significantly increased the sum of total expenditure for food, water, health, hygiene and housing of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Battistin 2016).
essential household items for IDPs found significant positive treatment effects not only on food security, but also on investment in assets and on adult mental health (life satisfaction and wellbeing) (Quattrochi et al. 2019). Cash transfers for Syrian refugees in Lebanon also significantly and strongly increased mental health by almost three-fold from 18.5 percent in the control group to 54.5 percent in the treatment group (Chaaban et al. 2020).

The findings on impacts on basic needs seem to be very similar for cash, voucher or in-kind food transfer programs but cash might have additional benefits. Cash transfers do give the beneficiaries more flexibility and allow them to spend the cash also on non-food items and save a proportion, as the RCT in Ecuador and another RCT comparing vouchers to cash for IDPs in the Democratic Republic of Congo found (Hidrobo et al. 2014; Aker 2013). Cash transfers might also increase overall consumption if refugees are only able to resell part of their in-kind assistance for a much lower price, as a study using a regression discontinuity design in Kenya shows (MacPherson and Sterck 2019). Alloush et al. (2017) find that Congolese refugees in Rwanda receiving cash transfers are happier than those receiving in kind transfers, but are not able to demonstrate a causal relationship, as camps were not randomly selected to receive cash or in kind support and they lack baseline data. The studies do not find evidence of beneficiaries spending cash on temptation goods (Lehmann and Masterson 2014; Aker 2013). Availability of goods and access to markets is, however, a precondition for cash transfers to work.

Repeated transfers do not seem to have a positive impact on adult employment rates and might allow refugees and IDPs to search for higher-quality jobs, but existing evidence is focused on Syrian refugees. Previous reviews of the literature on cash transfers to alleviate poverty have suggested that they tend to result in very little or no change in adult employment (Bastagli et al. 2019; Baird, Mckenzie, and Ozler 2018). The elderly and those caring for dependents or only working casually seem to be most likely to reduce their labor force participation in response to the transfer. Although many of the evaluations of the impacts of transfers on refugees do not consider employment or labor market outcomes, the ones on Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan that do tend to find that the transfers (slightly) reduce labor supply (Lehmann and Masterson 2014; Giordano et al. 2017; Chaaban et al. 2020) or do not have a positive impact on labor supply (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs, and Holmes 2018). This may be because of differences in the quality of jobs taken by refugees – if they secure some level of income from cash transfers, they may have more ability to choose jobs that are higher-paying, less hazardous, or otherwise higher quality. Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan who received unconditional cash transfers were not only less likely to be employed than those who did but were also much less likely to undertake risky or dangerous activities (Chaaban et al. 2020; Lehmann and Masterson 2014; Giordano et al. 2017). While Chaaban et al. (2020) find the highest decrease in male employment among Syrian refugees in Lebanon (17 percentage points), they also observe an increase of 10.6 percentage points in the rate of unemployed men who are not working but are actively looking for a better job, a result that was confirmed qualitatively. The same does not hold for refugee women, which seem to prioritize household chores and childcare when able to avoid low-paying and often hazardous jobs. Others find that Syrian refugees receiving cash transfers are much less likely than their counterparts to report independent income, which might represent reductions in child labor or fear of losing access to the benefits (Abu Hamad et al. 2017). The fear to lose assistance might also diminish incentives to apply for a work permit, as qualitative research among Syrian refugees in Jordan shows (Bellamy et al. 2017). The findings for adult labor force participation also seem to hold in high-income countries: cash transfers and other benefits appear to encourage refugees in the United States and Poland, to seek higher quality or higher-paying work (LoPalo 2019; Lukasiewicz 2017). Evidence on South Korea also shows that transfers are negatively associated with the probability of employment, likely through increasing reservation wages (Yu et al. 2012). A study exploiting a reduction in unemployment benefits provided to refugees in Denmark also supports this reservation wage interpretation, as the policy change increased refugees’ adult labor market participation, but their total income was lower than the cash transfer they had previously received (Jakobsen, Kaarsen, and Vasiljeva 2020).
Those with the poorest labor market prospects, low-skilled workers and women, were the least responsive to the reduction in the cash transfer amount (Rosholm and Vejlin 2010).

**Cash transfers may help low-income forcibly displaced people to afford education, which improves future labor market outcomes.** Cash transfers may also increase the ability of individuals and households to invest in human capital. The randomized controlled trial in the Democratic Republic of Congo found that those IDPs who received cash instead of vouchers used it, in part, to pay school fees (Aker 2013). Even if the cash transfers in Lebanon were intended to help Syrian refugees prepare for winter, children in the treatment group had higher school enrollment rates than those in the control group (Lehmann and Masterson 2014). Similar results were found in the second study on cash transfers in Lebanon (Chaaban et al. 2020). In Uganda, results from a non-representative survey show that the vast majority (85%) of refugees surveyed struggled to afford school fees, and that this lack of educational opportunity hindered their future employment prospects, as for refugees a higher level of education is associated with a higher likelihood of participating in the labor market in Uganda (Vemuru et al. 2016). Descriptive and qualitative research on Syrian refugees in Jordan found that high school fees were a major barrier to education for refugees, and increased cash or voucher transfer value was associated with an increase in school spending, although many barriers remain (Abu Hamad et al. 2017).

**Cash transfers might decrease negative coping strategies like child labor.** Several econometric papers find that cash transfers reduce child work done by Syrian children in Lebanon and Jordan outside the home or inside the home (Lehmann and Masterson 2014; De Hoop et al. 2019; Giordano et al. 2017). Qualitative findings also support that the transfer helps reduce child labor (Hagen-Zanker, Ulrichs, and Holmes 2018; UNHCR 2017b; Bellamy et al. 2017). These results are in line with general reductions in child labor found in studies looking at cash transfer programs in low- and middle-income countries beyond the forced displacement context (de Hoop and Rosati 2014). Meanwhile, in Denmark, using a regression discontinuity design, Jakobsen, Kaarsen, and Vasiljeva find no evidence of changes in youth’s labor supply caused by reduced cash benefit to parents (Jakobsen, Kaarsen, and Vasiljeva 2017). This might represent the differences in labor markets between low- or middle- and high-income economies.

**Transfers may indirectly increase social networks and decrease discrimination, which could help refugees and IDPs find jobs.** Although cash transfers are generally thought of in terms of increasing financial capital, there is potential for another mechanism: cash transfers may affect social cohesion and social networks within and between the host community and forced migrants. To the extent that lower discrimination and more positive relationships with the host community may affect employment, cash transfers may indirectly affect job outcomes through this mechanism as well. For example, cash, food, and voucher transfers have been found in an RCT for Colombia refugees in Ecuador to significantly increase social cohesion and social participation for refugees, probably because of joint targeting of refugees and poor host community members, or because of interaction at required training events (Valli et al. 2018). An RCT in the Democratic Republic of Congo found an increase in social cohesion as a result of vouchers or fairs for essential household items for IDPs (Quattrochi et al. 2019). Lehmann and Masterson (2014) found that cash transfers to Syrian refugees in Lebanon made them more likely to develop social ties, and less likely to be insulted by members of the host community. A difference-in-differences evaluation of a shelter assistance program by UNHCR serving IDPs and returnees in Afghanistan found that the program reduced social tensions because it reduced pressures on the local community’s resources and was perceived as transparent and fair (Siegel et al. 2012). However, faults in program design for cash transfers, such as poor targeting, may increase community tensions (Simon 2018).

### 4.1.2 One-off transfers and complementary interventions

**One-off grants or credits aim more directly at helping those forcibly displaced overcome the loss of assets to become self-employed or start a business.** Repeated transfer programs are often focused on
addressing poverty, food security, and basic needs rather than jobs outcomes. Only some regular transfer programs explicitly aim to support job search assistance, income-generating activities or business start-up, sometimes combined with one or two larger injections of capital. How such programs are framed might have an impact on how the cash is used. One-time grants or credits usually aim more particularly toward building productive assets, assuming that access to credit is a binding constraint. This is important with respect to the prospects of those forcibly displaced for self-employment and entrepreneurship if they faced the loss of assets, especially where labor markets are not able or willing to absorb the labor supply shock through the arrival of forced migrants.

One-off cash grants or asset transfers can increase income from self-employment, but uncertainty about length of stay and restrictive legal frameworks for refugees might lower impacts. Existing research shows positive results for cash-transfers on self-employment, with the exception of very insecure environments (Blattman and Ralston 2015). In the forced displacement context we would expect even more positive impacts due to the previous loss of assets. On the other hand, however, we would expect short time horizons or uncertainty about length of stay as well as very restrictive legal frameworks for refugees to limit the impacts of such cash injections, as discussed in section 2. More evaluations are needed to increase our understanding of the respective importance of these factors. The few existing evaluations often include other types of programming as well as one-off cash grants, and do not tease out the effect of the cash grant alone (see evidence on graduation approaches below). Compared to regular unconditional cash transfers, Hassan et al. (2018), for example, find positive impacts of business grants combined with business trainings on business ownership, income, and assets among Somali IDPs five months after the intervention. Using matching techniques, start-up subsidies in Germany, paid out monthly but tied to a business plan, were found to be particularly effective for disadvantaged groups on the labor market, but less effective for non-German compared to German citizens (Caliendo, Künn, and Wießner 2010). We have not found any evaluations of interventions granting access to or ownership of land, which is an important obstacle for agricultural activities.

