MANAGING SOCIAL RISKS AND IMPACTS FROM HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT: SHARING EXPERIENCE FROM A MEDIUM-SIZED DAM PROJECT IN VIETNAM Nguyen Quy Nghi, Martin H. Lenihan, Claude Saint-Pierre, Nguyen Thi Minh Phuong, Phan Huyen Dan Copyright © 2020 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank Group 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433 USA. All rights reserved. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, or its affiliated organizations, or to members of its board of executive directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. Cover photo: TSHPCo Contents iii Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms  vi Acknowledgments  vii Executive Summary  viii I. Background of the Trung Son Hydropower Project  1 A. Project Overview  2 B. Social Dimensions of the Trung Son Hydropower Project  3 C. Rationale  6 II. Methodology for Conducting the Review  7 A. Identification of Good Practice  8 B. Themes Selection  9 C. Good Practice Validation from Affected Communities  10 III. Life Before and After Construction of the Trung Son Dam  12 A. Before Construction of the Trung Son Dam  13 B. After Construction of the Trung Son Dam  14 IV. Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholder Engagement  18 A. Ensuring Early and Frequent Consultation with Affected Communities  19 B. Using the Languages of Ethnic Minority Communities  22 C. Gradually Building Community Relations Capacity  23 D. Section Summary 25 V. Resettlement 27 A. Mobilizing Local Knowledge to Select Resettlement Sites 29 B. Empowering Resettlers by Allowing Self-Construction of New Houses 30 C. Ensuring an Adequate Homestead Area 34 D. Allowing Adjustments during Construction of the New Homesteads 36 E. Paying for Self-constructed Houses in Installments 38 F. Section Summary 41 VI. Livelihood Improvement 43 A. Planning Livelihood Restoration as a Community-Based Development Project 44 B. Using a Proven Implementation Mechanism: Common Interest Groups  46 C. Adjusting Livelihood Restoration Activities and Resources 48 D. Ensuring Transfer to Local Government 51 E. Recognizing that Livelihood Change is a Long-Term Process 53 F. Section Summary 54 iv Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam VII. Risk Management at Reservoir Impoundment  57 A. Reassessing Risks and Impacts from Impoundment, Based on Up-to-Date Technical Design 58 B. Jointly Preparing and Implementing Mitigation of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts 58 C. Paying Special Attention to Communications during Impoundment 61 D. Section Summary  62 VIII. Attention to Local Context, Culture Sensitivity, and Inclusion of Women  64 A. Ensuring Respect of Ethnic Minority Cultures throughout Project Implementation 65 B. Paying Equal Attention to Men and Women within Affected Households 68 C. Grievance Redress Mechanism Allowing Maximum Access 70 IX. Conclusion and Outlook 71 A. Broader Take-aways for Hydropower Projects of Similar Size 72 B. Shifting to Good Practice in Management of Social Risks and Impacts Requires an Adaptative Approach and a Combination of Incentives 72 C. Answers and Concluding Thoughts on the Project’s Future 74 Bibliography/Reference List 77 Annex 1. General Project Area 79 Annex 2. Area of Project Activities 80 Contents v TABLES Table 1. Summary of environmental and social impacts by the Trung Son Hydropower Project 3 Table 2. Planned and Actual Project Milestones 5 Table 3. Consultation Activities During Project Preparation 20 Table 4. Consultation and Participation: Summary of Experience from the Trung Son Project  26 Table 5. Number of Households Affected by the Trung Son Project, and Compensation Amount 28 Table 6. Original and Revised World Bank Loan Agreement of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 34 Table 7. Examples of Comments and Solutions on Resettlement Plots 37 Table 8. Resettlement: Summary of Experience 42 Table 9. Livelihood Restoration Packages by Village Category 49 Table 10. Livelihood Improvement: Summary of Experience from the Trung Son Hydropower Project 56 Table 11. Potential and Actual Impacts during Reservoir Impoundment 59 Table 12. Communications Plan of the Trung Son Hydropower Project Relative to Reservoir Impoundment 61 Table 13. Risk Management at Reservoir Impoundment: Summary of Experience from Trung Son Project 62 FIGURES Figure 1. Timeline of the Trung Son Hydropower Project  5 Figure 2. Households with Bathrooms and Access to Electricity  14 Figure 3. Changes in household assets  15 Figure 4. Timeline of consultation decisions in the Trung Son Hydropower Project 25 Figure 5. Timeline of Resettlement Decisions in the Trung Son Hydropower Project 41 Figure 6. Timeline of Livelihood Improvement Decisions in the Trung Son Hydropower Project 55 Figure 7. Adaptive Approach for Social Risks and Impacts Management 73 BOXES Box 1. Criteria for Identifying Good Practice in the Trung Son Project 10 Box 2. Social Outcomes of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 16 Box 3. Village-Level Consultation on Planned Resettlement Sites 21 Box 4. Using Indigenous Knowledge When Selecting Resettlement Sites 30 Box 5. Procedure for Amending the Trung Son Hydropower Project Loan Agreement with the World Bank 33 Box 6. Homesteads in Thai Lifestyle and in Planned Resettlement 35 Box 7. Field Coordinators in the Livelihood Improvement Program of the Trung Son Project 51 Box 8. Beliefs of the Thai Ethnic Group 65 vi Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam Abbreviations and Acronyms AIDS Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome CLIP Community Livelihood Improvement Plan ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan EVN Electricity of Vietnam FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GENCO2 Power Generation Corporation 2 HIV Human immunodeficiency virus MoNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment OP Operational Policy RS Resettlement Site RPF Resettlement Policy Framework RLDP Resettlement, Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities Development Program SESIA Supplementary Environmental and Social Impact Assessment TSHPCo Trung Son Hydropower Company Limited VND Vietnamese Dong VRN Vietnam Rivers Network Acknowledgments vii Acknowledgments “Managing Social Risks and Impacts from Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam” is a World Bank paper prepared to document the experiences of the Trung Son Hydropower Project in the management of social risks and impacts. It also provides recognition of the efforts that were made by the project stakeholders during the implementation period to comply with the World Bank’s social safeguard policies on involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples. This paper is the outcome of a review undertaken at project end by a team comprising World Bank staff and consultants. Mr. Nguyen Quy Nghi (Senior Social Development Specialist, SEAS1) and Mr. Martin Henry Lenihan (Senior Social Development Specialist, SEAS1) led the exercise. Ms. Nguyen Thi Minh Phuong and Ms. Phan Huyen Dan, consultant sociologists, undertook in-depth field work and initial analysis. Ms. Claude Saint-Pierre, international consultant, contributed to the methodology. Ms. Vu Thuy Dung, team assistant, provided excellent administrative support. The World Bank’s Task Team Leaders, Mr. Franz Gerner (Lead Energy Specialist, IAFE3) and Mr. Tran Hong Ky (Senior Energy Specialist, IEAE1), provided valuable inputs and insights. The leaders and staff of the Trung Son Hydropower Limited Company (TSHPCo) supported this knowledge- sharing initiative. The team also thanks the TSHPCo team for their substantial help in the field and for logistical arrangements. Mr. Vu Huy Phuc (TSHPCo Director), Mr. Dang Ngoc Trieu (TSHCPo Deputy Director), and Mr. Hoang Ngoc Hien (Director of Project Management Board) made valuable contributions during the assessment. The project team also benefited from constructive comments of peer reviewers, Mr. Chaogang Wang (Lead Social Development Specialist, SMNSO), Mr. Satoshi Ishihara (Senior Social Development Specialist, SCASO), and Mr. Vincent Roquet (Senior Social Development Specialist, SESF2). For their support to this initiative, the team is thankful to Vietnam’s Country Management Unit and Social Development Unit in the East Asia and Pacific Region, including Ms. Susan S. Shen (Practice Manager, East Asia-Pacific Social Development Sector), Ms. Stefanie Stallmeister (Vietnam Operations Manager), and Mr. Ousmane Dione (Vietnam Country Director). The team is grateful to TSHPCo staff, local authorities, and the affected households and communities who offered their time to share their own valuable experiences, stories, and feedback without which preparing this paper would not be possible. viii Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam Executive Summary 1. The Trung Son dam is a medium-sized hydropower dam (260 megawatts) that was developed with the aim of achieving social and environmental sustainability. The dam, built on the Ma River in the upland parts of Thanh Hoa and Son La Provinces in Northwest Vietnam, has been in operation since end 2016. The Trung Son Hydropower Company (TSHPCo), a member of Vietnam Electricity/Power Generation Corporation 2 (EVN/GENCO2), manages the reservoir and hydropower plant. The World Bank has provided financing through a loan of US$330 million. The project was designed to follow an international good practice approach in terms of management of environment and social impacts and risks as well as technology and costs. One of the project components was dedicated to the management of social impacts from the reservoir and dam construction with a specific budget and associated framework of indicators. 2. Experience gained from the Trung Son Hydropower Project can provide relevant information for dam projects of a similar size. This report is the result of a knowledge-sharing exercise conducted at the end of 2019 by the World Bank with TSHPCo participation. The project benefitted from a decision-making process based on an adaptive management principle, defined by a framework of measures and implementation process. Detailed activities could evolve if they remained consistent with this framework. The adaptive management principle proved to be especially useful in addressing unexpected events throughout the long implementation period. Eighteen areas of good practice have been proposed in five core themes: (a) consultation and participation, (b) resettlement, (c) livelihoods restoration, (d) reservoir impoundment, and (e) vulnerable communities and cultural sensitivity. 3. Consultation was key to achieving project results and minimizing social impacts. Its effectiveness was evident in combination of four factors of good practice (timing, frequency, language, and community capacity enhancement). Starting from the preparation phase and continuing throughout implementation, consultations were conducted in languages used in local communities, which were mostly of minority ethnic groups. The participation of civil society was mobilized from the start. Consultation outcomes informed project design and mitigation measures, with all parties working collectively to complete every detail of these project documents. Through directly taking charge of consultation, TSHPCo gradually built its own community relations function and developed skills to interact with both households and local government. The affected people were afforded the opportunity to build their own capacity to more fully understand the project. 4. Experience gained from the Trung Son Hydropower Project demonstrates how relocation evolved, requiring continuous negotiations and engagement of all stakeholders to deal with unexpected problems. This participatory process, which demonstrates how affected- household preferences related to selection of locations for planned resettlement sites and to the construction of new houses by the households themselves, was part of the continuous discussion. Executive Summary ix Critical decisions included mobilizing local knowledge in planning resettlement sites and paying for self-construction in installments to control progress and quality of new housing. Allowing self- construction of new houses in the resettlement plan required a sustained effort and decisions of central-level agencies; and adjustments during onsite construction were key to ensure an adequate homestead area for all. As a result, relocation and the project in general made timely progress. Community voices were heard, and timely resources were allocated for the construction of new houses, whether household-built or project-provided. While preserving the popular style of Thai stilt houses, the quality of housing improved along with much better living conditions. Through this process, stronger coordination emerged among government at all levels and the project management unit. 5. Livelihood restoration through local communities took time but will likely lead to more sustainable outcomes. Livelihood restoration was planned as community- based development activities in the villages. Common interest groups, which are a proven implementation mechanism in Vietnam, were the main vehicle to organize training and demonstration activities. Members and topics were selected through bottom-up consultations. Individual advisory services were organized as a complementary activity to help affected villagers in making adjustments with regard to their livelihoods. Livelihood activities were merged step by step into the work of local authorities, starting at the village level. By 2019, activities had been fully transferred to local government, and households were in the process of diversifying their livelihoods. Among the various options, locals began to prioritize animal raising and to absorb new knowledge and skills in this area. Despite not being sustained after the project, common interest groups proved useful as a means to maintain and rebuild social capital during relocation. In this sense, the self-governance capacity of the village communities was raised. In parallel, local technicians had an opportunity for their own capacity building before the operation of community-based development models was transferred to local authorities. 6. The critical management of downstream impacts during reservoir impoundment requires mitigation of specific risks. Assessed during the project preparation stage, downstream impacts associated with reservoir impoundment would be minimized through maintenance of a minimum environmental flow. However, this action had not been feasible in the technical design of the Trung Son dam, resulting in concerns that the river could dry out and downstream activities would be seriously damaged. This then triggered research, consultations, evaluation, and identification of mitigation measures. A comprehensive communications plan was deployed to inform downstream communities and enterprises. Potential impacts were monitored in real time. It turned out that minimum environmental flow was maintained throughout reservoir impoundment and safety was ensured in the whole downstream area, effective mitigation plans were developed and communicated to the downstream communities. Financial compensation covered immediate and direct impacts, and reservoir impoundment was delayed by only three months. This highlights the importance of flexibility in addressing social impacts. It was also an opportunity for the hydropower company to develop proactive communications with a broader range of stakeholders. 7. Respect of ethnic minority cultures was ensured throughout project implemen­ tation. Impact and risks on ethnic minority communities were identified in the preparation stage. The relocation of graves, a project requirement but an unknown practice in local cultures, x Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam was a prominent issue. Based on the Trung Son project’s clear principle of respecting local cultures, the almost-impossible mission of relocating graves became a practice that required acceptability by the communities. Affected households could decide whether or not to relocate their family gravesites and, in turn, who would undertake the relocation. Communications with affected communities was key to reaching a relocation agreement and vital to organizing worship ceremonies at the time of relocation. Sufficient time was taken to confirm the numbers of affected graves. The selection of the new gravesites would not have been possible without proper consultation with local people. 8. Equal attention was paid to men and women within affected households. Early during implementation, an emphasis was placed on increasing the participation of women in project-related meetings. Collaboration with the district-level Women’s Unions was initiated and maintained to raise awareness about the large worker camp established in the Trung Son area. The Women’s Union invited both parents to inform them of potential risks and measures to protect women and girls. In the course of resettlement, attention to women successfully focused on two areas: (a) land use right certificates were issued in the name of both spouses, and (b) spouses’ joint presence was advised when making compensation payments. The participation of women in livelihood restoration activities markedly improved through appropriate training methods and activity schedules. Inviting the participation of Mong women however remained challenging given their limited literacy level of Vietnamese and local customs. 9. Managing social risks and impacts required the project developer to address obstacles through interaction with a large range of stakeholders. The project implementation unit under TSHPCo had limited experience in conducting meaningful consultations, in implementing livelihood activities, and in applying the World Bank’s social safeguard policies. The participation of a full range of stakeholders allowed clear decision-making to resolve each of these issues. This, rather than a dialogue between the hydropower company and the affected people, has ensured progress in the implementation of social mitigation measures and construction of the dam. Compliance with international standards was an incentive for the project stakeholders, and TSHPCo commitments were equally important. Engagement with stakeholders was another powerful incentive to progress in implementation of the mitigation measures. Among the diverse field of stakeholders, the local communities, with increased experience, contributed to successful decision-making. Without their influence, it is unlikely that project results would have been achieved. 10. The Trung Son reservoir area is rapidly evolving, with a newly created infrastructure network bringing both opportunities and challenges. The new phase has started, which is not only about operation of a hydropower dam but also about sustained social development of upland resettled communities now living around a reservoir. The implementation of the Resettlement, Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities Development Programs has created a momentum that now needs to continue to further improve living standards of local people in a sustainable manner. Now that the Trung Son dam is in full operation, much remains to be explored in terms of livelihood advancement. To further provide support to local households and their communities, the scope of the corporate social responsibility of TSHPCo will need to be confirmed, and interaction with the local government is likely to continue over a long period of time. Methodology for Conducting the Review 1 Background of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 2 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam I have been to many places and asked about their resettlement, how they were compensated, how their livelihoods were supported, they just shook their heads because it was not the same. I told them the Trung Son Hydropower Project was like this and that. They said that if we were like that, we wouldn’t have to suffer like this. (Interview No.15, Village Head, Tan Xuan commune) A. Project Overview 1. The Trung Son dam is a multipurpose infrastructure located in Northwest Vietnam. With an installed capacity of 260 megawatts, it provides electricity, helps control floods, and is at the same time expected to contribute to climate change mitigation in Vietnam by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The dam is built on the Ma River, one of Vietnam’s major rivers, with a total length of 400 kilometers, including a portion that runs through Laos. While the dam itself is sited in Thanh Hoa Province, in a commune called Trung Son, impacts from the reservoir created by the dam extend to two provinces and three districts.1 2. The Trung Son Hydropower Project components include the construction of the dam and ancillary infrastructure, the transmission lines, as well as social and environmental impact mitigation. The project implementing agency, Trung Son Hydropower Company (TSHPCo) is affiliated with the Power Generation Corporation 2 Company (GENCO2), a member of the Vietnam Electricity Group (EVN). The World Bank provided financial support to this investment project through a loan of US$330 million. 3. The Trung Son project was designed to follow international good practice in terms of technology, cost, and environmental and social sustainability. The development objective of the project was to supply least-cost electric power in a safe and environmentally and socially sustainable way. Environmental and social impact mitigation was one of the project components, with dedicated budget and specific indicators. To achieve expected results, living standards of people affected by the reservoir would be improved above or at least equivalent to pre-project circumstances. The EVN, TSHPCo, and World Bank as stakeholders were committed to making the Trung Son dam a worthy example of how hydropower can support Vietnam’s development, balancing the economic rationale with environmental and social sustainability. 4. While various stakeholders were involved in managing social impacts/risks of the hydropower project, the affected households, local authorities, TSHPCo, and the World Bank were the drivers in leading discussions and negotiations. Households were both project beneficiaries and project-affected entities. They were expected to actively engage and participate in the project activities (including planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). Local authorities, especially at district and provincial levels, institutionalized decisions that were prepared or proposed by TSHPCo in close collation with affected households and the World Bank. The key role of TSHPCo was to implement the project in accordance with the agreed 1 Quan Hoa District and Muong Lat District, Thanh Hoa Province; Van Ho District, Son La Province. Background of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 3 timelines, standards, and principles. In its turn, the World Bank had responsibility to supervise the project implementation to ensure the achievement of project development objectives, but also objectives of safeguard policies. Depending on themes and on specific project stage, other stakeholder arose (for instance, central agencies during the loan agreement amendment, NGOs during the consultations, livelihood technical support team for the Community Livelihood Improvement Plan (CLIP), and other contractors and consultants as required). B. Social Dimensions of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 5. In addition to regulatory requirements from Vietnam, project implementation had to comply with World Bank environmental and social safeguards. Eight of the safeguard- related operational policies were triggered, including two social safeguard policies: Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) and Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10). Through consultations with affected people, the social assessment, livelihood assessment, and Supplementary Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (SESIA) identified a range of impacts, or risks, within the project area. They are summarized in Table 1. Impact factors in italics are addressed through elements of the Environment Management Plan rather than the Resettlement, Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities Development Program (RLDP). TABLE 1. Summary of environmental and social impacts by the Trung Son Hydropower Project Project Element Negative Impact • Noise, dust, road safety • Waste • Safety at flooding Dam • Downstream impact: fish resources for livelihoods, sand extraction • Disruption of boat transportation • Relocation • Loss of agricultural land, especially land for bamboo plantation, Reservoir flooded areas need for livelihood restoration • Threats to ethnic/cultural identities in resettlement sites • Increased drug use and trade among workers Construction worker camp • Increased demand for local health services from camp followers • Safety and reproductive health, especially among women Access road, Power lines • Resettlement of affected households Sources: SESIA and livelihoods assessment. 6. There was one integrated the planning document, Resettlement, Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities Development Program (RLDP), for the management of social impacts and risks around the dam and reservoir. This was the “social” part of the environmental and social mitigation component of the project. This planning exercise was structured into four sections to ensure compliance with the aforementioned two safeguard policies: (a) a Resettlement Action Plan for the dam and auxiliary structures, (b) a community livelihoods improvement plan (CLIP), (c) an Ethnic Minority Development Plan, and (d) management and communications. “Management 4 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam and communications” included a grievance address mechanism and a monitoring and evaluation system. This option of an integrated planning document, the Resettlement, Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities Development Program, encompassed all households since they were eligible for project activities in the four sections. Impacts and risks generated by the construction of an access road and the transmission line from the hydropower plant to the national grid were planned separately.2 One single Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) defined entitlements and compensation for land acquisition and resettlement generated by these various types of infrastructure. 