Report No. 42863-EG Arab Republic of Egypt Improving Quality, Equality, and Efficiency in the Education Sector Fostering a Competent Generation of Youth June 29, 2007 MNSHD Human Development Department Middle East and North Africa Region Document of the World Bank Prefaceand Acknowledgements This report was written and prepared by Alec Ian Gershberg, Arun R. Joshi, Tomomi Miyajima, and Michel J. Welmond under the supervision of Mr. Joshi (Task Team Leader). Sherine El Shewarby and Yasser El Gamma1provided guidance throughout the period of preparation of this report. MahmoudGamal El Din and Ahmed Dewidar providedanalytic, organization, and other support in Egypt. Background papers were written by Dr. Mona El Baradei (Consultant), Aigli Zafeirakou (Consultant), Ahmed Dewidar, Christina Djemmal and Hannaa Gohary (Consultant). Dr.MohammedRaghebprovidedinvaluabledata inputand insightfulcomments. Dr.HebaLaithy providedthe analytic work fromthe 2004-05 HouseholdIncomeandExpenditureSurvey (HIES)as well as a background paper. Dr. RaguiAssaad (PopulationCouncil) providedvery valuable data and insightson youth, the labor market, and connections to the education system, as did Jean Fares andJohnBlomquist. We are especially grateful to our Ministry of Education (MOE) counterpart team-which was headed by Dr. Hasan Billawi and Dr. Mustafa Abdel Samie-and our donor partners, which included Elizabeth Warfield, Hala El Sirafy and Robert Davidson (USAID); Lynn Mortensen (Equip Egypt); KarinJohanssen, Paul van Schaik and FaridHegazy (EU), Abir Salem (Population Council); Peter Schmidt (GTZ); Amr Aboul Azm (KFW). World Bank peer reviewers, Farukh Iqbal, Ernesto Cuadra and Mourad Ezzine (Education Sector Manager) provided helpful and insightful comments that improved the results. We are also grateful to Eric Hanushek for key insightsand support regarding the analysis of outcomes, quality, and economic development vis-& vis TIMSS results. The current Minister of Education, H.E.Dr.Yossry El Gamal, has been mandatedby the President of the Republicto reformthe education system. He has led a strategic planningexercise with key donor partners and is engaged in numerous initiatives aimed at improving equity, quality, and efficiency in the pre-universityeducation system. This report has been researched, shared, and written with the objectiveofprovidingsupport and inputto these MOE initiatives.We have learned andbenefitedfrom the MOE's Strategic Planas it evolved andhopewe have also effectivelyadded to the Plan. This report was prepared through extensive consultations with the MOE and other relevant governmental and Parliamentary officials, as well as in partnership with key donors engaged in the education sector: USAID, EU, KFW, GTZ, CIDA, and relevant UN agencies. Four main group consultations were held in 2006 and 2007, startingwith the reviewof the concept paper and ending with a review of the report. MOE counterparts and donors were present in all of these consultations. In addition, dialogue and discussions were also held with the MOE and donor partners on a bi-lateralbasis. Overall, extensive commentshave been sought and incorporatedinto the draft from all the key stakeholders and it is our hope that these findings are of value to all the donor partnersin conceptualizingandtailoringtheir contributionsinthe sector. Sevenkey sources of informationwere usedin draftingthis report: (i) HouseholdIncomeand 2005 Expenditure survey provided a detailed picture of household education expenditure and some enrollment data, which allowed for some comparisons across households of varying income ; (ii) MOE education data provided information on enrollments, dropouts, and repetition; (iii)Public ExpenditureReview for Egypt (World Bank 2005) provided extensive information on efficiency and governance issues; (iv) review of the education policies and programs over the past 15 years provided information on what has been tried and lessons learned from past initiatives; (v) two separate analyses of TIMSS results-ne specifically on Egypt (Carol1 2006) and the other a comparative study on the Middle East andNorthAfrica (MENA) region(Abdul-Hamid2005); (vi) review of the teaching profession, teachers incentives, pedagogical approaches and teacher quality in Egypt; and (vii) the Population Council shared critical recent findings on youth and labor markets derived largely from the EgyptianLabor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS 2006) as well as previous similar labor market surveys. The Arab Republicof Egypt EducationSector PolicyNote2007 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction: Quality Education for the Next Generation of Egyptians............1 Chapter 2 . Enrollment Chapter 3. Disparities inEducational Opportunities, Quality and Achievement.,.............-9 and Inequality.................................................................................. 4 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Review of Education Policies Enacted: 1991-2006......................................... .. What causes inequality of educational outcomes?........................................... 28 47 Chapter 6. Conclusion, toward policy options .................................................................. 52 References ................................................................................................................. 61 Boxes Box 1. Teacher Professionalization: Critical Factors for a Focus on Quality ...................55 Box 2 Decentralization for improvinginequality o f quality ............................................. 56 Tables Table 1: Trends inInternational Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) for 8thgrade. Table 2: Pre and Post Achievement Test Scores for Fifthand Eighth Grade Students.....15 Egypt. 2003................................................................................................................ 16 Table 3: International Comparison of Economic Allocations inPre-University Spending (%)............................................................................................................................. 29 Table 4: Change 1995/96to 2003/04 inStudent Enrollment,Teaching andNon-Teaching Table 5: Private Spending on Education, by Income Quintile .......................................... Staff (%) .................................................................................................................... 30 41 Figures 4 Figure 2: Median Grades Completed for Ages 15-19 Year Olds. Mid-1990s .................... Figure 1: Gross andNet Enrollment Rates inEgypt by Level. 1996-2003......................... Figure 3: Poverty Rates inEgypt by Region 1995/96-2004/05........................................... 5 Figure 4: Enrollment Rates inEgypt by Income Quintile and Level. 2004/2005 ...............6 7 10 Figure 6: Deviationfrom fitted test score (percent of fitted value) ................................... Figure 5: International Comparison of TIMSS scores (2004) ........................................... 11 12 Figure 8: Achievement at International Benchmarks. Science.,........................................ Figure 7: Achievement at International Benchmarks inMath .......................................... 13 Figure 10: Science Performance andDispersion betweenCountries................................ Figure 9 Top and bottomachievers across countries inMENA (Science Score) .............12 13 Figure 11: Differenceinperformance betweenthe rich and the poor students across countries without any controls ................................................................................... 14 Figure 12: TVET enrollment (YO)of total secondary enrollment (2004) .......................... 19 Figure 13: Evolutionof Secondary GER by Academic Track, 1996-2003....................... 20 Figure 14: GER (2003-2004) and Poverty Level (2000) by Governorate, ........................ 21 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 15: GER (2003-2004) andPoverty Level (2000) by Governorate......................... Figure 16: Ratio of Vocational Enrollment to Total Enrollment (2003-2004)..................22 22 Figure 17: Distributionof the Male Working Age Population by Educational Attainment and Urban/Rural Location (1988. 1998. 2006).......................................................... 23 Figure 18: Distributionofthe Female Working Age Population by Educational Attainment and UrbadRural Location (1988. 1998. 2006)....................................... 24 Figure 19: Distributionof Unemployedby Level of Education (YO) ................................. 25 Figure 20: Returnsto Education........................................................................................ 26 Figure 21: Changes inDemands for Job-Skills ................................................................. 27 Figure 22: International Comparison of Public Expenditure on Education ...................... Figure 24: Proportion of Potential Teaching Staff by Type 1995/96-2003/04..................30 Figure 23: Proportion of Educational Staff ConsideredTeaching Staff ........................... 29 31 32 Figure 26: Statutory teaching hours by level of education, 2003...................................... Figure 25: Teachers Salaries and Workload inPrimary Education................................... Figure 27: Distributionofprimary school teachers by age bracket .................................. 33 35 Figure 29: Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary and SecondaryEducation (20024) ................... Figure 28: International Comparison of Average Class Size inPrimary Education.........35 Figure 30 Public primary pupil-teacher ratio ranking orders on equity measures Figure 31Percentage of Personswith Available Schools intheir Communities ..............37 ............36 38 Figure 32: Deviationfrom Average Class Density by Level of Education and UrbdRural ............................................................................................................... 40 Figure 33: Trends of Total Household Expenditure on Education (LE) by Income Quintile...................................................................................................................... 42 Figure 34: Trend of Share of Education inTotal HouseholdExpenditure (%) by Income 43 Figure 35 TIMSS MathPerformance andtaking extra lessons......................................... Quintile ...................................................................................................................... Figure 36: Key Education Policy Decrees Enacted (1991-2006) ...................................... 46 Figure 37: Policy Types (1991-2006)................................................................................ 48 50 Page .. 11 Empt Education Sector Policy Note CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: QUALITY EDUCATION FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF EGYPTIANS 1. Traversing many centuries o f immense developments in culture, technology, and trade, Egypt now faces a great challenge: preparing its youth, the next generation, to be competitive members o f the global economic community, thus puttingthe country on a trajectory for the well- being o f its citizens4ver 72 million at present-for the medium and long term. In short, Egypt must ensure that resources spent on education are, infact, investments inhumancapital. 2. Human capital refers to "a broad range o f knowledge, skills and capabilities needed for life and work, including those related to capability in successful living;' engendered through quality education" (WDR, 2007). Inadequate human capital constrains productivity and growth and compromises the overall well-being o f citizens. Significant investments in infrastructural development, such as dams, roads, and airports, will yield low returns in the absence o f adequate human capital. Hanushek (2004, 2006), among others, shows convincingly that the returns to quality education in terms o f increased growth are unequivocal. Nobel Laureate Michael Spence (2005) has made clear that even if education i s not considered a bindingconstraint to development in a given country, those who fail to invest consistently in it over the long term do not have robust growth. Many developed countries such as Singapore and Japan have focused on a two-pronged strategy o f growth and human capital formation. Buildinga strong human capital base, particularly through providing citizens with a variety o f quality educational opportunities, i s important not only for the present generation, but also to help reduce the intergenerational transmission o f poverty and long-term economic stagnation. Inthis context, the challenge inEgypt, therefore, i s how to achieve equitable, quality education for the next generation o f Egyptians; and to accomplishthis goal within a constrained fiscal environment. 3. The purpose o f this report i s to support the government o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt in reviewing the status o f the pre-university education sector; and in identifying the key challenges it faces as it develops and implements a strategic plan to enhance its base o f human capital. The key overarching finding-based primarily on the analyses presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 o f this report-is that while significant progress has been made in providing more educational opportunities to Egyptian citizens, the quality o f that educational experience is low and unequally distributed, leading to unequal educational outcomes. While inputs are important to quality, we also define quality in terms o f specific outcomes that indicate learning at a level necessary to compete in a global marketplace. For instance, international test results, such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), are taken to be a strong indicator o f educational outcomes that matter, and quality education is generally assumed to impact those outcomes. In addition, it is also clear that Egypt already spends a large share o f its public and private resources (by international comparison) on education and, therefore, further improvements inequality of quality provision needto be financed to a great extent through efficiency gains. 4. Inequality of educational outcomes: socio-economic data on Egypt's population exhibit inequality in education outcomes, particularly with respect to the two lowest income quintiles.' By some measures, inequality in Egypt is large both compared to other countries in MENA and compared more broadly to countries beyond the region2 These inequalities likely impact student The EgyptianMOE's five-year strategic plan itself does a commendablejob of highlighting this issue, andthis current report adds some depthto that analysis. Increasingly, internationalevidenceshows that such inequalitiesin outcomes inone generation are likely to perpetuateunequaloutcomes in future generations.Thus Egyptpolicymakers are to be commendedfor taking on this Page1 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note achievement and labor market outcomes. Many details are discussed in this report; however, we view the most importantset of factors to bethat: (i)the system is drivenby an outdatedcurriculum and high-stakestests that do not teach or measure skills needed by the labor market; (ii) the sorting that results from these tests creates a two-track system that corresponds roughly to those students who most often end up in general education and those in Technicaland VocationalEducation and Training (WET), or who drop out; and (iii)the incentive environment created by these factors, coupled with low pay for teachers, leads to poor work incentivesfor teachers, poor accountability and a pervasive prevalence of private tutoring. Fortunately, the current leadership is beginningto take on system restructuring through the utilization of adequate incentives and/or "accountabilitie~"~;(iv) there has been too little focus on the learning outcomes necessary in a global economy and the development of a serious monitoringand evaluationframework is nascent. Each of the above concerns is addressed directly in the MOE's recent five-year strategic plan for 2008-2012, and it will be important for annual operational plans to work towards achieving progressineach area. 5. Ironically, the inequitable outcomes in the Egyptian school system derive in part from nationalperceptionsof what is fair: admission to free university education is the most sought-after goal of most middle class families, and it is generally rewarded in the labor market (even if graduates may have to wait years for their first official job). The perception that admission to university is objective and "fair," basedonly uponperformanceon the high school leavingexam- called the ThanawiyaAmma -is deeply ingrained. The fact that those with the ability to pay for expensive private tutoring tend to succeed more in this system does not seem to be perceived as "unfair", even if it is inequitableas defined by most theories ofjustice (Sen, 2002: Rawls, 1996).4 The situation is further exacerbated when coupled with significant barriers to entry of the private sector into educationprovision. 