79553 Cambodia SABER Country Report TEACHER POLICIES 2011 Policy Goals Status 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers Expectations for students and teachers are clear, but teachers do not have adequate time to fulfill their duties 2. Attracting the best into teaching Career pay (aside from starting salary), benefits, and working conditions are appealing, and there is a selection process into initial teacher education; it is unclear which attractive career opportunities exist 3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience Standards for teacher training programs do not exist nor do they include enough practical professional experience; there are no induction programs in place to help smooth the transition into teaching 4. Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs There are not enough monetary incentives for teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools and there are no incentives to teach critical shortage subjects 5. Leading teachers with strong principals Strong entry requirements for school leadership exist, and principals are provided with performance-based incentives; however, they have limited authority over teacher firing and promotion 6. Monitoring teaching and learning Student assessments occur annually for all students in selected grades, and teacher performance evaluations along multiple criteria are required every year 7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction Teacher performance and student learning data are not used to inform teaching and learning; professional development is available but not required for primary or secondary teachers 8. Motivating teachers to perform There are minimum accountability mechanisms in place and some performance- related incentives exist; sanctions for low-performance are weak THE WORLD BANK CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 The Importance of Teacher Policies 1 Overview of SABER-Teachers Research suggests that teacher quality is the main SABER-Teachers collects data on 10 core teacher policy school-based predictor of student achievement and that areas in order to offer a comprehensive overview of several consecutive years of outstanding teaching can teacher policies in each education system. These policy offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students areas are listed in Box 1. It is important to highlight that (Hanushek & Rivkin 2006; Nye, et al. 2004; Park & SABER-Teachers’ main focus is on the policies formally Hannum 2001; Rivkin, et al. 2005; Rockoff 2004; adopted by education systems. While in some cases the Sanders 1998; Sanders & Rivers 1996; and Vignoles, et data collected also address how the teacher policy goals al. 2000). However, it is not yet clear exactly which are achieved in practice, the nature of our data teacher policies can raise teacher effectiveness collection approach (based on interviews with key (Goldhaber 2002 and Rivkin, et al. 2005). Thus, devising informants and official document review) do not allow effective policies to improve teaching quality remains a for a thorough assessment of policy implementation. challenge. Therefore, complementary research will be useful in most settings. There is increasing interest across the globe to attract, retain, develop and motivate great teachers. While the Box 1: Key Teacher Policy Areas World Bank has ample experience in supporting teacher 1. Requirements to enter and remain in teaching policy reforms in developing countries, until recently 2. Initial teacher education there was no systematic effort to offer data and analysis 3. Recruitment and employment that can provide policy guidance on teacher policies. A new tool, Systems Approach for Better Education 4. Teachers’ workload and autonomy Results (SABER)-Teachers, fills this gap by collecting, 5. Professional development analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating 6. Compensation (salary and non-salary benefits) comprehensive information on teacher policies in 7. Retirement rules and benefits primary and secondary education across a range of 8. Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality different education systems. In this report, we discuss 9. Teacher representation and voice the findings from the application of SABER-Teachers in 10. School leadership Cambodia. Our goal is to enable policymakers to learn about how other countries address the same policy challenges related to teacher management and thus To analyze these data and offer informed policy how to make well-informed policy choices that will lead guidance, SABER-Teachers analyzes progress on eight to improved learning outcomes. 2 teacher policy goals. SABER-Teachers used three criteria to select these teacher policy goals. They are: (i) 1 linked to performance through evidence provided by In order to offer guidance to policy makers in client research and studies; (ii) a high priority for resource countries on how to raise education quality, the Education allocation; and (iii) actionable. The 8 teacher policy Unit at the World Bank’s Human Development Department goals are presented in Figure 1. has launched Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER), an initiative that seeks to collect information about different education systems’ policy domains, analyze it to identify common challenges and promising solutions, and make it widely available to inform countries’ decisions on where and how to invest in order to improve education quality. SABER - Teachers is one such policy domain. 