7. Adaptive management was spelled out as a principle in RLDP. The adaptive management principle allowed for detailed activities to evolve provided they remain consistent with the RLDP, RPF principles and more broadly the World Bank safeguard policies. Adaptive management proved its effectiveness in: • Responding to the regulations and law (e.g., Decree 69/ND-CP guiding the implementation of land acquisition, compensation, and resettlement; the 2013 Land Law and its guiding decrees) issued after approval of the Resettlement Policy Framework for the Trung Son project. • Applying the principle of compensation at full replacement cost through the approval of compensation rates at the time of land acquisition. The project’s the Resettlement Policy Framework also set forth principles to determine whether a household splitting after the cut-off date was eligible to compensation and resettlement support. • Adjusting the RLDP budget as needed during implementation. Contingencies have been included to allow budget increases. • Revising the sequence of planned operations as frequently as needed during implementation. Originally planned for a five-year period from end-2010 until end-2015, RLDP timelines have been updated and revised accordingly since it has been extended to 2019. • Accommodating last-minute changes to AH’s choices of livelihood restoration and resettlement arrangements. Multiple rounds of consultations with local people have been conducted to validate people’s choices and have captured their wishes for changes in livelihood restoration and resettlement arrangements. In fact, people changed their choices several times since the first consultation meeting, especially in term of resettlement options. 2 Resettlement plans and Ethnic Minority Development Plans were prepared for (a) the construction of a 22-kilometer access road, including a bridge; (b) a 65-kilometer long, 220kV transmission line; and (c) Mai Chau 110kV substation and connecting lines. Background of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 5 8. The RLDP was implemented in all localities impacted by the reservoir, with focus on a more impacted “core area”. In total, 7 communes and 1 district town were impacted by the Dam and its 13-square-kilometer reservoir. The core area in Thanh Hoa Province was flooded by the reservoir, while the core area in Son La Province was flooded by a tributary. Nine communes were outside the core area downstream of the dam,3 stretched along a 65-kilometer-long section of the Ma River (see Annex 1 and 2 for the map of project areas). The support provided through RLDP has been designed proportionate to the impact level in a specific village. 9. Activities under RLDP took place over a period of eight years. The activities started in parallel with dam construction in 2012 when the access road was completed. The Trung Son hydropower plant started operations at end 2016. In 2017, CLIP activities continued as foreseen in the project framework until end 2019 during a two-year project extension period (Figure 1). FIGURE 1. Timeline of the Trung Son Hydropower Project 2008-2011 2012-2017 2018-2019 Trung Son hydropower Trung Son hydropower Trung Son project preparation project implementation hydropower project extension RLDP design RLDP implementation (CLIP) 2008-2011 2012-2016 2003-2007 2017- Trung Son dam Trung Son dam Trung Son dam design phase construction phase Trung Son dam identi cation phase operations phase Access road construction Transmission line construction 10. The major milestones of the Trung Son Hydropower Project were mostly met. The first unit of the hydropower plant started almost on schedule, three months after the initially planned date (Table 2). This was achieved while ensuring that construction activities only start after land acquisition (required for each milestone) had been completed and compensation delivered. This is an important achievement in an infrastructure project of that scale, especially in the context of Vietnam where projects are often stretched due to a prolonged process of land acquisition and responding to complaints. TABLE 2. Planned and actual project milestones Key Milestones Planned Actual Completion of access road and bridges June 2012 June 2012 Commencement of main civil works construction June 2012 October 2012 Completion of transmission line January 2016 October 2016 Reservoir impoundment October 2016 January 2017 Commercial operation of unit #1 of hydropower plant October 2016 January 2017 Commercial operation of unit #4 April 2017 June 2017 3 The core area communes were Trung Son (at the dam site, Quan Hoa District); Muong Ly, Trung Ly, Tam Chung, Ten Tan, and Muong Lat Town (Muong Lat District); and Tan Xuan and Xuan Nha (Van Ho District). 6 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam C. Rationale 11. This report documents good practice in the management of social impacts and risks in a medium-scale hydropower project and has four main objectives: • First, to review the achievement of principles of following international good practice committed at preparation. Therefore, this document, which was prepared at the end of 2019 (at project-end) helps parties reviewing the achievement of their commitments so far. • Second, to update the project impacts and the implementation of mitigation measures. While social safeguard policies had defined how to manage social impacts and risks before project construction started, the planning instruments for their implementation were regularly updated over the course of the project to better take into account actual risks and impacts. This document reports on actual impacts. It explains the many changes that took place in terms of design, implementation time and policies; and describes how the management of social impacts/risks was adjusted accordingly. • Third, to capture the dynamics of interactions among stakeholders in implementation. Many adjustments that were made Highlighted that a dynamic decision-making process throughout the course of a hydropower project is key to sound management of social risks and impacts. Other hydropower projects are likely to encounter similar situations. This document was therefore designed to help those working on similar medium-sized projects to anticipate the situation they will encounter and the diversity of options they may have and offer an example of how obstacles were overcome in the case of the Trung Son Hydropower Project. • Fourth, to contribute to building a knowledge-sharing platform for those who are interested or engaged in similar assignments in the hydropower sector or in general infrastructure investments. This document is produced for an audience of practitioners, policy-makers, researchers, engineers and others who are involved in the design, preparation, and implementation of social impact mitigation measures of a hydropower project, whether financed by an international financial institution on not. It will also be particularly helpful for those working for similar investments financed by international financial institutions. Methodology for Conducting the Review 7 Methodology for Conducting the Review 8 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 12. This section focuses on the methodology used in conducting the review: the identification of good practice; the selection of themes; the use of document review, face-to- face interviews, and focus groups discussion; and validation of procedures from stakeholders and project-affected communities. 13. Documentation requires the arrangement and analysis of events by timeline or by topics. Under each topic, it is necessary to answer several questions: What, When, Who, Why and How. • Document review. This review plays a critical role in identifying the main topics of a hydropower project, including the implementation of safeguard instruments and results achieved. In addition to aide memoires and letters among stakeholders (EVN, TSHPCo, and World Bank), other resources include project-related documents,4 consultation reports, background studies, periodic monitoring and evaluation reports, project- related administrative documents of governmental authorities at all levels, and research reports from similar projects. Review of academic publications helped the team in conceptualizing the project experience in the recognized analytical framework of social risk/impact management. These academic publications include studies on general resettlement issues or dam-induced resettlement. • In-depth interviews and focus groups discussion. The face-to-face interviews were conducted using a schedule of opened-ended questions. In addition to pre-defined key questions, this approach allowed certain flexibly in adjusting the discussion guideline to capture the full story happening on the ground. There were 28 in-depth interviews and 4 focus group discussions (including 2 male groups and 2 female groups). The key interlocuters included the project management unit, local authorities, village officials, and representatives of affected households. A. Identification of Good Practice 14. Existing literature on social risk and impact management provides limited information on assessment criteria of a good practice. The available guidelines either focus on a specific topic such as the resettlement program (World Bank, 2004; Scudder, 2005) or on integrated tools with several elements (Scudder, 2005; IHA, 2010) or adding different dimensions to address a specific impact (resettlement). There is a lack of common understanding of how to determine a good practice at micro level (project, activity, intervention). For instance, regarding compensation payments, it is often recommended that both spouses should receive them through a jointly owned banking account. What are the criteria against which people can assess whether or not this should be considered a good practice? 4 Resettlement Action Plan, Ethnic Minority Development Plan, Resettlement Policy Framework, and RDLP. Methodology for Conducting the Review 9 15. For purposes of this report, FAO guidelines on knowledge sharing have been recognized for its definition of good practice:5 “A good practice is not only a practice that is good, but a practice that has been proven to work well and produce good results and is therefore recommended as a model. It is a successful experience, which has been tested and validated, in the broad sense, which has been repeated and deserves to be shared so that a greater number of people can adopt it.” 16. Only a few good practice examples encountered in the Trung Son Hydropower Project have been selected for discussion in this report. Selected topics are explored in detail to confirm that they were actual good practice approaches. These selected topics are likely to be encountered in most similarly scaled hydropower projects in similar environments and have strongly influenced the capacity of project stakeholders to reach the development objective of the Trung Son Project. 17. Good practice is identified and documented throughout the entire project cycle. There is more focus in this report on the implementation phase of the Trung Son Hydropower Project since Gencer and Spencer (2012) documented in their paper the lessons learned during the preparation phase of the project in relation to environmental and social impacts and risks. An aim of this report has been to identify what could happen during project implementation and how to address it in an appropriate manner, taking into account policies requirements, local contexts (including cultural patterns), and technical and financial feasibility. 18. The identification of good practices in the Trung Son project was an interactive process. This exercise started with several brainstorming sessions among team members who had previous knowledge of the project as a means to shed light on key aspects such as scope, methodology, stakeholders, and potential “good practice candidates”. Consequently, the team defined five criteria to identify good practice candidates from the Trung Son project (Box 1). This list was discussed with project stakeholders from TSHPCo. This initial process presented an opportunity for these stakeholders to express their viewpoints. Priority was given to the good practice candidates that fulfilled all criteria. 5 FAO (2013) lists seven general criteria to identify a good practice: (a) effective and successful, (b) environmentally, economically, and socially sustainable; (c) gender sensitive; (d) technically feasible; (e) inherently participatory; (f) replicable and adaptable; and (g) reducing disaster/crisis risks. 10 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam BOX 1. Criteria for identifying good practice in the Trung Son project Policy compliance. In the Trung Son project, “policies” refer to project implementation rules jointly recognized by the Government of Vietnam and the World Bank. They include international standards. Since a policy often sets a lowest threshold to be met, this is a minimum requirement to define a good practice. People-centered approach. All formal decisions are based on a thorough consultation process and on engagement of stakeholders. The participation of each stakeholder is determined according to their ability to influence the decision-making. The affected parties play a proactive role in the process of participation and decision-making. No adverse social and environmental impacts. Decisions are based on the assessment of potential risks. Formal decisions ensure that no social risks will occur during the execution of the decisions. Tailored to local context. All decisions take into account the local context and socio-economic conditions. This is a prerequisite for successful implementation of development interventions. Gender and culture sensitivity. Good practice provides due attention to indigenous culture and local communities, taking into account their diversity and identity. Gender aspects are embedded in project interventions. B. Themes Selection 19. The Trung Son Hydropower Project exemplifies where the World Bank’s social safeguard policies have been applied to the fullest extent possible; hence, the first (and maybe the most difficult) task was to determine the themes that not only represent the project but also meet the selection criteria for further review and documentation. This was not an easy exercise given that social safeguard implications have been embedded in almost all project activities from the first day of project preparation until its closure. 20. From the brainstorming sessions with stakeholders, a set of 18 actions/decisions emerged as the most promising themes, considering their contribution to the achievement of project development objectives and their constant importance throughout the project cycle. Finally, 5 core themes were selected for further review and comprise the bulk of discussion in this report: consultation and participation (Section IV), resettlement (Section V), livelihood restoration (Section VI), reservoir impoundment (Section VII), and ethnic minority development and gender mainstreaming (Section VIII). Identifying the potential good practice candidates was only the first step, a more important exercise was to validate these choices with other project stakeholders when the team was in the field. C. Good Practice Validation from Affected Communities 21. Good practices were confirmed through in-depth field work with affected communities and other project stakeholders. The decision-making processes in relation to the management of social impacts and risks during the Trung Son project were carefully Methodology for Conducting the Review 11 reconstructed by combining information gained through discussions with relevant stakeholders and an intensive review of project documents. The latter provided useful insights into the events that have taken place during the project and helped elicit milestones in the implementation process. Reports from similar projects were used as reference information. Interviews with TSHPCo staff confirmed the good practice candidates and presented an opportunity for capacity building around these processes. 22. A step-by-step approach was necessary to allow individuals and communities to express their views of what was good practice in the project. During interviews and focus group discussions, participants typically started to express dissatisfaction with the project. They considered the discussions were another round of consultations in which local people and project implementers just talked to each other. Gradually during these discussions, the locals became willing to share more positive views about the project. Interviews and group discussions helped them recall important information and share multi-dimensional perspectives on the project. Community members contributed ideas and helped identify a common view on successful decisions during the project. These discussions also revealed how local people had the ability of understanding project activities. In particular, women participants, who were all from ethnic minority groups, made strong statements, in stark contrast with the preconceived idea that they were shy in voicing their concerns. They shared with the research team their knowledge about their household’s rights and how they went about to find out information and make requests or submit complaint letters to authorities at all levels. 23. A word of caution: This report does not aim to cover the full scope of social risks and impacts as defined in the policies governing the preparation and implementation of the Trung Son Hydropower Project. Instead it provides detailed analysis on key decisions or themes that show efforts of involved parties in addressing social safeguard challenges to achieve positive results. The practices presented in this report could be applied to other medium-sized dam projects although it is likely that they would have mobilized resources and carried out mitigation measures in a different manner. In addition, this report is neither a social safeguard implementation review nor a project impact assessment with robust design. It means that it was hard for the team to differentiate changes (positive and negative) introduced by project implementation and those that have occurred naturally over time in the without-project scenario. However, this does not overshadow the huge impact of the project given the socio-economic and geographical conditions in project areas at pre-project level. Finally, it was decided to document the decision-making processes that have proven to be effective, highlighting the obstacles that were encountered and overcome. The sharing of such experience is more effective. Some of the key follow-up questions are presented in Section IX of the report. 12 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam Life Before and After Construction of the Trung Son Dam Life Before and After Construction of the Trung Son Dam 13 A. Before Construction of the Trung Son Dam 24. When the geological survey team first came to search for a location for a hydropower dam in 2004-2005, they found Trung Son was a mountainous and sparsely populated area covered with bamboo. The overwhelming majority of residents were Thai, Muong, and Mong. Most adults had only attended elementary school, and very few had completed high school. Almost all children went to school, but only a small number continued to attend high school in a little town some distance from their village. 25. When project preparation was launched in 2007-2008, the local people were still living in poverty. In the core 8 communes, two-thirds of households were living below the national poverty standards. At that time, this proportion was 36 percent for Vietnam’s Northwest region, and 13 percent for Vietnam as a whole. This was a substantial gap in living standards of the local communities compared to countrywide. Communities in the 50 villages impacted by the hydropower plant were fragile and closely linked to local natural resources. The Government has had various development programs and projects that paid special attention to impacts in the development of ethnic minority groups. These programs offered help in areas of economy, education, healthcare, and culture and society. The most remarkable programs included Program 135 and Program 134.6 Other programs provided fee-free schooling for ethnic minority children, free medical examinations and treatments for ethnic minority people, and large-scale settlement carried out for ethnic minority groups (DRCC, 2008). 26. Local livelihoods relied on agriculture, which was mainly shifting cultivation of rice, maize, and cassava. Raising pigs and chickens was primarily for household consumption. Occasionally, during the dry season from February to August, villagers went fishing on the river as an extra food source for family. Few agricultural products were sold at the market. When there was an excess of cassava or a need for cash, the household farmer might sell a small amount of rice or maize, or some chickens and pigs. In general, families had only a small amount of cash available. In the upstream part of what is today the Trung Son reservoir, the average annual income per capita in 2008 was around 2 million VND (equivalent US$100). 27. Most of the households had never accessed the national electricity grid, and transportation was extremely challenging. Thai and Muong people lived in stilt houses, and the Mong lived in low-rise houses. Households had on average about 5 members (5.3). Only 400 households in 2 communes, close to Muong Lat Town, the district center, had access to electricity. Among other households, a few could afford mini generators. Coal, firewood, and candles were the main sources for lighting in one-third of the households. Only 4 communes (Trung Son, Trung Ly, Xuan Nha, and Tan Xuan) had roads but only to the commune centers. In order to reach 6 Program 135 provides financial support to the construction of small infrastructure for poor and extremely difficult communes. Also, the program developed some activities to encourage agricultural and forestry expansion and to apply advanced technology in these sectors in order to equip people with knowledge and skills to impulse their production. Program 134 provides support for the elimination of thatched cottages. 14 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam the nearby district towns, villagers would have to be able to ride a motorbike on the rugged mountain roads or walk several dozen kilometers. Women villagers rarely went to town. They did not have nor know how to ride a motorbike. The women, whose days were filled with housework, could not afford the time or expense of traveling the long distance to the district towns and be able to return the same day. B. After Construction of the Trung Son Dam 28. The Trung Son dam and Reservoir have brought change to the mountainous landscape. The project-financed roads now provide cars a paved pathway to every village. Local people have access to the national grid for a more reliable energy source. In the project areas, 97 percent of households had access to the national electricity grid in 2018 compared to less than one-third in 2015. As a result, most of the households do not keep a micro-generator anymore. Almost all housing is new construction in the style of traditional stilt houses. Most houses (80 percent) now have bathrooms and toilets compared to only 40 percent of households in 2015 (Figure 2). People express satisfaction with these houses. FIGURE 2. Households with Bathrooms and Access to Electricity 100 90 80 70 60 Bathrooms 50 Access to national 40 electricity grid 30 20 10 0 Baseline Survey Mid-term Evaluation Final Evaluation Sources: ASEC, 2018: 31. 29. Motorbikes, cellphones, and televisions have become indispensable items in every family. Gas stoves, refrigerators, electric rice cookers, DVD players, and electric fans are increasingly popular in households within the reach of Trung Son hydropower (Figure 3). People describe how life is more comfortable than before the dam was built. Through project financing, in addition to internal roads in the resettlement sites, 20 kilometers of access roads connecting the dam area to national road No. 15 have been built. This road entirely transformed the life of local people. Transportation of bamboo and agricultural products is considerably more convenient. All women under the age of 40 said they own a motorbike. They described how they bring their children to school and back or go to the market and the district center easily on their Life Before and After Construction of the Trung Son Dam 15 motorbike. This was previously impossible in pre-project period with the earth roads which were mostly inaccessible during rainy season. FIGURE 3. Changes in Household Assets Mobile phone Motorbike Electric fan Color TV Bed VHS, DVD player, digital receiver, parabola antenna Gas stove/Induction cooker Electric stove, rice cooker, pressure cooker Refrigerator Water pump Boat with motor Car Electricity generator 0 20 40 60 80 ! 100 Baseline survey Mid-term evaluation Final Evaluation Sources: ASEC, 2018: 33. 30. While agriculture has remained the main livelihood source, food security is no longer a concern. Agricultural land has decreased in the Trung Son area; however, access to productive forest land has been increased. Although households (especially in Son La) may need to travel longer distances to their agricultural and forest land, the roads are mostly accessible by motorbike. There is no shortage of food. Households with stable agricultural activities have recovered well after relocation. A few others require continuing support. Although agricultural production remains the dominant livelihood source, non-agricultural activities are gradually increasing. 