Using micro-finance or other form of loans instead of grants faces additional challenges in the context of forced displacement. Refugees face additional difficulties to access credit due to the perceived temporariness of their stay (and the associated perceived higher risk of non-repayment) and lower (perceived) group solidarity and pressure for loan repayment. Lack of collateral and credit histories, laws and regulations that restrict refugees’ access to financial services, and lack of required identification also play a role (Easton-Calabria and Omata 2016). The fact that refugees are often used to receiving services for free might decrease the likelihood of repayment (Jacobsen 2004). Nevertheless, the financial inclusion of refugees can have positive impacts on resilience and the ability to restart economic activities (El-Zoghbi et al. 2017). Lessons learnt from a project providing loans to displaced populations in African countries show different ways how programs can be adapted to the forcibly displaced target population (Jacobsen 2004). Several microfinance and access to finance initiatives exist for refugees and IDPs in low- and middle-income countries and there is some evidence that refugees do repay their loans and lending to them might be sustainable under certain conditions (IFC and Bridgespan Group 2019; Nourse 2003). There is, however, a lack of robust evidence on the impacts for those forcibly displaced and the existing literature is limited to qualitative and descriptive results. Beneficiaries of UNHCR-financed microcredit projects in Costa Rica, Serbia, and Kenya have indicated that their income increased after the loan (Azorbo 2011; UNHCR 2018a). Qualitative evidence from IDPs in Azerbaijan suggests that microfinance has helped them obtain agricultural land for farming and other economic opportunities (Flowers 2003). A microfinance pilot targeted to women IDPs in Uganda was associated with IDPs better able to purchase productive assets like bicycles and clocks and helped them to build business skills (Jacobsen et al. 2006). However, there are also challenges. For example, Germany’s InvestitionsBank Berlin piloted micro-loans for refugees, but had very low uptake because of product design and the shorter term of loan, which was designed to match the refugees’ visa length of three years (Dhawan 2018). Beyond the forced displacement context, most micro-finance in low- and middle-income countries has proven to be
expensive and the short, inflexible repayment periods are not conducive to increasing profits (Blattman and Ralston 2015; J-PAL and IPA 2015; A. Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015).

Compared to grants or microfinance alone, combined approaches like graduation-type programs hold a larger promise for vulnerable populations like refugees and IDPs. Graduation-type programs include both cash grants geared to building up assets and business or entrepreneurship training, along with intensive coaching and financial inclusion for the extreme poor and vulnerable populations to graduate into sustainable livelihoods. Their objective is to address multiple constraints simultaneously to reduce extreme poverty. Most of these programs are implemented in low- or middle-income contexts. In 2017, the Partnership for Economic Inclusion documented 99 active graduation-type programs around the world, with 16 percent of them targeting refugees, compared to 9 percent in 2016 (Arévalo, Kaffenberger, and de Montesquieu 2018). There is increasingly strong evidence that such integrated programs can have significant and large impacts on poor and vulnerable populations in general (A. Banerjee et al. 2015; Bandiera et al. 2017; Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013; Blattman et al. 2016), including in fragile contexts (Bedoya et al. 2019). The existing evidence for forcibly displaced populations, however, is mostly qualitative or descriptive so far and focuses on short-term impacts. There are some RCTs currently under preparation or already in the field, which will help improve the evidence base on economic inclusion programs for refugees in the future. Pre-post evaluations of the UNHCR graduation programs for refugees in Costa Rica and Ecuador showed that program participation was associated with increased employment, income and access to financial institutions and savings, as well as stronger self-confidence and support networks (UNHCR and Trickle Up 2016b; 2016a). Results in Ecuador were more modest, as the evaluation was conducted mid-term during an economic crisis. Similarly, participants of UNHCR’s graduation program for refugees in Egypt increased their employment, business ownership, and income (UNHCR 2017a). This was confirmed by a mid-term difference-in-differences evaluation, which found significantly larger increases and smaller decreases in income for program participants than non-participants; however, 79 to 95 percent still report that their income cannot meet their basic needs and little effect on savings (UNHCR and Beit Al Karma Consulting Egypt 2016). A guide for graduation in urban refugee contexts points to some design features and implementation modalities that might positively influence results (Trickle Up 2017). Meanwhile, these findings are also supported by qualitative work, such as an analysis of an asset-focused cash grant in Niger which (combined with food vouchers and non-food/shelter cash transfers as well as some training) helped create productive opportunities for Malian refugees and allowed for greater investment in businesses owned by refugees (Groothuis and Calo 2016). For IDPs in Colombia, Ibanez and Moya (2010) show that income-generating programs including labor training and wage subsidies, courses for small enterprises’ management, and seed capital as well as psychological support had large and significant impacts on asset accumulation, but these impacts decrease when additional household characteristic controls are included and lose significance in the IV estimates.

4.2. Human capital investments

4.2.1 Vocational, business and other skills training and recognition of skills

Training programs could help address the lack of skills that those forcibly displaced might face in destination labor markets, but the track record of “skills only” interventions is not promising. In the

19 This includes an RCT with refugees and host communities in Uganda conducted by IPA, comparing the cost-effectiveness of different variations of the graduation approach. The final survey is planned for 2021 https://www.poverty-action.org/printpdf/36101. Under the DfID program “Building the Evidence on Protracted Forced Displacement: A Multi-Stakeholder Partnership” the World Bank is funding RCTs on graduation-type of approaches for example in Afghanistan and Niger.

20 The confidence level is only 85%.
forced displacement context, vocational, business and other skills programs could help overcome the mismatch between the skills of those forcibly displaced and the needs of the host labor market. In high-income countries, many vocational or skills training programs are evaluated alongside other programs such as language training. The mostly descriptive and qualitative literature that exists for low- and middle-income countries shows that many training programs have not been successful. Using qualitative methods, Zetter proposes that skill development programs in Mozambique were not effective in helping refugees become less dependent on social assistance, with refugees noting that the skills they learned were not appropriate for finding jobs (Zetter 1996). Similar findings emerged from qualitative work on refugees in Egypt (Nichols and Jacobsen 2012b), and Jordan (Leghtas 2018). These findings corroborate the results for skills training notably in poor and fragile settings, where many skills programs do not have positive impacts or have costs that are much larger than the benefits (Blattman and Ralston 2015; McKenzie 2017). Few evaluations, however, study long-term impacts of the trainings, which tend to be larger (Card, Kluve, and Weber 2018). While there is some evidence that soft skills training seems to be more important than business skills training (McKenzie and Woodruff 2013; McKenzie 2017; Acevedo et al. 2017), we did not find any studies that compared these interventions with refugees and IDPs as beneficiaries.

**Training programs in forced displacement context have the additional challenge of tailoring trainings to skills that are appropriate and marketable in view of the legal framework and location of forced migrants.** In the forced displacement context, training programs do not only need to be preceded by an assessment of whether the lack of skills is the binding constraint to employment and which skills those forcibly displaced wish to acquire. It is also important to look at what the legal framework in terms of right to work and freedom of movement is and whether there is a market for the skills where those forcibly displaced are located. The returns to new skills will be low if refugees are legally not allowed to enter the segment of the labor market where there is demand for these skills or to move to where such demand might exist.

**Training programs need to take constraints to participation into account and focus on those that need to change occupation after displacement.** Another weakness of training programs is that many refugees report struggling to find time to attend training programs even if they believe they would benefit from them (Nichols and Jacobsen 2012a; Leghtas and Hollingsworth 2017) or may be hindered from attending by social or cultural norms, such as norms that discourage women from appearing in public spaces (Pavanello 2018; Leghtas 2018). A higher number of female-headed households and higher dependency ratios among those forcibly displaced might also make attendance of women in training programs more difficult due to lack of availability of childcare (Leghtas 2018). More flexible organization of the trainings could help. In terms of needs, it also seems important that trainings focus on those who are forced to change occupation after displacement. Survey data from Uganda shows that more than half of refugees changed occupation after displacement, but they were less likely to benefit from training programs (4 percent compared to 8 percent overall) (Mejia-Mantilla et al. 2019).

**Positive results have been found for skills like coding and IT skills but the potential for scaling up needs to be proven.** IT and coding skills tend to be in high demand in countries of all income levels, are attractive for refugees and IDPs because they are portable skills, offer a higher salary than many of the other jobs available, and allow individuals to work remotely. Rigorous evaluations are, however, still lacking, and the existing descriptive and qualitative evaluations do not include cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis. As numbers of existing initiatives tend to be small, the potential for scale-up still needs to be proven. A review of qualitative and descriptive evaluations of training programs focused on coding and IT skills for refugees as well as connection to online work opportunities suggests that they have high job placement rates and substantially increased earnings of refugees (Hatayama 2018).21 Two qualitative

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21 Results of a multi-year RCT on long-term outcomes of one of the interventions will be available in 2019-2020. [https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4379491/Impact%20Scorecard%20Q1%202019.pdf](https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4379491/Impact%20Scorecard%20Q1%202019.pdf)
and descriptive reviews, one of over 20 coding boot camps for refugees in Europe and the Middle East, and the other of coding schools in Germany with varying design features including length of training also reported promising job placement records for the case studies included (Francis 2019; Mason 2018). Other ICT programs, such as in Jordan, have not yet been evaluated but are regarded as promising for increasing work opportunities (Huang 2017, UNCTAD 2018, Benton and Glennie 2016). Even if these programs try to circumvent the fact that refugees are often not allowed to work and are located in remote areas, they are, however, not always able to overcome these difficulties (UNESCO 2018). As coding requires a certain level of education and language skills, programs might be limited to a lucky few in certain contexts.