6. Both the Egyptian government and the Egyptian people spend substantial public and private resources in education (larger compared to other similar countries), leading to the conclusion that further improvements in equity and quality would have to be secured largely through improvedsystem efficienciesover the longterm; thus, it is not the levelof investment, but the nature of investment that must change.5 Major efficiency issues discussed include high levels of non-teaching staff, low pay for teachers, few incentives for teacher performance likely to improveaccountability, difficultiesimplementinginnovativepedagogy, a highly centralizedsystem and low (though increasing) levels of school-based management and decision making.Again, the MOE's five-year strategic plan addresses to some extent each of these issues and the key will be successfully implementingthat plan. 7. Inequality,especially with regardto outcomes, was identifiedas a fundamentaland priority education issue facingEgypt by various stakeholders, includingthe government and donors. It was difficult but important issue. See, for example, FernandoReimers(Ed.). (2000). Unequal Schools, Unequal Chances: The Challenges to Equal Opportunity in the Americas. Cambridge, MA: David RockefellerCenter, HarvardUniversity Press. See also P. Oreopoulos, M.E. Page, andA.H.Stevens. "Does HumanCapitalTransfer from Parentto Child? The IntergenerationalEffectsof CompulsorySchooling." NBER WorkingPaperNo. 10164, December 2003 For instance, inMarch2007, HisExcellencythe Minister himself hosteda conferencecalled"International Conference on EducationDecentralization," and his closingremarksaddressedmany of these same issues, particularly the needto improve accountability,in part, throughdecentralization. Notethat schoolsdo provideadditionaltutoring after hours whether in large or small groups. These tutoring sessions are providedat avery small fee. Poor families can afford these tutoring sessions; thus, none are deprivedaccess to tutoring. However, the willingnessof many middleand upper income families to pay for more expensiveprivate tutoring strongly implies parents' perceptionthat it is of higher quality (See Chapter 4). Muchof the work on inefficiency in the presentreportdraws upon, updates, and/ or builds uponthe World Bank's 2004-05 public expenditure review(PER). Page 2 Emvt Education Sector Policy Note agreed early on duringparticipatory discussions that this report should focus on providing more in- depth analysis o f this key issue rather than a cursory review o f the overall sector and sub-sector issues. As a result, education sub-sector specific policies in the areas o f pedagogy, textbooks, and teacher training, "inputs," are not discussed inthis report. 8. The purpose o f this report is not to provide answers to, or remedies for, the challenges o f inequality and poor educational outcomes. Overall, the report's objective i s to provide analytic support for the MOE's five-year strategic plan largely by documenting and analyzing the wide dispersion of educational outcomes in Egypt (between, for instance, poor and non-poor, low achievers and high achievers, etc) as a key theme that is relevant as a national issue. Evidence presented in the report should be sufficient to build that case, however, the report should also be considered exploratory. In fact, one o f the most important and consistent findings is the crucial need to improve the data collection and availability needed to perform the more precise policy- analytic work needed to more precisely diagnose problems in the Egyptian education system, let alone prescribe the most promising reform remedies. We conclude with "policy options" rather than recommendations or "remedies" in order to highlight and organize some o f the principle findings o f our analytic work, as well as to explore their likely implications. These policy options dovetail closely with the strategies and policies proposed and highlighted inthe MOE's own Strategic Plan. Page 3 Emvt Education Sector Policv Note CHAPTER 2. ENROLLMENT AND INEQUALITY 9. Egypt's education system is the largest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regionand grew rapidlyduringthe 1990s. At the pre-universitylevelalone the systemenrolls over 16million students and employs over 1.2millionworkers, ofwhom around 800,000 are categorized as teachers. Total public spending on education is high by internationalstandards (5.9 percent of GDP and 19 percent of total public spendingin 2002/03). Total privatecosts of education, most of which is for students in the public system (for private tutoring, textbooks, school fees, uniforms, supplies, etc.), amount to an additional 3.7 percent of GDP investment in education, and has been risingfor a decade. 10. As a resultof such highpublic investment, duringthe past decade the government achieved increasesin enrollmentrates that would have been remarkable even without the increase in student population. Enrollment in basic education for both girls and boys is now nearly universal, and secondary and tertiary enrollments are rising. Gross enrollment rates (GER) for primary education (grades 1-5) stand at 98 percent, the preparatory level(grades 6-8) at 82 percent, and the secondary level (grades 9-12) at 66 percent, which are robust compared to similarly situated middle income countries (Figure 1).Moreover, the speedwith whichthe gender gap inbasic educationwas closed i s not only impressivebut historic.Inthis sense, Egypthas accomplishedmuch in the gender aspect of equity. Inaddition, higher education enrollment is growingrapidly with a GER currently at 30 percent. Figure 1: Gross and Net Enrollment Rates in Egypt by Level, 1996-2003 ~~ Figure 2: Gross Enrolment Rates, 1995196- Figure 3: N e t Enrolment Rates by Gender in 120, 2003104 88 7 Basic Education ;:I, , , , , , , 72 70 +Primary l996/97 !998/99 2000/01 2002103 2996197 2998/99 2000/01 2002103 -I--Preparatory -A- Sec-General +Basic-B oys --cBasic-Girls ++Sec-Vocational +Total Seconday -Linear (Basic-B oys) -Linear (Basic-Girls) Source:Ministry ofEducation. 11. There is additional evidence that overall, in terms of access and attainment, Egypt is a moderately equitable country. In fact, work based on Filmer (1999) shows that, even before Egypt's expansionin access, attainment by the poor was comparativelyequitable. Page 4 EwptEducationSector PolicyNote Figure 2: Median Grades Completedfor Ages 15-19Year Olds, Mid-1990s Mscllangradscorap(u?ad lor ages15-19yoirrlollds Onds Immthepxrorsw40agpccnd 0 1 2 a 4 5 6 7 8 , 9 1 9 I t I ,---."-Fee""*( and dCb& 21)pmmf hw1$%-@E Source: World Bank (2007). Education attainmentand enrollment around the world The World Bank reports6"There are enormous differences across countries in the gap between the educational attainment o f the rich and the poor, the `wealth gap.' While in some countries the difference in the median years o f school completed by the rich and the poor i s only one or two years, the wealth gap reaches as high as nine or ten years in some countries." Inthe mid 1990s' Egypt's `wealth gap' was modest at 3 years. The World Bank's (2007a) MENA Education Flagship Report-The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and North 4fiica-also provides encouraging results about Egypt's relative educational achievement^.^ Of the 14 countries analyzed, Egypt was a top performer in access and average in terms o f a composite index o f educational outcomes that summarizes performance along a number of different dimensions. The report gives the following overall assessment: "whereas Egypt has reached universal primary education and reduced the gender gap at all levels of instruction, literacy levels remain relatively low and the quality o f education could be improved."* 12. These aggregate figures and results, however, mask differences among levels o f education and regions, and do not necessarily use the best measures o f outcomes for determining either quality or equality. In the last decade, while overall poverty has remained almost unchanged (poverty slightly increased from 19.4 percent in 1995/96 to 19.6 in 2004/05), it has grown worse in rural Upper Egypt (from 10.8 to 18.6 percent in urban Upper Egypt and from 29.3 to 39.1 in rural Upper Egypt, over the same period). Source: World Bank (2007). Education attainment and enrollment around the world: httr,://web,worldbank.or~/external/defauIt/main?menuPK=l460753&paeePK=64 168176&1~iPK=64168140&theSitePK =I460718 'Note that throughout the report, World Bank (2007a) is generally referred to as "the MENAEducation Flagship Report," or some variant of that term. *Interms ofequity, the flagship report focuses almost entirely on gender parity. Our exploration of educational equality inEgypt is considerablybroader. Page 5 Empt Education Sector Policy Note 1995196 0 1999/00 2004/05 I .1 21.5 19 4 19 6 Metropolitan LowerEgypt Urban Lower Egypt Rural UpperEgypt Urban Upper Egypt Rural AllEgypt Source: Leithy (2006)based on EgyptHouseholdandIncomeExpenditureSurvey 2005 13. As Figure 3 shows (based on the findings o f the Household Income and Expenditure Survey), after improving between 1995/96 and 1999/2000 (down from 19.4 to 16.7 percent), overall poverty in 2004/05 i s back to almost the same level as it was in 1995/96, 19.6 percent. Only metropolitan Egypt registered a reduction in poverty up to 2000 that was not reversed somewhat. Infact, poverty in Upper Egyptis worse than itwas tenyears ago. Morethan 50 percent ofEgypt's poor live in the Upper rural region. In sum, almost 14 million individuals could not obtain their basic food and non-food needs-up from 11.5 million in 1995/96 and 10.7 million in 1999/2000.'0 14. While it i s true that increased access and improved educational quality reduces poverty, this dynamic i s not responsible for these recent trends in poverty in Egypt. The timeframe i s short, and there are too many other factors (such as poor economic growth and labor market opportunities) that likely drive the trends. However, when poverty increases, the challenges faced by an education system also increase (through its potential impact on enrollment, readiness to learn, and ability to pay). It is important to understand that policies and reforms today are being made in an environment where poverty is high and has been growing, as well as growing unevenly across the country. Thus, both the challenges and the stakes are high. Failure to deliver improvements in educational outcomes soon and equitably will impair prospects for sustained economic growth through the middle o fthe 21st century. 9 In2004-2005, the total sample was 47,095 households, of which 21,995 inurbanand 25,100 inrural areas, total of 207,030 individuals were surveyed. The 1995/96, 199912000 and 2004/2005 HIECS were based on the Censuses sampleframes andthe questionnaire design and administrationwere similar across the three surveys. loSome analystshave suggested these figures are driven by clusteringo fpopulationsjust above andbelowthe poverty line as well as there the povertyline is drawn (e.g., should it be $2 per day or some other level?); the context, however, for this report is clear: Egypt is a relatively poor countryand inmany areas poverty levelshave not been improving. Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 4: Enrollment Rates in Egypt by IncomeQuintile and Level,2004/2005 Poorest Second Third Forth Richest Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile 10basic education Isecondarv Iuniversitv I Source:Leithy(2006). 15. As Figure 4 shows Net enrolment rates by level of schooling across income quintiles, which not surprisingly reveals some inequality at all levels, with the enrolment gaps between income quintiles risingwith the level of education. While it is reasonable to ask "How does this kind of equality in Egypt compareto other countries?"we are not currentlyable to do so with great precision.Nevertheless, our discussion of the results (here and in the next chapter) attempts to put the trends in perspective.11 16. On a positivenote, these results show that inequalityacross income quintiles is lowest for primary enrollment. Stated differently, secondary enrollment drops twice as fast as primary enrollmentacross quintiles, and tertiary drops morethanthree times as fast when householdincome decreases. Inaddition, in the past 10years, net enrolment has improvedfor all income groups, but the improvement has been strongest among the poorest two quintiles and especially in secondary education.12 This highlightsEgypt's success in primary schooling in terms of closing the access gap betweenrich, middleclass and poor, while raisingthe challenges notedfor secondary and post secondary. 17. The trends for secondary education in Figure4 are, we will argue, more worrisome. A gap of 30 percentage points exists between the richest and the poorest quintiles (74 percent - 44 percent), combined with a similar trend for all quintiles, means that the gap between rich and poor in secondary school attainment is large and consistent across the income distribution. While the gap at the universitylevelmight be larger, it is nearlyimpossible to narrowthat gap without first, or at leastconcomitantly,narrowingthe gap at the secondary school level. 18. While we cannot easily compare these results with other countries in MENA, a recent international study by UNESCO on educational equity in the world's 16 most populous countries placed Egypt in the middle range of their sample of large countries with respect to equity of "Ongoingwork at the Bankmay soon allow comparison of suchHIESacrossthe MENAregion, but it is notyet available. Notethat these finding are basedon results not shown, comparingthe datain figure 4 to similar data from 1995.The results are availableuponrequest. Page 7 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note primary and secondary enrolments across regional jurisdictions (governorates in Egypt). This indicates that while there i s room for improvement, other equity concerns (aside from pure geography) are more imp~rtant.'~However, when the study adds information on the wealth o f the governorates, the results for Egypt are worse-it i s one o f three countries in the sample that have significantly higher enrolment rates in wealthier regions (their measure o f equal education opportunity) at both the primary and secondary levels (Sherman and Poirer, 2007). 19. The UNESCO study methods compared enrolments by regional units (Le., governorates) which we believe is less relevant and less accurate than the analysis we present which is at the household level. Nevertheless, the point is well taken: primary and secondary enrolment rates in Egypt are positively associated with wealth. Our household level data support this finding and highlightthe more serious nature o fthe inequality at the secondary level. 20. These differences in post-basic enrollments by income groups shown in Figure 4 are, thus, visible signs o f an education system that is not likely providing equal educational opportunities or achieving equitable outcomes.I4 In Chapters 3 and 4 we will explore in greater depth the inequalities in outcomes. We describe the differences in outcomes between income groups better than we can explain their underlying causes. For instance, we cannot prove that the educational system per se causes the inequalities we de~cribe.'