31. The households have expressed overall satisfaction about their quality of life after relocation. In 2018, 89 percent of participants in the project final evaluation (ASEC, 2018) said they were satisfied with their new houses in the planned relocation sites, 91 percent were satisfied with the transportation system, and 93 percent were satisfied with access to electricity. Satisfaction was lower (77 percent) for allocation of resettlement plot. Box 2 provides excerpts from 16 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam the final evaluation of social outcomes of the Trung Son Project. Livelihoods before the project were precisely documented through a social assessment (2008). Restoration or improvements of living standards were surveyed in a detailed manner through one baseline survey (2013) and two impact evaluations (2017 and 2018). BOX 2. Social Outcomes of the Trung Son Hydropower Project Consultation Affected people have been fully informed and consulted about resettlement activities, housing construction plans, resettlement locations, and income restoration measures. Public consultation was organized to discuss about procedural issues, difficulties, and new issues arising, and to propose solutions. Satisfaction on project information scored positively. Information on the dam, the reservoir, and compensation measures was widely disseminated to local people and authorities. Resettlement The project implementers in charge of land acquisition and resettlement, livelihood restoration, ethnic minorities and gender, and the compensation monitoring committees have fulfilled their responsibilities. Affected people have received adequate compensation. Compensation payments to affected households, as well as for the public, were made in full and according to the agreed schedule. The new villages were ready in time. The sites and the new houses were completed at least one month before the households moved in. Affected households were consulted on the sites and on housing options. They had access to technical assistance for the construction of the new houses. Essential infrastructure including water supply and sanitation and transportation was built in the new villages as foreseen in the resettlement plan. Infrastructure is at the same standard as in the old villages, or higher. Livelihood improvement The livelihood support activities were adapted to the socio-economic conditions of the affected people. They were designed with people’s participation and reflected the needs of the community. Training activities on livelihood improvement were convenient in terms of time, location, and financial support. Participating households received agricultural inputs including seed and young animals, as well as technical guidance. Some households had access to micro finance. Training has opened up opportunities to find employment and improve incomes. Satisfaction on livelihood improvement activities in the Trung Son project scored positively. Indicators of the quality of life in the new villages reached a satisfactory level. These include monthly income, number of stable residents in resettlement areas, school infrastructure, health stations, cultural houses, roads, schooling status of children, number of household members with employment. Life Before and After Construction of the Trung Son Dam 17 BOX 2. Social Outcomes of the Trung Son Project (cont) Livelihood improvement activities were completed in December 2019, three years after the relocation. These activities made slow progress during a long initial period. Some of them proved to be inappropriate under local conditions and were discontinued. Gender and ethnic minority development The Trung Son project fully complied with the World Bank’s indigenous people policy in terms of information provision and consultation. Negative impact on the communities, their environment, and local cultures was minimized. The Trung Son project has respected the customs, traditions, beliefs, and spirituality of local communities. Preferences regarding cemetery and graves were taken into account. Attention was extended to women’s vulnerability. Women’s rights to property, compensation, employment, and participation were secured. Access to healthcare facilities, trained health workers, subsidized medicine and village sanitation was ensured. The water supply systems have been maintained and gradually improved. Sources: Excerpts from the Project Final Evaluation. 18 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholder Engagement Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholders Engagement 19 32. Consultation and participation in the Trung Son Hydropower Project were important throughout project cycle, and equally for resettlement and livelihood improvement activities. Consultation activities were set by both Vietnamese regulations and World Bank safeguard policies, but also as a means for encouraging active participation of affected people and a working method for building interaction with local authorities. A. Ensuring Early and Frequent Consultation with Affected Communities A lot of meetings. Every day we had meetings about the hydropower project. A lot. Sometimes they came back and listened to people’s opinions and interviewed us about many things. I participated in all meetings. Not only me but all my family members were in the meetings. Any family with 3 members who knew the Kinh or Thai language joined the meetings. (Focus group discussion No.1, Group of affected woman, Trung Son commune) The most important point is the consultation and participation of all parties. This is the most essential factor in resettlement. People were provided with enough information and participated in all stages from finding resettlement sites to planning. People’s participation helped avoid project failures. (Interview No. 1, Project officer, TSHPCo) 33. Most households first heard about the hydropower dam at a village meeting. They did not know about the proposed project before the consultation activities started in 2007. Some had heard about it in 2004 when the first geological survey teams approached the project area. In 2007, information about a hydroelectric dam to be constructed in Trung Son commune quickly spread among the communities as the first round of village meetings was organized. The focus of this first round was on the project’s potential impacts and proposals for mitigation measures. 34. During the 2008-2010 period, eight rounds of consultations were organized. Each round of consultations had a different focus and purpose. During project preparation, consultations took place in each of the villages affected by the access road, the dam site, and the reservoir and the downstream village. The third and largest round of consultations took place between December 2009 and January 2010, with meetings in 53 villages (including 44 affected villages) and with the participation of 2,324 people (1,394 men and 930 women representing one-fifth of the estimated number of affected people (10,591). Invitations were sent out 1 month in advance with follow-up conducted a few days before the consultation. Meetings with women were organized separately (Table 3). 35. The communities were provided with information about the project, including the dam construction timeline. Findings on environmental and social impacts were shared with them. Various measures to mitigate the project’s risks on the communities were prepared on this basis in the forms of a social impact assessment, an RLDP, and a stand-alone health impact assessment. The RLDP included the Resettlement Policy Framework, a Resettlement Action Plan, a Community Livelihood Improvement Plan, and an ethnic minorities development plan. Mitigation measures for environment impacts were also subject to local consultation. 20 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 3. Consultation activities during project preparation Date Areas and Participants Purpose • 5 communes affected by access Prepare resettlement plan for 2008 (January and April) road, 12 villages access roads • 5 communes affected by reservoir, 10 villages • Household sample (1 household out of 7) and focus Prepare CLIP: analysis of livelihood 2008 (March) group discussions, 3 meetings challenges and opportunities (102 farmers), local leaders and agencies, and local mass organizations • 5 communes affected by the reservoir and 1 commune affected by access road, 11 villages 2008 (April - June) Health impact assessment • 440 people, of which 190 people from resettled households; leaders and health workers • 6 communes affected by the reservoir, 3 communes affected by access roads 2008 (May - August) • 499 participants in meetings, Social assessment 30 in-depth interviews with households, 57 with district and commune official. • 14 villages to be relocated in 2008 (June) Resettlement consultation the reservoir area • Relocated and host Consultation on resettlement and 2008 (October) communities livelihood restoration • 34 villages affected by access road, construction sites, 2008 - 2009 (December - Consultation on environmental reservoir, and downstream January) and social impacts impacts. Including villages with loss of land but no relocation • Consultation on all project mitigation measures, including 2010 Consultation on design of RLDP communities, commune and (January – March) and environmental management district authorities plan • National consultation with civil society organizations Sources: World Bank (2011a). Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholders Engagement 21 36. Consultation on resettlement continued throughout project implementation with preparation of relocation as a major subject. A half-day meeting was organized in every village to consult with affected households on their preferences for new housing in the planned resettlement sites and other applicable resettlement policies. The meetings were attended by almost all affected households. The project’s Resettlement Policy Framework was used as a key document in these meetings. Besides the full document, its contents were converted into leaflets, frequently asked questions, audio communication, and other materials in ethnic minority languages. Staff from TSHPCo, together with the district land fund development center and commune-level People’s Committee, made the presentations and answered questions from local people. All households were given a house registration form to be collected a few days after the consultation meeting so that affected people would have enough time to reflect on the information provided. Consultation results via these registration forms were summarized and used as a basis for TSHPCo and local authorities to develop and finalize appropriate resettlement planning. BOX 3. Village-level consultation on planned resettlement sites Example of a village meeting report from Muong Lat District, January 23-26, 2013 The house of the village head was used as venue for the consultation meeting. Nearly all affected households were present at the meeting. The meeting was also attended by other village heads, commune-level People’s Committee members, and the chairman and officer of the District Resettlement and Compensation Committee. The TSHPCo team took the lead in presenting the master plan of all the planned resettlement sites; a detailed plan of the relevant resettlement site for the community, and models of project-built resettlement houses (for those households who would choose this option). During the consultation sessions, there was no community resistance to project implementation or to resettlement in general. All questions and comments received were requests for further clarification on how the resettlement policy applied to the specific case of affected households: payment schedule, option for relocation outside planned resettlement sites, construction of a new house on productive forest land, and relocation process. The Trung Son team provided further explanation based on the project’s Resettlement Policy Framework. There was one concern about water availability in the resettlement site from Xuoc village. TSHPCo confirmed the availability of water and how water would be distributed to the households. Form BM 01 will be collected one week after consultation. The names of contact persons were provided for further questions/queries (via phone, or through the village leader). 37. Specific consultation events took place when needed. Allocation of individual resettlement plots to relocating households took place over a period of six months. Drawing lots was organized on-site in the planned resettlement areas. Relocating households were invited to the resettlement site where they were expected to move. At each site, staff from the project management unit presented the general plan of the site and the specific locations of each resettlement plot. Villagers had the opportunity to make suggestions for a better arrangement of the resettlement sites. Finally, a meeting was held in which households took part in drawing 22 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam lots to obtain a resettlement plot. After the drawing session, villagers could exchange their plots with one another on a voluntary basis. They then completed the administrative procedures. 38. Consultations took place at all stages of the Community Livelihood Improvement Plan, from its pilot phase (in five villages) to its full-scale implementation. During the 2016-2017 period, 3 rounds (October 2015, April 2016, and November/December 2016) of consultations were conducted with the total of 138 village meetings, with 2,600 participants, of which about 22 percent were women. Compiling household preferences expressed through consultations was a prerequisite to select and prepare livelihood restoration activities. These meetings started with providing information to the communities on the livelihood plan, often with the participation of local authorities. The potential and limitation of agriculture and other income-generating activities in the village were then discussed. This led to identify preferences among a menu of livelihood improvement activities, which had been gradually developed. Finally, the households were invited to form common interest groups, which would undertake pilot productive activities called models. B. Using the Languages of Ethnic Minority Communities 39 One major obstacle to consultations was the limited Vietnamese literacy of affected people. The population around the Trung Son reservoir is almost entirely from the Thai, Muong, Mong, and Kho Mu ethnic groups. For the purpose of the meaningful and effective consultation, local languages were used (in some cases through the interpretation). Participants were encouraged to use the language that they are comfortable with. During project preparation, this was combined with audio communication in ethnic minority languages. Fifteen-minute audio messages were produced in Thai, Mong, and Muong languages and in Vietnamese. 40. Attention was paid to the local specific features of each language. First, the Thai language in the Trung Son area has a pronunciation based on intonations, while the vocabulary used is from the white Thai group in West Thanh Hoa and Nghe An provinces. Thai speakers from these provinces do not understand the Black Thai language from Son La Province. The person who recorded the project’s audio tapes was from the white Thai group. He was also an ethnologist who joined the consultation group in the Thai communities. Second, the Mong community in the Trung Son area has a pronunciation of the Mong language that is quite similar to the red Mong in Lao Cai Province since it mostly migrated from Lao Cai and Cao Bang provinces in recent times. A broadcaster from the ethnic minority program, The Voice of Vietnam, was invited to record audio messages. This person was also invited to join the consultation team in Mong villages during project preparation. Third, for Muong communities, although the Muong people Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholders Engagement 23 in the Trung Son area speak Thai and Vietnamese fluently, audio materials were also recorded in the Muong language to ensure that the elderly, who have some difficulty in understanding Vietnamese, were receiving project information in their native language. A Muong speaker from Thanh Hoa Province, also a broadcaster from The Voice of Vietnam, was available to translate for the consultant team during consultation meetings and to record project messages in the Muong language. Last but not least, a senior and seasoned broadcaster of The Voice of Vietnam, whose inspiring voice is very familiar with the audiences, assisted the consultant team during the recording process. 41. Ethnic minority languages have been continuously used during project implemen­tation. In consultation meetings, whenever necessary, messages were repeated in the local languages with the support of local officials and village heads. Discussions in small groups also allowed villagers to directly exchange with their peers, using their local language. Starting from 2016, a network of facilitators was recruited locally, and therefore included Thai speakers as well as one Mong speaker. When communicating in Vietnamese, simple language was used to enhance the understanding. C. Gradually Building Community Relations Capacity There were many times when the World Bank came here for meetings, we went with them. They hung the maps for people to discuss. The World Bank gave advice to the investor and to villagers. They hung the map, explained to villagers, asked villagers’ opinions, and they took notes. They did it very carefully. They consulted very carefully. (Interview No. 2, Project officer, TSHPCo) At the first consultations, people were not brave enough to propose ideas. The collected opinions were rather weak. The second round of consultation was really serious. A lot of ideas from the villagers were taken into account by the project. (Interview No. 27, Task Team Leader, World Bank) 42. Conducting a meaningful consultation was a completely new experience for the hydropower company. The project management unit had extensive experience in the construction of hydropower projects and in planning relocation. However, they had limited prior experience of conducting meaningful consultations and lacked internal capacity to do so. This lack of experience reflects a common pattern of project consultations in Vietnam in general, and in hydropower projects in particular. They are rarely conducted to the level of international standards. 24 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 43. Interaction skills with each target group were developed through directly organizing and facilitating meetings. During the first consultation meetings, the project management staff faced numerous difficulties when inviting affected people to raise their voices. With hands-on support from consultants and World Bank teams, different approaches were used for consultation on resettlement or on livelihood improvement. In any case, adopting a two- way communication approach and encouraging participants to give inputs were elementary principles in consultations as was providing villagers with specific information on project implementation activities and detailed information on resettlement and relocation methods. 44. Over the project implementation period, there was a significant improvement in the capacity of local people to participate in discussions and share opinions. They became proactive in monitoring, capturing information, and making their requests to meet their interest. Before the Trung Son Hydropower Project, villagers were quite reserved and less aware of their rights. Their contacts and interaction with the outside were limited. An obvious change was observed among ethnic minority women (especially the younger women) when they were able to highlight their proposals and requirements for the project in a strong voice. They would not have done that without the increasing access to project information and regular exposure to consultation meetings. The regularity of consultation meetings had contributed to this change, as well as the approach emphasizing a two-way exchange of information. 45. The TSHPCo built a community-relations team and invited local authorities to take an increasing part in consultations. Initially, staff from the hydropower company interacted with local authorities for the purpose of regulatory requirements in handling land acquisition and resettlement. In addition, the company’s social team included one person overseeing village- level work and consultants working exclusively on livelihood improvement. The hydropower company started to work closely with district and commune authorities when undertaking local consultation at end 2012. The selection of the type of housing in the planned resettlement sites – self construction or project built – was an opportunity for the company and local authorities to undertake jointly a round of village-level consultations. Commune and district authorities then continued to interact closely with TSHPCo in their work with the communities. During the last years of the project, the TSHPCo community relations team continued to work jointly with communities and local authorities. 46. Civil society was involved from the start. Civil society organizations took part in consultations with affected communities during project preparation and were themselves consulted on the project. A consultation event was organized in Hanoi in March 2010, attracting more than 100 delegates from non-governmental organizations, and advisory and research agencies in Hanoi. After presentation of RLDP, questions were raised regarding capacity building for households during resettlement, management of livelihood risks, health, and social security in the project area. Issues related to the rights of affected people to raise grievances, compensation for community work, water supply, and construction of new cemeteries were also concerns raised by civil society. The organizations that had participated in village consultations were also invited to present their observations and comments. Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholders Engagement 25 D. Section Summary 47. Consultations during the Trung Son project were effective through the combination of four factors that can be considered as good practice. First, consultations started in 2008 and were conducted on a regular basis. Second, the ethnic minority languages used were those in use in local communities. Third, a community relations function was built within the hydropower company through a gradual development of capacities, in interaction with local government. And fourth, the participation of civil societies was mobilized from the start and maintained during implementation with strong participation of interested parties. Consultation outcomes have been used to inform project design and mitigation measures, especially social safeguard instruments. All parties have collectively worked to complete every detail of these documents. 48. During implementation, the planned resettlement sites were adjusted compared to the original design, and the livelihood improvement activities were undertaken with the active contribution of targeted communities. In addition, through multiple rounds of consultation, TSHPCo gained trust in the relationship with affected communities. The communities, in turn, demonstrated the increasing proactivity in asking questions and seeking additional project information. Finally, full understanding by the affected people of the project, and specifically of the provisions spelled out in the policy framework had clearly contributed to improving their own capacity. Table 4 summarizes the main parties involved, the issues identified during implementation, the process through which these issues were resolved, and the social development results. FIGURE 4. Timeline of consultation decisions in the Trung Son Hydropower Project 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016-2019 First RLDP RLDP Livelihoods and Resettlement Livelihoods notification announ- consultation resettlement site consultation consultations on Trung Son cement (3rd round) consultations Drawing lots (continued) project Consultations start with NGOs 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Consultation Resettlement Trung Son Resettlement Resettlement for community Policy project Site consultation support to Framework approved consultation (continued) on Trung Son approved (continued) project 26 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 4. Consultation and participation: Summary of experience from the Trung Son Project Main obstacles • The project implementation unit had no prior experience of conducting consultations and lacked internal capacity to do so. • Consultation activities in projects in Vietnam in general, and in hydropower projects in particular, are rarely conducted according to international standards. Stakeholders involved • Affected and host communities • Project management unit and its consultants • World Bank and its consultants • Local authorities • Non-governmental organizations Decision-making process • Before the project, inform communities about the construction of the Trung Son hydropower dam • Consult the community • Conduct social assessments by independent consultants to identify challenges in compensation, livelihood restoration, and protection of local cultures • Build project staff capacity to undertake consultation activities • Consult the community about project documents for the management of social risks and impacts • Revise these project documents after consultation • Conduct consultation on a regular basis during project implementation Results • The project received wide support from the community (86% of surveyed households at baseline) • Resettlement sites that met the communities’ demand were found • Communities’ ideas were collected and utilized as a basis to adjust the design of the planned resettlement sites • Impacts from relocation were minimized • The cultural values of ethnic minority communities were protected • Local people were empowered to speak out and participate, especially women Consultation and participation: three areas of good practice from the Trung Son project • Ensure early and frequent consultation with affected communities • Use the languages of ethnic minority communities • Gradually build community relations capacity and coordinate with local government Consultation, Participation, and Stakeholders Engagement 27 Resettlement 28 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 49. Construction of the Trung Son dam had direct land-taking impact on 3,413 households, of which 648 had to relocate. The majority of resettlers were from ethnic minority households. The dam and reservoir were by far the major source of impact, with 2,013 affected households scattered over 7 communes and 1 town. Relocated households were offered two resettlement options: (a) to planned resettlement sites or (b) to locations of affected-households’ preference. In total, 483 households settled in 4 planned resettlement sites, spread across 13 locations.7 One-hundred households voluntarily registered for relocation outside the resettlement sites, and 65 households resettled along the access roads that would have impact on their lives. These 3,413 households received compensation for the acquisition of their land and assets with payments made before construction commenced (Table 5). The total cost of compensation, which was paid from EVN/GENCO2 counterpart funds, was 581.3 billion VND (around US$25 million). In addition, 47 resettlement plots for households affected by the West Thanh Hoa Road project were arranged through the Trung Son project. Managing land acquisition and resettlement during the Trung Son project has generated experience in 4 areas, all in relation to planned resettlement sites: planning, self-construction of houses, homesteads, and payment for the construction of houses. TABLE 5. Number of households affected by the Trung Son project, and compensation amount Number of affected households Compensation Households Infrastructure Relocated budget (VND Total losing >10% of households million) productive land Main construction site, reservoir, and planned 2,103 418 583 549,440 resettlement sites Access road 498 50 65 18,050 Mai Chau substation and 445 - - 4,709 connecting lines Transmission lines 349 - - 8,848 Access Road (repairing) 18 - - 203 Total 3,413 468 648 581,250 7 The four planned resettlement sites and their subdivision into 13 locations: Site 1 (Co Pung, Pom Chon, Pa Pua, Keo Dam, To Xuoc); Site 2 (Tai Chanh, Nang village, Lat village); Site 3 (Lin village, To Chieng-Co Cai village); and Site 4 (Tham Ton, Suoi Non 1, Suoi Non 2). Pom Chon and Pa Pua were later subdivided into a main location and an expanded location. Resettlement 29 A. Mobilizing Local Knowledge to Select Resettlement Sites The terrain of Xuan Nha and Tan Xuan communes is very difficult. We suggested many scenarios including moving out of the district as well as moving out of the commune. We have also suggested organize the moving of people to those locations. There are places outside the commune which are very nice but far away from their home village and their current place of residence. People did not want to move to other areas neither within the commune nor to other places. In the end, the project decided to choose Tham Ton and Suoi Non as resettlement sites. These are the places that people proposed based on their own search. On-site relocation was approved by project. Getting this done is the success of the project. (Interview No. 22, District official, Van Ho district) 50. The location of planned resettlement sites was a key topic in the consultation process. Affected households expressed their desire to find a site which was close to their old places for easier agricultural production. The initial proposed location for 2 out of the 4 planned resettlement sites did not receive people’s consent. Through additional consultation rounds, an alternative location was selected for these two unacceptable sites. The average distance from the affected villages to the final resettlement sites was about 2 kilometers whereas the initially proposed site was 20 kilometers away. All planned resettlement sites are located in the same communes and villages. 