Combining skills training with other interventions could lead to better results but must demonstrate cost-effectiveness. There seems to be consensus that skills training in general should be linked to job opportunities and not delay labor market entry. Some have proposed, for example in Sweden, that obtaining work experience in the host country is more valuable than training, especially immediately after arrival (Lemaître 2007). Training programs can have negative impacts through lock-in effects, at least in the short-term (Clausen et al. 2009). As the positive results from more integrated approaches show, for example for youth, the combination of training with other interventions yields higher promises for populations facing multiple obstacles (Kluve et al. 2019). If work permits are required, skill training interventions should also help refugees to obtain them. For business trainings a combination with access to capital seems important, as in general business skills trainings alone have had limited impacts (Blattman and Ralston 2015; Cho and Honorati 2013). Difficulties in accessing capital, for example, limited impacts of business trainings on self-employment in a randomized pilot with urban refugees in Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania (CWS 2018). It is still unclear, however, how much the skills training adds to the impacts that the capital injection would have anyway and if it justifies the increase in costs. Another variation on these types of multi-faceted skills programs are business incubators, which offer specific training or legal advice, as well as access to social networks, space and in some cases access to finance, to encourage enterprise development. Business incubators exist for refugees in several high-income countries including Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Australia, along with a few in middle-income countries, but they have not yet been rigorously evaluated. Anecdotal evidence from Finland suggests that refugees who have no certainty about their length of stay find it challenging to develop and commit to a business plan (UNCTAD 2018).

Assessment and recognition of skills and qualifications could be helpful, notably in more formalized labor markets and for those middle- or high-skilled, but more evidence is needed. An assessment of skills at all levels, including those acquired through informal learning and previous work experience, seems important in host countries of all income levels to be able to convey the competencies of those forcibly displaced to employers and develop training programs aimed at skills gaps. The formal recognition of skills and qualifications as a signaling effect is likely to be more important in countries with more formalized labor markets and affect refugees more than IDPs and those middle- or high-skilled more than those low-skilled. OECD countries have increasingly started to assess the skills of asylum seekers and refugees and, where possible, formally recognize their degrees (OECD 2016b). There is, however, little causal evidence on the recognition of skills and qualifications even in high-income countries and for migrants in general (Ö. Bilgili 2015). The existing evidence indicates that the recognition of skills and qualifications may delay labor market entry at least in the short-term, as it is more difficult for refugees to find jobs that correspond to their skill level (Correa-Velez, Barnett, and Gifford 2015). Employers might be more skeptical towards foreign credentials even if they have been fully recognized, notably if they are not involved in the validation and recognition procedures. Procedures are often not transparent and can take a long time, even in OECD countries (OECD 2014, chapter 2). Refugees might need additional courses to fully meet the requirements for recognition. Overall, however, the recognition of foreign skills and qualification is associated with higher employment and wages, at least in high-income countries (OECD 2014, chapter 2).
4.2.2 Language training

Language training not only addresses a lack of skills but can also help build social networks. Programs that focus on developing language skills may help forced migrants find employment by allowing them to match more closely employer preferences in the host community, but also through allowing them to build up social networks in the host community and improving their mental health through reducing the feeling of social isolation. The evidence on these interventions mainly focuses on refugees, who are more likely than IDPs to face a substantial language mismatch in the host community and is concentrated in high-income countries.

Language training, combined with other measures, may be helpful for employment, as evidence from high-income countries shows. Most of the literature on language in the context of labor market integration focuses on international migrants in general (without differentiating between different groups like refugees, family migrants and labor migrants) and analyses the role of language skills for labor market outcomes (and not language training itself) (Chiswick and Miller 2007; Chiswick 2009; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003). Even if the studies struggle with the endogeneity of labor market outcomes and language proficiency, results from different OECD countries clearly show a positive relationship (Chiswick and Miller 2014). The more limited number of studies on the effectiveness of language trainings often evaluate such training as part of a larger package of interventions without separating the effects of each element. The literature is also largely focused on refugees in the United States and Western Europe. Language training is offered to or required for refugees in many European countries, often as part of a pre-arrival training program and extending several years into the refugees’ stay (Papadopoulou et al. 2013). Evidence on refugees in the United States suggests that, controlling for observable characteristics, those who use language training services may be more likely to be employed and have higher wages (Capps et al. 2008). Cebulla et al., in addition to showing a positive correlation between language ability and employment of refugees in the UK, also confirm that participation in language training did increase self-reported language ability (Cebulla et al. 2010). After participating in language courses in the UK, 75 percent of refugees reported that these courses were useful (Peckham et al. 2004). Looking at the random placement of refugees in Switzerland, Auer finds that language training can offset a language mismatch in resettlement (Auer 2018). Clausen et al. (2009) find that improvement in language skills significantly increases the likelihood of employment among refugee and family migrant participants in language courses in Denmark. Using a regression discontinuity design, Lochmann et al. (2019) find that the number of language training hours significantly increases labor force participation of refugees in France (more than for other types of migrants) but without increasing the probability of employment. This might be due to the basic level of the classes and the limitation of the study to short-term effects. Positive impacts of language training might be stronger in the mid- to long-term (Clausen et al. 2009). It might also be important that the trainings be adapted to the different education levels and needs of those forcibly displaced. Impacts of basic language skills might be stronger for those low-skilled while those high-skilled might benefit more from higher proficiency. Even while the quantitative literature is largely focused on high-income countries, qualitative research shows that similar patterns may hold in other contexts, when language programs are well-designed and combined with other measures. Qualitative research on refugees in Egypt suggests that they find language and other training programs useful, but require even more support if they are to be successful, perhaps especially in Egypt where social networks are important because refugees must have an Egyptian partner in order to start a business (Nichols and Jacobsen 2012b). Employers in Turkey perceive vocational and language training as necessary, but these programs have not yet been evaluated with respect to their impact on refugees’ labor market outcomes (Bellamy et al. 2017).

Language classes should be linked to work opportunities and not delay labor market entry. Qualitative research on refugees in Egypt also affirmed the importance of linking language and skills training to concrete work opportunities (Nichols and Jacobsen 2012b), a proposal which has been noted in reviews of these programs in high-income contexts as well (Ott 2013; Martin et al. 2016). Based on
results from studies on migrants in general, it seems important that language classes do not delay labor market entry and are adapted to the needs of the labor market (Ö. Bilgili 2015; Martin et al. 2016). Rigorous evaluations of the combination of language classes with work training are unfortunately scarce. An exception is the evaluation of a pilot program for migrants in Sweden using propensity score matching. The program combined work-oriented language training and practical workplace training which showed very positive results (Delander et al. 2005).

4.2.3 Mental healthcare and psychosocial support

Mental health services or other forms of psychosocial support for refugees and IDPs aim to address mental health issues due to displacement. As discussed in section 2, mental health issues might prevent forced migrants from working and hamper their productivity. Some interventions explicitly offer these services with the objective to improve their ability to integrate the labor market. Graduation programs targeting refugees, for example, more often include psychosocial support compared to programs with other target groups (Arévalo, Kaffenberger, and de Montesquiou 2018).

Mental healthcare and other psychosocial support have important positive impacts on the mental health of refugees and IDPs. A number of RCTs show that different forms of therapy have had significant positive effects on the mental wellbeing of refugees and IDPs in different low- and middle income countries. Positive results have been found for example for narrative exposure therapy, which is based on the principles of cognitive-behavioral exposure therapy. Evidence from a randomized control trial with PTSD diagnosed Sudanese refugees in Uganda showed that that the group exposed to four sessions of narrative exposure therapy presented significantly better results on measures of PTSD than the control groups which received a session of psychoeducation alone or combined with four sessions of supportive counseling (Neuner et al. 2004). A meta-analysis of seven studies using narrative exposure therapy mostly for refugee children showed positive and significant effects as well (Gwozdziewycz and Mehl-Madrona 2013). Effects seem to be particularly positive among refugee and IDP children and youth.

More evidence is needed to understand which type of psycho-social support works best in which context and how to best implement it in low-resource settings in a cost-efficient way and in environments with a lack of professional counselors and psychotherapists. Confirming results from high-income countries, an RCT with war-traumatized patients in Iraq showed that web-based cognitive behavioral therapy can have significant positive effects (Knaevelsrud et al. 2015). An RCT with Rwandan and Somalian refugees in Uganda showed that short-term psychotherapy carried out by lay counselors with limited training was effective in reducing PTSD (Neuner et al. 2008). The meta-analysis of studies using narrative exposure therapy also provided some evidence that after receiving training, lay refugee counselors can be even more effective than trained counselors when treating other refugees (Gwozdziewycz and Mehl-Madrona 2013). These results were corroborated by an RCT among Burmese refugees in Thailand which showed that a transdiagnostic psychotherapy provided by lay counselors was highly effective in reducing depression and PTSD (Bolton et al. 2014). Schulz et al. (2006) find that Cognitive Processing Therapy was highly effective in reducing symptoms of PTSD among resettled refugees in the US, both if the therapist spoke their language or used an interpreter. Using an interpreter might, however, create challenges in other settings (Searight and Armock 2013).