~We marshal1 the best data available and the conclude that overall the evidence strongly suggests that there are fundamental factors in the education system as a whole that impact differences in student achievement and that these differences are not likely based solely on differences in socio-economic status o f the students. We attempt to shed some light on the myriad sources o f the gap: I s the biggest problem access to school requiring additional construction? Poor quality and low rates o f return that fail to retain students? We do not have definitive answers; however, given the link between knowledge acquired in schools and the ability o f individuals and economies to compete in a globalized society, the inequality o f enrolments, outcomes, and low achievement in general, deserve particular attention because they threaten Egypt's medium- and long-term growth potential and competitiveness. l3 The 16 countries are Argentina,Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the RussianFederation, SouthAfrica, andthe United States. Clearlythis is not the most relevant set of comparators for Egypt in many respects, but giventhe paucity o f data on relativeequity across countries, the results are instructive and worth noting. l4 Note, it is possible for us to construct a gini coefficient of educational enrolment and attainment; however it is not possible for us to construct a gini coefficient for educational outcomes or expenditure. We do not view the gini coefficientof enrolment or attainment to be any more insightful than examiningEnrollment Rates inEgypt by Income Quintile and Level as we do. For one, it would be more difficult to interpretthe actual measures and second, it does not allow as an intuitive insight into the differences across income groups. However, the MENA flagship report does present gini-coefficients for Egypt and other countries and shows that in terms of attainment, inequality in Egypt is comparable to the MENA region, which lags behind East Asia and Latin America. Sherman and Poirer (2007), too, calculate a gini coefficient for primary and secondary expenditure per pupil across governorates and find similar results-that Egypt is Sth out ofthe 11countries for whichthey can do the calculations. I sSuch causalproof is indeedvery rare in the literatureeven for developedcountrieswith far fewer data limitations. Hanushek's (1986) definitive overview aptly statesthat "Although the educational processhas been extensively researched, clear policy prescriptionsflowing from this research havebeen difficult to derive." Hanushek, Eric A., "The Economics of Schooling:Productionand Efficiency in Public Schools," Journal of Economic Literature 24 (September 1986), 1141-1 177. For but one of many examplesof studies that do successfilly derive causalinferences from school conditionsandgovernment policy and control for family background, see LorraineDearden, Javier Ferri, and Costas Meghir, THE EFFECTOF SCHOOLQUALITY ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND WAGES, The Review ofEconomics and Statistics 84(1), 2002: 1-20. ClearlyEgyptianpolicy makers cannotwait for adefinitive study provingthese causal links, althoughsome thoughtshouldbe givento gatheringthe kind o fdata necessaryto do so over the next severaldecades. For now, decisionsmust be made on imperfectinformation. Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to inform suchdecisions. Page 8 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note CHAPTER 3. DISPARITIES INEDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, QUALITY, AND ACHIEVEMENT 21. As discussed in the previous chapter, Egypt's achievements in improving general access and years of educational attainment are impressive and put the country on a clear trajectory to achieve equality between the poorest 40% of the population and others in terms o f the quantity o f schooling received. There is room for improvement, but it seems clear that quantity is less an issue for Egypt than quality-as well as high levels of poverty. In fact, Egypt suffers poor quality schooling for much of its population (across income quintiles), but even in that context, there is worrisome inequality ineducational outcomes. 22. In2004, Egyptparticipated for the first time inthe Trends inInternationalMathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) for 8th grade, providing an opportunity to view educational achievement in Egypt on an internationally comparative basis. While some might interpret TIMSS scores as outcomes (which of course they are), increasingly analysts interpret such results from the major international evaluations (Le., TIMSS, PISA, and PIRLS) as proxies for school quality l6because they measure valuable cognitive skills and given the strong impact of such skills on individual earnings they are among the best and most important measures of both outcomes and school quality. 23. While we interpret the results primarily as indicators o f achievement, we pay particular attention to the variation in outcomes between students and schools, and the implications for the need to enhance quality. We do not have good evidence on how much of the existing variation comes from schools (for instance differences in school quality) versus other factors. Indeed, we do not have any easy way even to do such decomposition". Following Hanushek and Woosman (2007), we believe it is sufficient to say that school quality can affect these outcomes (regardless of what generatedthe variation in the first place). There is, in fact, ample evidence in the literature for both developed and developing countries on that statement, and we believe this is sufficient to motivate the development of policies designed to improve school quality in Egypt-particularly the policy issues of trying to ameliorate the differences inachievement between different students. 24. Egypt scored an average 406 in math and 421 in science. This placed the country's 8th graders below international averages (467 and 474, respectively), as well as below Jordan (424 and 475); on par with Indonesia (410 and 420) and Tunisia (410 and 404); and ahead of the Philippines (378 and 377) and all participating countries from Sub-Saharan Africa.18 Results were mixed in comparison to Iran (411 and 453) and Lebanon (433 and 393). Overall, Egypt was above average for the MENA region. l6See Hanushek (2004) and Hanushek and Woosman (2007) for ajustification for using internationally standardized test scores and cognitive skills as a proxy for school quality. We do not have the capacity to employ the re-scaling method of Hanushek and Woosman (2007) that allows a closer interpretation ofthese tests scores as measuresof school quality and as they note. "Cognitive skills may be developed in formal schooling, but they may also come from the family, the peers, the culture, and so forth." Nevertheless, they show a strong relative relation between such test scores and school quality and state that "Quality schools can lead to improved educationaloutcomes. Moreover, from a public policy perspective, interventions in the schools are generally viewed as both more acceptable and more likely to succeedthan, say, direct interventions inthe family." l7In fact, these statements are true about the general literature on educationalproductionfunctions for both developed and developing countries, notjust for Egypt. It is, clearly, beyond the scope of this study to go into great detail about the such empirical debates inthe literature. Our international comparisons in this Chapter are constrained by those countries that have participated in TIMSS. Most emphasis should be given to the MENA countries and the international averages, but we report the remaining resultsfor some additional perspective. Page 9 Emut Education Sector Policv Note Figure 5: International Comparison of TIMSS scores (2004) InternationalComparison of TIMSS (8th grade) Score (2003) Source: TIMSS 2003 results: httu:timss.bc.edu/ 25. This is clearly an encouraging entry into this important international testing arena. However, simply comparing scores across countries does not necessarily reflect the different challenges countries face with respect to underlying conditions known to affect educational achievement, such as poverty and level o f overall economic development. Shown in Figure 6, deviation from the fitted test score for Egypt suggests that the education outcome (TIMSS score) o f Egypt is in a reasonable range. It implies that Egypt is not performing poorly for its size o f GDP per capita and level o f secondary GER. Rather, the test score is slightly above the theoretical fitted value. When compared with other Lower Middle Income Countries, Egypt scores lower than Indonesia, Jordan and Lebanon, whereas Egypt displays higher performance than Chile and phi lip pine^.'^ For the selected 20 countries which cover Asia, Latin America, and MENA (including GCC), regressionsare done to explain the test scores (all available TIMSSPISA scores average) by GDP per capita (PPP current international$) and secondary GER. Indoing regressions, regional characteristicsare controlled. Results show that coefficients on GDP, LAC, GCC are statistically significant. Then, basedon the regressionresults, fitted value are calculated, and the charts shows difference betweenfitted and actual test scores. Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 6: Deviation from fitted test score (percent of fitted value) Deviations from FittedTest Score (Percent of fitted value) 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 - 1 5 J . .. .. , ,. .._ . , _. .. . . . . . I Source: Staffcalculationbased on average TIMSS, PISA scores (Camoy, 2006) and GDP (2003) and secondaryGER (2003) dataobtained by World Bank Edstats. 26. Yet, these results do not indicatethat Egypt's education system is performingwell. More --importantly,this best availableevidence threaten Egypt's development prospects. Indeed, Egypt's still leaves overall student performance at a low level in internationalcompetition andwill by the education system is not currently producing results sufficient for achieving international competitiveness or enhancingequity, especially consideringthe levelof investment inthe education sector. TIMSS decomposes the mean scores by defining four benchmarks for grouping student performance-Low (400), Intermediate (479, High (525) and Advanced (600). As shown in Figures 7 and 8, among Egyptianstudents, only 6 percent were "High" performers in math and 10 percent in science, but over 40 percent failed to achieve even the "Low" benchmark. By comparison, in Iran77 percent achievedthe Low benchmark in science and in Lebanon, 68 percent achievedthe Low benchmark in math." Insum, Egypt's low end is both low and large, creating a sizable cohort of studentsnot fully preparedfor the globaleconomy. 2o Egypt i s clearly poorer than, for example, Iran (GNIkapita atlas methodo f 1250and 4440 GNIkapita at PPPwhile Iran2770 and 8050, respectively.(WDR 2007). This is an importantconsiderationfor suchresults. Thus, we spend significanttime in this section attemptingto examinethe significanceofthe inequality inoutcomesEgypt from as many angles as possible to disentangle, ifat all possible, the extentto which the inequality stems from the education system as opposedto the underlyingsocio-economic status of studentsandfamilies.. Emut Education Sector Policv Note Figure 7: Achievement at International Benchmarksin Math Achievement at InternationalBenchmarks in Math (MENA) Figure 8: Achievement at International Benchmarks,Science Achievement at international Benchmarks, Science (MENA) ADVANCED (625) =HIGH (550) 0 INTERMEDIATE (475) OLOW (400) =BELOW (c400) 27. Figure 9 dramatizes these results. Among the MENA countries for which data are available, Egypt's top achievers in science were second best and the low achievers were second worst.*' Ideally, a country would want high achievement for all, which could be called high 21Inmath, accordingtoAbul-Hamid (2005: 1I), low achievers fared better, about average, while the top achievers the were about the same (second best), but we do not have the data available to show in a figure. Results are similar for the international dispersion analysis presented next. Egypt Education Sector Policy Note achievement with little dispersion, Figure 10 shows that even beyondMENA, in an international context dispersion inEgyptis high, even ifaverage scores are above averagefor MENA.22 Low achievers in Science across countries 400 I I 300 200 100 n Top achievers inScience acrosscountries 600 I 500 400 300 200 100 0 Figure 10: Science Performance and DispersionbetweenCountries Sut ct: Science 600. 500. 300 - Ghana South Afrzca 200 - I I I I I I I 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 Dispersion Page 13 Emut Education Sector Policy Note 28. Naturally, in aggregate, low achievers tend to have lower socio-economic status (Le., higher poverty levels). Figure 11 specifically looks at the achievement gap between "rich" and "poor" students in different countries in MENA.23In contrast to data presented in the previous chapter regarding a small wealth gap for years o f attainment and access, Egypt's wealth gap in achievement is by far the largest inMENA.24 Figure 11: Difference in performance between the rich and the poor students across countries without any controls I 14T- 1 Source:Abdul-Hamid (2005) 29. Finally, Abdul-Hamid (2005: 18,41) performed a rough analysis o fthe combined impact o f student achievement and attainment on a country's GDP per capita. The results show Egypt i s under performing and that productivity could be increased ifthe percentage o f students reaching the high and advanced international benchmarks increased and those at the very low international benchmarks [decreased] ." Furthermore, this analysis shows that variation in Egypt is the highest in MENA both between students and between schools. While we cannot, as mentioned earlier, disentangle the causes o f such variation and in particular, we cannot separate out the impact o f differences in school quality, we do believe that taken together the evidence presented above strongly suggests that there are fundamental factors inthe education system as a whole that impact differences in student achievement and that these differences cannot simply be explained away based on differences in socio-economic status o f the students. 30. Performance on the TIMSS can be disaggregated and analyzed by subject and cognitive type. For instance, overall, performance in science is better than math, and better in chemistry than in earth science. Perhaps the most important result in this realm is that performance is better regarding the knowledge o f facts and procedures and relatively weaker in those assessing reasoning, higher order thinking, conceptual thinking and cognitive ability, the very skills that are in demand in the modern labor markets. Similarly, in math students are better in using numbers than they are in using or interpreting data. These results are consistent with our argument that the 23Using data collectedthrough the TIMSS, socio-economic status of students is based on an asset score derived on a vector of home resources and parental education (Abdul-Hamid, 2005: 37). These assets scores presumably provide relativelycomparable measuresof SES across countries. 