51. The relocated communities played a direct part in selecting their own resettlement sites. Affected people were encouraged to give suggestions on the location of planned resettlement sites. In Ta Ban village and Ta Lao village, local people’s insights about their lands helped choose the right resettlement location as discussed in Box 4. This process also allowed optimizing the subdivision of each planned resettlement site into a number of smaller settlements. 30 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam BOX 4. Using indigenous knowledge when selecting resettlement sites The people of Ta Lao village (Tan Xuan commune) reported that they did not agree with the original plan for their resettlement site (An village). Many people in the village went to see the area. This was a flat area, convenient for the arrangement and construction new houses on residential land plots. But all said they did not want to move there. An village is 20 kilometers away from the affected village. This location was described as a very nice place, but the climate was particularly hot since it was in the middle of a valley, sheltered from winds, with insufficient water resources. Living there would have meant traveling over 20 kilometers of hilly roads every day to return to their farmland to work. Similarly, villagers from Ta Ban expressed the need to identify an alternative resettlement site. Further consultations were held. The hydropower company realized that no one understood this land as much as the local community. Villagers knew each stream, forest, and hill. They also knew how to organize their farm activities. After consultation, the community was allowed to select their own resettlement site. They sent a group of men, who searched for several days and assessed water sources, slope, soil quality, weather conditions, distance to their former residence, and accessibility by road. Once a satisfactory location was found, they invited commune officials, TSHPCo project staff and all villagers to come and see. Further discussion was needed since the newly proposed resettlement location was far from the agricultural fields of some of the households, remote from roads, and possibly exposed to landslides. In total, after 7 meetings with Ta Lao village and 10 meetings with Ta Ban village, a final agreement was reached. The villagers recognized that the project managers had been very patient in helping them find a new place to live. As for their part, they were also quite satisfied with the location that they found. B. Empowering Resettlers by Allowing Self-Construction of New Houses Yes, I want to build it myself, do it myself. If built by the project, there will be just over 20 m2 per person, too narrow compared to this house. I will build a stilt-house which is more open to the outside. The house built by the project has small windows and too narrow. In general, ethnic people like large houses and stilt houses. Most are built by themselves. They said if I wanted to do it, I would have to prepare myself. Many people who wanted to build a new house had to prepare wood for themselves. But the wood from this house is still good so we only have to replace some. I made an application for the forest ranger to cut new timber, otherwise I cannot do it. (Interview No. 17, Male resettler from relocating household, Tan Xuan commune) The houses they built on their own are very nice. Houses built by the project will not be as nice as theirs. That is for sure. It is the key difference between this project and other projects which build houses for the displaced persons. Thai people like to stay on stilts. It is their identity. If the house is still good, they put it up again. They can use the money the project pays to repair needed places such as roofing, painting, or replacement. (Interview No. 25, Project officer, TSHPCo) Resettlement 31 52. The majority of relocating households wanted to build their own houses instead of receiving project- built houses. A new round of community consultation was conducted in 2012 to specifically assess the prevalence of the need for self-construction of the new houses. The majority of households chose the option of building their own house with 96 percent in both districts located in Thanh Hoa Province and 73 percent in Son La Province. At project-end, the project-level proportion increased to 95.5 percent of the relocated households. 53. This preference was understandable given the poor resettlement outcomes of similar projects in Vietnam. Within TSHPCo, there was experience from a previous hydropower project in which affected households had not agreed to receive the resettlement houses built by the project. Similarly, in the Trung Son area, due to the nature of agricultural production, farmers needed a large housing area whereas houses built by the project followed pre-defined technical standards which did not always satisfy people’s needs and demands. Allowing resettlers to build their own houses would encourage their proactivity, ownership, and additional financial investment for a better house to satisfy different needs in style, decoration, and home orientation. The self-construction option more fully empowered the affected households in maximizing the effectiveness of using the offered compensation and resettlement packages in their design, labor mobilization, construction, timing, and decoration of their new homes. A new and convenient home has proven to have facilitated their attachment to a new location and overcome the shock from moving from their old village. 54. The self-construction option was deemed legally, technically, and financially feasible, resulting in culturally appropriate and more sustainable housing. First, self- construction of new houses was an option included in the Resettlement Policy Framework. The full document was made broadly public to local authorities and stakeholders. Second, experience shows that resettlement arrangement should be designed in a flexible manner, allowing displaced people to adapt the houses in accordance to their specific needs such as space for livestock and gardens and to add their own structures so that they can obtain larger or better houses. Third, the Trung Son project was to build resettlement houses in cement and concrete, making it impossible to take advantage of existing construction materials from existing houses, especially wooden beams. The custom of the Thai people, which accounted for the majority of relocating households, is to move their old house when they move to a new location. 55. The risks associated with this preferred option has been properly assessed and mitigated. Two risks were identified. If direct payment of housing compensation was not made 32 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam on time, the whole Trung Son project would have been delayed. And there were concerns of households not having the financial management skills to handle house construction budgets and facing the risk of becoming homeless. To mitigate these risks, it was proposed that the cash be disbursed in 3 tranches, which would be verified against a set of technical criteria. There were technical specifications for the house that the affected household must comply with in order to get the cash. This aimed at ensuring that the cash would be used toward house construction and not simply treated as a fungible resource that might be wasted away on consumables. From the viewpoint of the World Bank, a cash advance to affected households to build their own house was part of the comprehensive package detailed in the Resettlement Plan and was simply cash advanced in lieu of materials and labor and other costs associated with construction of the new house. The cash tranches paid toward such house construction is hence clearly only part of a larger resettlement package and cannot be qualified as “cash compensation”. Finally, this option would enhance affected household ownership and free THSPCo from any liabilities of maintaining the houses after project closure. 56. Self-construction of the new houses in practice faced many obstacles from the point of view of both Vietnam and World Bank regulations. On the fund flow, unless the loan agreement was amended, the World Bank loan could not allow direct payments to households to self-construct new houses. Land acquisition and resettlement and rehabilitation payments to affected persons must be solely financed from counterpart funds. The TSHPCo, in its turn, had not anticipated this scenario (as it was assumed that people would receive project-built houses of which the construction costs were eligible for project funding). Hence, TSHPCo fell short on counterpart funds. An amendment to the loan agreement was necessary so that the World Bank loan could continue to be used for the purpose of building houses. Although the total amount of the loan remained unchanged, a long process through Vietnamese regulations was required (details in Box 5). Resettlement 33 BOX 5. Procedure for amending the Trung Son Hydropower Project loan Agreement with the World Bank • In September 2013, TSHPCo submitted a proposal to GENCO2, which directly managed the project, to allow amendment of the loan agreement so that sufficient funds could be paid to households who wanted to build their own house. • The rationale for this request was that relocating households wished to build their own house, that the project had the financial capacity to include this option, that this option was the best one to prevent delays in the overall Trung Son project, that it would minimize project costs since domestic loans would be applied for, and that it would not increase the size of the World Bank loan. • GENCO2 reviewed this proposal and rationale. The proposal was transferred in May 2014 to Vietnam Electricity (EVN) for consideration and settlement. The EVN sent a written request to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, asking for permission to amend the loan agreement and requesting the ministry to give its official feedback to the State Bank of Vietnam. • The State Bank of Vietnam, which is responsible for proposing signature by the Prime Minister of international legal documents on concessional loans with the World Bank, consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment before submitting a proposal to the Prime Minister in March 2015. • The Prime Minister reported to the President about the amendment of the loan agreement. After the President’s reply in May 2015, the Government Office immediately issued a document requesting the State Bank of Vietnam to work with the World Bank and proceed with the amendment of the loan agreement. The State Bank of Vietnam sent an official request to the World Bank on May 21, 2015. • The World Bank triggered internal processes that entailed a level-II project restructuring (with approval of Regional Vice President) and the revision of loan agreement. • The amendments to loan agreement were signed by the World Bank Management on January 4, 2016. 57. The revised loan agreement was countersigned in March 2016 concluding three years of discussion and negotiation at all levels with strong participation of the various stakeholders. The initial Resettlement Policy Framework remained a guiding document to be complied with. All parties made efforts to take households’ wish into consideration and remove difficulties in time. During this period of time, relocation and resettlement activities continued in order to meet deadlines for construction of the dam. The parent company, GENCO2, advanced counterpart funds to TSHPCo to cover expenses under discussion. With a retroactive financing provision, those expenses would be recovered from the World Bank loan once its amended version becomes effective. See amended version of loan agreement in Table 6. 34 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 6. Original and revised World Bank loan agreement of the Trung Son Hydropower Project Original Loan Agreement Revised Loan Agreement Part 3(a) of Schedule 1 to the Agreement (a) Resettlement, Livelihoods, and Ethnic Minorities Development Provision of support for the implementation of Provision of support for the implementation of the RLDP, including resettlement, rehabilitation, the RLDP, including resettlement, rehabilitation, compensation, and livelihoods development compensation, and livelihoods development measures that will improve, or at least maintain, measures that will improve, or at least maintain, the living standards and income earning capacity the living standards and income earning capacity of people affected by the Project, including of people affected by the Project, including ethnic minorities (excluding land acquisition ethnic minorities (excluding land acquisition and resettlement and rehabilitation payments to and resettlement and rehabilitation payments to Affected Persons). Affected Persons, other than support for construction of self-built resettlement housing). Paragraph 3(a) of Section IV.A of Schedule 2 to the Agreement The term "Eligible Expenditures under Parts 1 and 3 The term "Eligible Expenditures under Parts 1 and 3 of the Project" means expenditures incurred under of the Project" means expenditures incurred under Parts 1 and 3 of the Project for the reasonable costs Parts 1 and 3 of the Project for the reasonable of: (i) consultants' services; (ii) goods; (iii) civil works; costs of: (i) consultants' services; (ii) goods; (iii) (iv) training and workshops; civil works; (iv) training and workshops; and (v) support to Affected Persons for construction of self- built resettlement housing as set forth in the project operational manual, which support TSHPCO has incurred as of December 1, 2014." C. Ensuring an Adequate Homestead Area Up here, because of the terrain, it is very difficult to get 400 m2. But because the policy already stated that, it can’t be otherwise. The local government and people demanded that. They insisted on 400 m2 because it was written and signed by the project. And it was signed by all departments. (Interview No. 5, Project officer, TSHPCo). Measurement on the map was correct. But on the site, there was a difference in level and after releveling, the total area was reduced. So the project was planning to leave this place to look for another place. But it was too difficult to find another place. They consulted with my family: “we tried hard to find another place for you but we could not. You can go and look for another location, we will accept it”, they said. So I said, I just want to stay here. (Focus group discussion No. 5, Group of male members from relocated households, Tan Xuan commune). 58. In the Trung Son project, a special effort was invested in securing residential land for relocating households. Each household relocating to a planned resettlement site was eligible for 400 square meters of residential land and 300 square meters of garden land. This area could be larger if more residential land was available. Initially, it was understood that these 400 square meters included slopes as observed in some similar projects in Vietnam. Therefore, in the first batch, the leveled land was only 250 to 300 square meters (or even less than 200 square Resettlement 35 meters in some cases) partly due to difficult construction conditions on mountainous terrain. The relocating villagers refused to accept these smaller plots. They claimed they wanted to receive 400 square meters of levelled residential land. The large majority were Thai people, and they wanted to preserve the Thai lifestyle after relocation (Box 6). They also wanted to protect their rights as defined in the Resettlement Policy Framework. BOX 6. Homesteads in Thai lifestyle and in planned resettlement Thai households are accustomed to spacious settlement patterns, where houses are not adjacent to each other. A stilt house in a large space always looks better. They wanted to rebuild the new house with an 80 square meters or larger floor plan. Most of the affected Thai stilt houses in the Trung Son area had a floor area of around 100 square meters, usually 13 meters long by 7 to 8 meters wide. Thai houses also have stairs on both sides, which require additional land. Relocating households wanted to build new houses with at least 80 square meters of floor area plus staircases. Building such a house on a plot of only 250 square meters would have resulted in a cramped resettlement. In addition, Thai homesteads have space for the family’s small livelihood activities. Some households were wondering how they could sustain these activities if the residential land area was just enough for a stilt house. 59. Maximizing areas of residential land would not only ensure compliance with the Resettlement Policy Framework but also create strong foundation for life stabilization of affected people. Three scenarios were defined to resolve the issue of small plots: (a) searching for an additional resettlement site, (b) increasing the size of garden land allocated to households with a small plot, or (c) providing additional cash compensation. The final option must be identified through consultation with affected households and be agreed upon among the TSHPCo, local authorities, affected households, and the World Bank’s project team. 60. Technical solutions were mobilized. Among these three options, finding a new resettlement site was deemed unfeasible due to limited availability of local land and pressure to meet the deadlines for construction of the dam. By keeping people informed and getting a consensus regarding the options, the size of resettlement plots significantly increased. The technical design of the planned resettlement sites was adjusted, and contractors’ contracts were revised, allowing them to get reimbursement for the additional work. Most of the land plots after adjustment reached an area of not less than 400 square meters (residential land). Regarding this, the aide-memoire of the World Bank mission in July 2015 noted: The size of resettlement plots has significantly increased. In resettlement site No. 1 where the data is most comprehensive, only one plot has a size less than 350m2 (334.5m2) accounting for 1% of total plots. The percentage of plots having the size between 350-400m2 and more than 400m2 are 23.1% (46 lots) and 76.4% (152 lots) respectively. The same level of effort and practice could be replicated in resettlement sites No. 2, 3, and 4. 36 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 61. Those households that could not be allocated sufficient space agreed to an alternative option. These households that could not get more land space were provided with additional financial support or additional garden land. However, they accepted this option not because of the accompanying support, but because they felt that the project had fully considered the technical plans to provide large enough resettlement plots while ensuring safety for those who were going to live on these plots of land. D. Allowing Adjustments during Construction of the New Homesteads Now they measure the plot of land, the 20-meter front width must be exactly 20 meters, otherwise they will not accept. This depth must be exactly 15 meters. I have to note down details: whether the ground surface is flat, whether there is earth or stones on it. Only then will they receive it, otherwise they will not accept it. (Interview No. 1, Project officer, TSHPCo) There are households who would not accept their plot even after the first payment was made. They insisted on moving out, and the project had to let them do so. They said, “I have been handed over the land but after signing for it, I feel that I cannot stay. My family discussed, and we now want to move outside the resettlement site.” We still had to let them move. There are many cases when we had to level the ground and then leave it. (Interview No. 1, Project officer, TSHPCo) 62. Households moving into planned resettlement sites directly monitored ground leveling by the construction company. Some plots of residential land were large enough to be directly consolidated while others had to be further leveled in order to reach the agreed upon area of 400 square meters of residential land area for each household. In one single resettlement location, 11 requests for adjustments were received. When plots were at a significantly higher level than neighboring ones, the households proposed to reduce this difference through levelling in order to ensure safety and prevent soil instability. This extra work required real-time adjustments in the construction company’s contract with the project management unit. Three tasks were undertaken in parallel: adjustment of the works’ detailed design, adjustment of the contract, and the levelling work. This was a stressful time since handing over residential plots to the households had to be completed in time for the scheduled reservoir impoundment date. To speed up progress, the project management unit arranged for a permanent presence of a supervisor at the resettlement sites. All comments from the relocating households were recorded in the presence of the households, construction company, supervision consultants, the project management unit, and local authorities. Resettlement 37 TABLE 7. Examples of comments and solutions on resettlement plots Plots Request from villagers, village, Agreed solutions or commune Plots H1, H2- Axis A Lower ground level so that 2 lots H1 and H2 to be equally leveled of H1 & H2 are at the same level. Plots H3, H4, H5, H6 Lower ground level so that all H3, H4: dig 0.5m lower plots are at the same level and H5, H6: dig 1 m lower ensure they are one meter higher than the road. Plot H7 Increase the area since a Do not adjust, consider reduction was caused by the increasing the area reinforced road bank. Plot H8 This plot is too shady. Per their Allocate another lot for this custom, Thai people do not build household. Reallocate H8 to H7 a house in a shady location. The and H9. family proposed to level another location. Plots H14 and H15 The new West Thanh Hoa road Reinforce bank with construction was built too close. The initial stone VXM M100 layout is not safe. It is proposed that the roadside slope is reinforced to avoid erosion and ensure lasting stability. Sources: Project management unit. Excerpts from complaint monitoring file for Tai Chanh resettlement site. 63. The households signed the relevant documents after all construction demands had been met and no further adjustments were necessary. They were concerned of being responsible for repairs in case a problem was identified after having signed. As recorded in the World Bank reports in June 2016 and January 2017 missions, for households that opted for moving to the project-built resettlement sites, 100 percent of them had accepted the plots offered by the project and on average 98.5 percent of them were building/finalizing their houses in resettlement sites.8 The project met the requirements for reservoir filling, including (a) payments of monetary compensation for land and structures affected by reservoir and associated facilities; (b) provision of basic infrastructure in resettlement sites No 1, 2, 3, 4; (c) relocation of affected households from to-be-submerged areas. 8 96 percent in RS1, 98 percent in RS2, 100 percent in RS3, and 100 percent in RS4. 