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22 See amongst others results from RCTs for Syrian refugees in Turkey Acarturk et al. 2016; adolescent and child IDPs in Uganda Bolton et al. 2007 and Ager et al. 2011; adolescent war bereaved Afghani refugees Kalantari et al. 2012; and adolescent refugees in Gaza Lange-Nielsen et al. 2012. A pilot evaluation with a convenient sample also found positive effects of cognitive-behavioral therapy on IDPs in Uganda (Sonderegger et al. 2011). Other pre-post studies with small non-random samples of refugees in high-income countries found positive results as well (Weine et al. 1998; Kananian et al. 2017), and refugees report that they found mental health services as part of integration programs useful (Peckham et al. 2004).
Evidence on which type of support can facilitate labor force participation in particular and how it can be best integrated into broader jobs interventions is scant. The studies for refugees and IDPs cited above do not measure the impacts on economic behavior and one can only assume that a decrease in PTSD would increase economic activity and earnings. Evidence on the use of cognitive behavioral therapy and other shorter forms of psycho-social support with other target groups confirms the positive impacts on economic outcomes, but there is also evidence that this does not necessarily have to be the case (Lund et al. 2011; Kumar and Willman 2016; Campos et al. 2017; Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan 2016). We also need more knowledge on how the psycho-social support needs to be combined with job interventions in order to have economic impacts. An RCT for refugee girls in Ethiopia that focused on building empowerment through mentorship, discussion groups for caregivers and safe spaces, for example, did not seem to have any employment effects. The authors explained the lack of effects with the lack of accompanying injections of financial capital (Stark et al. 2018). Another RCT currently in the field will explore how imagery techniques which encourage individuals to visualize future scenarios as part of entrepreneurship trainings may be effective in increasing personal initiative and future-oriented thinking among vulnerable groups including IDPs in Colombia.23

4.3 Changing the legal framework for refugees and informing about their rights

The legal framework limits the ability notably of refugees to integrate the labor market, As described in chapter 2. As the existing literature mainly for OECD countries shows, if, when and how the right to work, residency status, and freedom of movement are granted has impacts on refugees’ labor market outcomes. Anti-discrimination laws and information about rights could help address discrimination but existing evidence is scant.

Whether or not laws and regulations give refugees the right to work is an important factor that determines their labor market outcomes. Exploiting variance in labor market access restrictions between cantons in Switzerland, to which the asylum seekers are randomly allocated, Slotwinski and Uhlig (2019) find a sizable significant positive effect of inclusive labor market access regulations of around 10 percent, which is higher for those with a lower language distance. Where refugees do not have the legal right to work, this is associated with higher employment in the informal sector notably in low- and middle-income countries, which may also lead to lower job quality and greater risk of exploitation (Zetter and Ruaudel 2016). How lowering the regulatory barriers for formal labor market participation of refugees or helping them overcome the administrative hurdles will impact their labor market outcomes will depend on the context (Clemens, Huang, and Graham 2018). In Jordan the introduction of work permits had limited uptake and impacts, likely due to the limitation of work permits to a small number of sectors that did not match the skills and aspirations of the refugees and the fact that work permits were tied to employers (Gordon 2019). Even if refugees mostly continue to work in the informal sector, because of their skill levels and the size of the informal sector in the respective country, they will do so on a more equal footing with natives in terms of bargaining power if they have the right to work. Easing restrictions around ownership and registration of businesses should facilitate entrepreneurship by refugees. Being allowed to register home-based businesses would be particularly important for refugee women, as the example of Jordan shows (Leghtas 2018). Ongoing studies of policy changes in Colombia and Ethiopia will help shed more light on the causal links between the right to work and labor market outcomes.

The time at which they obtain the right to work and can earn host-country specific work experience matters for speed of employment and income trajectories in high-income countries. Studying different policies in European countries, researchers have shown that longer waiting periods delay the earning of country-specific work experience and lead to the depreciation of human capital as well as

23 https://www.poverty-action.org/study/impact-entrepreneurship-training-using-imagery-techniques-colombia
scarring effects on the labor market. De Vroome and van Tubbergen (2010) find that the time spent in a reception center is negatively related to employment and occupation status, mostly channeled through the negative effects on the acquisition of country-specific human capital. Using individual-level register data and the same exogeneous variation in wait time like Hainmueller et al. (2016), Hvidtfeldt et al. (2019) corroborate these results, finding that an additional year of waiting for the asylum claim to be processed in Denmark is associated with a decrease in employment of over 3 percentage points afterwards. This is mostly due to the additional delay in entering the labor market, as access to the labor market is restricted for asylum seekers. Independent of when the right to work was granted, evidence for OECD countries shows that migrants employed quicker and relatively continuously after arrival in the host country are on higher income trajectories which persist over time, compared to those who took longer to take up their first job (Fuller 2015). This is in line with research on labor market outcomes of women, which also shows the importance of continuous and full-time employment for human capital accumulation and in terms of signaling (see for example Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Rossin-Slater 2017; Evertsson and Duvander 2011). Impacts of granting the right to work earlier might, however, be less strong in settings with sizable informal labor markets and lack of social welfare, aid, or remittances, where refugees might already be working in the informal sector and continue to do so after obtaining the legal right to work.

Some have argued that granting asylum seekers and refugees the right to work immediately upon arrival also results in better outcomes by allowing them to have higher expectations or motivation for the future and avoiding additional traumatic experiences post-displacement. Exploiting a new limitation to the employment ban for asylum seekers in Germany, Marbach, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2018) find that five years later employment rates of those who had to wait longer (around 7 months on average) were 20 percent lower and it took up to ten years to close this gap. Based on additional analysis, the main channel seems to be that the longer wait time and the uncertainty discourages refugees and reduces their motivation to search for jobs. Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Lawrence (2016) confirm the role of motivation, using registry panel data and an exogeneous variation in the wait time of refugees for their asylum claim in Switzerland. Even if asylum seekers are allowed to work after a number of months (with restrictions depending on the canton), each additional year of waiting reduces the employment rate in the year after receiving refugee status by 4-5 percent. Using cross-sectional data on refugees in the Netherlands, Bakker, Dagevos, and Engbersen (2014) show that those asylum seekers who stayed in temporary accommodation for more than 5 years, well beyond the average of 21 months, had worse mental health outcomes and lower levels of socio-economic integration.

Along the same lines, faster certainty about prospects of stay and permanent residency status can have a positive impact on labor market outcomes. As shown by studies cited above, how long asylum seekers have to wait for their asylum claim to be processed and under which conditions they wait has an impact on their labor market outcomes afterwards, be it through delaying labor market entry or additional negative impacts on mental conditions and motivation. Beyond the uncertainty about the prospects of stay during the asylum process, the type of residence permit granted, if only temporary, can prolong uncertainty. The political discourse might also create or reinforce incertitude. Using two waves of the European Labour Force Survey, Fasani et al. (2018) find that those admitted when recognition rates for permanent refugee status are relatively high have better labor market outcomes (while results for faster decision processes are not significant). Permanent status gives refugees a longer time horizon and incentivizes country specific investments (see chapter 2). Evidence on OECD countries shows, that there is also a correlation between acquiring citizenship and better economic outcomes of refugees (Bakker, Dagevos, and Engbersen 2014; Bevelander and Pendakur 2014). This is in line with research on migrants in general (e.g. OECD 2011; Steinhardt 2012; Bevelander and Veenman 2006). Besides diminishing uncertainty about the length of stay, naturalization also opens up all jobs in the labor market (including civil service and regulated professions) and has important signaling effects for employers.
Allocating asylum seekers and refugees taking labor market opportunities into account or allowing them to move and settle freely improves their economic outcomes. Fasani, Frattini and Minale (2018) show that refugee cohorts that were affected by dispersal policies in European countries had worse labor market outcomes. The negative effects diminish over time as refugees are allowed to relocate. These results confirm the findings on refugee dispersal policies from studies for Sweden (Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003; Aslund and Rooth 2007), Denmark (Damm and Rosholm 2010), and Switzerland (Martén, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2019; Auer 2018). The policy implication of these results would be to consider resettling refugees based on their observable characteristics like language, skills and nationality as well as opportunities in the area of settlement in order to improve their labor market outcomes or, if possible, allow them to settle freely. A simulation using data from the United States and Switzerland to develop and test an approach to refugee resettlement based on machine-learning and characteristics such as language, suggests that it would improve the employment outcomes of refugees by 40-70 percent compared to the current random assignment (Bansak et al. 2018). If they were to choose freely, the gains are likely to be even higher. These results from high-income countries bear important lessons also for low- and middle-income countries which limit refugees and IDPs to freely choose their area of settlement and which do not take labor market integration into account when deciding where to locate them.

Anti-discrimination laws and communication about rights of those forcibly displaced aim to address discrimination against refugees and IDPs, but there is a lack of rigorous evaluations of such policies and interventions.24. Along with having less access to social networks and communities, refugees may also face social capital deficits in the form of discrimination against them. Policy approaches to reduce discrimination include legal structures mandating equality – in general, in employment, or in wages – as well as communication about the right of refugees. These types of policies and interventions may exist in countries across the income spectrum. ILO in Turkey, for example organized consultations, awareness-rising seminars and campaigns with refugees, employers, workers, public institutions and the general public after refugees were allowed to obtain work permits (ILO 2017). If these types of programs can increase employer awareness of refugee or IDP rights, especially the right to work in certain contexts, then they may increase employment by increasing the willingness of employers to hire forced migrants. If refugees are better aware of their rights, this can also facilitate their labor market integration. Anecdotal evidence points to the fact, that anti-discrimination laws do not only need to be put in place, but also be monitored. Despite antidiscrimination laws in Uganda, for example, about 10% of refugees in the country still report that they face discrimination in labor contexts (Vemuru et al. 2016). An RCT showed that text messages with information on eligibility for benefits significantly improved awareness of benefits for IDPs in Colombia (Blanco and Vargas 2010), but it would need to be tested if information on labor market access would have similar impacts.