24When the comparison is broadened beyond MENA countries, and broadened to inter-country and not just intra- countrycomparisons, Egypt still has the largestachievementgap betweenrich and poor across countries. Page 14 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Egyptian education system is based predominantly on various national curricula and testing systems that are not geared towards producing the kinds o f skills necessary to compete in a global economy.25 3 1. The MOE i s also able to produce approximate scores for sub-samples o f different kinds o f schools in Egypt (Table 1). Care must be taken in interpreting these results since: (i) the sample within school groups may not be representative; (ii)they likely reflect underlying student characteristics as much as school quality; (iii) similar sub-groupings in other countries would likely show higher scores as well; and (iv) the implications o f these results for larger reform efforts are unclear-for instance, the success o f these categories o f schools may not be replicable in a manner facilitating scaling up. Table 1: Trends in International Mathematicsand Science Study (TIMSS) for Sthgrade, Egypt, 2003 National Private School: Public Private Public Arabic Afternoon 2" Average (Language) Experimental Arabic (Government) Shift Schools Schools Schools (Language) Mathematics 406 529 509 500 401 389 Science 421 528 506 515 417 403 Source:TIMSS 2003 results: httu:timss.bc.edu/ 32. Nevertheless, the results are instructive: Egypt has schools, particularly a group o f experimentalpublic schools with a more decentralized administration that are on par with or above international averages. These experimental "language" schools, though, are less than one percent o f the TIMSS cohort, and thus provide an example o f the kind o f difficult strategic decisions the MOE faces between equity-enhancing strategies and those that bolster the high-end for international competitiveness. Experimental language schools are better housed and equipped than the regular schools, in some ways (e.g., computers) dramatically so. Instructional time is longer and they pay incentives to recruit better teachers. However, they are overwhelmingly located in areas with more than 500,000 population and they enroll very few disadvantaged students - even fewer than private schools. The students' parents have a very high educational level (more than 81 percent o f the mothers have a first or higher degree), which have been shown in other studies to be a `supportive' variable in the educational process. Their homes have many more books, and they are more likely to have computers (Caroll, 2006). Interms o f process and pedagogy, however, they are not that much different from the regular schools26. 33. In addition, there are many students in government schools who do well. In fact, the top quartile o f students in government schools score about as well as the top three quartiles o f the experimental language schools. These results may hold more information for scaling up quality enhancing reforms. 34. Since Egypt has participated only once in the TIMSS by the time this report was written, one cannot derive trends in quality improvement from the results. However, some relatively recent results from national achievement tests point to improvement in quality o f instruction in the overall 25Notethat in this paragraphwe are not discussingthe benefits or pitfalls of a nationalcurriculum(or curricula) per se-such details, and how different curriculaare manifestedin differentkinds of schools, are clearlythe purviewof the MOE itself-but rather we are discussinghow the particularcurriculainEgyptappear to have impactedperformance aginast internationalbenchmarks. 26They do not exhibit a great number of characteristicsof effective schools. For example, they make if anything less use of group-work, project-basedor experimentalactivity, or remedial or enrichment work than the regular schools. Page 15 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note system.27 As shown in Table 2, improvements in mean scores in mathematics, Arabic language and critical thinking skills were greater and statistically significant for 5th grade students. Improvement in student learning outcomes i s greater in mathematics, followed by Arabic, and is lowest in critical thinking. However, preliminary data also show achievement scores in Lower Egypt(less disadvantaged) to be higher than inUpper Egypt(more disadvantaged); though some o f the poorest governorates, such as Beni Suef, did show marked gains in achievement scores. Table 2: Preand PostAchievement Test Scores for Fifth and EighthGrade Students Fifthgrade Eighthgrade Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test Arabic 52.23 56.86* 55.48 59.85* Mathematics 43.20 50.18* 43.78 48.59* Critical Thinking 48.38 50.84* 56.30 57.05 Note: (*) denotes statistical significance at the five percent level. Source:Ministry of Education. 35. Inequalities in achievement scores are the `outcomes' o f an unequal educational system and, therefore, tell a partial story. These outcome inequalities are also reflected in the students' educational trajectory in a two-tracked system (general education and VT) as well as in labor market outcomes, as will be shown later. Remarkably, all o f the TIMSS results discussed earlier- and the high level o f dispersion in outcomes between high and low achievers, rich and poor-relate to scores o f Sth grade students, which i s before most o f this tracking and the divide between general and technical education takes place. Until Egypt participates in PISA-which evaluates 15 year olds-we can only postulate that given the tracking, the disparities could grow larger after Sthgrade. Students in the `two-tracked' Education System 36. Analysts and policymakers often conceive o f an education system in which students progress from pre-school to primary, then to preparatory, secondary, perhaps post-secondary education and finally into the labor market or some other chosen path o f life. However, increasingly analysts discuss important forces that work, conceptually at least, in the opposite direction to support these transitions. For instance, the labor market pulls students through and out o f secondary or higher education, which in turn pulls students through pre-school, primary and preparatory schooling2*. As we explore inequality o f achievement and educational opportunities, we pay considerable attention to this dynamic; we view the most challenging educational policy issues as those that revolve around how the school system, along with other social and economic forces, pulls some students through and leaves others behind. "At the onset of the EducationEnhancementProject (EEP), and to monitor the impact of EEP activities (especially teacher training on interactive student instruction methods), standardized achievement tests were administered to students in the 5`h and 8`h grades in mathematicsand critical thinking skills in 1997 in project governorates. These tests were re-administered in 2003/04. Achievement tests include tests on five dimensions in mathematics (normal number and operations, fractions and decimals, geometry and measurement, statistics and measurement, and algebra). Critical thinking skills were assessedin terms of improvements in student mastery levelin each dimension with respectto recall, comprehension and application. Achievement test results are preliminary and still under refinement. In addition, one must note a caveat that the students beingtested are not the same students over time, but rather two separate cohorts. Thus the possibility remains that the improvement in scores comes from the underlying characteristics of the students and not the quality of the schoolingthey receive. Since TIMSS is a representative sample of schools and students at various organizational andjurisdictional levels, future participationinTIMSS should not share this same data challenge and should, thus, provideinsightsregardingtrends and improvement over time. '*For instance, see the literature on the discouraged worker effect resulting from fewer available jobs for those of moderate education and skills, e.g. Raffe, D. & Willms, J.D. (1989) "Schooling the Discouraged Worker: local labor market effects on educationalparticipation," Sociology, 23, pp. 559-581 Page 16 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note 37. What are the underlying forces and trends affecting Egypt's education system? Much stems from the vestige o f the social contract established since the socialist regime o f the 1950s, in particular, the promise that all university graduates and many secondary school graduates would receive public sector employment (though university graduates got more desirable jobs with career ladders). For decades, the system allowed nearly all general secondary school graduates to gain entrance to a free university education, though the value o f this opportunity depended greatly on which university faculty each student earned the right to attend, based on hidher performance on the ThanawiyaAmma PA),which serves as both the school exit exam and the university entrance and placement exam, though a few faculties (e.g. colleges o f education) require students to pass oral tests and interviews for admission. Starting in the 1980s, however, recognizing the demographic pressures, the unsustainable promise o f public sector employment for university graduates; and assessing the demand for a skilled workforce, the Ministries o f Education and Labor began heavily promoting the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sub-sector. This set the `two-tracked' educational system that is inoperation today.29 38. Currently, general education students who perform poorly on a 6th grade exam are tracked into vocational preparatory schools and those who perform similarly on a 9th grade exam are tracked into vocational secondary schools. Only about 5 percent o f preparatory school students are in vocational education, but that shoots up to over 60 percent by the first year o f secondary. General education students who do not perform well enough on the 12th grade TA to enter higher education are given a `diploma,' but not access to universities. Overall then, the system pulls qualified students through the general education stream, while tracking those who fail into vocationalhechnical tracks at all three levels o f the schooling ladder. Only the best performers gain admission to the most competitive faculties (e.g., engineering). N o other criteria aside from the TA are usually considered for admission. Private tutoring, which i s discussed later in detail, is used as an essential supplementary learning process to help practice for the TA and attain grades that will ensure admission to higher education institutions. While private tutoring does not, o f course, guarantee success on the TA, those who are able to afford good quality private tutoring have major advantages over those who cannot pay. 39. Anecdotal and qualitative evidence, including many interviews with senior MOE officials, suggest that most schools in the TVET track are at best o f questionable quality and poorly connected to the needs o f employers. These schools are perceived as "a last educational chance for low performing students to enable them to complete their basic education" (Abdel-Latif, Moussa & Dixon, 2006). Vocational preparatory schools do not pay much attention to the remedial needs o f many o f their students. Thus, the exams that track students into specific education cycles practically determine their later life chances, occupational and income attainment. The rigid tracking system does not allow students to redirect themselves from the vocational to the general (academic) track. As typical in many other MENA countries, plum public sector jobs are reserved for university graduates only.30These findings are consistent with the argument in the MOE's five year strategic plan, which asserts that:31 *'Note that TVET is the common acronym for technical and vocational education and training. For simplicity we will generally refer to "vocational education" as vocational and technical training for students through secondary education-that is, we use "vocational education" to cover all non-generaltrack basic and secondary education.Where necessary, we distinguish betweenthe various kinds of TVET. This differs from the actual usage of the terms in the Egyptian system inwhich most of the schools inTVET are categorizedas "technical schools" and only very few are "vocational." 30There are some promising TVET programs, or at least some high profile and highly sought after ones, like Mubarek- Kohl, and others initiatives that are working through Public Private Partnershipsor donor programs to find models for improvement How to generalize policy recommendations from these experiences, however, is not yet clear, not least because of the cost of the programs and the need for proper and supportive relationships with industry. More generally, Page 17 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note "[Mlost technical schools lack qualified staff and necessary equipment and machinery" 0 There is "low respect from society for technical education compared to general secondary education, which has fostered a culture that general secondary education is for the elite while technical education i s for the poor." "[Elnrolment in technical education is based primarily on the basis of results in the Preparatory Certificate rather than on the bases o f student preferences." Modernizing secondary education requires "restructuring the curriculum to maintain balance between general and technical education through building strong general content (Core Curriculum) to provide basic perspectives of knowledge, culture, and skills in all branches of secondary education. Thus, some technical schools will be converted to general, but all technical schools will pay more attention to the academic content of student learning." 0 There should be "an open system which provides possibility o f switching from general secondary to technical secondary and vice versa." 40. Considering how much attention the subject has received, it is both surprising and unfortunate how little good data appear to be available to analyze such a critical aspect of the school system. There is no "smoking gun," and naturally vocational schools have their benefits and success stories as well. Actually the poor quality and inequities created by vocational schools are difficult to prove with the data sets we have at hand, which show that they enjoy reasonable class size, studendteacher ratios and the same quality o f teachers as definedby the MOE.32Despite these data deficiencies, there are some proxy findings that show that the limited seats o f public general secondary school are reserved for the best graduates o f the prep schools (competition), who usually also come from a wealthier background. 41. As shown inFigure 12, Egypthas a very highproportion of secondary students intechnical and vocational education, compared to some other countries inMENA and other countries to which the government of Egyptoften refers for purposes of comparingvocational school systems.33 there are five-year schools (as opposed to the more common three-years) that are also well-regarded and sought after, however, these are a very small proportionof the universeof TVET schools. 31 All quotations below are from a July 2007 draft version of the MOE's strategic plan. The final version may differ. 32For instance, the survey instrument for the HIES remarkably does not allow analysts to differentiate between respondents ingeneral andTVET schools. Just addingthis one simply item to the next survey would provide a wealth of important information for analysts and policy-makers alike. 