2 The focus of the initiative is the design of teacher policies as opposed to their implementation on the ground. A number of complementary activities will be looking at implementation in a sample of countries as this will involve a different methodological approach and will require more financial and human resources. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 2 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 Figure 1: Teacher Policy Goals Cambodia’s Teacher Policy System Results Goal 1: Setting clear expectations for teachers Setting clear expectations for teachers is important for several reasons. First, expectations for student and teacher performance influence how potential entrants perceive the profession. The clearer these expectations, the more likely an education system is to get the type of teacher it seeks. Second, expectations guide teachers’ work. The more specific they are, the better teachers can organize their time and resources to meet them. Finally, expectations can help align the goals of different key aspects of the profession (e.g., pre-service training, professional development and teacher appraisals). The The eight teacher policy goals exclude other objectives more institutionalized these expectations are, the more that countries might want to pursue to increase the likely all of these aspects will be working towards a effectiveness of teachers. These were excluded because common purpose and thus the more likely it will be there is to date insufficient empirical basis on which to achieved. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers make specific policy recommendations, either because education systems can use to reach this goal: evidence on policy interventions in that area remains • Are there clear expectations for what students unclear or because the top-performing education should know and be able to do? systems take very different approaches to reach these • Are there clear expectations for what teachers are objectives. 3 For a more detailed report on the eight supposed to do? teacher policy goals and the evidence supporting this • Do teachers have enough time to fulfill their duties? selection, please see Vegas, et al. (2010). In Cambodia, there are clear expectations for students 3 For example, SABER-Teachers collects information on and teachers, and performance goals for teachers have teacher organizations (as part of the policy area of “teacher been established. Expectations for the tasks that representation and voice�) and will make it publicly available. teachers are supposed to do are explicitly laid out in Yet no clear trend has emerged regarding whether (and if so, legal regulations, and teachers are guided by how) governments should engage with these organizations in performance goals. Cambodia has a national policy formulation or consultation. To be sure, many studies curriculum, which sets the contents in detail, informing have looked at the impact of unionization on schools’ teachers of required subject content that should be productivity (Argys and Reese, 1995; Eberts and Stone, 1986; taught to students at different grades. In addition, and Hoxby 1996), student learning (Kingdon and Teal, 2008; national standards, or measurable indicators of Kleiner and Petree, 1988; Kurth, 1987; Register and Grimes, 1991; and Steelman et al, 2000), teachers’ wages (Ballou and learning, have been defined for what students should Podgursky, 2002; Baugh and Stone, 1982; Bee and Dolton, know and be able to do. 1995; and Dolton and Robson, 1996), working conditions (Eberts, 1984; Murillo et al, 2002; and Zegarra and Ravina, Working time is between 1000 and 1520 hours per 2003) and education policy (Goldschmidt and Stuart, 1986 year for primary and secondary school teachers, fewer and Woodbury, 1985). But even top-performing countries hours than the required time in high-performing differ widely in how much they engage, to what extent they systems (Figure 2). However, similar to top education regulate, and how they organize teachers’ unions. Data systems, the school year consists of 800 hours or more collected by SABER-Teachers will offer guidance on how to at both primary and the secondary levels. Teachers’ approach these issues in the future. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 3 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 working time is defined as the number of hours spent at • Are entry requirements set up to attract talented school, which recognizes at least some of the non- candidates? classroom tasks that teachers are required to carry out, • Are pay and benefits appealing for talented including lesson planning and other administrative candidates? tasks. However, data are not available on how much • Are working conditions appealing for talented time school teachers are expected to devote to teaching candidates? as a share of total working time, making it difficult to • Are there attractive career opportunities? evaluate how much time is available for other necessary activities. In Cambodia, there are entry requirements to initial teacher education and pre-service training is available. Figure 2: Average teacher working hours per year, Over 90 percent of primary and secondary school teachers selected countries meet requirements to become a teacher. Pre-service training