4.4 Job search assistance or matching programs and coaching

Job search assistance and matching programs can help forced migrants overcome information asymmetries and lack of social networks. Many programs include assistance in searching for jobs or matching employers and employees. These types of interventions bridge supply- and demand-side programs and complement them both by helping overcome search and matching frictions. They account for refugees’ and IDPs’ lack of social networks at destination and help make up for a lack of knowledge on how to search and apply for a job in the new location. They also may help overcome information asymmetries regarding the qualifications and skills of those forcibly displaced by providing employers

24 Two RCTs in Uganda will be testing whether reducing information frictions on the legal framework around refugees in Uganda change firms’ beliefs and attitudes towards refugees and their willingness to hire them, and if a wage subsidy intervention can decrease discrimination (see Loiacono and Silva Vargas 2019).
with more accurate and reliable information. Intensive coaching combined with more individualized supply-side measures also aim to more directly match those forcibly displaced with job opportunities.

**Evidence from high-income countries shows that job search assistance programs are associated with positive effects on employment rates where job opportunities in the formal sector exist.** An RCT with refugees in Germany found that job matching assistance had a significant positive effect of 13 percentage points on employment rates a year after the conclusion of the assistance (Battistiti, Giesing, and Laurentsyeva 2019). The effects are concentrated among those low-educated and without a secure residence status. Analyzing another RCT in Sweden, Joona and Nekby find that public employment matching services including refugees do positively affect their employment rates (Joona and Nekby 2012). Studying a similar program in Sweden matching refugees who were ready to work with employers with a difference-in-differences framework, Aslund and Johansson also found positive effects on the probability of finding work (Åslund and Johansson 2011). The impact of such matching efforts might be higher for groups like refugees and IDPs which lack social networks. Other studies confirm these general findings, albeit without being able to correct for self-selection on unobservable characteristics like ability or motivation, which may bias results if those who have the highest ability or are most motivated are also more likely to participate in these types of programs. Studying North Korean refugees in South Korea, Yu et al. reemphasize that employment networks are important for finding jobs in the host community, and that public programs helping foster these networks are associated with increases in employment, controlling for other observable characteristics (Yu et al. 2012). At the same time, a longitudinal analysis in Australia also suggests significant positive effects of job matching programs as well as informal networks on refugee employment (Correa-Velez, Barnett, and Gifford 2015). Meanwhile, evidence on refugees from the US has shown that, controlling for other observable characteristics, refugees who received job search assistance may be significantly more likely to be employed and have higher wages (Capps et al. 2008).

However, again most of these evaluations focus on refugees in high-income countries and existing evidence is not very promising for LMICs. Job matching programs tend to be less common in low- and middle-income countries where there is a lack of jobs in the formal sector, the informal sector is larger, and self-employment is more heavily emphasized. Some have also argued that these programs lead to job displacement rather than an increase in jobs due to reduced search costs (Fox and Kaul 2018). The little existing evidence is less promising for forced migrants in LMICs compared to high-income-countries. Female refugees in Uganda who received job search training were only slightly more likely to participate in the formal labor market, controlling for other observable characteristics, and were no more likely to become self-employed (Vemuru et al. 2016). When the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) offered job matching services in East Amman, they found it more difficult to assure sustainable jobs for refugees than for low-income Jordanians, due to the legal environment and the mismatch between refugees’ skills and aspirations and the jobs accessible for them in the formal sector.25 Employers, however, were more likely to recruit people who had been referred by DRC (DRC 2017). Even in low-income contexts, however, descriptive evidence suggests that giving refugees access to technologies such as the internet and refugee-specific hiring websites may help them find jobs (Hatayama 2018; UNCTAD 2018). Just informing refugees about the application documents requested by firms could also be helpful, as the stark discrepancies between what firms expect job seekers to bring along and what refugee job seekers actually bring along when applying for jobs shows (Loiacono, and Silva Vargas 2019).

**Matching services cannot replace private networks and refugees and IDPs might benefit from support to build up such networks.** Even if public employment agencies are successful in helping

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25 Career guidance and job matching services are provided for Syrian refugees in several MENA-countries (e.g. ILO 2019), but we are not aware of any rigorous evaluations. A new RCT on job search assistance for refugees in Jordan, currently in the field, will provide further evidence https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3870 .
female refugees from North Korea find jobs in South Korea, Yu et al. (2012), for example, find that finding jobs through members of the host country is even more effective and leads to higher wages. This is likely even more true in low- and middle income countries, where qualitative work among refugees suggests the importance of social networks for finding work (Nichols and Jacobsen 2012c; 2012a; Barbelet 2017). Providing refugees and IDPs with networking opportunities, organizing events like job fairs and competitions with business idea pitches, and matching refugees and IDPs with mentors and broader measures to promote social integration might be promising (UNCTAD 2018), but no rigorous evaluations of such programs were found for forcibly displaced persons.

Case management, intensive coaching and individualized assistance can have positive impacts on labor market outcomes but tend to be more costly. For low- and middle-income countries there is evidence that programs which include coaching and more individualized assistance instead of standard packages seem to have positive impacts. In Rwanda, South Africa, and Tanzania, analysis of a randomized pilot of intensive case management for urban refugees was found to increase rates of employment (CWS 2018). First evidence from graduation-type programs also seem to point in this direction (see section above). These studies do, however, not tease out which part of the impact is due to counseling and coaching. For high-income countries there is some evidence on the positive role of coaching itself. An RCT with refugees and family migrants in Sweden found that the inclusion of intensive coaching and counseling through caseworkers in the immigrant integration programs significantly increased employment probability for refugee men, but not for refugee women (Andersson Joona and Nekby 2012). Studying a natural experiment with a regression discontinuity design also in Sweden, Andersson Joona et al. find that increased job coaching and individual integration plans resulted in positive effects on employment rates and earnings after two or three years (Andersson Joona, Lanninger, and Sundström 2016). In general, the evidence from high as well as low- and middle-income contexts comes from smaller-scale pilots and their cost-effectiveness is not analyzed. The positive results of coaching and counselling are, however, in line with the general findings on such interventions for other target groups. An exception is Clausen et al. (2009) which find a negative or non-significant impact of counseling and upgrading programs on the hazard rate of employment of refugees and family migrants in Denmark.

Interventions aiming to overcome spatial mismatches seem promising and need to be further tested and evaluated. The evaluation of investments to increase refugee self-reliance undertaken in Dollo Ado refugee camps in the remote Somali region of Ethiopia showed the limited impacts such investments can have in remote areas (Betts et al. 2020). Even when allowed to move freely, forced migrants might need support to actually do so. Programs providing support for transportation or housing allowances for urban centers can allow forced migrants to move to where economic opportunities are. Although these types of programs have not yet been rigorously evaluated or systematically implemented, qualitative studies have suggested that refugees do face significant barriers in accessing transportation and paying for rents in urban areas, and this creates an obstacle to employment (Bose 2014; Leghtas 2018; Beine et al. 2019). Programs aiming to overcome spatial mismatches in terms of employment opportunities have proven quite successful in other contexts (McKenzie 2017).

4.5 Subsidized employment

4.5.1 Wage subsidies in the private sector

Wage subsidies can help refugees and IDPs increase their employability by gaining destination specific work experience. One method of increasing the demand of private sector employers for refugee and IDP employees is by offering wage subsidies, which may compensate for employers’ lack of
information about refugee skills and qualifications or lower productivity due to language or other barriers (Aiyar et al. 2016). These types of programs may also help refugees avoid “inactivity traps” where they are unable to find a first job in the host community due to high minimum wages (Aiyar et al. 2016). Subsidized employment interventions can help refugees and IDPs first break into the labor market and facilitate future employment. For example, data from Sweden suggests that most refugees seem to use a first job as an entry point for other jobs (Åslund, Forslund, and Liljeberg 2017). Reviewing the international experience with wage subsidies, Almeida, Orr, and Robalino (2014) find that while wage subsidies are not an effective instrument to create jobs, they can help those who have difficulties (re-)entering the labor market, like forced migrants, to improve their employability, also in developing countries. If designed appropriately, the social benefits will outweigh the costs.

The evidence on wage subsidies for refugees and other migrants in developed countries is positive in terms of increasing short-term employment, but evidence on longer-term impacts and on low- and middle-income countries are missing. The studies of wage subsidies for immigrants, including refugees, in EU countries have suggested that these policies may help immigrants find jobs faster (Konle-Seidl 2016, 40; Nekby 2008; Aiyar et al. 2016). Using the timing of events as identification strategy, Clausen et al. (2009), for example, find that wage subsidies for private sector firms in Denmark increased the speed at which refugees and family migrants found employment, while impacts of other active labor market policies were insignificant or negative in the short run. In Finland, an evaluation using propensity score matching showed that wage subsidies had a positive impact on the employment probabilities of “non-Western” immigrants (Kvinge and Djuve 2006). In Denmark, wage subsidies also seem to increase employment probabilities for “non-Western” immigrants (Hardoy and Zhang 2010). Meanwhile, a meta-analysis of the previous literature on immigrants in Europe found that wage subsidies were the only active labor market policy more effective than training, and estimates of effects on employment of immigrants were mostly positive (Butschek and Walter 2014). In her review of 50 impact evaluations as well as other reviews of labor market integration of immigrants in OECD countries, Bilgili (2015) confirms these results and notes that wage subsidies seem to be especially effective when implemented quickly after arrival or unemployment. Considering other policies that affect wages of refugees, Lundborg and Skedinger evaluate the impacts of minimum wages on refugee employment using a model of the wage-elasticity of refugee employment in Sweden. They find that minimum wage increases negatively affect refugee employment rates (Lundborg and Skedinger 2014). This suggests that refugee employment may also be responsive to the opposite effect, that is, if a minimum wage decreases refugee employment, a wage subsidy should increase refugee employment. There is qualitative evidence from high-income countries that other types of placement with employers (including internships or unsubsidized work programs) also have positive impacts (Ott 2013; UNHCR 2014). As wage subsidies face sustainability challenges, more studies evaluating longer term impacts on employability and evaluations covering LMIC would be needed.