33Interview with Dr. Sherif Omar, Member of Parliament and Chair of the Education Committee. In addition, similar international comparisons were highlighted in the Ministry's recent international conference on education reform. In particular, Chile, Indonesia, and South Africa are being consistently cited and experts and practitioners from those countries have been invited by the MOE to share experiences. The data for this figure are not available for a wide range of countries so the selectionof countries is also, in a sense, a convenience sample. Note also that some countries like Chile have pursued more of a European model of secondary school and do display high rates of technical and vocational enrolment. However, even without considering the quality of Chile's system, the proportion of TVET students is, while high, significantly lower than Egypt's Emut Education Sector Policv Note Figure 12: TVET enrollment(YO)of total secondary enrollment (2004) I TVET enrollment (2004) (% of total secondary enrollment) I 35 ' 30 25 total 20 15 female 10 50 male Source: World BankEdstats(2007) 42. Overall, more than sixty percent of students enrolled in secondary education are tracked into TVET secondary schools; with a total secondary education GER o f 83 percent in 2003-2004. Typically, only the high-performing preparatory graduates are acceptedto general education, nearly all of whom go on to free public university. Page 19 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 13: Evolution of Secondary GER by Academic Track, 1996-2003 Secondary Education GER by track (1996-2003) 50 45 40 -E 35 Secondary GeneraI 30 25 n W Secondary Vocatioanl (total o 20 industrical, agricultural, commercial) 15 10 5 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 GER in general and vocational track, 1996-2003 30 25 Secondary 20 General * 15 Secondary a 0 Industrial 10 Secondary 5 AgriculturaI 0 Secondary Commercial Source:Egypt Ministry of Education(2006) 43. The government has set a goal to increase the proportion o f students in the general secondary track, and has been doing so successfully. As Figure 13 shows, the share o f vocational education students has declined since 2002. However, only commercial education (traditionally where many girls were enrolled) has declined significantly. Thus, while there may be additional movement among categories not captured by these averages, there has essentially been a transfer o f students from commercial vocational education to general. We know little about the quality or nature of these conversions. Ironically, some o f the resistance to these conversions has come from EgVpt Education Sector Policy Note the families o f TVET students. The reasons are not fully known, but MOE officials say that parents tell them that they fear the cost of private lessons which they understand as a "requirement" in the general education track. In addition, the general education track may require more years o f support from a student's family and may also delay his or her entry into the labor force (in part to provide financial support for the family) or delay eligibility for marriage. These are powerful social forces that must be considered inthe design o f any reforms. 44. Still, despite the trend o f increasedproportion o f general secondary education, the number o f vocational secondary graduates is increasing very rapidly (as is the number o f general secondary graduates); this is very significant because it has implications for the labor market, as we shall see-particularly since few general secondary graduates enter the labor market before going to university. 45. Research shows a large share o f the WET track students are from low income families (ETF 2005). As shown inFigure 14, poorer governorates tend to have larger shares o f vocational- track students. The correlation between poverty level and secondary education enrollment rate shows more students are enrolled in secondary education (regardless o f track) in the governorates with lower poverty levels. In fact, the wide dispersion o f secondary GERs by governorate, even regardless o f poverty level, i s striking (Figure 15). Examined by track, the figures show that less- poor governorates tend to have more general-track students than poorer governorates. Furthermore, the share o f vocational-track students in the total enrollment pool is larger in poorer governorates. This confirms that in the poor regions, students are more concentrated in vocational track. It does not confirm that the poor get lower quality education, but it i s strongly suggestive o f that conclusion.34 Figure 14: GER (2003-2004) and Poverty Level (2000) by Governorate, Secondarv Education. General and Vocational Track (YO) 34 In addition, the results mask what is very likely significant heterogeneity within governorates. Governorates are, after all, not necessarily the most appropriate level of observation for such analysis. That is, we recognize the `ecological fallacy' inherentinthese comparisons. Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 15: GER (2003-2004) and Poverty Level (2000) by Governorate, General Secondarv Education (YO) Figure 16: Ratio of Vocational Enrollment to Total Enrollment (2003-2004) and Poverty Level (2000) by Governorate, Secondary Education (YO) Staff calculation based on Egypt's poverty analysis 2002 and educationdata from MOE (2004) Labor Market Outcomes 46. By some measures, Egypt's youth unemployment situation is the most difficult in the region-at least in terms of difficulty in entry to thejob market. The overall unemployment rate in Egypt is estimated by the government to be just below 10 percent. According to the HIES conducted in 2004, the unemployment rate i s estimated at 18 percent among youth aged 15-24. Unemployed youth in fact account for about 70 percent of total unemployment. As many as 90 percent of the unemployed are first timejob seekers. 47. Educational attainment affects labor force participation. Assad (2006) shows that the proportion of university graduates i s increasing across the three time periods under consideration, but at a slower pace than that of vocational secondary graduates (Figure 17). The male labor market is, therefore, becoming increasingly dominated by vocational secondary school graduates who now make up 30 percent of the male working age population in both urban and rural areas. H e asserts that this is "the most dramatic shift in educational composition o f male working age population." The educational composition of the female working age population exhibits similar trends. The share of vocational secondary school graduates has shot up, especially in rural areas: Page 22 Emvt Education Sector Policy Note "These compositional shifts have enormous implications for female labor force participation.. . rates [which] increase significantly once women reach the vocational secondary level. The rapid increase in the share of this educational credential is undoubtedly the most important factor in the large observed increase in female labor force participation of rural women inEgypt." 48. In addition, technical school graduates (especially males) are finding their first job faster than they were inthe late 1990s, and that duringthe first 3 years after graduation their odds are now about equal to university graduates. Said (2006) notes that "the proportion of the male technical school graduates who obtain ajob after 3 years has more than doubled - reachingapproximately 60 percent. Nevertheless., , the probability o f getting ajob after a certaintime increases at a faster rate among men holding universitydegrees than among vocational secondary school graduates." While this is good news interms ofthe trend, it is hardly an indication of a well functioning labor market and an education system that effectively supplies what employers want. That i s to say, 3 years is a longtime to wait for a firstjob, and 40% have not found employment even after 3 years. 49. Again, though, the education system is only partly responsible. Investmentclimate surveys consistently show that rigid labor market policies are of greater concern to employers than the poor skills of graduates, though they do complain about the poor state of the latter as well. Figure 17: Distribution of the Male Working Age Population by Educational Attainment and UrbanRural Location (1988,1998,2006) Distributionof the Male Attainment and Urb 0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50 Percent Source: Assad (2006b) Page 23 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 18: Distribution of the Female Working Age Population by Educational Attainment and Urbanmural Location (1988.1998.2006) Percent Source: Assad (2006b) Page 24 Emut Education Sector Policy Note 50. While these findings reflect some improvements in outcomes for vocational graduates in terms of employment rates and labor force participation, significant problems remain. First, as shown in Figure 19, the overall ratio ofjobseekers with secondary education (the vast majority of who are vocational graduates) is high in Egyptcompared to other MENA countries. Figure 19: Distribution of Unemployed by Level of Education(YO) Figure 4.4. Distribution of the Unemployed by Level of Education (percent) 80 None Rimry e4 Secondary Tertiary 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Iran Bahrain Oman Jordan Egypt Morocco Tunisia Algeria Djibouti Sources: ILO2002; except for Bahrain, ILO2003; for Egypt ELMS 1998;for Morocco, LSMS 1999 Source: World Bank (2003b) 51. Second, we need to know more about the quality of the jobs the vocational graduates are getting in terms of either pay or career ladders. Additional work from the Population Council (Amer, 2006) shows clearly that young technical school graduates are far more likely to be in the informal sector for their first job; this trend is increasing rapidly for females while public sectorjob opportunities are drying up. Nevertheless, for technical school female graduates as well as female and male university graduates (all but technical school male graduates) there has been some upward trend in formal sectorjob entry since 2000. 52. Third, and perhaps most importantly, recent work by the Population Council (Said 2006) finds that in Egypt, private rates of return to education in general are low, but the returns for vocational secondary graduates are not only low, but falling. Page 25 Emut Education Sector Policy Note Figure 20: Returnsto Education Returns to education are down for vocational secondary graduates, but up for university and post-secondary graduates D. Returns to Education 0 120 0 100 0 080 0 060 0 040 IPostSecondaryHigherinstitute Education 0 020 IUnlbersityEducation 0 000 -0 020 -0 040 lS88 ieea 2006 I I 53. Skill mismatch and education quality partly explain the modest economic returns to education in Egypt. Males with some upper secondary education, but no universityeducation, earn only about 6 percent more than someone with no formal education, accountingfor age and region of residence. On average, someone with a university degree would earn 37 percent more than the person with no formal education. The returns to university education are higher among females, who earn an estimated 65 percent more with a university degree than with no formal education. This is consistent with observations for the MiddleEast regionwhere returns to educationtypically increase with the level of education (Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). But the overall returns are low compared with countries in the region such as Tunisia and Morocco, and low relative to OECD countries. The bottom line is that most secondary school students are tracked into the part of the education systemwhere rates ofreturnare not only lowest, but also falling over time. "Ifind no relation between what I have studied and the current requirements of the labor market, and the result is non-employment.'' --Young manfrom Upper Egypt. "Most of my colleagues graduated from the university, and waitedfor governmental jobs. They waitedfor a long time without work...'' --Shimaa, Egyptianfemale youth. (Focus Groups on YouthinEgypt, WorldDevelopmentReport2007) 54. International studies on demands for job skills show that competencies such as expert thinking and complex communicationskills are preferredover the conventionalroutine cognitive and manual tasks35 (Figure 21). This emphasis on high-order cognitive skills is one of the major characteristics of a knowledge-basedeconomy; however, WET in Egypt lagsbehindin adaptingto this trend. The following example, albeit from the United States, may prove instructive for 35In this analysis, importance of each task in US economy is set to 0 in 1969, value in each subsequent year represents percentile change in importance of each type of task in economy (adapted from World Bank seminar, Juan Manuel Moreno, presentationmaterials"changes insecondary education:from weakest link to cornerstone" 2005 Page 26 Eavr?t Education Sector Policy Note Egyptian policymakers in terms o f how quickly demands for skills are changing in a labor market that is increasingly globalized. Figure21: Changes inDemands for Job-Skills Demandsfor Job-Skills is Changing Rapidly 15 I -10 I 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 IS Years Source:Autor, Levy, andMurnane(2003) "The Skill Content o fRecent TechnologicalChange: An EmpiricalExploration," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics. 55. In sum, the government's objective to increase the proportion o f general secondary school students is laudable and on target, but could easily take a generation or more to be fully implemented. In the meantime, Egypt needs to focus on improving quality, relevance, and flexibility o f the current education throughout the `two-track' structure. Policy options in this area are discussed in the last chapter. The next chapter will discuss the key underlying variables that affect outcome inequalities. Educationaloutcomes inEgypt are, on average, reasonable for Egypt's level o f economic development, but less so given the high level of public and private investment, especially coupled with the relatively high level o f enrolment rates and years o f attainment. Outcomes are also highly unequal, a fact that clearly reflects differences in socio-economic status across students, but also likely inequality in the quality o f schools. Our inability to be more conclusive regarding the inequality o f quality across schools shows the need to increase analytic efforts to understand better the quality o f schools in Egypt. Page 27 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note CHAPTER 4. WHAT CAUSESINEQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES? 56. The previous chapter makes the case that the inequality o f outcomes i s one o f the key education issues facing Egypt today. Three elements demonstrate the inequality o f educational outcomes. First, test scores in Egypt, although at or above expected values by some measures on average, have a wide dispersion both within and between school and geographic areas (governorates). There i s also wide dispersion between the upper and lower ends o f the income distribution. Second, children entering upper secondary school are divided into two streams o f the education system, one that provides few opportunities for relevant learning (technical high schools) and the other where better performing students are enrolled (general high schools) who have the opportunity to enter university. This streaming likely serves to widen the distribution o f educational outcomes amongst upper secondary school students, though conclusive evidence o f such is lacking. Third, there i s evidence o f these education inequalities also spilling over into the labor market. Thus, the problem o f inequitable distribution o f educational quality mirrors other inequities in Egypt. 57. There are three principal factors that contribute to this inequity in educational outcomes. First, there are considerable inefficiencies in the management o f sector resources, thus privileging some regions and households more than others. These inefficiencies also tie up funds that could be used to improve overall educational performance. Second, measures o f inequality of educational outcomes are correlated with income levels and the wealth gap in student achievement i s large in an international comparative framework. Third, the fundamental structure o f the education system emphasizes selection for the educational opportunities most likely to yield strong rates o f return rather than the acquisition o f fundamental competencies by the greatest number o f students. Each o f these i s explored in greater detail below. I. Inefflciency and disparitiesin resource allocation and of the impact of unequaleducational outcomes 58. Public expenditure on education was a robust 5.9 percent o f GDP in 2003 and nearly one fiftho ftotal public spending (Figure 22).36 Household expenditure is quite highas well-about 3.7 percent of GDP according to the most recent calculations from the HIES. This constitutes a large investment in education in comparisonto other countries. Unfortunately, this generous allocation is not used in an optimal manner, and the inherent inefficiencies contribute to educational outcomes that are not as strong as they could and need to be. These inefficiencies are also likely among the determinants o f the wide disparities in educational outcomes, though how much and how they contribute is not as well understood as it will need to be for Egypt to properly tackle its most important challenges. The inefficient and/or ineffective use o f public and private resources fall into three types o f expenditures: personnel; construction; and private tut~ring.