exists, but the share of teachers who enter these Japan 1899 programs out of the applicant pool is not known, making it Hungary 1864 difficult to evaluate the extent to which candidates are South Korea 1680 competitively selected into these programs. Concurrent Netherlands 1659 models of teacher training are available for both primary Cambodia and secondary school teachers, and consecutive models 1225 are also offered for secondary school teachers. Therefore, Cambodia 980 prospective secondary school teachers have the option to 0 500 1000 1500 2000 first learn content and then receive training in pedagogy in a second phase, or learn both content and pedagogy at Source: SABER-Teachers. the same time. Most pay and benefits are appealing for talented Goal 2: Attracting the Best into Teaching candidates, but starting salaries are very uncompetitive. Starting salaries are less than 50 percent of GDP per capita, which is lower than at least 60 percent of GDP per capita in top-performing systems Getting talented people to go into teaching is essential (Figure 3). However, teacher pay can potentially change for several reasons (Guarino, Santibáñez & Daley moderately over a teacher’s career and the salary 2006). First, more able individuals make better teachers schedule varies based on the results of teacher (Boyd, et al. 2008). The better the quality of the performance evaluations. In addition, pay is teaching force, the more likely an education system is differentiated for teachers who teach in hard-to-staff to have effective teachers. Second, top candidates schools or certain geographic areas, giving incentives to maximize the impact of teacher training (whether teach in these environments. Teachers are entitled to traditional or abridged). If the quality of student retirement but not health benefits, and salaries are paid teachers is too low, training is likely to focus more on on time 10 months or more every year. making up for their deficits in knowledge and skills and less on turning them into effective teachers. Finally, luring top talent into teaching has a “multiplier� effect: if teaching attracts qualified people, competitive candidates who had not considered teaching might be drawn to it. SABER - Teachers considers four policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal: 4 that some women prefer to teach because they can take leaves of absence to take care of their families without incurring wage penalties when they come back (Flyer & Rosen 4 One issue that is not included in this list because of lack of 1997; Stinebrickner 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b). Yet, it is clear guidance from available evidence on how to tackle it is unclear that education systems want to attract these that of the “flexibility� of the profession. Several studies find candidates any more than other groups. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 4 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 Figure 3: Starting Teacher Pay as a Share of GDP • Are there minimum standards for pre-service Per Capita, Selected Countries ( percent) teaching training programs? • Are individuals required to have classroom South Korea 117 experience to be allowed to teach? Finland 82 • Do teachers have a smooth transition from pre- service training into their first job? Japan 81 Chile 79 In Cambodia, there is an accreditation process for pre- service teacher training programs, but no Cambodia 37 specifications on subject content have been 0 50 100 150 established. High performing countries tend to have clear specifications with a balance of both content and Source: SABER-Teachers and EdStats. pedagogy, as research shows that subject matter knowledge can positively impact teacher performance Teachers’ working conditions are appealing, but there (Darling-Hammond 1999a, 1999b; Guyton & Farokhi are many primary school students per teacher. About 74 1987; Monk 1994; Rowan, et al. 1997). percent of schools comply with infrastructure standards and the secondary student-teacher ratio is 27, similar Teacher trainees are required to have only minimal conditions to top-performing systems. However, there are classroom experience. Teacher trainees are required to 49 primary school students per teacher, which may have up to three months of classroom experience, detract some teachers from the profession. which may be too short to have a positive impact on teacher effectiveness. The more teachers try out their Promotion opportunities are linked to performance. pedagogical theories, subject matter knowledge and However, data are unavailable on potential promotion classroom management skills on a group of students, opportunities. the better prepared they will be for their job. Goal 3: Preparing Teachers with Useful In addition, there are no systems in place to facilitate new teachers’ transition into teaching for primary or Training and Experience secondary school teachers. In high-performing systems, comparable programs for both primary and secondary school teachers are usually longer than seven Equipping teachers with the skills they need to succeed in months. These programs have the potential to make a classroom is crucial. First, few (if any) individuals are teachers more effective in the classroom and reduce born effective teachers. Teachers need subject matter teacher turnover (Figure 4). knowledge, classroom management skills and lots of practice in