Other monetary benefits for employers need to be adapted to the firms’ profiles. Related to providing subsidies are other monetary benefits that may be provided to firms hiring refugees or IDPs. A prominent example is 2016 EU-Jordan Compact on Syrian refugees, which included provisions allowing firms where Syrian refugees make up 25% of the workforce (15% in the first two years of the agreement) to face relaxed rules of origin when exporting to the EU. However, Temprano-Arroyo reports that, through April 2018, few firms took advantage of this opportunity, mostly due to lack of firm suitability, as only few firms are competitive exporters to the EU market, and the related jobs not being adapted to the refugees’ skills and aspirations (Temprano-Arroyo 2018).

4.5.2 Cash for work, labor-intensive public works and other subsidized public sector employment

Cash for work and labor intensive public works have become popular in the context of forced displacement. Public works programs are frequently used in low- and middle-income countries to quickly generate employment, reduce poverty or mitigate shocks. They have been more commonly used
for refugees since the Syrian refugee crisis (Fratzke and Jacobsen 2016; Corser 2018). They increase participants’ earnings during the time of the program and can have multiplier effects in the economy as well as growth effects through the public infrastructure they built. If programs are massive, they might also lead to a (temporary) increase in low-skilled wages which impacts also those not involved directly in the program (Blattman and Ralston 2015). Public works programs often more or less directly aim to have supply-side effects as well. They potentially allow participants to save and build up assets for future self-employment. If it is a recurring scheme, it can also serve as a form of insurance, allowing individuals to make investments with higher risks but potentially higher returns. Depending on the task, participants could also build up skills. Public work programs, however, usually only are an option for those bodily able to work. Like wage subsidies they face the issue of sustainability.

**Public works programs can potentially have important positive short-term impacts in the forced displacement context.** Public work programs have proven useful in contexts of natural disasters (Nagamatsu 2014). They are promising in the forced displacement context because they can have positive impacts, at least in the short-term, on income, assets and consumption even in remote and fragile regions, where refugees and IDPs are often hosted. They can also be run by donors and NGOs where refugees’ access to the labor market is limited or banned. Using propensity score matching and recall questions, an evaluation of Oxfam’s cash for work program in Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan finds that participation increased household wealth (assets and housing conditions) (Lombardini and Mager 2019).

**The medium- to longer-term impacts seem less promising.** Public works programs might be one way for refugees and IDPs to increase social networks, develop host community-specific human capital, and general preparedness for future work engagements. Participation in public work programs could also help them build up assets for future self-employment. More recent programs have made these supply-side effects more explicit and include additional measures like training and incentives to save. On the other hand, it has been argued that such programs only have short term impacts, may distort the labor market and crowd-out regular employment. Notably in high-income countries, participation might also send negative signals to future employers. There is a lack of rigorous evaluations of public works programs specifically for those forcibly displaced due to conflict and their host communities in low- and middle-income countries. The evidence base on public works programs in general has only increased in recent years. In their recent review of experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations of 15 public works programs in developing countries, Gehrke and Hartwig (2018) find that they are usually insufficient to allow participants to make productive investments afterwards, with the exception of reliable, long-term programs. Accompanying trainings do not seem to have positive impacts on employability or business earnings. They conclude that public works programs only justify the additional costs compared to cash-transfer programs if they show additional impacts on the productive capacity of the households. The evaluation of Oxfam’s cash for work program in Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan confirms these results: while participation increased household wealth, it did not have any significant impacts on new skills learned (Lombardini and Mager 2019).

**Impacts of public works programs on the likelihood of employment of refugees in high-income countries are also rather discouraging.** The meta-analysis of different active labor market programs for immigrants in Europe found that public works programs were less effective than training and mostly had negative or insignificant impacts on employment probabilities (Butschek and Walter 2014). Reviewing rigorous impact evaluations, Bilgili (2015) also finds that subsidized public employment programs for migrants (including refugees) are less successful than wage subsidies for private sector jobs. Clausen et al. (2009) find no clear impacts of direct employment of refugees and family migrants in the public sector in Denmark on the hazard rate for regular employment.
4.6 Assuring access to markets: Value chains, making markets work for the poor, and market-based livelihood interventions

An increasing number of interventions for refugees and IDPs aims to improve access to markets. Even if those forcibly displaced might prefer being self-employed or entrepreneurs in certain contexts, those who choose to start businesses may struggle to access markets for their goods and services. For example, key constraints that refugees in Uganda face when accessing markets are a lack of access to credit/financial services and information gaps (Mercy Corps 2018). Lack of networks and information on markets are likely to be even stronger barriers for forced migrants compared to the host population. While livelihood interventions among refugees and IDPs used to focus on the supply side without taking market demand into account, they now increasingly include market and value chain assessments as well as interventions to develop market systems (Nutz 2017; Gettliffe and Rashidova 2019). Interventions aimed at increasing access to markets for those forcibly displaced may include a wide range of activities or a combination of many types of interventions. Just like economic inclusion/graduation type approaches, market system approaches are integrated approaches. As ILO outlines in their handbook on market-based livelihoods interventions for refugees, these may start with conducting market assessments and value chain analysis, and may include providing access to information about markets, improving linkages along the value chain (between input-suppliers, producers and customers), as well as supply side interventions discussed in the sections above (like language classes, access to finance, skills training and business development services, coaching, transportation infrastructure and mobility) (Nutz 2017).

Interventions aiming to develop or strengthen links along value chains and provide information on markets, often combined with other measures, seem promising, but rigorous evaluations are needed. Although market-based and value chain types of approaches have become quite common for those forcibly displaced more recently, especially in low- and middle-income countries, handbooks and guidelines seem to be more prevalent than rigorous evaluations. So far only qualitative and descriptive evidence suggests that these programs may positively impact refugee and IDP businesses and increase their incomes. For example, a market-based approach under the ILO/UNHCR Approach to Inclusive Market Systems framework provided three services to Somali refugees in Ethiopia: (1) an information campaign to improve market coordination for livestock sales, (2) creating linkages between supply chain actors and refugee camps and host communities, and (3) a business skills training program. A qualitative evaluation of the program found that all three interventions positively impacted refugees’ ability to sustain themselves through their businesses and generate larger incomes (de la Chaux and Nutz 2019). Propcom Mai-karfi, a market-based approach which includes supporting IDPs and returned IDPs in Nigeria by providing information, strengthening local market relationships, and access to finance, has reported substantially increased incomes for participants in the program over the course of their participation (Propcom Mai-karfi 2019; 2018). The literature on value chain development in other contexts also lacks rigorous evaluations but points to mostly positive impacts on the quantity and quality of jobs (Ingram and Oosterkamp 2014; Conroy and Kessler 2019). There are also attempts to support larger companies not only in hiring refugees directly but also integrating refugee owned enterprises into their supply chains. This includes companies such as IKEA and Safeway, Inc. hiring Syrian refugees in Jordan, and incorporating refugee-owned enterprises into their supply chains (Huang 2017) and Sanivation in Kenya, who employs refugees in Kakuma refugee camp (IFC and Bridgespan Group 2019). Numbers, however, seem to be small so far.

5. Conclusions, gaps and ways forward

Our review brought together two strands of literature: the evidence on how forced displacement impacts those forcibly displaced in their economic lives and the existing evidence on jobs interventions in the context of forced displacement. In addition, our paper is the first review of the literature that considers
different types of jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs implemented by different types of actors in the forced displacement context, with a specific focus on low- and middle-income countries.

Refugees and IDPs struggle more than other groups to integrate the labor market. A slowly growing body of research uncovers the specific constraints they face when integrating the labor market. They struggle with the loss of assets and are often confronted with a mismatch in terms of skills on the new labor market. The forced displacement experience might have an impact on their physical and mental health, affect their outlook on life, their risk appetite, their time-horizon and their willingness to invest. Their legal access to the labor market might be limited or banned, they might not have the freedom to move to where labor market opportunities and networks are, face restrictions on their ability to own property, land or access financial services. They usually lack social networks at destination and are confronted with a general lack of labor demand as well as discrimination. How important these obstacles are in practice depends on the individual characteristics of those forcibly displaced as well as their country of origin and destination.

Program designers and policy makers need to understand these specific barriers as well as the perspectives and aspirations of those forcibly displaced and adapt interventions accordingly. Even more so than in other contexts, thorough assessments of the demand and supply side of the labor market need to inform program design. In the past, skills programs, for example, have often not been based on an assessment of the legal framework for labor market access and the market demand at the locations where refugees and IDPs were located, which limited their possibilities for positive impacts. Jobs interventions also do not really seem to consider how the forced displacement experience impacts economic behavior and investment calculations.

The existing literature on jobs interventions for refugees and IDPs is scarce in terms of experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations. The current evidence base, notably the more rigorous work using counterfactuals, has been focused on high-income countries. Little research has been done in low- and middle-income contexts, even though the number of RCTs is slowly increasing. Most of the evidence on those forcibly displaced is focused on short-term impacts and on refugees instead of IDPs. At the same time, there is much more evidence on migrants in general, compared to forced migrants. Given these limitations, we were only able to synthesize first emerging lessons, point to factors to take into account when designing interventions and identify ideas, hypotheses and interventions worth testing.