~' 36Educationspending as aproportionof GDP mayhave dropped alittle, but mostly becauseof the overall growth of the economy. 37We have unfortunately not been able to gather data on the distribution of non-salary inputs in Egypt. Whereas the overall proportion of non-salary expenditures seems reasonable (above 16%), it is not clear whether this amount translates into the same inputs in all schools. However, the high proportion of non-salary expenditures may hide an underlying distortion: it appears that more than two-thirds of non-salary spending is used for the purposes of administration (e.g., MOE centraland governorateoffices, GAEB). Textbooks also representa disproportionatelyhigh proportion. Page 28 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 22: International Comparisonof Public Expenditure on Education I Public Expenditure on Education 30 ' O 1 8 - - 25 6 - - 20 - 15 4 - - 10 2 - - 5 0 , m 1 0 InefficienciesinEducationSector Staffing 59. Personnel costs are within the international norm, at approximately 85 percent o f public recurrent expenditures. However, the education staff i s configured such that this seemingly adequate allocation is in fact used in an inefficient manner, with equity consequences. First, Egyptian teachers are the least paid in the region (compared to GDP per capita). Furthermore, education staff has among the highest teaching: non-teaching ratios inthe world (1:1.2). Figure 23 shows the breakdown by school level; preparatory i s the worst, with only 51 percent teaching staff, 7 percent administrators, and 42 percent workers.38 And in fact, the situation may be worse than it appears in Figure 23, especially in TVET, which has well over a hundred different teacher specializations. If a school does not have enough students to fill a "specialists" full course load, he or she may not teach a full load. Inaddition, some teachers may work as administrative "deputies," thus also reducing their teaching load. Essentially, the education corps is ineffectively deployed, overly represented in administrative and other non-teaching roles, and underpaid -characteristics that render problematic the provision o f education quality. Table 3: International Comparisonof Economic Allocations in Pre-University Spending (YO) Total nre-universitv exnenditure Current exnenditure Current Capital Total staff Other current compensation E U P t 87.0 13.0 83.5 16.5 Indonesia 93.9 6.1 85.8 14.2 Jordan 89.0 11.0 92.5 7.5 Tunisia 88.7 11.3 95.1 4.9 Philippines 91.6 8.4 85.6 14.4 WE1mean (1999) 90.7 9.3 82.9 17.1 OECD mean 92.1 7.9 80.3 19.7 (2000) Source: OECD (2002), adapted from EgyptPER policy note (2005) 38Inaddition, GershbergandGohary(2007) reportthat schoolstaffs say guidelinesrequire5% ofthose inthe worker categoryshould be handicappedwhich, while a noble social aim does not necessarilyhelp school productivity. Page 29 Empt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 23: Proportion of EducationalStaff Considered TeachingStaff Secondaiy Commercial Secondary lndurtnal Secondary General Pmpsratoly Pnrnary 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 80% 70% 80% 90% 100% Source: EgyptMinistry ofEducation(2006) 60. This configuration of educational personnel has a number of stubborn characteristics. As shown inTable 4, the growth of both teaching and non-teaching staff is outpacing the growth of the relevant student population at all school levels, insome cases dramatically so. Table 4: Change 1995/96 to 2003/04 in Student Enrollment, Teaching and Non-TeachingStaff (YO) Students Teaching staff Nonteaching staff Primary -3 -42 7.77 5.16 Preparatory 17.9 19.2 85.0 Basic 3-45 11.95 29.42 Secondary (total) 32.94 24.10 40.16 Source: MinistryofEducation. 61. There are other ways that the split of the education staff into teaching and non-teaching personnel does not account for the time that teachers actually teach. Figure24 shows the fall in the proportion of regular teachers and the rise of Senior and Supervisor Senior Teachers, who teach halfas much as regular teachers, or even less. Page 30 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 24: Proportion of Potential Teaching Staff by Type 1995196-2003104 14% 83% 82% 12% 81% 10% 80% 79% 8% 78% . 77% 6% 76% 4% - 75% .74% 2% - 73% 0% .72% All pertainto left-handscale, exceptTeacher, which pertainsto the right-handscale Source: EgyptMinistry of Education(2006) 62. One of the reasons for the high proportion of administrative personnel seems to be that the limited number of grades in the pay and promotion scale restricts promotion possibilities and encourages senior teachers to take administrative positions. The civil service for this category o f teacher, as for the other categories, is a traditional, career-basedsystem with a weak application o f discipline and performance provision. Teacher job descriptions are quite generic and performance reviews are not oriented to outputs; they are mostly determined by automatic advancement provisions. Although the rigid pay and grading system links performance and pay in principle, in reality this practice has become obsolete. For example, most teachers simply receive a grade of excellent intheir performance review (Steedman, D.& Jups, K.2005). 63. The preference of teachers to become administrators is compounded by the very low salaries they receive. Although the official teaching load, interms of number of hours of teaching, i s slightly lower than some comparator countries, the average salary for teachers i s barely 1.5 times GDP per capita (Figure 25).39 Figure 26corroborates, using UNESCO (2006) data for more countries, that the teaching load is relatively low, though not as low as salaries. 39 UNESCO(2006) cites even lower figures for Egyptianteacher salaries as apercentageof GDP (below 1percent), which would make Egyptianteachers paidworse that all countries inthe world other than IndonesiaandKazakhstan. While we believethese figures are simply too low, the relativepoint is clear: teachers' salaries inEgypt are low. The same UNESCOreport corroboratesour figuresfor teachinghoursandwork load Page 31 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note 64. According to an analysis o f teacher salaries that controls for GDP per capita and student teacher ratios, Egypt would have a predicted teacher salary o f 2.2 times GDP per capita.40 Other analyses fix average teacher salaries in low and lower middle income countries between 3 and 3.5 times GDP per capita.41 Figure 25: Teachers Salaries and Workload in Primary Education F i g u r e 9 : T e a c h e r s ' s a l a r i e s a n d w o r k l o a d in p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n 1 4 0 0 1 3.5 2 . 5 0 3 a 2 1.5 20 0.5 ' g ? 0 -N urn b e r o f t e a c h i n g h o u r s y e a r s % o f G D P p . c Source: World Bank, EgyptPER Policy Note andEdstats 40Data for Egypt is basedon staffcalculationapplyingthe methodsdevelopedinCamoy and Welmond (1996). 41B. Bruns, a. Mingat, andr.Rakotomalala, Achieving universalprimary education by 2015 - a chancefor every child. The World Bank, 2001. Page 32 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 26: Statutory teaching hours by level of education, 2003 5tatuOory teaching hours by level of education, 2003 Primary education Lower secondary education Y 10004 - . d Upper secondary education .-.." . . I . _ - E 800 600 ;2 400 zoo 0 Notes: -1 Data refer to 2002, +I refer to 2004, +Z Data refer to 2005 * No reference year available Data Source: UNESCO Institute for Stattstics, Annex 3, Statistical Tables A3 5, A3.6 and A3 7 Page 33 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note 65. Furthermore, the average age o f educational staff i s such that many are at the point intheir career trajectory where they convert to positions and administrative posts requiring less teaching, though the average age will not likely leadto highretirement rates inthe near term. The largest cohort of teachers i s inthe 35-44 year old age bracket. Figure 27 shows that most o f the stock o f teachers i s less than 44 years o f age. Only about 2 percent o f the teachers are expected to retire over the next 5 years, which limits the opportunities for either increasing the average teaching load or reducing the surplus o f teachers in some subjects through retirement. Combined with an infrastructure gap requiring additional classroom construction in some areas, the increasing number o f non-teaching posts (and o f teachers who teach less) has resulted in some very large class sizes, especially in disadvantaged urban areas. Egypt has made great progress with respect to class size, but challenges remain. Only about 9 percent o f schools have an average class size (ACS) more than 60, and a little more than half have an ACS o f 40 or less. There is, however, great variation across governorates and cities. For instance, World Bank (2005, Note 7) states "In the rare governorate, such as Matroh, more than one third of the schools enjoy an ACS of about 20 students, in contrast to such governorates as Medina and Fayoum, where 55 percent and 61 percent o f the schools, respectively, have an ACS o f 50 students. Inthose cases with large class size, many teachers have difficulty dealing with these conditions and are "pressing" to obtain non teaching positions. Teachers seeking non-teaching positions prefer to work in schools o f wealthier communities than in schools inpoorer communities. Thus, schools in disadvantaged areas, particularly when not participating in any international project, tend to have fewer non-teaching personnel than in project schools (also confirmed by field observations, 2006)42. Somewhat ironically, this means that even getting many qualified non-teaching staff back into the classroom will not likely improve the equality of quality unless there are also incentives for redeployment to needier schools and, perhaps, regions. And without changes inhuman resource management practices and significant civil service reform, these trends are unlikely to change for the better. In some visited project schools a significant number of non teaching staff is part of the personnel, including with almost equal amount of administrative staff versus teachers. E.g. an "effective" school in Qualybia with total personnel of 150, included 83 non teaching personnel and 67 teachers. However, in disadvantaged schools, the number of non teacher personnel was considerably lower than in project schools. For instance, in a school in a very poor area in Fayoum Governorate, we found a total personnelof 33, including only 4 non teaching personnel.Note that these trends do not likely mean that disadvantaged areas have better quality or even better inputs to quality. First, this phenomenon impacts student-teacher ratio, not necessarily class size. Unless one believes, then, that the non-teaching teachers are literally doing nothing to positively impact quality, then this means that school quality would be, all else equal, higher inthe non-disadvantagedschools, as would expenditure per pupil. Page 34 Empt Education Sector Policy Note Source: Egypt Ministry o f Education (2006) Figure 28: International Comparison of Average Class Size in Primary Education International comparison of average class size in primary education I Chile Egypt Indonesia Jordan Tunisia OECD Source: MOE data, Staff calculations 66. The high proportion o f non-teaching teachers contributes to the relatively large disconnect between class size and pupil-teacher ratio. Comparisons o f Egypt on this latter figure tell a rather different story, at least on face, and indicate that Egypt does potentially have the human resources inthe system to improve quality.43 43There is, however, an alternative interpretation to these differences between class size and pupil teacher ratio essentially that "teachers work hard." This interpretation is reported in a recent UNESCO report with international comparisons o f teacher data across a wide range of countries (See UNESCO, "Teachers and Educational Quality: Monitoring Global Needs for 2015," Montreal, 2006, Figure 3.8 p. 92). However, since we are unable to determine if that report accounted for teaching staff in Egypt listed as teachers but who do not in fact teach, we are cautious about accepting their interpretation. Thus, while it is clear that the work load for teachers is not pai-ticularly lobv, we cannot conclude that it is particularly high either. Page 35 Empt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 29: Pupil-TeacherRatio, Primary and Secondary Education(20024) Pupil-Teacher Ratio, Primary and Secondary Education (2004) p G z secondary Source: World Bank Edstats 67. Inaddition, thereareregionaldisparities inpupilteacher ratiosthat maycontribute to some o f the inequities inherent in the system. While we might document the differences in Egypt, such data are not meaningful without a comparative context. Herman and Poirer (2007) calculated four equity measures for primary school pupil-teacher ratios for 13 o f the most populous countries in the world, as shown in Figure 30. In a composite ranking based on all four measures, Egypt ranked IOth, better than India, Pakistan and Nigeria, but worse than countries such as Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil. Whatever the validity and relevance o f the comparisons for Egypt to these particular countries, the results do show that there are inequities in the pupil-teacher ratio across governorates that could be addressed and thus, perhaps, differences in this input measure could be contributing to the unequal outcomes we reported between different populations. In addition, o f the four measures, the coefficient o f variation i s perhaps the most relevant and important since it is the best measure o f variation across the entire distribution. On this measure, Egyptis 10" out o f 13.44 68. Inpart because o fthe disparities inpupil-teacher ratio, but also because o f other factors, the same study also finds that Egyptdisplays inequity in the expenditures per pupil across governorates. Other factors that could contribute to such disparities would be the average seniority o f teachers in more "desirable" governorates and myriad other factors that we cannot account for. Figure 30 measures, Egypt ranked loth, ahead o f only China on a composite index based upon the results o f shows that o f the 11 countries for which Sherman and Poirer (2007) could calculate the four equity all four measures. Again, even if one argues this is not the best group o f comparator countries, the results clearly show that there are inequities in expenditure per pupil across governorates and one 44Briefly, how to interpretthe four equity measures: 1) the rangeratio comparesthe highest and lowestregionsto each other; 2) the McLooneindex compares the bottomhalfofthe distribution (bottom meaningworse offby the measure of interest) to the median, and give a sense of what it would take to get all districts to the median; 3) the coefficient of variation, measures the variability of an indicator around the mean. It is the standard deviation divided by the mean). Unlike the range ratio and the McLoone Index, it providesinformation on the entire distribution; the gini coefficient is derivedfrom aLorenz curve and relatesto the cumulativeproportionof aresource that is heldor receivedby the same cumulativeportion of the relevantpopulation.It also provides information on the entire distribution. See Sherman and Poirer(2007: 28-29) for more complete definitions. Page 36 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note might also surmise, between schools. It is worth noting, however, that Egypt appears more inequitable than either Indonesia or South Africa, which as mentioned previously, are two countries the MOE itself often sites and potential examples upon which to build its own reforms. To the extent that expenditure per pupil impacts outcomes, differences in this input measure could be contributing to the unequal outcomes. A more complete study i s needed to fully understand the causes and nature o f the disparities in expenditure per pupil (across schools more than these rougher measures across governorates), and full consideration would then need to be given as to how to address the inequities in a manner that might improve school quality for the di~advantaged.