38 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam E. Paying for Self-constructed Houses in Installments A stilt house had to be a real stilt house, a masonry house had to be a real masonry house. Otherwise, people had to accept houses built by the project. If I made a shabby house, they would not accept it. The project gave 1 person 25m2. If it was not enough to build a house, then people will not accept it, but if it was more than enough, it was okay. It was for our sake anyway. (Interview No. 17, Male from affected household, Tan Xuan commune) “What they mean is that the payment has to be divided into 3 times because once the people get it all, they cannot make a house. For example, if we finish building the foundation of the house, they will give the second payment. To avoid the case that we spend the money on other purposes and do not have enough left to make a house. Some can keep it and build their own house, but others cannot and they will not have a place to live in. When you have money, you want to buy everything. So maybe the option is good. It ensures that everyone can build their own house.” (Focus group discussion No. 2, Group of female members from relocated households, Trung Ly commune). 64. When opting for self-construction, relocating households knew that as stipulated in the project’s Resettlement Policy Framework, they would be entitled to receive a monetary package equivalent to the value of the new house of determined size.9 The Resettlement Policy Framework also stipulated that if the old house is worth more than the value of the new entitled house, affected households would receive the financial difference. In the reverse case, the households would not have to pay the difference between the values of the old and new houses. Finally, the households were allowed to reutilize construction materials from their previous house without deduction from the amount of compensation. In accordance with Vietnam’s regulations, we made an inventory to decide the type and value of existing houses. That is how Vietnamese do it. But in this project, the compensation amount was equal to the price of a new house. With this replacement price, people received a good amount of money to both build a new house, and were able to use materials from the old house… The project provided standard prices for a new house with the design produced after consultation with residents. We gave them cash compensation if they wanted to build by themselves. Basically people here have stilt houses, except for only some households. So people could use materials from the old house. Thai people are just like Kinh people. Everyone wants to build a house for themselves. People prefer to build their own houses. As a result, complaints during implementation were reduced. (Interview No. 25, Project officer, TSHPCo) 9 25 square meters for 1-2 persons in household; 45 square meters for 3-4 persons in household; 65 square meters for more than 5 persons in household. Resettlement 39 65. A standard financial package for building a new house was defined on par with the compensation amount for an affected house. In Vietnamese regulations, a relocated household would typically receive a cash compensation packages for their losses (land, structures, crops, etc.). People could use that money to buy a resettlement plot (maybe at subsidized cost) and build their new house. The compensation value of an affected house was its residual value, calculated on the basis of the value of a newly constructed house with equivalent technical standards minus depreciation proportional to the age of the house. With such a calculation, households with a small house were at risk in the post-resettlement period as they may not have enough money to buy or rebuild a new house. Several resettlement projects in Hanoi, for example, have shown that after 10 years some poor resettled families remain unable to repay the loans taken to purchase a new house. They face the risk of having to move and/or become the sub-tenant of the house they have not paid off. In the Trung Son project, a different policy provision was applied. A relocated household would receive (a) compensation for affected assets (land, house, structure, crops); and (b) the full value of the new resettlement house that they are entitled to. This amount was approved by district-level People’s Committees. 66. Special attention was paid to the quality of the new houses. Technical parameters for stilt houses and masonry houses were disseminated to the community before they started to build their own home. For self-constructions, the kitchen, water tank, and an outside toilet had to meet technical standards. The area of the house could not be smaller than the minimum pre- defined standard. The structure of the house had to meet safety requirements, whether it was a wooden house, a wooden house on stilts, or a concrete house with tile or steel sheet roofing or equivalent. And hygiene and environmental conditions had to be fulfilled. The ground floor of a stilt house had to be 1.8 meters to 2.2 meters high to allow its use as a warehouse or for other purposes. And the pillars of the stilts could be round or square, with a diameter no less than 20 centimeters. 67. Households received housing compensation in three installments. The first payment, 40 percent, was made when the existing house had been dismantled and construction materials had been transported and prepared. Affected households might have temporary housing (temporary camps in resettlement site, relatives’ houses, or rented house using renting allowance) during the construction of the new houses. In cases where neither husband nor wife had the capacity to take charge of building a new house and handling relocation, relatives could be mobilized if they committed to help until full completion of the house. The second payment of 30 percent was made when at least the main work had been completed. This second payment was made generally 4-5 months after the initial one. The final payment was made after acceptance by the district’s entity responsible for compensation, relocation, and resettlement. In addition, a payment for the construction of water tanks and toilets would be made after the entire house was completed. Each payment was recorded in a logbook. In case construction was not satisfactory, the project management unit required the family to modify and reinforce the house in order to ensure minimum quality requirements. 40 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam I don’t like that way of doing, but I think if the full amount is granted in one single time, there will be households without a house, because money in their hands will soon go away. They decided to pay money in three phases probably because they were experienced, so they knew. There are people who lack financial management skills, the money in their hands will soon go away and so they will not have a house. People are not satisfied with that, because they do not understand that it was difficult to manage it in only one payment. (Interview No. 13, Male member of affected household, Trung Son commune) When Trung Son proposed this option, it was agreed by the World Bank and also by us. We were very worried but when this option came up, we immediately agreed. 100% will have a house. It can’t be otherwise. People also wanted to speed it up to receive money as soon as possible. We held a lot of meetings and persuade them to follow Trung Son. Unfortunately, other provincial projects don’t have that option. (Interview No. 4, District official, Muong Lat district) Some people say that they cannot build a house with that payment option. Yes, you can do it, I told them. Finish a part and you will be paid for that part. If you buy materials, you don’t have to pay that money yet because people know that this project will give money after that. It is not that the project does not pay you, but rather, you finish phase 1 and they will pay you phase 1. (Interview No. 15, Village head, Tan Xuan commune) 68. Half of the households in the community were satisfied with payments in installments, the other half were expecting to receive the full amount in a single payment. The option of three installments was however maintained. Households in local communities were not used to managing large amounts of cash. There was a high risk that a single payment to build a new house would have been used for other purposes such as buying a motorbike or a car, buffaloes or cows, or expensive consumer goods. This would have left some households without improved housing after the project, or even without a house. This preventive measure was therefore taken. To better explain this option, additional communication in communities was made. 69. Construction of new houses outside the planned resettlement sites was also monitored, and followed the same payments principles. The project management unit required households that chose to relocate outside the planned sites to make a commitment to arrange a new accommodation. The commitment included two points: one was to build a house in compliance with Resettlement Policy Framework regarding the area and the structure of the new house; the other was to move on time to the actual registered address. The address was checked to verify that it was legal to build a house on the designated plot of land. After preparing confirmation minutes, the project management unit transferred the documents to the district authorities, which in turn issued a decision approving construction of new houses by these households outside the planned resettlement sites. Resettlement 41 F. Section Summary 70. Experience gained from the Trung Son project demonstrates how relocation evolved, requiring continuous negotiation and engagement of all stakeholders when problems arose. These experiences showed how affected household preferences were addressed in relation to the selecting of locations for planned resettlement sites and to construction of new houses by the households themselves. Critical and positive decisions included mobilizing local knowledge to plan resettlement sites and paying for self-constructed in installments to control progress and quality of the new houses. Allowing self- construction of new houses in the resettlement plan required a sustained effort and a revision of the loan agreement, and adjustments during construction of the sites were key to ensure an adequate homestead area for all. As a result, there was timely progress of relocation, and of the project in general. Voices of communities were listened to, and timely resources were allocated for the construction of new houses, whether they were built by the households or provided by the project. The quality of housing improved, allowing much better living conditions while preserving the style of Thai stilt houses. Through this process, stronger coordination between government at all levels and the project management unit had also emerged. FIGURE 5. Timeline of Resettlement Decisions in the Trung Son Hydropower Project 2008 2010 2012 2014 01-11/2016 Cut-off date Some households in WB SBV in charge of amendement Households Consultations Muong Ly Commnune recommends Ground leveling, drawing lots, continue to build on ask for self-construction new round of relocation starts new houses resettlement of new house in planned consultation Complaints on residential Relocation of last houses resettlement site lan area households 2009 2011 2013 2015 Two housing WB loan Consultation on resettlement Sign amended WB loan agreement options are agreement options Residential land area is ensured included in Consultation Consensus on self-constructions 70% of households have received relocation on house of new house Application for WB resettlement plots, start building masterplan samples loan agreement amendment new houses 42 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 8. Resettlement: Summary of experience Main obstacles • Self-construction of resettlement house was the preferred option for the majority of relocating households, but its fund flow was not foreseen when the loan agreement was signed. • Direct payments to affected households for self-construction of resettlement house was initially not allowed, and using counterpart funds created a financial risk for the hydropower company. • The definition of the minimum area for homesteads was unclear after ground levelling in an environment of steep slopes. Stakeholders involved • Affected Communities. • Project management unit, TSHPCo Ltd, GENCO2 and EVN. • Provincial-, district- and commune-level People’s Committees. • State Bank of Vietnam, Ministries of Industry and Trade, Finance, Planning and Investment. • Prime Minister’s Office, President’s Office. • World Bank. • Contractors for the construction of resettlement sites. • Consulting companies (design, supervision, environmental and social supervision) Decision-making process • Communities were consulted on the option of self-construction of their new house • Public opinion polls were conducted in all relocating villages. • Trung Son worked with the World Bank on people’s aspiration to build houses themselves. • Internal procedures were conducted from both the Government and World Bank sides. Amendments to loan agreement were signed and countersigned by World Bank and State Bank of Vietnam. • Households registered for self-construction of their new house, using a project form certified by the commune-level People’s Committee. • The project management unit submitted to the district-level People’s Committee a list of households with the self-construction option. The district-level People’s Committee approved this list. • Stakeholders agreed to pay for self-construction of houses with three installments based on construction progress, including water tanks and toilets. Results • Voices of communities were listened to. • Timely resources were allocated for the construction of new houses. • There was timely progress of relocation, and project progress in general. • The majority of affected households were provided with 400 square meters of residential land as homestead. • Levelled ground ready for house construction was provided in time for relocation. • Houses were fully constructed. • Housing quality and living conditions were improved. • The Thai and Muong style stilt houses were preserved. • Coordination between government and project management unit was strengthened. Resettlement: five areas of good practice from the Trung Son project • Mobilize local knowledge to select planned resettlement sites. • Prepare a national decision allowing self-construction of the new houses. • Ensure adequate homestead area. • Allow adjustments during construction of the new homesteads. • Pay for self-constructed houses in installments. Resettlement 43 Livelihood Improvement 44 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam A. Planning Livelihood Restoration as a Community-Based Development Project There is almost no livelihood component in other projects. Trung Son has financial support for livelihood activities. Initially, EVN was not ready because it had never been like this before... Livelihood restoration has been stipulated in Vietnam policy, but compensation is normally in cash. In this case, the compensation is in kind and in technical support ... Later, EVN also realized a great impact by the project and agreed to support livelihood. (Interview No.25, Project officer, TSHPCo) Consultation is meaningful because the project’s livelihood program is based on the needs and actual conditions of the people, there is absolutely no imposition, or any top-down plan. After consultation, the consultant team summarizes the number of households registering for each certain activity. We have to filter into categories, then synthesize into one list to see how many households and activities there are, as well as the budget to mobilize for each supported activity based on local conditions” (Interview No.4, Team leader, Livelihood Technical Support Team). 71. Early in the preparation phase of the Trung Son project, options had been sought to address difficulties in restoring living standards of affected households. This was a persistent challenge for all infrastructure projects. Although livelihood restoration was stipulated in existing national regulations, few projects had successfully implemented such activities. Restoration support had generally been converted into cash payments, often without follow- up activities. Therefore, launching a livelihood restoration program under the Trung Son project posed new challenges for the implementing agency, supervisors, and even beneficiaries. It took however a long time to kick off the program and gradually scale up the livelihood activities. Lengthy planning, budgeting, and procurement processes and the mobilization of adequate technical assistance services proved to be specific difficulties. Livelihood support activities were carried out through 4 phases: a pilot phase (2012-2013), a transition phase (2013-2014), a scale- up phase (2015-2017) and an extension phase (2018-2019). The total expenditure was 22.6 billion VND (excluding consultancy costs), which is equivalent to US$0.95 million, of which 20 percent took place in the extension phase. 72. The Community Livelihood Improvement Plan was a community-based program. In an environment where agricultural resources were affected by the Trung Son reservoir, CLIP fully mobilized the communities’ human, social, and natural resources while bringing in financial and physical resources to facilitate the restoration of sustainable livelihoods. The community- based development approach had been widely applied in poor rural communities with strong principles of empowerment, participation, demand-driven economic needs, strengthened responsibility, and promotion of local capacity. These principles were thoroughly applied during the process of developing and implementing CLIP: consulting the local community, mobilizing community participation in livelihood improvement activities, and empowering the community so that these activities could be self-managed or co-managed with local authorities. Livelihood Improvement 45 73. The scope of CLIP included all affected villages, and within each village affected households were gathered under common interest groups. Communes in Vietnam’s upland areas are made up of villages, each of which is a community. In the context of the Trung Son project, since some villages within a commune were affected by the reservoir and some were not, defining the village and not the commune as the community was an obvious choice. All households within an affected village were defined as being eligible to take part in CLIP and access project benefits. Most activities took place through common interest groups composed of households within a village. Over the project’s implementation period, common interest groups actually played a strong role in maintaining and further developing linkages among its members. They therefore became a second level of community in the affected villages. 74. For TSHPCo, a new approach meant a new mechanism to mobilize human resources, plan and budget activities, and deliver on-site implementation. Since households had expressed strong preference to continue their livelihoods based on agriculture and to diversify income sources, young animals, seed, and other agricultural inputs were needed. CLIP was designed to provide in-kind livelihood support. This approach has been often applied in rural development projects in similar environments, but rarely in development-induced resettlement. In parallel, private suppliers were encouraged to develop locally available agricultural inputs, and a number of households were supported in becoming breeders of young animals or producers of tree seedlings. 75. Livelihood activities were the result of bottom-up consultations and planning. During project preparation, a formal process from district to commune and village heads was followed. This resulted in tentative CLIP plans for each village. These plans that were included in the RLDP, confirmed the entitlement of each village to CLIP support and showed how diversified activities could be planned to respond to local needs. At dedicated consultations during implementation, as livelihood activities were adjusted and common interest groups became the main CLIP implementation mechanism, villagers prioritized which interest groups were more appropriate in their village. They signed up for participation in interest groups and for access to agricultural inputs. This consultation step took quite a lot of time; but the returns were clearly identified: community needs and group activities, local priorities, and households willing to participate in common interest groups. 76. During project preparation, commune-level People’s Committees took an active role. As commune authorities were deeply aware of the characteristics of the population and local environment and production, and some commune officials having to relocate their own households, their ideas helped in shaping CLIP activities and adapting them to each location. During implementation, the village heads were an active party in village consultations. District authorities in charge of the local socioeconomic development plan were kept informed throughout the project, both formally through a reporting process, and informally through conversation with other villagers. 46 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam B. Using a Proven Implementation Mechanism: Common Interest Groups One of the successful practices is related to livelihood activities. Why divide villagers into interest groups? Interest groups help people support each other to maintain their livelihood activities. (Interview No.7, Commune official, Muong Ly commune) When participating in the interest groups, we observed and exchanged experience with each other, especially when raising unfamiliar pigs. (Focus group discussion No.5, man, Tan Xuan commune) If a chicken is sick or dead, it is necessary to meet and report to the group. The group will contact the commune livelihood committee to inform about the number of the deaths, or the concrete situation of sickness. They come to check. They give medicine or inject. If they give medicine, then it is be my duty to give instructions to other members of how to use the medicine. In many cases, the sick animals will be cured. (Focus group discussion No.3, woman, Trung Son commune). 77. The common interest groups constituted a proven mechanism in Vietnam with innovative features to respond to livelihood restoration needs in a hydropower project. They have long been used in agricultural extension and community-driven development projects in Vietnam. These groups and the associated pilots, called “models”, were therefore a recognized activity at all levels. This allowed setting up informal groups in the communities. Throughout the project, three types of interest groups were in place: (a) crop production groups ranging from paddy rice improvement to fruit production; (b) animal husbandry, with a large range of productions (poultry, pigs, goats, fodder for cows, fish, honeybees); and (c) non-agricultural activities. In the latter category, there were groups focusing on processing of newly developed crops (canna noodles), others on handicrafts. One “household business group” was set up to help small entrepreneurs link up and develop market access plans. And other groups, open to young people, helped with individual plans to access vocational schools or set up a small service activity such as a repair shop. 78. Common interest groups started early during the pilot phase of livelihood improvement. Setting up such groups was one of the project activities envisioned to support restoration of livelihoods. Small groups of 3-6 households were expected to be set up. While households were still in their original villages, livelihood improvement activities were to be tested through these groups so that experience could be drawn for the next stages. During the pilot stage, 5 crop interest groups, 8 husbandry interest groups and 3 non-agricultural and Livelihood Improvement 47 market development groups were established, with a total of 275 members in 5 participating villages. Group members mostly came from more active households. Animal husbandry interest group members were provided with young animals from improved breeds. They were advised to build light animal sheds using bamboo as building materiel and combine locally available feed with commercial feed. Crop production groups were provided with seed and agricultural inputs. All members attended training courses on animal husbandry, crop production, or animal disease prevention. A few representatives were selected by the groups to join study tours organized by the project to visit agricultural and non-agricultural activities in nearby districts outside the Trung Son area. Monitoring of pilot activities was done by the members themselves. 79. After the pilot phase, common interest groups continued to be the main modality for livelihood improvement implementation. At its full scale, when CLIP covered 44 villages, 429 interest groups were established, in which there were 175 crop production groups, 191 animal husbandry groups, and 63 non-agricultural groups. Out of these, 220 undertook demonstration activities, while the others mostly took part in training. Existing groups were consolidated as activities gradually expanded to cover all villages, while new common interest groups were created. 80. The groups operated in a way that facilitated close linkages among their members as well as between the group and the community. This facilitation was done by focusing on simple improvements in crop and animal production and learning how to use agricultural inputs combined with locally available inputs and practices. Group members encouraged each other to participate in training activities and to apply the acquired knowledge and skills during training. They shared experience, mostly on crop and animal production. The households that participated in the initial groups assisted new group members to acquire the necessary skills. Training on household budget and production plans was also offered to help affected households optimize the use of compensation. 