order to be successful in a classroom. In addition, preparation puts all teachers on an equal footing, Figure 4: Length of induction programs for new giving them a common framework to work and improve teachers, selected countries their practice. SABER - Teachers considers three policy Cambodia Singapore Japan levers education systems can use to reach this goal: 5 0 6 12 18 24 5 Length of induction programs for new teachers (months) One aspect not included in this framework because no data on this indicator was collected is that of teacher certification. Source: SABER-Teachers. Although the definition of teacher certification varies by country (and sometimes, within one country), studies have found that a certification status is generally associated with higher teacher effectiveness (Darling-Hammond 1999a, 1999b; Darling- Hammond, Barnett & Thorenson 2001; E. J. Fuller 1999; Goldhaber & Brewer 2000; Hawk, Coble & Swanson 1985). SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 5 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 Goal 4: Matching Teachers’ Skills with Figure 5: Incentives to take up posts in hard-to-staff Students’ Needs schools, selected systems Promotion Monetary Housing Loan bonus support assumption Cambodia X X Ensuring that teachers work in schools where their High-performers and top-improvers skills are most needed is important for promoting equity and efficiency. First, it is a way of ensuring all South Korea X X students in an education system have an equal High-performers opportunity to learn: without purposeful incentives, Finland X teachers tend to gravitate towards schools with better Netherlands X working conditions, which often serve better off New Zealand X X X students (Boyd, et al. 2005a; Hanushek, et al. 2004). Top-improvers Second, it is a way of ensuring teachers are distributed Chile X efficiently—i.e., to minimize the number of surplus Slovenia X teachers at a given grade, subject or geographic area. Finally, ensuring teachers are a good match for their Source: SABER-Teachers and OECD. school can also increase their effectiveness and reduce turnover rates (Boyd, et al. 2002, 2005b; Jackson Cambodia has identified critical shortage subjects, but 2010). 6 SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers has not created monetary incentives for teachers to education systems can use to reach this goal: focus on them. In high-performing and top-improving • Are there incentives for teachers to work at hard- systems, various incentives exist to attract talented to-staff schools? professionals, particularly from high-demand fields, to • Are there incentives for teachers to teach critical teaching critical shortage subjects. shortage subjects? In Cambodia, there are monetary incentives for teaching in hard-to-staff schools, but teaching experience is considered when deciding transfer priorities (Figure 5). Using seniority as a basis for approving transfer requests may motivate the most seasoned and potentially best teachers to leave hard- to-staff schools. Attracting effective teachers to work in these schools, which may serve students from disadvantaged populations, is a challenge for many countries, and often requires incentives such as differentiated pay. 6 Much research has been devoted to the issue of turnover. Several studies have noted that it is not always the most effective teachers who leave (Boyd, et al. 2007; Hanushek, et al. 2005; West & Chingos 2008). Yet, these studies also concede that there is still considerable room for schools to enact targeted policies aimed at retaining only the most effective performers. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 6 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 Goal 5: Leading Teacher with Strong Principals have limited authority over decisions that Principals affect teaching. While school principals have formal responsibility for hiring teachers, they do not have the authority to promote nor dismiss them (Figure 6). However, they do have substantial authority over the The quality of school heads is second only to classroom distribution of time during school hours. High- teaching as a predictor of student learning (Eberts & performing and top-improving systems often grant this Stone 1988; Leithwood, et al. 2006). Quality principals type of decision-making authority to principals. attract and retain quality teachers (Boyd, et al. 2009a; Ingersoll 2001a, 2001b; Papa Jr., Lankford & Wyckoff Figure 6: Principals’ decision-making in teacher hiring 2002). Also, capable principals can spearhead much- and firing, selected systems needed change at the school level, so having strong leaders is important not only to ensure acceptable Hiring decisions Firing decisions levels of performance but also to drive improvements. Cambodia High-performers and top-improvers Finally, good principals can facilitate teachers’ work and Singapore continuous improvement. The more capable a principal South Korea High-performers is, the more he or she can support teachers, create a Japan sense of community, make teachers feel valued and Netherlands ease their anxiety about external pressures (Mulford New Zealand 2003). SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers Top-improvers education systems can use to reach this goal: Chile • Are requirements to become a principal set up to Slovenia attract talented candidates? • Do principals have incentives to perform