~~ Figure 30: Public primary pupil-teacher ratio ranking orders on equity measures Range ratio Coefficientof variation 161n1Gwfkirsnt OAdjusZcd hkiooine Endex 69. Finally, the particular way that teachers are deployed also contributes to the inequitable distribution o f quality. In Egypt there are 3 categories o f teachers: (i)permanent (civil servants hired for life), (ii)contracted teachers (who have all other benefits except pensions and participation in in-service training), and (iii)hourly teachers, who receive no benefits. The appointment of teachers to posts does not necessarily reflect the specific needs o f that position or class subject matter, while there is also a tendency to hire more contracted teachers. In certain governorates the number o f contractual teachers may be as high as 50 percent o f the teacher population (Steedman, D.& Jups, K. 2005). The growing and widespread use o f contract teachers has been one way to address education budget shortfalls. However, this may result in more export o f qualified teachers from-and also in a reduction o f qualified teachers in-more disadvantaged school areas since the proposed positions o f contract teachers have less access to in-service training opportunities. In addition, current negotiations for contract teaching positions must be repeated annually, are highly centralized, hamper planning and reducingthe flexibility that such hires should increase.46 70. In sum, teacher policy in Egypt has rendered the pursuit o f more equal educational quality very difficult. There has been some progress o f late, and promising policies have been proposed but not implemented. Still, poorly paid teachers, working within a sea of administrators, with little 45Again, Egypt ranks 10 out of 11 on the coefficient of variation and also on the Range Ratio, which is of greater concern for expenditure than for teacher-pupil ration since the latter is driven by a few remote governorates with very small communities and schools with low pupil teacher ratios. 46See PER (2005) for details on the process of hiring contract teachers. Ewpt Education Sector Policy Note incentive to change behaviors, are reluctant advocates o f policy changes that could produce improvements in learning outcomes. We have only anecdotal evidence regarding the relative quality o f contract teachers, for instance, the prevailing sentiment expressed by seasoned MOE senior bureaucrats. The bottom line is that human resources simply do not reach the classroom as effectively as they should. Egypt cannot afford to have so many teachers and other educational staff teaching so little. Quality improvement will always lag as long as these are the long-term trends in staffing. 71. These basic teacher demographics and the human resource management system will prove particularly challenging for wholesale curricular reform: the MOE's strategic plan, for instance, calls for the development o f school-based reform, comprehensive curricular reform, and authentic assessment o f students. In addition, we argue in the next section that the entire evaluation and testing system must be restructured. Such reforms will require significant changes in the ways teachers teach, which is even more challenging in many ways for teachers steeped inthe established methods. 72. The MOE's strategic plan has been developing a proposal for a special "teachers cadre" in the civil service with a large pay raise, 50% o f which will be for pay linked to incentives (e.g. for teachers to get accredited or teach in remote areas). We applaud and support this development, but the final regulations have not yet been passed and there is sure to be significant negotiation among politicians and labor advocates. Achieving working incentives will require strong resolve on the part o f the MOE, which will also need the support o f the Prime Minister and, ultimately, the President. Inefficienciesin the distributionof schools and classrooms 73. Although Egypt has reached full enrollment, certain parts o f the country will continue to need additional schools, particularly in poorer communities both in remote locations and in very dense urban areas. Indeed, enrollment rates by income quintile appear to mirror the availability o f a school ina given community. As the figure below shows, access to schools correlates not only with poverty and location, but also with enrollments. Figure 31: Percentage of Persons with Available Schools in their Communities 100 80 60 40 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Quintile Primary W Preparatory W Secondary Source: Leithy(2006). Page 38 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note 74. However, an analysis o f the determinants o f enrollment by students usingthe HIES shows that, controlling for the many well-known factors that negatively affect enrollment (e.g., parental education, overty etc), having a school in the community has little significant effect on enrollment.' That is, surprisingly, the availability o f a school at the community level did not appear to affect the likelihood of children to enroll at primary or preparatory levels, while it does affect secondary school enrollments. One way to interpret these findings is that once a family decides it i s worth their child attending school, they are generally willing to have the child travel. That is, one interpretation is that quality schooling i s more important that easy access. 75. Inaddition, highclass density affects bothteacher and parental assessments o fpriorities for reform. Given this, there will be continued pressure for school construction in certain areas (many o f them disadvantaged). For example, based on the HIES, 19 percent of rural residents reported shortages o f teachers as the first reason for dissatisfactory primary education, while urban residents pointed to high class density as the first reason for dissatisfaction. In reporting the reason for dissatisfaction, there were no differences found between the poor and non poor, however in either case, it shows quality of the learning environment matters for effective student learning and parental satisfaction. 76. Further, in the recent TIMSS teacher background questionnaire, teachers were asked to list possible limitations to teaching. For mathematics teachers, the two main limitations identified were "high student-teacher ratio" (which is related both to the availability o f teachers and classrooms) and "uninterested students." In science, the general level o f reporting o f limitations was higher and more than 50 percent o f teachers reported "high student-teacher ratio," "uninterested students," and "different academic abilities" as limitations. Figure 24 presents data to support and narrow some o f these claims. Specifically, in urban areas pre-primary, primary, general secondary, and vocational agriculture classrooms are more crowded. 47Such modeling is fraught with all the usual challenges of endogeneity and, in this case especially, lack of true independenceof the independent variable. It is not clear exactly how to interpret the "all else equal" criteria of such a model. Thus, while caution is needed in interpreting the results, they are instructive. Using multivariate logistic regression analyses, we analyzed the likelihood of enrolling in school at various levels vis-&vis students' family background.The relationshipbetweenthe probabilityof enrolledinschool, on one hand, and, Householddemographic, education and employment characteristicsas well as gender, educational attainment and employment status of head of householdand regions of residence,a binary variable denoting whether the household lives below the povertyline, and gender of the child on the other hand were evaluated. This was achieved by fitting the probability of enrolling in schools, as a function o f the various personal and human capital characteristics, which are assumedto influence school enrollment.Using the unit level data of HIECS, the performance of several indicatorswas assessed. The analysis was applied for primary,preparatory and secondary levels separately. Page 39 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 32: Deviationfrom Average Class Density by Level of Education and Urban/Rural -3 -2 1 0 1 2 3 Source:EgyptMinistryofEducation(2006) 77. Naturally,all these issues are inter-relatedand have some interactionwith issues of school construction. Egypt must build schools, but schools must be built more efficiently, more nimbly, and in a more variedmanner to better matchdemographic trends andthe preferencesof parents and communities. I1 Private expendituresfor education: the inefficient and inequitable effects of tutoring and Egypt's student assessment 78. Perhapsno other single set of factors skews the incentiveenvironment andthe inequalityof educational opportunities more than private tutoring, school fees and other private investments households inEgypt currentlymust maketo give their childrenthe best chance to succeed. And of course, the tutoring is the symptom of the disease, which is more accurately diagnosed as being driven by (i)high stakes tests that require rote memorization; and (ii)very low teacher pay. Differences in household expenditure on education naturally vary by income level and region (Table 5). Page 40 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Table 5: PrivateSpendingon Education, by IncomeQuintile Private spending is significant and unequal I Poorest Quintile i educationtutoring and fees &E> 172.49 637.80 Total HHaxpenditure oneducmion (LE) 358.93 1051.04 `?Aoftutoring wdfees out of tota1HH expenditure 2.52 3.20 3.75 5.23 10.95 % oftotal HH expenditure 5.25 6.31 7.17 9.34 16.04 9.42 Source:Leithy (2006). 79. Table 5 shows that the level of private spending increases in both absolute and relative terms as household income rises. The richest quintile spends more than 8 times as much as the poorest quintile overall48and more than 10 times as much on tutoring and fees. As mentioned earlier, private expenditure in the aggregate i s about 3.7 percent of GDP, and this figure has been steadily growing. Itwas 2.98 percent in 1995196and 3.22 per cent in2000.49 80. Over 60 percent of private expenditure currently is on tutoring and fees, with the split between the two close to equal (and this proportionhas also been growing). Thus, both tutoring and fees paidto schools are significant costs to households. Fees paidto public schools represent approximately1.1percentof GDP. Similarresults are seen for per-studentexpenditure. 81. Almost half of education spending of the poor is allocated to transportationand books, and about one-quarter to school fees and another quarter for private or group tutoring. Expenditureof the richest quintile is distributed equally among these three categories. Expenditure on private tutoringrepresents28 percent ofprivateexpenditureon education andalmost equals education fees. 82. Examining the trends over time is also instructive. Figure 33 and 34 show household education-related expenditure by income quintile for the last three relevant household surveys. Figure 33 shows actual education spending in constant prices while Figure 34 shows education spending as a proportion of total household expenditure, and both distinguishbetween school fee and tutoring spending on the one hand, and all other expenditures on the other (e.g., uniforms, transportation, books, supplies, backpacks, etc). First, it is clear that fee and tutoring expenditures are bothrisingand"crowding out" other educationalexpenditures across all income groups. 83. Second, there is clearly inequalitythat is in most ways growing over time. The inequality i s not unequivocally growing in all possible ways over time, but it i s growing in the following important senses: (i) fees and tutoringexpenditure i s growingin real terms this was true even in - 48 In additionto tutoring and fees, total householdexpenditureincludesa wide range of items from school uniforms, to supplies, to backpacks. Indeed one lesson that emerged from the analysis is that donors could make a significant contributionto the poor by supplyingbackpacks, which are a surprisinglylargeexpenditure item. 49 The calculationof these figures reliesheavily on the estimation ofthe ratio ofprivateconsumption to GDP derived from the nationalaccounts, where privateconsumption is always calculatedas residual.Thus, there is some uncertainty in the precisionof the calculation, but it is highly likely that the trend we note is valid. Page 41 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note 2000 when total education expenditure went down; (ii)for most quintiles for most years-with a few exceptions-fees andtutoringare unequivocallygrowingbothinreal terms and as a proportion of household expenditure; and (iii) multiple by which the rich outspend the poor is growing the over time: in 1995, the proportionof householdexpenditurethat the richest quintiledevotedto fees and tutoringwas 2.3 times that of the poorest quintile, and in 2004 it was 4.4 times as great.50A similar pattern holds for spendingat constant priceswhere we see the top quintilespent 6.5 times as much as the bottom in 1995, and 10.6 times as much in 2005. Technically, one could argue that this is progressive(in that the richspenda larger proportionoftheir expenditure); however, because what is being bought with the tutoring and fees is presumably quality education and the ability to stay out of vocationalschools and go to university, thenthis trend representsgrowinginequality. Figure33: Trends of TotalHouseholdExpenditureon Education (LE) by IncomeQuintile Trend of Total Household Expenditure on Education (LE) by Income Quintle 3500 (1995. 2000. 2004) n School fee and 3000 private tutoring 2500 related expenditures at household J W c1 2000 3E E 1500 0 1000 n 500 0 Poorest i 2nd 3rd I 4th 5th I EA,;pt I ~ Income Quintile Source: Staff Calculation based on Egypt HIES data 20055' ~ ~~ 50These calculations are done with the underlying data for the figures: 4.02h.76 = 2.28 and. 10.9Y2.52 = 4.35. A similar patternholds for spending at constant prices: 766.34/117.45 = 6.52 in 1995 vs. 1828.01/172.49= 10.6in2005. 51 Note for the data interpretation in figure 33: The real spending during 2000-2004 in all quintile declining, but the column All Egypt is increased. This is because all Egypt figure is the weighted average and the weights are the number of households or students in each quintile. These weights are not the same across quintiles or in different years thus resultsin this pattern. Page 42 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure34: Trend of Share of EducationinTotalHouseholdExpenditure( O h )by IncomeQuintile Trend of Share of Education Expenditure in Total Household Expenditure (%) by Income Quintle (1995, 2000, 2004) 1 Poorest I 2nd 1 3rd 1 4th 1 5th \All Egypt1 Income Quintile tutoring 0 othereducation-related Source: Staff Calculationbased on Egypt HIES data 2005 84. There is a significant variation in spending on tutoring between the lowest and highest income households, which gives childrenfrom higher income householdsan advantage interms of beingselectedinbetter schools or more desirable types of education. However, the nature and cost of the tutoring also varies across different kinds of students and families. Results from the latest TIMSS show that students in experimental language schools, for instance, take fewer private lessons than those inthe best government schools (though they may spendmore for those lessons). But students in the bottom quartile schools take the most private lessons. Again, the implication here is that the lessons for the students in the bottomquartile schools are likely more numerous but less expensive. 