81. Clarifying responsibilities of group members was useful. Group regulations were developed, which clearly stated the responsibilities of participants. For example, group members did not have to contribute financially to the demonstrations but did comply with the technical recommendations of the livelihood technical assistants. Households receiving young animals had to ensure construction of animal sheds and availability of fodder and animal feed. All interest group members had to be trained before receiving young animals, seeds or seedlings, and other materials. Group leaders played an important role in maintaining the activities of interest groups. They were elected by the group members using criteria such as proficiency in Vietnamese; being reputable; being positive; and having a better economic condition. Those chosen were often villagers who understood the characteristics of each family. They were key people in promoting the capacity of interest groups and had a positive influence on other members. From 2016, they attended specific training sessions organized for leaders of common interest groups. These sessions took place in each district town and lasted for 4 days. In addition to agriculture and animal husbandry techniques and skills, these courses were designed to provide group leaders with group management skills, including meeting organization, experience sharing, and teamwork. 48 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 82. Literacy levels and languages were taken into account. Training materials were designed (by livelihood technical support team) for a semi-literate audience, including easy- to-understand ideas and pictures. For example, the need for animal vaccination was explained through comparison with the vaccination of children. Specific solutions were tested and then developed for those who are not fluent in Vietnamese, with a focus on less-fluent, middle- aged women in Thai villages and Mong villages. Interest group activities helped each other understand pictures and messages. Those who were fluent in Vietnamese were able to explain to those who had difficulties. One Mong field coordinator was recruited to enhance the capacity in communicating in local language. 83. Additional measures were taken to overcome difficulties such as unavailability of group leaders, and access to vulnerable groups. Solutions to each of these problems were identified and implemented. First, at full-scale stage, each interest group included a deputy group leader to share responsibilities in management of the group in a more flexible and effective manner. Second, the use of specific methods was encouraged in Mong villages. From their smartphones, the field facilitators could show photographs and short videos of local good practices. The Mong-speaking field coordinator recorded key messages and good practice stories from other villages, and commune people committee’s members were encouraged to contribute. Participating households could listen to these files using the field coordinators’ smartphones. To facilitate inclusion of vulnerable households, the field coordinators were provided with village lists of vulnerable households and were asked to identify those who had not yet joined a group. C. Adjusting Livelihood Restoration Activities and Resources Back then, my household registered in the pig-raising group but did not receive any pigs. There were many others like that. I attended the training courses several times. More knowledge, knowing how to do husbandry, I know that if I apply all the techniques, I will be able to raise livestock. (Interview No. 16, Female member of pig-raising group, Tan Xuan commune) 84. When the Trung Son project was prepared, livelihood improvement activities were planned on the basis of the magnitude of impact in each village. The villages affected by the reservoir were divided into three categories: severely affected villages, moderately affected villages, and less affected villages, as explained in Table 9. While a standard support package was budgeted for each category of impacted village, it was made clear that support would be adjusted as needed during implementation through the preparation of an annual plan and continuous consultation with local people. The purpose of a flexible livelihood restoration program was to better meet actual demand of affected households, while taking advantage of upcoming and unforeseen income-generating opportunities. Livelihood Improvement 49 85. A different livelihood restoration package had been budgeted for each of the three categories of villages. Most severely affected villages received intensive resettlement support. Some CLIP activities were equally open to moderately affected villages. In moderately affected villages, paddy fields were limited; some households wanted to develop enriched home gardens, fish ponds, or handicrafts; and some young people wanted to turn to off-farm employment through vocational training. Support to less affected villages mainly focused on cattle rearing for livestock interest groups and improved access to credit. Most of the technical support and services defined at that time were implemented. Affected households received direct support for production improvement, with a focus on livestock. Individual advisory services were organized to cover all households except in less affected villages, with priority to the more affected or vulnerable. Vocational training was an option offered to younger people through contracts with neighboring schools. TABLE 9. Livelihood restoration packages by village category Magnitude of dam Severely affected Moderately affected Less affected villages impact on village villages villages No relocation and < 5 > 50% households < 50% households households severely relocated or severely relocated or > 5 affected on land affected on land households severely affected on land only 1. Technical support in village Technical assistants Pilot year Field coordinators 1 per 2 villages 1 per 2 villages Visits 2. Production improvement Pilots 5 villages No No Cattle interest groups 1head/household 1 head/ 5 households Small livestock, fish Yes No Public infrastructure No Yes No Paddy terraces* Planned resettlement Yes No sites Forest protection Yes No contracts* 50 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 9. Livelihood restoration packages by village category (cont) Magnitude of dam Severely affected Moderately affected Less affected villages impact on village villages villages No relocation and < 5 > 50% households < 50% households households severely relocated or severely relocated or > 5 affected on land affected on land households severely affected on land only 3. Service center activities Individual advisory Priority to relocated households, other severely services affected households and vulnerable groups Credit facilitation – Yes No microloan* Credit facilitation - Around 20% of Some Some small enterprise* households Vocational training Around 20% of households Few Business clubs Around 5% of Some households * Activities planned at the time of project preparation, which were reduced or cancelled due to implementation difficulties. 86. Finding the right fit between technical assistance and the project timeline was a major difficulty. As foreseen initially, CLIP mobilized a small team of livelihood advisors starting from the pilot phase, and a livelihood technical support team of 5 experts and 11 field coordinators during a main phase of three years. At the end of the pilot phase, the launch of the main phase was delayed (due to the poor performance of the technical assistance task force that led to the replacement of the entire team). Launching the main phase and mobilizing the replacing team became increasingly challenging with the project management unit concentrating efforts on resettlement and TSHPCo preparing the amendment of the loan agreement with the World Bank. 87. Strengthening the relationship with local authorities became a key task in the livelihoods restoration workplan. When the technical assistance task force was in place, the livelihood advisors of the pilot phase were redirected to a function of community relations officers, working closely with commune officials and village heads. The function of the community relations officers was to act as a bridge between the communities and the project, providing information on livelihood improvement activities as well as receiving complaints and grievances from affected people. Project-funded commune livelihood boards started to operate officially in each of the main affected communes. Members of a community livelihood board comprised one of the commune leaders, the agricultural extension staff or veterinary staff, the Women’s Union representative, and village heads from the project-affected area. The commune livelihood boards assisted the technical assistance task force to plan, implement, and monitor local activities. 88. Human resources, once in place, provided a channel to reach out to affected households. Field coordinators offered a permanent presence in the affected communes and villages (Box 7). Instead of one service center, the technical assistance task force opened a small office close to the main construction worksites to serve villagers in one commune and Livelihood Improvement 51 delivered advisory services directly to homes. These advisory services complemented training and facilitation for interest group members. They prioritized services to the more affected and vulnerable households. BOX 7. Field coordinators in the livelihood improvement program of the Trung Son project • The Trung Son project area covered 44 villages in 8 communes of 3 districts. The technical assistance support consisted of 5 experts and 11 field coordinators, plus 3 part-time community relations officers, supported by a part-time international advisor. • On-the-job training of households meant giving advice to around 3,000 households so that they could master new techniques and practices. • The use of field coordinators was confirmed to be a suitable option. They were constantly present in the area and could provide timely support when local people needed technical assistance. They were recruited within the communes and some of them could speak the local languages. • Ensuring communications between field coordinators and technical assistance providers based at the dam site was critical. Initially the coordinators did not have their own phones and had difficulties using cellphones and email and social networks. It took four months for the technical assistants to train field coordinators in the use of information technology, including the internet. • This training was provided in parallel with management and technical training on CLIP activities, which was organized jointly for field coordinators and 142 interest group leaders. All 11 coordinators were involved as both trainees and facilitators in the training courses. D. Ensuring Transfer to Local Government This is a good model because of the cooperation with the local authorities. Local authorities assign veterinary and agricultural extension staff to deliver on-site support. The confirmation of all relevant government levels in all activities creates a smooth support system for the program. (Interview No.24, livelihood field coordinator, Tan Xuan commune) The post-resettlement livelihood is also a success of Trung Son hydropower. The most important thing is that the local authorities from district to village level joined in the Trung Son hydropower project, and also coordinated with mass organizations to join in. (Interview No.7, commune official, Muong Ly commune). 89. Livelihood activities and local authorities began being integrated at the village and commune levels. Linkages between the village officials, leaders of interest groups, and other households were frequent and tight. There are features that brought great advantage for TSHPCo in maintaining the relationship with local authorities and communities. The nature of the project required the physical presence of TSHPCo early in project preparation and throughout the project cycles. Besides, the openness and commitment of TSHPCo paved the way for more proactive participation of local people and authority. Group leaders, through project activities, were encouraged to take a strong role in connecting households with the field coordinators. An informal village-level network, which was built in that way, was further reinforced by carrying 52 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam out the proposed activities (delivering agricultural inputs, organizing training, monitoring pilot fields, animal raising, or small processing) of the common interest groups. Regular exchanges and coordination between the field coordinators and the livelihoods technical assistants helped provide timely solutions to the difficulties encountered in village-level livelihood activities. This positive feature of the project inspired close coordination between program beneficiaries and local government, helping common interest groups to know the reliable sources for technical advice when needed. This model had the advantage of providing an information and human resource network alongside technical support. At commune level, coordination with local government was gradually developed. Setting up commune livelihood boards, (i.e., commune- level People Committee members and staff specifically in charge managing and supervising livelihood activities in the Trung Son project) was suggested early on. The option was tried in one commune then expanded to all reservoir-affected communes when project activities were at full scale. 90. Individual advisory services further developed the skills of field coordinators in the communes. After the main round of technical training was underway, the livelihood technical support team worked jointly with the field coordinators and the interest group leaders to undertake individual advisory visits in each household. Individual advisory activities were first performed by the technical assistant, who then passed on the method to a field coordinator. The coordinators were then able to continue on their own on a larger scale. In addition to helping each household to develop a better production, labor, and budget planning, the coordinators were able to organize group activities that responded better to group member demand. They also built their own capacity through these individual advisory visits. Commune livelihood boards oversaw monitoring the quality of these activities, combining interest groups with individual advisory visits, and thus preparing for taking charge of these activities. 91. After full-scale implementation was underway, a new approach was taken in which local initiative was encouraged. Transferring livelihood activities and agricultural and veterinary services to local authorities had been envisioned during the preparation of the Trung Son project. Starting from 2018, for each type of livelihood improvement pilot and related groups (called model in Vietnam), either the district or the commune authorities were identified as the agency responsible for taking over, maintaining, and promoting the activity. The commune livelihood boards received all the technical manuals (produced by the livelihood technical support team) and lists of interest groups and activities being carried out in the villages. Local authorities committed to continue monitoring and pushing interest groups to help households maintain the livelihood activities supported by the project as part of regular governmental-led, socio-economic program. For example, in one district (Van Ho in Son La Province), the project financed acquisition of 120 cows for affected households. The district-level People’s Committee nominated the district-level Women’s Union to take charge and continue implementation at the grassroots level beyond the end of the Trung Son project. The district’s Women’s Union cooperated with the commune-level Women’s Union to implement activities with interest groups in the villages, select the households that would raise the first cows, and organize training courses on cow raising. The livelihoods technical assistants of the Trung Son project continued Livelihood Improvement 53 to provide advisory services, supervision, and technical assistance until the end of the project in order to ensure technical quality, ensuring that implementation remained in accordance with the project’s recommendations. E. Recognizing that Livelihood Change is a Long-Term Process For the project here, the goal is not to bring in the advanced science and technology to apply, but to develop from what they are having. Bringing in new science would certainly not work. They are raising cows and chickens, so our task is to help them expand or increase productivity. We should not suggest something they have never done that before. (Interview No.25, Project officer, TSHPCo) Village pigs are kept in barns, not free. Now there is no one grazing. I don’t know about other villages, but in this village, chickens and pigs are kept in barn. Grazing was popular at the old village only, not here. Here, all the lands have wall, no one lets their animals to run around because they don’t want to bother other households. In general, husbandry is also organized, no more grazing. (Focus group discussion No.5, Male participants from relocated households, Tan Xuan commune) 92. Livelihood change in the Trung Son project was supported over a period of five years. This period included one year of piloting, one year of transition, and three years of full- scale activities. An overall livelihood restoration plan was developed, reviewed, and cleared by TSHPCo and the World Bank. It provided the implementation team with guidance on target, proposed target, and estimated budget. The annual plan of livelihood activities was developed based on the overall plan. Once the annual plan was approved, procurement of agricultural inputs and technical support mobilization followed. Over this period of time, it became necessary for combined effort from livelihood technical assistants from TSHPCo, a contracted team of technical assistants, locally recruited field coordinators, and commune livelihood boards. Specifically, in veterinary care, the technical assistants launched early training of households from various villages as para-veterinarians and continued to do so and provide animal medicine until veterinary services became available in all affected communes. Veterinary care, a major constraint in these tropical uplands, is now accessible and delivered on time. 93. Among the various options offered to diversify and improve their livelihoods, households prioritized animal raising. In the Trung Son area, all livestock from poultry and pigs to cows and buffaloes used to be kept in the open with larger animals staying for long periods of time in the forest. The majority of households turned to keeping livestock inside fenced areas and animal sheds, especially in the planned resettlement sites. Farmers found 54 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam this is easier to manage, safer for the animals, conducive to a cleaner environment, and more productive. Working in groups helped improve traditional farming practices of households and made them more efficient, reducing damages due to disease or lack of care. Affected households could sell the mature livestock at the local market or through intermediate traders who would provide transport of the animals from the affected households to market. Affected households were encouraged to use the earned money to repopulate the herd. 94. Interest groups were a project-specific and useful mechanism although few were maintained after project-end due to lack of resources. Farmers who participated in training and pursued recommended practices were able to accumulate new insights and share with others. Although the pilot agricultural activities were often rated as “successful”, many interest groups mostly met initially while training activities were organized under the project and did not maintain regular group meetings for further exchange of experience. They did meet in cases when an animal disease occurred. This was foreseen: interest groups were a transition arrangement to help households overcome the stress and difficulties of relocation. Ensuring all villagers were aware of group activities and women were actively taking part in group activities was a challenge that was only partly addressed. Many affected households are still struggling to apply the new ideas and skills they have gained from project activities. Their low level of education and unfamiliarity with group work made such application more challenging. 95. Linkages with the outside were a critical ingredient to start switching to non- agricultural activities. During the Trung Son project, non-farming interest groups were encouraged but yet remained quite small. The livelihood technical assistants encouraged and assisted interested households to meet on a regular basis to set up groups, to plan new activities, and to contribute financially to launch these activities. Some processing equipment was financed through the project. A few groups emerged, producing quality products for the market. These groups had some experienced members with strong motivation. Group leaders that had established relationships with the outside were especially useful. This confirmed the relevance of the community-based approach to livelihood restoration in the Trung Son project, in which the more knowledgeable and better-connected people in a village were encouraged to participate. It also confirmed how capacity building in livelihood improvement was not only a matter of applied knowledge and techniques but also about management skill, to ensure active participation in both production and sales. F. Section Summary 96. Experience gained from the Trung Son project demonstrates that livelihood restoration through local communities takes time but is likely to lead to more sustainable outcomes. Looking back, significant positive contributions resulted from planning livelihood restoration as a community-based development project, adjusting activities and resources to the overall project timeline, using a proven implementation mechanism (common interest groups), and tailoring the program to groups with different level of literacy. However, it is recognized that livelihood change is a long-term process. Continuing activities after the project-end and Livelihood Improvement 55 ensuring transfer to the most local level of the government (the commune) is critical. The project- related achievements are only the first steps. These steps will pave the way to integrate project- supported common interest groups into the annual socio-economic development plan or other governmental funded programs in project areas. FIGURE 6. Timeline of Livelihood Improvement Decisions in the Trung Son Hydropower Project 2015 2019 Technical assistance task 2017 Community relations force team 2011 2013 Scale up phase Year 2 (5 persons) (44 villages) (3 persons) Design Pilot pilot phase Prepare and approve scale- New and existing groups Maintain groups activities (5 villages) up phase plan (44 villages) Expand individual advisory Test new activities Recruit and train 11 eld services Local government coordinators transfer 2016 Second 2012 technical assistance taskforce 2014 Scale-up phase Year 1 2018 Pilot TA team (3 persons) Transition phase (15 villages) Final evaluation (10 villages) Prepare and New and existing groups Approve post- First commune project plan approve pilot phase Start individual plan livelihood board advisory services 8 commune livelihood boards and community relations team (3 persons) 97. As a result of the project, local livelihoods are in the process of being restored. Affected households’ knowledge and skills in crop and animal production have improved. Livelihoods have changed not so much through diversification into non-agricultural activities, which was initially encouraged, but rather in the introduction of new animal husbandry practices. Because of their encouragement, interest groups proved useful even when they were not sustained after the project. They were a means to maintain and rebuild social capital during relocation. In this sense, the self-governance capacity of the village communities was raised. In parallel, local technicians had an opportunity to build capacity before operation of community- based development models was transferred to local authorities. 