Certain types of interventions might have larger impacts in the context of forced displacement (as they tackle specific challenges of refugees and IDPs) and other types of interventions may have smaller impacts (if they do not take the specific situation of refugees and IDPs into account). One way in which refugees and IDPs differ from other types of migrants or poverty-affected groups is their particular need to make up for the loss of assets associated with their (unplanned) migrations. In response, even more so than in other contexts, financial capital injections are important, and skills training should be linked to cash injections or access to credit to be more effective. Where relevant, this would need to include granting access to land. Because refugees are not able to choose their locations based on host community labor market needs, training programs should directly tackle this greater mismatch in terms of skills by focusing on those that need to change occupation after displacement. The implementation modalities of the trainings need to be designed in a way that allow female participants to attend, as the number of female-headed households and dependency ratios are often higher among those forcibly displaced. In addition, to address language mismatches, language training can be helpful for employment, notably if it is adapted to the education level, linked to job opportunities and does not delay labor market entry. A number of studies have shown positive impacts of short-term therapy interventions on mental health. We do, however, not know which type of support can facilitate labor force participation in particular and how it can be best integrated into broader jobs interventions. Jobs interventions in general need to understand and potentially address changes in mental health and economic behavior due to forced displacement, as they can affect risk appetite, aspirations and willingness to invest. They also need to address the potential...
scaring effects of long periods of inactivity and take into account that beneficiaries might not be used to work anymore.

As we have seen above, legal frameworks are especially important in determining refugee and IDP relationships with the labor market, and any kind of program aimed at these populations must take the legal obstacles into account. As evidence from OECD countries showed, the length of waiting periods before first allowed to enter the labor market is associated with employment gaps that take many years to fill, due to scaring effects, deterioration of human capital and lower motivation. Faster certainty about the prospects of stay leads to better labor market outcomes, possibly by giving refugees a longer time horizon and incentivizing country specific investments. In addition, allocating refugees taking labor market opportunities into account or allowing them to move and settle freely has a positive impact on their labor market outcomes. Future research will be able to exploit recent changes in legal frameworks for refugees’ access to the labor market in countries such as Jordan, Colombia and Ethiopia to broaden our knowledge to low- and middle-income settings.

Besides targeting the assets and human capital of forced migrants, interventions may also target potential employers of refugees and IDPs. Wage subsidies show the most promising evidence for refugees and other migrants, but evidence is limited to high-income countries. Public works programs can have important positive short-term impacts in the forced displacement context, even in very fragile and poor environments, but the medium- to longer-term impacts seem less promising. Value-chain and other market-based interventions are increasingly implemented in the context of forced displacement to increase demand for the goods and services of those self-employed, but as for public works programs, counterfactual-based evaluations are lacking. We also need more evidence on potential impacts of anti-discrimination laws and information about the rights of refugees for employers and refugees themselves.

Job search assistance or matching program are associated with positive effects on employment in high-income countries, where job opportunities in the formal sector exist. The little existing evidence on low- and middle-income countries seems less promising. Beyond public matching services, refugees and IDPs need support to build up social networks. In addition, intensive coaching and individualized assistance can have positive impacts on labor market outcomes.

As refugees and IDPs usually face multiple barriers to enter the labor market, the evidence for integrated interventions that tackle several constraints at once seems promising. Such interventions range from the combination of training with cash injections or work experience to full-fledged graduation-type of approaches. More evidence is needed to uncover the black box and understand which program elements are most effective.

Future evaluations should not only include more low- and middle-income countries and interventions working with IDPs, but also longer-term impacts. General evaluations of active labor market policies should investigate heterogeneous impacts, differentiating not only between immigrants and natives, but also between different groups of immigrants, including refugees and IDPs. Evaluating the impacts of interventions in the forced displacement context should not be limited to basic needs outcomes such as food security: evaluations should also consider employment and jobs outcomes, which may indicate a more substantive form of integration with the host community and may provide long-term benefits and sustainability. Moreover, as explored above, these interventions should also consider the quality of work, including wages and exposure to hazardous conditions, since programs such as cash transfers which show little to no effect on employment rates may have hidden positive effects in increasing quality of work conditions. Self-reliance indices might help measure impacts over time (Leeson et al. 2020; Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative 2020). More data, notably panel data, is also needed for low- and middle income countries to better understand the challenges those forcibly displaced face on the labor market.

Future research should also aim to understand how jobs interventions for host communities need to be adapted to changes in the labor markets after a forced displacement inflow. How do wages and
employment of the local population change? Who is most impacted by the inflow? How do firms adapt to the inflow? A recent review of the literature shows that the majority of studies looking at the impacts of a forced displacement inflow on host community labor market outcomes do not find significant impacts, but there is evidence that certain subgroups might be negatively or positively impacted (Verme and Schuettler 2019). Jobs interventions can help to address such potential negative impacts for host community members and seize new opportunities.
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Ingram, Verina, and Elsje Oosterkamp. 2014. “Literature Review on the Labour Market Impacts of Value Chain Development Interventions.” LEI Wageningen UR.


Martén, Linna, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner. 2019. “Ethnic Networks Can Foster the Economic Integration of Refugees.” Proceedings of the National Academy of


Annex: List of papers on evaluations of employment interventions in the context of forced displacement.

Table A1: Compiled papers

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Institution or Journal</th>
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<th>Host Country</th>
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<td>More Cash, Bigger Impacts? A Field Experiment of Cash Transfers in</td>
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<td>Save the Children</td>
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<td>Cash, food, or vouchers? Evidence from a randomized experiment in</td>
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<td>The effects of vouchers for essential household items on child health,</td>
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<td>Reducing income transfers to refugee immigrants: Does start-help help you start?</td>
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<td>Humanitarian vs. Development Aid for Refugees: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design</td>
<td>MacPherson and Sterk</td>
<td>CSAE 2019</td>
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<td>International Rescue Committee 2014</td>
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<td>Multi-purpose Cash Assistance in Lebanon: Impact Evaluation on the Well-Being of Syrian Refugees</td>
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<td>American University of Beirut 2020 Lebanon Syria Refugee</td>
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<td>“Min Ila” Cash Transfer Programme for Displaced Syrian Children in Lebanon (UNICEF and WFP)</td>
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<td>Does reduced cash benefit worsen educational outcomes of refugee children?</td>
<td>Jakobsen, Kaarsen, and Vasiljeva</td>
<td>Nordic Council of Ministers 2017 Denmark</td>
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<td>Masstricht University, Samuel Hall 2012 Afghanistan Afghanistan IDP</td>
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<td>Determinants of Labor Market Participation and Wages of North Korean Female Refugees in South Korea</td>
<td>Yu, Kim, Jeon, and Jung Asian Economic Policy Review</td>
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<td>Transfers for Refugees in the Context of Protracted Displacement? Findings from Jordan</td>
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**Refugees: Strategies and good practices**

**Setting the Stage: What we know (and don’t know) about the effects of cash-based interventions on gender outcomes in humanitarian settings**

Simon UN Women 2018 Various Various Refugee, IDP Unconditional cash transfer, Vouchers or food stamps Health, Community or social tensions

**The Effects of Cash Transfers on Adult Labor Market Outcomes**

Baird, McKenzie, and Ozler World Bank 2018 Various Various Refugee Unconditional cash transfers (repeated), Unconditional cash transfers (grants), Conditional cash transfers (repeated), Needs-based cash transfers, Enterprise development/self-employment assistance Employment rates, Underemployment/Seasonality of employment, Entrepreneurship or self-employment, Earnings, Consumption

**One-off transfers (grant or credit)**

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**Final Report: Mid-Term Evaluation of UNHCR Graduation Programme in Egypt**

UNHCR and Beit Al Karma Consulting Egypt UNHCR 2016 Egypt Syria Refugee Graduation-type/productive inclusion Entrepreneurship or self-employment, Earnings, Employment rates Instrumental variables and regression discontinuity

**Economic Inclusion of the Poorest Refugees**

UNHCR UNHCR 2016 Various Refugee Graduation-type/productive inclusion Entrepreneurship or self-employment, Earnings, Employment rates Pre-post