well? • Can principals make key decisions to improve teaching? In Cambodia, three requirements for becoming a public school principal exist, in line with best practices. Source: SABER-Teachers and OECD Principals must possess educational qualifications equivalent to the ISCED 4A, complete certain courses, and perform satisfactorily in a supervised internship. Principal pay is highly competitive, and there are other incentives in place to perform well. Principals are paid 170 percent of GDP per capita, which is highly competitive by international standards. Principals are evaluated by local, sub-national, and national education authorities, and there are performance-based incentives. In addition, the role of principals as instructional leaders is explicitly directed by policy, as they are required to provide guidance to teachers. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 7 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 Goal 6: Monitoring Teaching and data are not available on how many teachers fail Learning external evaluations, making it difficult to assess the rigor of these assessments. Goal 7: Supporting Teachers to Improve Assessing how well teachers are teaching and whether Instruction students are learning is essential to devise strategies for improving teaching and learning. First, teacher and student evaluations help identify good practices, which can then be shared among the teaching staff to improve Helping teachers be more effective in the classroom is school performance. Second, identifying low- vital. First, all teachers can improve—regardless of how performing teachers and students is necessary to effective they are at one point in time. Therefore, support them in a timely manner. Education systems support mechanisms are necessary to help teachers need to be able to know when to provide struggling reach their potential and perform at their best. Second, classrooms with adequate support to improve. Finally, changes in classroom assignments and/or student such information is useful for accountability purposes. populations can pose new challenges to teachers. Thus, SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers during periods of transitions, teachers will need education systems can use to reach this goal: additional help to sustain their performance. Finally, • Is there enough student achievement data to support mechanisms can go a long way in preventing inform teaching? burnout and reducing turnover. Even motivated • Is there enough teacher performance data to teachers may choose to leave if they are consistently inform teaching? ineffective, do not know how to improve and receive little support. SABER - Teachers considers two policy In Cambodia, there are some student achievement levers education systems can use to reach this goal: data, but these data are not used to inform teaching. • Is teacher performance data used to improve Cambodia conducts annual national and subnational teaching? assessments of student learning for all students in at • Is there professional development to improve least three grades across both primary and secondary practice? levels. Although it is possible to track students’ scores over time, student assessment data cannot be linked to In Cambodia, teacher performance data from individual teachers, making it impossible to use the data evaluations are used to require professional to inform teachers about the learning needs of their development, but they are not used to inform students. Cambodia has not participated in any classroom practice or assign additional supervision. In international assessments of student achievement, thus high-performing systems, teacher performance making it difficult to assess its performance relative to evaluations are used to inform classroom practice, other countries. designate a supervisor for support, and assign professional development to improve teaching Teacher performance evaluations are regularly methods. If evaluations are not used to improve conducted and required for all teachers. In Cambodia, instruction, it is unlikely that teachers will improve on teacher performance is evaluated annually by external areas because they are not aware that they need to get education authorities as well by the school. Several better. The strategies of assigning tutors, supervisors or criteria are used to assess teacher performance, coaches or providing additional professional including teacher attendance, knowledge of subject development to struggling teachers can offer them the matter, compliance with the curriculum, teaching tools and guidance they need to improve. methods, student assessment methods, student learning, and class participation. These evaluations are Professional development in the form of workshops or based on a self-assessment by the teacher as well as courses is not required nor recommended. However, colleagues’ assessment and classroom observation. It is professional development does exist, and includes 5 possible to track teachers’ evaluations over time, but SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 8 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 kinds of activities, such as: (i) observation visits to other student performance (Chaudhury, et al. 2005; schools; (ii) participation in a teacher network; (iii) Herrmann & Rockoff 2009; Miller, Murnane & Willett participation in a school network; (iv) individual or 2008; Rogers & Vegas 2009). Education systems can collaborative research; and (v) mentoring. Content for encourage teacher attendance by taking it into account primary and secondary school teachers’ professional in teacher evaluations, giving teachers monetary development is adequate, including 4 aspects related to bonuses for coming to school and/or by dismissing teaching: (i) knowledge and understanding of subjects; teachers if they are consistently absent. (ii) understanding and teaching the curriculum; (iii) relating the curriculum to meeting the required learning There are rewards for high-performing teachers. In standards; and (iv) knowledge and understanding of Cambodia, high-performing teachers get higher salaries, instructional practices in main subjects. In line with better chances of promotion, and public recognition. many top-performing systems, individual teachers are However, the share of teachers’ salary (and therefore not responsible for paying for their professional significance of this incentive) that is affected by development. performance is not known. Top-performing education systems often motivate teachers by rewarding outstanding performance through these channels as Goal 8: Motivating Teachers to Perform well. Sanctions in place for low-performing teachers are Incentives help education systems signal priorities. The inadequate. There is a mandatory probation period for more aligned incentives are with the behaviors and teachers before they are granted open-ended outcomes they expect from teachers, the more likely appointments, and performance on the job factors into they will obtain them (Figure 7). Incentives are also a whether teachers receive appointments. However, way of recognizing teachers’ work. Teaching is a there are no pay cuts for low-performing teachers, nor challenging job and incentives can let teachers know the are job evaluations used to dismiss ineffective teachers. results they have achieved are valued so that they continue working hard to sustain them. In addition, Figure 7: Motivating teachers to perform, selected some types of incentives can influence the profile of the systems teaching profession and make it more competitive, Dismissal for under Probationary dynamic and performance-driven. The presence of ` performance period Cambodia incentives can affect the attractiveness of the teaching High-performers and top-improvers profession. SABER - Teachers considers three policy Singapore levers education systems can use to reach this goal: South Korea • Are there minimum mechanisms to hold teachers High-performers accountable? Japan • Are there rewards for high-performing teachers? New Zealand Top-improvers • Are there sanctions for low-performing teachers? Chile There are minimum mechanisms in place to hold Takes place teachers accountable. In Cambodia, requirements exist Does not take place for primary and secondary school teachers to remain in the profession, and teachers can be dismissed for misconduct or child abuse. Teacher absenteeism is Source: SABER-Teachers and OECD. taken into account in performance evaluations, but it does not result in penalties such as salary deductions and/or dismissal. 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Economics and Political Science. ——. (1999b). "The Reasons that Elementary and High West, M. R., & Chingos, M. M. (2008). "Teacher School Teachers Leave Teaching: An Analysis of Effectiveness, Mobility, and Attrition in Florida: A Occupational Change and Departure from the Descriptive Analysis." PEPG Working Paper Series. Labor Force." Research Report. Ontario, Canada: Cambridge, MA: Program on Education Policy and University of Western Ontario. Governance (PEPG). ——. (2001a). "Compensation Policies and Teacher Woodbury, S. (1985). "The Scope of Bargaining and Decisions." International Economic Review, 42(3), Bargaining Outcomes in Public Schools." Industrial 751-780. and Labor Relations Review, 38(2), 195-210. ——. (2001b). "A Dynamic Model of Teacher Labor Zegarra, E., & Ravina, R. (2003). "Teacher Unionization Supply." Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1), and the Quality of Education in Peru: An Empirical 196-230. Evaluation Using Survey Data." Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. Vegas, E., Loeb, S., Romaguera, P., Paglayan, A. S., Goldstein, N., & Ganimian, A. J. (2010). "SABER - Teachers: Objectives, Rationale, Methodological Approach, and Products." Washington, DC: The World Bank. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 12 CAMBODIA ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2011 www.worldbank.org/education/saber The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative produces comparative data and knowledge on education policies and institutions, with the aim of helping countries systematically strengthen their education systems. SABER evaluates the quality of education policies against evidence-based global standards, using new diagnostic tools and detailed policy data. The SABER country reports give all parties with a stake in educational results—from administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, objective snapshot showing how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn. This report focuses specifically on policies in the area teacher policies. This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. THE WORLD BANK SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 13