56 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 10. Livelihood improvement: Summary of experience from the Trung Son Hydropower Project Main obstacles • Livelihood restoration support in EVN projects mostly were in the form of cash payments. • TSHPCo had no experience in planning and budgeting livelihood activities with in-kind supply of agricultural inputs. • Matching project area needs for technical assistance and consultant recruitment was difficult. • Matching the schedule of livelihood improvement activities and resettlement was challenging. Stakeholders involved • Hydropower company and project management unit. • World Bank. • District-level and commune-level People’s Committees. • Village head and village management board. • Livelihood Technical Support Team. • CLIP technical assistants (individual consultants within hydropower company and contracted technical assistance team). • Field coordinators. Decision-making process • Develop detailed plan for livelihood improvement activities in affected communities. • Establish different levels of priority for affected villages. • Consult with local authorities and the community about livelihood improvement plans. • Establish interest groups based on household voluntary membership. • Establish commune livelihood boards. • Establish a good connection among technical assistants, field coordinators, and interest group leaders. • Integrate CLIP activities into local government programs. • Gradually transfer activities to commune-level People’s Committees. Results • Local livelihoods are in the process of being restored as confirmed in the final evaluation. • Households’ knowledge and skills in crop and animal production were improved. • Animal husbandry practices shifted from free ranging to breeding in animal sheds, and veterinary services were expanded. Livelihood improvement: five lessons learnt from the Trung Son project • Plan livelihood restoration as a community-based development project. • Adjust activities and resources to the overall project timeline. • Use a proven implementation mechanism such as common interest groups. • Ensure transfer to local government. • Recognize that livelihood change is a long-term process. Livelihood Improvement 57 Risk Management at Reservoir Impoundment 58 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 98. Managing downstream impact during reservoir impoundment was critical, requiring mitigation of specific risks. Downstream impacts associated with reservoir impoundment had been assessed during the project preparation stage. From the environmental and social perspective, guaranteeing minimum water releases (often referred to as environmental flows) during reservoir filling and at all times during subsequent operations is both an obligation under domestic law and regulations and a key requirement of the project Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP). A. Reassessing Risks and Impacts from Impoundment, Based on Up-to-Date Technical Design 99. At project appraisal, the reservoir impoundment was scheduled in the late rainy season requiring about a week to complete the filling. The project aim was to release the required environmental flow via the sluicing outlet in 2-3 days after commencing reservoir filling. Hence, no technical solutions and ESMP for downstream during the reservoir impoundment were required. However, during project implementation, the dam safety review panel recommended not to fill the reservoir in the rainy season for safety reasons, which resulted in the reservoir filling period increasing up to 3 weeks before the project could release water through the spillway. Since the sluicing outlet was located above the diversion culverts, which needed to be filled with concrete taking up to 3 months, that outlet could not be used to release water flows during the reservoir filling. Subsequently, TSHPCo investigated various alternative technical solutions, but none of the alternatives were technically or economically feasible and viable to provide at least 15 cubic-meter water flow downstream during reservoir filling. It was decided that the impoundment would be carried out only when the impacts of impoundment were properly assessed and addressed. This decision triggered a series of mitigation measures. The perimeter of the area at risk was extended from 43 kilometers to 85 kilometers where an already operating hydropower plan, Ba Thuoc 2, was located. All was synthesized and presented in a stand-alone ESMP, covering impacts and risks in connection with the reservoir impoundment period. 100. The downstream area was divided into three sections in accordance to the impact level from the dam (20, 43, and 85 kilometers). The nature and magnitude of impacts and risks from reservoir impoundment were assessed in parallel for each of these sections. Consultation meetings were carried out with the provincial and district authorities, the 17 commune authorities, 47 village heads, and 2 hydropower companies. In addition to identifying and assessing social and environmental impacts, these consultations led to an understanding of the communities’ communications needs during the impoundment period. The ESMP was also submitted to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) and its two provincial departments for their consultation and information. B. Jointly Preparing and Implementing Mitigation of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts 101. The TSHPCo took responsibility for mitigating all downstream impacts caused by impoundment of the reservoir. The mitigation measures prepared and implemented Risk Management at Reservoir Impoundment 59 included technical solutions, site-specific mitigation measures, communications, and financial compensation of affected households. Environmental measures — addressing impacts on river and riverine ecosystems, preventing impact from potential landslides, and ensuring continuity of transportation — were planned jointly with social measures communicated among stakeholders and providing financial compensation to all households with fish-cage production affected by the reservoir filling. The implementation of these measures was then allocated to the TSHPCo environmental and social team. 102. Just as important, mitigation measures were adapted to actual impacts. As a result, impoundment was delayed by only two months, and the impoundment period was shortened to 15 days, instead of the 30-day period as initially planned. The overall impact is less significant than expected, including the water level in the first 20 kilometers after the dam. In the second and third sections, the river receives significant flow from Xia stream and Luong river (Table 11). This, together with advanced communication and other mitigation measures, resulted in a smooth impoundment. No incidents or emergencies took place. TABLE 11. Potential and actual impacts during reservoir impoundment Impact Information Potential and Downstream Downstream Downstream category on actual impacts section 1 (20 section 2 (43 section 3 (85 impoundment km) km) km) and discharge Dam to Co Co Luong Luong River schedules Luong Bridge bridge to to Ba Thuoc 2 Luong River hydropower dam Ma River Potential • None • 7 river • 5 river crossing impact identified crossing crossing points points Actual impact • Water level was sufficient for navigation and existing road networks met the population’s demand Aquaculture Potential • 5 households, • 23 • 37 impact • 17 fish cages households, households, • 81 fish cages 107 fish cages Actual impact • The hydropower company provided financial support to affected households: 1.5–3.0 million VND per household depending on the degree of impact Sand mining Yes Potential • Three small • 27 sand • 12 sand impact sand mining mining mining households locations locations located on this section Actual impact • Impacts were insignificant: enterprises did advanced preparation after having received information 60 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam TABLE 11. Potential and actual impacts during reservoir impoundment (cont) Impact Information Potential and Downstream Downstream Downstream category on actual impacts section 1 (20 section 2 (43 section 3 (85 impoundment km) km) km) and discharge Dam to Co Co Luong Luong River schedules Luong Bridge bridge to to Ba Thuoc 2 Luong River hydropower dam Small Yes Potential • Not found • 10 small • 16 small enterprises impact bamboo bamboo processing processing enterprises enterprises Actual impact • Absence • The enterprises took proactive of bamboo measures to prepare for the processing temporary shortage of water enterprises was verified Downstream Yes Potential • Thanh Son • None • Ba Thuoc 2 HPP hydropower impact HPP under identified plants construction Actual impact • No impact: these two plants • Ba Thuoc under construction were coordinated its regularly informed by the own reservoir Trung Son hydropower impound­ment company Ma River Yes Potential • Few • Some • Some transportation impact households households households for bamboo used the used the used the river and river river agricultural Actual impact • Communities received • Water flow products information on alternative from the transport routes by road. Luong river was sufficient to maintain river transporta­tion Risk of Yes Potential • 7 households • None • None identified landslide on impact living along identified river bank left riverbank prone to landslides Actual impact • No landslide during the water impoundment River and Potential • River aquatic • River aquatic • River aquatic riverine impact ecosystem ecosystem ecosystem ecosystem Actual impact • The hydropower company • No impact financed fish rescue observed and monitoring of fish populations by consultants Risk Management at Reservoir Impoundment 61 C. Paying Special Attention to Communications during Impoundment 103. A communications plan was prepared and fully implemented. Activities covered all categories of stakeholders such as local authorities and enterprises, from other hydropower projects to individual businesses, and people living near the at-risk perimeter. These activities were planned in advance with a detailed schedule and predefined communications means (Table 12). When impoundment time approached, the project regularly contacted village heads to promote communications activities in villages and received feedback from villagers. Village heads took an active role by announcing the time of impoundment in village meetings, receiving feedback from local people and forwarding this to the project implementation unit. The feedback received was recorded and filed. Project officers were equipped with a crisis communications handbook. The hydropower company also closely monitored media reports and social media during the impoundment period. TABLE 12. Communications plan of the Trung Son Hydropower Project relative to reservoir impoundment Timing Activities Channel Stakeholders 15 days in The hydropower company informs provincial and Official Letter Local authorities advance commune authorities of the reservoir filling and asks for their support. The hydropower company informs schools, and Official Letter Schools, at-risk enterprises (other hydropower projects, sand enterprises, mining, chopstick production). individual enterprises Trung Son provides information via the village head Hotline, Village heads, hotline, and the village heads communicate in turn meetings, local people with villagers. leaflets, loudspeaker 5 days, 3 The hydropower company sends information Letter, Local authorities days and on water re-discharging to local authorities, and telephone 1 days in repeats twice. advance The hydropower company sends similar information Letter, Schools, to schools and enterprises. telephone, email enterprises and individual enterprises Regularly The hydropower company maintains Telephone Village heads until end of communication with village heads to understand impound­ the local situation. ment The hydropower company answers questions via hotline All period the hotline. The hydropower company uploads information on Website All the Trung Son website. The hydropower company monitors mass media Mass media All and social media. 62 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam 104. The communications plan was combined with formal information on the impoundment ESMP in the at-risk perimeter and at national level, before and after impoundment time. The hydropower company submitted the document to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and its provincial departments of the two provinces within the perimeter (Thanh Hoa and Hoa Binh). Four days later, the document was disclosed to each commune in the downstream area from the dam to the Ba Thuoc 2 hydropower plant. The hydropower company also shared regularly updated information on the reservoir impoundment on its website. Two months after impoundment, when the mitigation measures were completed, the hydropower company briefed Vietnam Rivers Network (VRN) on the progress of the project and on results of ESMP implementation during the impoundment period. D. Section Summary 105. A result from this set of actions was that safety was ensured in the whole downstream area. This also reflects the flexibility in addressing social impacts despite a late change in technical design. Financial compensations only covered actual impacts. Reservoir impoundment was delayed by only three months. The hydropower company confirmed the importance of proactive communications with a range of stakeholders and close community relations. TABLE 13. Risk management at reservoir impoundment: Summary of experience from Trung Son project Reservoir impoundment: Three areas of good practice from the Trung Son project • Reassess risks and impacts from impoundment based on up-to-date technical design • Prepare and implement jointly mitigation of environmental and social risks and impacts • Pay special attention to communications during impoundment Stakeholders involved • Project management unit • World Bank • Department of Natural Resources and Environment of 2 provinces (Hoa Binh and Thanh Hoa) • District-level and commune-level People’s Committees, village heads • Affected people, schools in the area • Downstream hydropower projects Main obstacles • There was a late change in the technical design. Therefore, downstream risks of impact had changed. • The downstream at-risk area was very large. • Reservoir impoundment was also a stressful time for communities around the reservoir. Decision-making process • Include downstream impact in the initial ESMP of the Trung Son Hydropower Project. • Prepare a specific ESMP for reservoir impoundment through additional consultations and surveys • Establish a hotline to contact village heads. • Send the specific ESMP to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, its provincial departments, and downstream communes within the at-risk perimeter. • Send official letters 15 days prior to the impoundment, confirming that financial support would be provided for impacted fishing activities, river transportation and vulnerable groups, and receive feedback. • Jointly deliver project impact mitigation subsidies and monitor downstream areas until the end of the impoundment period. Risk Management at Reservoir Impoundment 63 TABLE 13. Risk Management at reservoir impoundment: Summary of experience from Trung Son Project (cont) Timeline 09/2016 11/2016 01/2017 Start communication on Finalize data ESMP implementation impoundment collection Brie ng with VRN Reassess risks Finalize ESMP Reservoir impoundment 12/2016 10/2016 WB clears ESMP Recruit consultants WB clears impoundment Collect data ESMP submitted to MONRE Submit draft ESMP ESMP disclosed 64 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam Attention to Local Context, Culture Sensitivity, and Inclusion of Women Attention to Local Context, Culture Sensitivity, and Inclusion of Women 65 A. Ensuring Respect of Ethnic Minority Cultures throughout Project Implementation 106. The risks of impact on ethnic minority communities during construction of the dam and after establishment of the reservoir were identified in the preparation stage. They were documented in the Ethnic Minority Development Plan. This document defined a principle of respecting the cultural characteristics, typical aspirations, and development needs of ethnic minority communities in the Trung Son project area, and defined implementation measures in line with these principles. 107. Few affected physical cultural resources were identified. The project implementation unit organized the relocation of the Huoi Pa ancient tomb area and the old Stone Relic in Nang 1 village, whose sites were to be flooded by the reservoir. This activity was formally approved by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, and the new sites were handed over to competent authorities.10 There was otherwise no impact from the reservoir on sacred forests of ethnic minority communities in the project area. 108. Although it has been one of the most challenging tasks in hydropower projects across countries, relocating affected graves was properly done, with a practice acceptable to the communities. In the culture of the Thai people, who formed a large proportion of households in all three affected districts, deceased people are buried in permanent graves and are not visited at regular intervals (Box 8). The practice of grave excavation in case of change of land use, which is common among the Kinh majority and a requirement in dam projects, was absent among these communities. It took several months before an agreement was reached between affected households and the project implementation unit. BOX 8. Beliefs of the Thai ethnic group Thai people believe in life after death and in the immortality of the soul. Graves belong to the world of nothingness where the evil (evil spirits, demons available in nature or transferred from the deaths) and the good (ancestors) co-exist. Graves are located deep in the forest. Those who are alive will not go to this area after the ritual of burying the dead has been performed. Thai women in the Trung Son area say they used to be scared every time they had to pass through the forest, and thus tried to stay away or went through another way. Note: Details on graves in the Thai culture are available in Le Hai Dang (2014) and Cam Trong and Chu Thai Son (2016). 109. Communication with affected communities was key to reaching an agreement on the relocation of graves, as well as organizing worship ceremonies at the time of relocation. 10 Decision No. 851 / QD-BVHTTDL dated March 24, 2015 on archaeological excavation. Minutes of completion and handover were made on February 29, 2016. 66 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam When it became clear that project implementation was unavoidable, all involved parties took the removal of graves as a serious issue. Thai people said they were initially shocked with the proposal. Communications and consultations about graves and cemeteries were conducted in each village. Particular attention was given to listening to the elderly. Some people expressed their concern that relocating graves might bring them bad luck (causing illnesses for children and other family members). The hydropower company committed to cover not only relocation costs but also expenses of worship events (and/or associated rituals) before and after relocating the affected graves. In villages with unresolved issues of land/house/asset compensation, timely resolution helped ease tensions around relocation of graves. Until then, there had never been a removal of graves in our village. We left the grave where the burial had taken place. Relocating graves made us afraid of losing this and that. There were many things that made us worried. It was not our custom here. After finishing a burial, Thai people never remove a grave. If we did not agree to relocate our graves, then they would have been flooded, some others would be under the new road. Some households would have suffered some kind of illness. (Focus group discussion No.2, Female participants of relocated households, Trung Ly commune) Communication activities took three months. This very bridge used to be the cemetery. Fortunately, the young village head was aware of the situation. Thai culture is to abandon graves. Removing a grave is considered “exposing our father’s grave”. After the relocation was completed in this resettlement, other sites followed. They agreed with us to move graves. (Interview No.25, Project officer, TSHPCo) 110. Options were given to affected households: relocation decision and modality. The majority of households opted to remove graves and relocate them to a new cemetery. Those who choose not to relocate graves performed a ritual (to inform their ancestors of the site of a new cemetery) and took a symbolic piece of soil to the new cemetery. The implementing agency also consulted the community about the arrangement for the actual relocation. Two options were proposed: relocation by the affected households or by project-hired contractors. Most affected households opted for the first option. The project implementation unit was responsible for relocating unknown graves in collaboration with local authorities. In all cases, TSHPCo respected the rituals associated with the relocation of graves, including selection of an auspicious day. 111. Sufficient time was taken to confirm the numbers of affected graves. Since Thai people did not have the custom of visiting graves, few of them could remember their exact location. Often there had been no signposting for identification and localization; and in some cases, it was marked by a stone. In addition, there were cases of false statements or affected graves were claimed by several families in the same lineage. Verification was therefore an important task. Once having the confirmation of grave location, households prepared a list with photos for review and approval by local authorities. The final list was made publicly available to local people for their final review, comments, and agreement. In total, nearly 2,300 graves were compensated for and relocated. Ninety percent were in Quan Hoa (59 percent) and Van Ho (31 percent) districts. Attention to Local Context, Culture Sensitivity, and Inclusion of Women 67 Leaflets were distributed. Families listed the number of graves, the names of the deceased, and the year of death. After that, they sent the list to the commune council and Trung Son officers came to check directly. After checks and verification by the project staff, a list was made by the commune authority, and sent to the district authority. The district issued an appraisal decision. Based on that decision, the project gave compensation to local people for the relocation of graves to a new site. During relocation, we monitored whether they actually removed the grave and relocated it, and how many removed graves were relocated. For example, when a household informed us that they had ten graves, Trung Son would check [in the new cemetery] whether this number was correct. (Interview No.4, Project officer, TSHPCo) This issue was very sensitive. How could we be sure how many graves this house had, and whether or not they were actually buried? Sometimes, this might be a grave, that stone might also be a grave. A piece of soil might be spiritual, bone, ash. We had to invite the police to cooperate. There were both good people and bad people. Bad people could report more than the actual number of graves. (Interview No.5, District official, Muong Lat district) 112. The selection of the new cemetery sites would not have been possible without proper consultation with local people. The elderly people played a central role at this stage too. At the beginning, people disagreed with the location proposed by the project implementation unit. They were encouraged to identify a new site acceptable to the community. This task was assigned to a group of respectable villagers. Consultations with other villagers were organized whenever a potential site was identified. After the majority of villagers voted for a preferred site, the project implementation unit and the local authority verified and made it an official selection. Two hectares of land were thus reserved in each planned resettlement site as a cemetery. At first, the project people pointed to a location which was about 200 meters from here, but it was too close to the residential area. A cemetery should not be too close to houses. They just told us that it was up to the villagers to find another site. To establish a cemetery in our new place was very complicated because one side was the border area, the other was the land of Nga village in Tan Xuan commune. I did go five times to find a location for the cemetery. The project officers and commune officials could not decide. If the villagers agreed, then they would support. (Interview No.17, Male participant, Tan Xuan commune) It is okay there. The location is good, not affected by the road at all. In the past, Thai people set up graves anywhere. Sometimes, when we went into the forest, we were scared. Now that all graves are relocated here, the cemetery is stable. This position was chosen by the villagers, not in a compulsory manner by the project. The villagers gathered themselves and chose the location. We are satisfied. The project did not force use. They let us choose according to our customs. (Focus group discussion No.2, Female participants from relocated households, Trung Ly commune) 68 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam B. Paying Equal Attention to Men and Women within Affected Households 113. Early during implementation, attention was paid to increase the participation of women in project-related meetings. Women were encouraged to speak out and give their opinions. In the early-stage of consultations, women often kept silent in gender-mixed meetings. Compared to Thai women and Muong women, Mong women were identified as among the most vulnerable groups. They spend more time on household chores. They have limited contact with people outside the family. For instance, they rarely go to the district center. And the majority of them have limited or no literacy of the Vietnamese language. 114. The smaller organized women-only meetings allowed these women to be more proactive. The use of ethnic minority language was maximized during consultation meetings. This practice showed its effectiveness in getting women’s feedback and was particularly useful for consultations on post-resettlement livelihood restoration. Audio messages were used to reach vulnerable ethnic Mong populations and inform them about project impacts and compensation in their own language. This communications mean had been successfully piloted and determined to be cost-effective, appropriate, and innovative. 115. Collaboration with district-level Women’s Union was initiated and maintained to ensure and maximize women’s participation in risk-awareness meetings. Early during the preparation phase, the risk to the security of women and young people was analyzed. A large workers camp was in place for several years during construction of the dam, and new roads were being opened. These risks proved potentially higher in ethnic minority communities. The district- level Women’s Unions were funded under the project to organize training and communications, both for communities and construction workers. Communication materials were developed, including posters, video and audio discs, and leaflets. Their focus was on gender equality, gender bias, and prevention of discrimination. Training courses were organized on HIV/AIDS, health, sexual safety, and prevention of infectious diseases. They were organized in the villages (instead of commune centers as originally planned) to maximize the participation of women. The Women’s Union invited both parents to inform them of potential risks and measures to protect their teenage children. In the first two years, we invited them to the commune committee headquarters to attend the trainings. Only one out of 4-5 invited women came, which was not effective. The following year, we reconsidered the situation, I thought if we continue to invite them to the headquarters, only a few of them will come. In the last year, I proposed that we should go directly to villages seriously affected by the reservoir to conduct the trainings. As a result, both male and female participants exceeded the planned number. (Interview No.5, District Women’s Union, Muong Lat district) 116. In the course of resettlement, attention to women focused on two areas, land use right certificates and compensation payments. The provision of the 2013 Land Law, stipulating that land use certificates and house ownership certificates must include the names of both Attention to Local Context, Culture Sensitivity, and Inclusion of Women 69 husband and wife, was implemented. The real added value of the project was the high proportion of women who participated in the reception of compensation payments and installments for the construction of a new house. This participation was encouraged to ensure that the money was not spent for unintended purposes. This was especially important since excessive alcohol consumption and drug addiction are present in the Trung Son area. Payment notices were sent to both husbands and wives. However, initially, a majority of those who attended on payment day were men. Starting from 2015, women were strongly encouraged to attend payment sessions and sign the receipts. This announcement was done through loudspeakers and through the mobilization of village heads and the Women’s Union. A section for the wife’s signature was added on the compensation payment receipts. As a result, the proportion of women having signed final payment receipts was 30 percent, whereas only 10 percent signed receipts for the initial payments. 