**Graduation Model Pilot project 2014-2016: UNHCR Costa Rica**

UNHCR and TrickleUp UNHCR 2016 Costa Rica Colombia Refugee Graduation-type/productive inclusion Entrepreneurship or self-employment, Earnings, Employment Pre-post
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<td>Microfinance for Refugees: Emerging Principles for Effective Implementation</td>
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<td>Financial Inclusion of Germany’s Refugees: Current Situation and Road Ahead</td>
<td>Dhawan and European Microfinance Network</td>
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<td>Using Microfinance Interventions to Support the Livelihoods of Forcibly Displaced People: The Impact of a Microcredit Program in IDP Camps in Lira, Northern Uganda</td>
<td>Jacobsen et al and Feinstein International Center</td>
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<td>Microfinance in refugee contexts: current scholarship and research gaps</td>
<td>Easton-Calabria and Omata and Refugee Studies Centre</td>
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<td>Vocational, business and other skills training, and recognition of skills</td>
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<td>Employment Among Recently Arrived Refugee Migrant Men Living in Australia</td>
<td>Mejia-Mantilla et al</td>
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<td>2019</td>
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<td>Informing the Refugee Policy Response in Uganda. Results from the Uganda Refugee and Host Communities 2018 Household Survey</td>
<td>Ibanez and Moya</td>
<td>The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>Nichols and Jacobsen</td>
<td>Tufts Feinstein International Center</td>
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<td>Refugee Survival and NGO Project Assistance: Mozambican Refugees in Malawi</td>
<td>Zetter</td>
<td>Community Development Journal</td>
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<td>Tech Jobs for Refugees: Assessing the Potential of Coding Schools for Refugee</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>Migration Policy Institute</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<td>Guide to Mobile Data Analytics in Refugee Scenarios: The 'Data for Refugees Challenge' Study</td>
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<td>Lessons from Past Practice</td>
<td>Integration of Immigrants: The Role of Language Proficiency and Experience</td>
<td>Delander et al</td>
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<td>Spotlight on refugee integration: findings from the Survey of New Refugees in the United Kingdom</td>
<td>Cebulla et al</td>
<td>UK Home Office</td>
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<td>Labour market entry of nonlabour migrants – Swedish evidence</td>
<td>Aslund, Forslund, and Lijeberg</td>
<td>Nordic Council of Ministers</td>
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<td>The Effect of Integration Policies on the Time until Regular Employment of Newly Arrived Immigrants:</td>
<td>Clausen et al</td>
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<td>The Nordic experience</td>
<td>Martin et al</td>
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<td>Healthcare and psychosocial support</td>
<td>Ager et al.</td>
<td>J Child Psychol Psychiatry</td>
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<td>Interventions for depression symptoms among adolescent survivors of war and displacement in northern Uganda: a</td>
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<th>Country/Region</th>
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<td>The efficacy of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing for post-traumatic stress disorder and depression among Syrian refugees: results of a randomized controlled trial.</td>
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<td>Meta-Analysis of the Use of Narrative Exposure Therapy for the Effects of Trauma Among Refugee Populations</td>
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<td>Trauma rehabilitation for war-affected persons in northern Uganda: A pilot evaluation of the EMPOWER programme</td>
<td>Sonderegger et al.</td>
<td>British Journal of Clinical Psychology</td>
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<td>The Effectiveness of Cognitive Processing Therapy for PTSD with</td>
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## Refugees in a Community Setting

**Testimony Psychotherapy in Bosnian Refugees: A Pilot Study**

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### Legal framework

**Empowering IDP with SMS: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Bogotá**

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**Employment Effects of Dispersal Policies on Refugee Immigrants: Empirical Evidence**

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**The Struggle for) Refugee Integration into the Labour Market: Evidence from Europe**

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**Do When and Where Matter? Initial Labour Market Conditions and Immigrant Earnings**

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**The employment experience of refugees in the Netherlands**

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<td>International Migration Review</td>
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<td>When lives are put on hold: Lengthy asylum processes decrease employment among refugees</td>
<td>Hainmueller et al</td>
<td>Science Advances</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>An estimate of the effect of waiting time in the Danish asylum system on post-resettlement employment among refugees</td>
<td>Hvidtfeldt et al</td>
<td>PLOS One</td>
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<td>Marbach, Hainmueller, and Hangartner</td>
<td>Science Advances</td>
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<td>Are asylum seekers more likely to work with more inclusive labor market access regulations?</td>
<td>Slotwinski et al</td>
<td>Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immigrants -- Evidence from a natural experiment</td>
<td>Edin et al</td>
<td>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>Marten et al</td>
<td>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America</td>
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<td>Various including Africa, Asia,</td>
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<td>Resettlement policies, Language training, How long until first employment, Multivariate regression</td>
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<td>Placement on Refugees' Labour Market Integration</td>
<td>Balkans, Near East, and rest of the world</td>
<td>Health, Employment rates, Social assistance dependence, Underemployment / Seasonality of employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>The importance of resources and security in the socio-economic integration of refugees</td>
<td>Bakker et al</td>
<td>Journal of International Migration and Integration</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Somalia</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Resettlement policies, Psychosocial support</td>
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<td>Improving refugee integration through data-driven algorithmic assignment</td>
<td>Bansak et al</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Various including Myanmar, Iraq, Bhutan, Somalia, and Afghanistan</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Resettlement policies</td>
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<td>Promoting Labour Market Integration of Refugees with Trade Preferences: Beyond the EU-Jordan Compact</td>
<td>Temprano-Arroyo</td>
<td>Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Migration Policy Centre</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Legal right to work and work permits or anti-discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees' Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment</td>
<td>Zetter and Ruaudel</td>
<td>KNOMAD</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Chad, Ethiopia, Ecuador, Germany, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, the</td>
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<td>Legal right to work or anti-discrimination</td>
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<td>Employment rates, Employment satisfaction, Underemployment / Seasonality of employment, Sources of income</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title</td>
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<td>Institution/Year</td>
<td>Geographic Scope</td>
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<td>An Assessment of Uganda's Progressive Approach to Refugee Management</td>
<td>Vemuru et al</td>
<td>WB/UNHCR 2016</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employment rates, Debt reduction and access to financial institutions or lines of credit</td>
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<td>The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees</td>
<td>Bellamy et al</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute 2017</td>
<td>Turkey, Jordan, Syria</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employment rates, Employment rates, Employment satisfaction, Community or social tensions, Earnings, Formality of employment</td>
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<td>Comparative study on the best practices for the integration of resettled refugees in the EU Member States</td>
<td>Papadopoulou et al</td>
<td>European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2013</td>
<td>EU, Various, Various</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employment rates, Community or social tensions</td>
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<td>The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access</td>
<td>Clemens, Huang, and Graham</td>
<td>CGDEV 2018</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Earnings, employment rates, Community or social tensions, Review</td>
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<td>Supporting Resilient Labour Markets to Drive</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO 2017</td>
<td>Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employment rates, Entrepreneurship, Review</td>
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### Inclusive Economic Growth and Decent Work for All: A Summary of Emerging Lessons Learned from ILO Syrian Crisis Interventions in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Type</th>
<th>Countries/Countries of Origin</th>
<th>Evidence Type</th>
<th>Employment Outcomes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational or skills training or apprenticeships, Market-based or value chains interventions</td>
<td>Various, with the most common being Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Syria</td>
<td>Refugee Job search assistance</td>
<td>Various, with the most common being Iraq, Somalia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can job search assistance improve the labour market integration of refugees? Evidence from a field experiment</td>
<td>Battisti et al, Labour Economics, Germany</td>
<td>Job search assistance</td>
<td>Employment rates, Earnings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reforming the Integration of Refugees: The Swedish Experience</td>
<td>Andersson Joona, Lanninger, and Sudstrom, IZA, Sweden</td>
<td>Job search assistance, Wage subsidies, Needs-based cash transfers</td>
<td>Employment rates, Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtues of SIN: Can Intensified Public Efforts Help Disadvantaged Immigrants?</td>
<td>Aslund and Johansson, Evaluation Review, Sweden</td>
<td>Job search assistance</td>
<td>Employment rates, How long until first employment in host country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Refugee Self-Reliance Pilot Program in Rwanda, South</td>
<td>CWS, Church World Service, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, In Rwanda: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the</td>
<td>Job search assistance</td>
<td>Employment rates, Entrepreneurship or self-employment</td>
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<table>
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<th>Job Matching Services Case Study</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Syria, Sudan, Mauritania, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen</th>
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<th>Job search assistance</th>
<th>Sources of income, Formality of employment, Earnings</th>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum Wages and the Integration of Refugee Immigrants</td>
<td>Lundborg and Skedinger</td>
<td>Institute of Industrial Economics</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Minimum wage</td>
<td>Employment rates, Underemployment / Seasonality of employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges</td>
<td>Aiyar et al</td>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Wage subsidies, job search assistance, other training</td>
<td>Employment rates, Earnings, Employment satisfaction</td>
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</table>

**Wage subsidies**

**Subsidized public sector employment**

<p>| Livelihoods in the Za'atari Camp: Impact evaluation of Oxfam’s Cash for Work activities in the Za’atari camp | Lombardini and Mager | Oxfam | 2019 | Jordan | Syria | Refugee | Direct employment or cash for work | Expenditure, Sources of income, Community or social tensions | Matching |
| Are Cash for Work (CFW) Programs Effective to Promote Disaster Recovery? Evidence from | Nagamatsu | Journal of Disaster Research | 2014 | Japan | Japan | IDP | Direct employment or cash for work | Non-measurable reported improvements in wellbeing | Multivariate regression, Simple difference |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Organization/Programme/Location</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
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<td>the Case of Fukushima Prefecture</td>
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<td>Global Business and Refugee Crises</td>
<td>Huang</td>
<td>Center for Global Development</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<td>Employment rates, Earnings, Basic needs, Sources of income</td>
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<td>Access to markets / value chain interventions</td>
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<td>Microfinance/microcredit, Job search assistance, Market-based or value chains interventions, Vocational or skills training or apprenticeships</td>
<td>Multivariate regression</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Guide to Market-Based Livelihood Interventions for Refugees</td>
<td>Nutz</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Market-based or value chains interventions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private Sector &amp; Refugees: Pathways to Scale</td>
<td>IFC and Bridgespan Group</td>
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<td>2019</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Refugee, IDP</td>
<td>Market-based or value chains interventions</td>
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<td>Evaluation of Market Systems Development Interventions for Refugees and Host Communities in Jijiga, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Chaux and Nutz</td>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Sources of income, Entrepreneurship or self-employment</td>
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<td>Propcom Mai-Karfi's Annual</td>
<td>Propcom Mai-Karfi</td>
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