117. The participation of women in livelihood restoration activities took off gradually. Several gender-related criteria were incorporated in the project design: for example, 30 percent female participants in training courses; specific courses for women; minimum number of women in common interest groups; number of common interest groups with female leader; and livelihood activities that fit both needs and interests of men and women. Having defined these criteria encouraged participation of some younger women early on. It also pointed out a lower participation rate among middle-aged Thai women who had lower command of the Vietnamese language. Practical solutions were defined to solve this issue. New training materials were repaired to meet the literacy level of women from ethnic minority groups. Training times were selected to suit women’s availability. Women were also encouraged to get involved in the selection of the agricultural inputs supplied through the project. In our commune, only ten percent of common interest groups leaders are women. Group members often vote for men because men understand technology better than women, and men are more active in giving opinions. (Interview No.24, Livelihood local coordinator, Tan Xuan commune) Men and women join common interest groups in equal numbers. There are more women than men leaders in chicken and goose-raising groups, the number of female leaders is higher, while in the pig raising, cow raising and cage fish groups, men are dominant. (Interview No. 15, Village head, Tan Xuan commune) My family registered for the animal husbandry interest group under the name of my wife, but during training, if any of us stayed at home, then that person would attend the training, and repeat what he or she got from the trainings to the other. (Interview No.11, Male member of the poultry interest group, Trung Son commune) 118. As a result, the participation rate of women in training on livelihood restoration reached 30 percent. Women were more involved in implementation of the CLIP component such as livelihood consultation meetings, registration of livestock, crops and supplies, training, and taking care at home. In many case, husband and wives jointly made decisions in implementing livelihood models based on the provided technical support. 70 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam C. Grievance Redress Mechanism Allowing Maximum Access 119. The grievance redress mechanism was designed using both formal processes regulated by national legislation and project-specific arrangement. The formal process entailed a four-stage mediation, starting at commune level and could be escalated to provincial level and district court if the aggrieved person was not satisfied with the outcome. Under this procedure, TSHPCo was responsible for recording and reporting all complaints/grievances and exempting eligible complainants from administrative and legal fees. The project-specific arrangement referred to the independent grievance panel established by TSHPCo with a dedicated focal point (community relations officer) in the social and environmental team. The key principles of this information process were to deal with the complaints and inquiries at the lowest level (in this case, the village level) and to enable a quick response as soon as a complaint/ question was lodged. Complainants always had the option of pursuing a formal process if they were not satisfied with the outcomes. 120. The actual implementation of the grievance redress mechanism somehow went beyond the arrangement defined in the project document. In addition to the formal processes and the appointment of a community relations officer, TSHPCo was able to multiply the intake by mobilizing multiple channels through which local people could send or submit their inquiries. In many cases, complaints or questions were collected from village heads (the typical go-to person for locals) or from TSHPCo on-site engineers who perform supervisory work, or from TSHCPo social and environmental staff who frequently visit affected areas as part of their daily jobs. As staff were assigned to cover a specific project area, local people could call directly to the assigned staff and follow up regularly until an official answer was confirmed. All received complaints were properly recorded and referred to local authorities (if needed) for further processing and investigation.11 121. The outcome of the grievance redress mechanism indicated the overall achievement of the above-mentioned principles. First, all complaints (regardless of the receiving channels) were solved at project level, with strong involvement of TSHPCo in collaboration with local authorities and in consultation with concerned households. The TSHPCo staff and relevant contractors could properly handle questions or inquiries that required technical/engineering considerations (e.g., revision of resettlement plots). An official decision from district-level People’s Committee would be needed for questions about compensation or resettlement policies; therefore, TSHPCo prepared technical explanations (based on project policies, national regulations, and World Bank requirements) to clarify the decisions. Second, all complaints were properly addressed in a timely manner. In the final evaluation (ASEC, 2018), 82.2 percent of surveyed households indicated their satisfaction with the project implementation and outcomes of complaints-handling processes. 11 On-line resources were also established and publicly disclosed on the TSHPCo website (https://trungsonhp.vn/ khieu-kien-khieu-nai-lien-quan-den-cong-trinh-va-tai-dinh-cu/#). Attention to Local Context, Culture Sensitivity, and Inclusion of Women 71 Conclusion and Outlook 72 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam A. Broader Take-aways for Hydropower Projects of Similar Size 122. Good practice on consultation, relocation, livelihood restoration, and ethnic minorities development have emerged during preparation and implementation of the Trung Son Hydropower Project. This was achieved for a dam located in a remote area with difficult access, and a fully ethnic minority population of culturally different communities. While social management solutions are often tailored to the local socio-economic environment, four identified areas had broad relevance: • First, consultation activities were built on the free, prior, and informed principles and remained unchanged from project preparation to closure. As a result, the project implementers received broad support from local communities, gradually enhancing their participation and empowering them. They were able to adjust the initial design to meet the aspirations of the indigenous communities, minimizing the project’s impacts from relocation and land acquisition. They also worked better toward preserving the cultural values of ethnic minority communities. • Second, efforts made in the construction of planned resettlement sites were worth­ while. Increasing the leveled area for new residential land, organizing construction of new houses by the relocated households, and managing compensation payments carefully required a long chain of decision-making. These efforts ensured compliance with existing policies from Government of Vietnam and the World Bank. More importantly, they contributed to a socially sustainable development around the reservoir, which was the objective of these policies. • Third, the design of a stand-alone livelihood improvement program, in parallel with compensation payments, provided better livelihood restoration opportunities for the affected communities. The livelihood improvement program in the Trung Son project was not a mere livelihood support project. Through this program, effective ways of developing livelihoods around the reservoir were piloted, confirmed, and transferred to local authorities. There is now scope for continuation and expansion of livelihood support services under their responsibility. • Fourth, specific risks for ethnic minority communities, and women among them, were identified at the preparation stage. An Ethnic Minority Development Plan was developed early on to address these risks, based on clear principles and some specific actions. This was a useful tool for project implementers, who then remained committed to respect the rights, cultural characteristics, aspirations, and development needs of the local ethnic minorities. B. Shifting toward Good Practice in Management of Social Risks and Impacts Requires an Adaptative Approach and a Combination of Incentives 123. The Trung Son Hydropower Project had proven that an adaptive management approach can work in managing social risks and impacts. Although social safeguard Conclusion and Outlook 73 instruments had been prepared and approved during project preparation, its implementation spanned several years. Hence, changes and adaptation were nearly unavoidable to ensure the full achievement of policy requirements and project development objectives. The changes were not at the level where the Resettlement Action Plan needed to be formally updated; changes that occurred during the project implementation were captured in the aide memoire, with adequate follow up from TSHPCo and the World Bank. Figure 7 illustrates an indicative social risks and impact management in a changing context. FIGURE 7. Adaptive approach for social risks and impacts management • Social impact assessment • Identi ation of potential • Socio-economic survey impacts • Livelihood assessment • Early consultation • RLDP development • Consultation Impacts Scoping Assessment Implementation Completion Monitoring and Evaluation • Independent monitoring • Final Impact Evaluation • Panel of experts • Implementation • Adapting to changes; impacts, Completion Report mitigation measure, design • Consultation 124. Some crosscutting factors have clearly facilitated the sound management of social risks and impacts in the Trung Son Hydropower Project. While there are specific lessons learned from the Trung Son project relative to consultations, resettlement, livelihood restoration, adaptation to changes in technical design, and ethnic minorities and gender, the following crosscutting factors were present in each of these areas. These factors have acted as incentives for the implementing agency to define and actually implement good practice in the project context: • First, compliance with international standards was a minimum requirement, paving the way to achieve development effectiveness. Existing and potential risks were identified from the beginning. The project underwent a process of measuring, reviewing, and analyzing social risks and impacts before mitigation measures were developed. In addition, because the pursuit of compliance with international standards was a management principle during the project, including for social risks and impacts, project implementers carefully and repeatedly weighted options (defined in the safeguard instruments) and their implications for local communities before making formal decisions during project implementation. 74 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam • Second, the social responsibility of investors and contractors toward ethnic minority communities was gradually strengthened. The strong commitment from EVN and TSHPCo in delivering a project that met international standards of social risk management reflected the shift of social responsibility of an enterprise to the indigenous community. This shift did not happen overnight, but rather it was the result of lengthy negotiations and discussions among the World Bank and EVN and TSHPCo on environmental and social policies applicable to the project. This motivation helped the project overcome obstacles and difficulties in the implementation process, especially the period of loan agreement amendment and the period of timely relocation for reservoir impoundment. 125. There was commitment from project stakeholders to respect the rights of local communities and ethnic cultures. The project’s compliance with the two World Bank safeguard operational policies [Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) and Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10)] has opened up opportunities for indigenous communities to reverse their poverty and to preserve the cultural characteristics of ethnic groups in resettlement, traditional houses, gravesite rituals, and community activities. With the strong commitment of the client and tight supervision by the World Bank team, the project not only complied with the governing policies but also contributed to the positive project outcomes. 126. There was coordinated participation of a broad range of stakeholders in addressing specific requirements in order to ensure progress of implementation and construction quality. Had there been a lack of harmonious coordination among the parties, the decision- making process would have been at the expense of the pursuit of good practice in social management. 127. Finally, with increasing experience, local communities have contributed to successful decisions. Communities voiced their concerns and preferences. They increasingly took an active part in decision-making processes and in defining best options. Without their influence, it is unlikely that project results would have been achieved. C. Answers and Concluding Thoughts on the Project’s Future 128. How is a win-win solution developed for the affected households and project owner? During implementation of the Trung Son project, the managers of the hydropower company had to strike a balance between answering demands from communities, pressing implementation progress, the scope of responsibility of the hydropower company, and the applicable policies. While the project documents provided a framework to prepare these decisions, some trade off had to be made to ensure that dam operation would start on time while securing broad agreement of local people and support from the local government. Engagement and stability of staff among project implementers were critical to continue to fully take into account social impacts and risks when making such decisions. Now that the Trung Son project is in its full operation, it is equally important to define the company’s corporate social responsibility, and the interaction modalities between the company and the local government. Conclusion and Outlook 75 129. What else could have been done to support livelihoods change? Some of the planned activities in the livelihood restoration plan were not fully implemented. When the project ended in December 2019, relocated people had fully recovered their living standards but were still in the process of adapting their sources of livelihood to their new area of residence. A range of actions were proposed to complement the common interest groups: access to credit through a guarantee fund with a bank, a call for local small business proposals, production contracts with urban entrepreneurs, opening of a farmers market, opening of a service center close to the dam, access of young people to vocational schools, and community participation in the management of land and bamboo resources. As of end 2019, the animal-raising interest groups, associated with training and individual advisory services, remained the main broadly welcomed activities. The scope of non-agricultural interest groups has remained modest given the low interest level of affected households. Regardless, the diversification of income sources out of agriculture will be necessary in the future. While one of the lessons learned from the project is that livelihood change is a long-term process, much remains to be explored through other projects in terms of support to livelihood change around a reservoir as shown in other hydropower projects around the globe (e.g., Xiaolangdi Dam in China, Manantali Dam in Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania). 130. What are the new opportunities and challenges in the Trung Son reservoir area? The social and economic environment is rapidly evolving in the Trung Son area. The drive to Hanoi is now less than 4 hours from Trung Son commune. Compared to the pre-project period, Muong Lat town has become an easily accessible center and has a number of small private operators trading agricultural inputs and products. Some companies have started to develop small-scale tourism activities in villages around the reservoir, and some small entrepreneurs are interested in the new opportunities brought by the reservoir. This could become an opportunity for households and communities that need to further adapt their livelihoods, provided that related risks for local cultures and rights over resources receive attention. Options that respond to the preferences of the young generation will be critical. A new period has started, which is not only about operation of a hydropower dam but also about sustained social development of upland communities living around the Trung Son reservoir. 131. What might be considered the most difficult aspect of the Trung Son Hydropower Project? The implementation of a resettlement program might be considered the most difficult task throughout the project cycle. An implementing agency might need to start working on resettlement-related issues for years before the official project groundbreaking. The resettlement program might last much longer than actual time required for civil works and project completion. In addition, the resettlement program will be influenced by multiple stakeholders whose interests/purpose/motivation may differ. Therefore, a resettlement program needs to be designed as a development opportunity. It should be not only agreeable to all involved parties but also be implementable in a smooth way. While some government-funded resettlement programs have been designed using a one-size-fits-all approach, the Trung Son Hydropower Project has demonstrated that satisfactory resettlement outcomes for households and communities could be achieved through a program where affected households are placed in the center of all aspects under consideration. The adaptive management mechanism, along with the strong commitments of involved stakeholders and support from local people and 76 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam communities, made implementation of the Trung Son project successful. Local living standards will further and sustainably improve due to the momentum gained from the Resettlement, Livelihood Restoration, and Ethnic Minority Development Program. Bibliography/Reference List 77 Bibliography/Reference List ASEC and Rural Information Center. (2018). Final Evaluation Report: Resettlement Livelihoods and Ethnic Minorities Development Program (RLDP). Trung Son Hydropower Project. Trung Son Hydropower Company. Binswanger-Mkhize, Hans P., Jacomina P. De Regt, and Stephen Spector. (2009). Scaling up Local and Community Driven Development (LCDD): A real world guide to its theory and practice (English). Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/334991468151478904/Scaling-up-Local-and-Community-Driven-Development- LCDD-a-real-world-guide-to-its-theory-and-practice Cernea, Michael. (1997a). “The Risk and Reconstruction Model for Resettling Displaced Populations”. World Development. Vol. 25, No 10, 1569-1587. Cernea, Michael. (1997b). “Hydropower Dams and Social Impacts: A Sociological Perspective. Social Assessment Series”. Social Development Paper. Paper No 16. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development. The World Bank, Washington, DC. Chu Thai Son (ed.), and Cam Trong. (2016). Thai ethnic culture. People’s Army Publishing House. Hanoi. Colson, Elisabeth. (1971). The Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement Upon the Gweme Tonga. Published on behalf of The Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia by Manchester University Press. DRCC (2008), Social and economic survey and assessment: Trung Son Hydropower Project, Report of Package XH-01: Technical Assistance (PHRD grant) for preparation of Vietnam Power Source Development Project. East-Asia Pacific Gender Practice of the World Bank. (2017). Results of Collaboration for Social Inclusion in the Trung Son Hydro Power Project, Vietnam. Available at http://documents. worldbank.org/curated/en/903511496219887678/ Results-of-collaboration-for-social- inclusion-in-the-Trung-Son-Hydro-Power-Project-Vietnam FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). (2013). Good practices at FAO: Experience capitalization for continuous learning. Available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-ap784e.pdf Gencer, Defne, and Richard Spencer. (2012). New Approaches for Medium-Scale Hydropower Development in Vietnam: Lessons from Preparation of the Trung Son Hydropower Project. The World Bank Group. Washington, DC. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2009). Household living standard survey in 2008. Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House. https://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=512&idmid=5 &ItemID=9646 78 Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam Hanoi TC Consulting & Center for Development and Integration. (2018). Final Report on CLIP Implementation. Trung Son Hydropower Project. Trung Son Hydropower Company. IHA (International Hydropower Association). (2010). Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol. IHA, London. First publication. Le Hai Dang (2016). Family rituals of Thai people from transition ritual theory. Viet Nam Social Sciences, No.3(100). Mehta, Lyla (ed.). (2009). Displaced by Development: Confronting Marginalization and Gender Injustice. SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. New Dehli. Nguyen Hong Quang. (2008). Social and economic survey and assessment report. Trung Son Hydropower Project. Trung Son Hydropower Company. Onazi, Oche. (2013). Human Rights from Community: A Right-Based Approach to Development. Edinburgh University Press. Scudder, Thayer. (2005). The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental, Institutional and Political Costs. Routledge. Tran Thi Minh Luong. (2016). Gender Mainstreaming In Resettlement, Livelihood Restoration and Ethnic Minority Development Program. Trung Son Hydropower Project. Trung Son Hydropower Company. Trung Son Hydropower Project Management Board. (2011). Resettlement, Livelihood, and Ethnic Minority Development Program (RLDP). Trung Son Hydropower Project. Trung Son Hydropower Company. World Bank. (2011a). Vietnam - Trung Son Hydropower Project (English). Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/104781468134093713/Vietnam- Trung-Son-Hydropower-Project World Bank. (2011b), Project Appraisal Document, Trung Son Hydropower Project. Sustainable Development Division, East Asia and Pacific Region. Available online at http://documents. worldbank.org World Bank. (2004). Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects. The World Bank. Washington, DC. Available online at http:// documents.worldbank.org Annex 1. General Project Area The boundaries, colors, denominations and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 79 80 Annex 2. Area of Project Activities The boundaries, colors, denominations and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal Managing Social Risks and Impacts in Hydropower Development: Sharing Experience from a Medium-Sized Dam Project in Vietnam status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 81 Photos Front cover: View of the Trung Son dam across the reservoir (Photo credit: TSHPCo) Section I: Details of the Trung Son dam (Photo credit: TSHPCo) Section II: Crossing the stream to visit affected communities (Photo credit: Son Vo/World Bank) Section III: View of the only access road leading to Trung Son Commune (Photo credit: Son Vo/ World Bank) Section IV: Local villagers from affected households attend consultative meetings (Photo credit: Mai Bo/World Bank) Section V: Typical village in project areas before relocation (Photo credit: Son Vo/World Bank) • p.29 View of new planned housing development (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/World Bank) • p.30. New house under construction at resettlement site (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/ World Bank) • p.36 Lottery drawing of resettlement plot (Photo credit: Chinh Nguyen/TSHPCo) • p.41. View of new asphalt road in Tham Ton resettlement site (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/ World Bank) Section VI: Village splitting Luong bamboo, an important livelihood activity in the project area (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/World Bank) • p.46 Household benefiting from equipment support through CLIP (Photo credit: Erin Gamble/World Bank) • p.49 Rice paddy harvest, resulting from livelihood support through CLIP (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/World Bank) • p.53 Newly emerged income-generating activities in resettlement site (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/World Bank) Section VII: View of Ma River from high point in Trung Son (Photo credit: Son Vo/World Bank) Section VIII: Two villagers carrying bunches of weed flower to make brooms, an important livelihood source in Trung Son (Photo credit: Son Vo/World Bank) Section IX: Village children returning from school (Photo credit: Mai Bo/World Bank) Back cover: Reservoir area (Photo credit: Nghi Nguyen/World Bank)