85. Private expenditures, per se, are not necessarily a problem in education systems. Such resources can augment public expenditures and leadto greater outcomes for all students. However, when such expenditures aim to compensate for weaknesses in the public education system, the results are often inequitablydistributed. III.Theinfluenceof studentselectionmechanismsonthedistributionof quality 86. All countries have mechanisms that sort students on the basis of ability and then orient them towards different types of educational opportunity. However in the case o f Egypt, student selection is the overwhelmingforce in the education sector. Everythingstarts with the Thanawiya Amma the secondary leavers exam and university placement exam in one. This test determines - whether a high school graduate will go to universityand his or her score will decide whether the student will attend preferred faculties. Thus, this test serves three functions: a signal that the student has completedsecondary school; a ticket for universityentry and a devise for selectionand Page 43 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note streaming. Three other features amplify the importance of this one test. First, all graduating students in the country take exactly the same exam - there is no differentiation by field o f study (students can take additional, more difficult tests to increase scores on the ThanuwiyaAmma - as a consequence, some students score above 100%). In addition, faculties and universities use no other mechanism to select students. Finally, students are required to sit for the exams in the year in which they finish secondary school. They cannot enter the labor force, study and prepare, and take the exam when they feel prepared. 87. The origins o f this test are from the vestige o f the social contract established since the socialist regime o f the 1950s, in particular, the promise that all university graduates and many secondary school graduates would receive public sector employment (though university graduates got more desirable jobs with career ladders). For decades, the system allowed nearly all general secondary school graduates to gain entrance to a free university education. Starting in the 1980s, however, recognizing the demographic pressures, the unsustainable promise o f public sector employment for university graduates; and assessing the demand for a skilled workforce, the Ministries o f Education and Labor began heavily promoting the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sub-sector. This set the `two-tracked' educational system that is in operation today. 88. The consequence o f the singular value o f the Thanuwiya Amma i s substantial for the education system, particularly because o f the stratified nature o f the higher education system. It spurs a frenetic competition for access to the preferred faculties o f universities (engineering, medicine, etc.), which tend to have better teaching conditions and better opportunities for employment upon graduation. For those students that do not have the remarkable scores to enter these faculties, their main option is to enroll in the less promising faculties o f commerce or law, which tend to be overcrowded and offer little promise o f gainful employment. Unfortunately, faculties o f education are below these in stature. The students with the lowest scores are oriented towards technical colleges, widely considered to be the lowest quality institutions in higher education. 89, This dynamic is mirrored by the structure o f secondary education, discussed inthe previous chapter. It could be argued that the selection introduced at the end o f preparatory school serves to control the proportion o f students who will eventually be eligible for higher education, thus serving as a "safety valve." 90. More than anything else, the main and most problematic manifestationo f this extreme level o f selection on the quality o f education i s private tutoring. Aside from the financial impact discussed above, we note here that a consequence o f widespread tutoring i s the weakness o f the public perception o f the value and usefulness o f public school. Field evidence indicates that parents, students and teachers are taking more seriously studies that take place in private tutoring than those inpublic school classrooms (Zafeirakou, 2006). 91, Another negative impact i s the absence o f incentives to improve teaching and learning in the public classrooms, since teachers know that children will make up through private tutoring. It may happen that teachers are slowing down their pace o f delivery to ensure that they have a market for the after-school tutoring. Private tutoring also has a strong negative impact on the pedagogical relationship between students and teachers during official class time, especially in the case o f teachers providing private tutoring (in many cases ina location other than the school, but at times in Page 44 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note the school itself) to their own classroom students some o f whom cannot afford the costs o f tutoring.52 92. It also diminishes incentives for teachers to be involved in reforms in innovative peda ogical practices. Assessments o f pedagogical reforms in Egypt since the 1990s, (TIMSS 2003$3 SCOPE Analysis 2005) confirm that despite the shown political will, concrete education strategies, and effective implementation o f components targeting changes on factors o f the teaching-learning process in Egyptian schools, there is not much evidence on teacher involvement and thus on impact on pedagogical practices. In addition, as long as a primary goal o f the system i s to sort students into general and vocational schools, and then ration university access, then the use o f poor testing instruments relying on rote memorization, even massive efforts at teacher training will not likely change actual pedagogy and teacher behavior in the classroom-ither in public school classes or in private tutoring. 93. Another consequence o fthis booming sector i s a diminishing social demand for reform and diminishing incentives to improve public schools. It may be one o f the greater hindrances to effective reform. There seem to be few (and possibly no) serious studies analyzing the impact o f private tutoring on teachers' professionalization, students' performances and reform dynamics in Egypt. However, we know that families and students often attribute success or failure in exams to the role o f tutoring rather than to the public school (TIMSS 2003, PISA 2003). This incentive environment fuels the private tutoring system, which in turn creates perverse incentives for teachers. And access to tutoring is directly correlated with income. 94. If, however, all the private lessons and tutoring significantly improve valuable cognitive skills and competencies, that could be the silver lining in the cloud. This does not appear to be the case, however, for Egypt - or for many other countries. Abdul-Hamid (2005: 58) reports that "whether students are taking extra lessons after school i s not associated with performance." Figure 35 shows the association between private lessons and TIMSS math scores. Abdul-Hamid postulates some reasons why so few differences might be observed, namely that weak students may tend to take the lessons, that the quality o f the lessons may be poor, and/or that schools may not provide sufficient remedial support. However, there is an additional potential reason inthe case o f Egypt, namely that students and parents do not, of course, pay for lessons to improve TIMSS scores but rather to improve performance on the ThanawiyaAmma and the other tests and evaluations that determine placement and success within the Egyptian system. Thus, these results provide additional, if again suggestive, evidence that the testing and evaluation system in Egypt, in particular the ThanawiyaAmma, does not measure (and thus does not foster) the kinds o f cognitive skillsneeded ina global and competitive market. 52 Much private tutoring i s technically illegal in Egypt, especially by governmentteachers in non-sanctionedsessions; however, both quantitative and qualitative evidence accumulated over many years and many different reports makes it clear that such practices are widespread. Even the MOE's Strategic Plandiscusses such practicesand calls clearly for reducingthe prevalence of private tutoring. Ratherthan proscribing punitive measures, however, the Plan states: "The plan perceives private tutoring not only as a social and educationalphenomenon but as a symptom for an illness that has many causes." This seems like a promisingbasis for strategic policy formulation. 53 TIMSS provide information on pedagogicalpractices, only indirectly through the questionnaireof principals and teachers, Page 45 Emvt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 35: TIMSS Math Performance and taking extra lessons PerBomance bystudentreportedextra lessondinMath I ~ ~ofoextra I~SSORSrnmany extra t sameextra. ~o extra lessom I 5m T- I 3 sa rn s 3 3 PerfonancebyMathenrichment lessons E M0 t4 450 fj400 350 Vl 3610 250 Source Abdul-Hamid(2005). Note:Redarrows indicatethat the differencesbetweentaking mathenrichment lessonsand not is significant, 95. The difficulty in actually changing teaching practices will persist until the overarching exam system, and the tutoring that it spawns, are changed to measure true value added and allow applications and policies encouraging real accountability. The bottom line i s that teachers need to need the pedagogy they are being taught to use. Ifthe success o f their students does not depend on it, and inturnthe success of the teachers does not depend onthe success o fthe students, attempts to change classroom practice will continue to face considerable level o f indifference. Page 46 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note CHAPTER5. REVIEW OFEDUCATIONPOLICIES ENACTED: 1991-2006 96. Inthis chapter, Egypt'spastandexistingreformendeavorswill beassessed. Inparticular, the focus will be to assess the objectives, strategies, and implementation performance of these reforms. The aim is to review what Egypt has already tried and tested in terms of policies and interventionsto address some ofthe challengesdiscussedinthe previouschapters beforesuggesting forward lookingrecommendations. 97. Inthe earlypart ofthe 1900s,Egyptunderwentwhat canbetermeda"renaissance" period, during which Egyptians became not only well versed in different aspects of their own civilization but also absorbed Western views and attempted to amalgamate them into an Arab modernity (Heggy, 2003). Subsequentto and buildingon successes of that period, great strides were made in Egypt's educational development, including extending access to all eligible children across the country. As a result, more Egyptian boys and girls became better educated than ever before. Illiteracy rates declined and education reached rural disadvantaged areas and population groups previouslydenied educationalaccess. 98. However, as the previous chapters have illustrated, Egypt's educational system is not yet geared to face the challenges of the new century. The system neither provides markets with graduates with high and relevant quality education; nor has it helped erase inequalitiesof quality (outcomes and inputs) among different income groups, thereby providing greater possibilities of social and economic mobility. As noted inprevious chapters, Egypt's educationsystemtoday: (i)exhibitsinequalityineducationindicators,particularlywithrespecttoqualityandtothe two lowest incomequintiles; and (ii)expendssubstantialresourcesineducation(largercomparedtoothersimilarcountries), leadingto the conclusionthat further improvements in equity and quality will have to be significantlyfinanced throughimprovedsystemefficiencies. The Road Traveled: 1991-2006 99. Inthe past 15 years, which is the focus of our review, Egypt's educationpolicieshave been influencedboth by a growingpool of students inthe system and a growing demand for education, as well as by donor prioritiesand internationalconventionsanddirectives(from Jomtien to Dakar). 100. At a broad level, evidence suggests that there has been a natural progression of the initiation of polices in Egypt that focused first on `access to educational institutions,' and then on `quality improvement'and `system efficiency'. Page 47 Emvt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 36: Key Education Policy Decrees Enacted (1991-2006) Key Education Policy Decrees Enacted (1991-2006) 20 15 sAccess 10 Quality 5 Efficiency/ 0 - Accountabilih 1991- 1996- 2000- Total 1996 2000 2006 101. As can be seen in the figure above, out o f the total number o f 35 key education policy statements enacted through Presidential and Ministerial decrees in the past 15 years, the vast majority (18) are related to `quality improvement,' while the others are related to `improving access' (9) and `improving efficiency' (8). However, a review o f when these policies were initially enacted shows that while the number o f `quality' related decrees has remained stable over the 15 year period, most `access' related decrees were introduced between 1991 and 1996, followed by the most `efficiency' related decrees enacted between the period 2000-2006 (phase 3). This trend i s consistent first with the types o f issues Egypt started to face with (i)the large number o f children who needed to be given access to schools and literacy programs in the first phase (when decrees such as the establishment o f GAEB and codes for school construction were enacted); (ii)the need to improve quality between the period 2000-2006 (phase 2, when decrees such as those pertaining to prohibition o f private tutoring and violence in schools were enacted); and then (iii) followed by the need to initiate mechanisms to improve efficiency and accountability in the system (when decrees such as those that determine school management responsibilities establishment o f the National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation were enacted). 102. Review o f the donor support programs in the education sector during this period is also consistent with these themes. Notable among them were the Education Enhancement Program supported by the EUand the World Bank during phase 2 with a focus on both increasing access (in disadvantaged areas) and improving quality and the Alexandria Project supported by USAID during phase 3 with a focus on promoting school level management. 103. While these are general findings, a careful review o f these policies reveals the following important characteristics: 104. Few explicitly pro-poor education policies have been enacted. `Equal and Free Education Opportunities for All' is a principle enshrined in the 1971 Egyptian Constitution. This principle would ensure that every child, irrespective o f economic or social background, would have access to quality education. But not all education policies enacted duringthese 15 years are fully consistent with this principle. An example o f this `contradiction' is the policy that established `experimental language schools,' which have been successful in many regards and provided valuable lessons about how to structure and implement school-based management and other decentralization and participatory practices. However, these schools also often charge high fees. Such practices not only favor urban populations with higher incomes, but may be also crowding out the private sector that Page 48 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note could be providing the same services at equal or lower cost. In addition, across a wide range of families and socio-economic groups, there is substantial householdexpenditures on education (see Chapter 4). Overall, therefore, it is unclear whether these policieshave been enactedto benefitthe poor and the vulnerable. In fact, a careful review of the policies shows that only 2 decrees (prohibiting private tutoring and authorizingNGOs to establish one-classroom schools) out of 35 were directed explicitly to resolvingeducational issues faced by the poor. Yet, as Skocpol (1991) and Wilson (1987) have argued"pro-poor" policy neednot be explicitly pro-poor ifwell designed. Their well-known argument for what they call "targeting within universalism" posits that political feasibility and other criteria may make some policies that apply universally to a country's entire populationthe most effective pro-poor strategy. Some examples for Egypt might be universalpre- primary education; improvingTVET; increasing accountabilitythroughschool-basedmanagement; or improvingthe testing, monitoringand evaluation systems. However, it is not clear that Egypthas pursued either strategies of "targeting within universalism" or explicitly pro-poor policies in the education sector. And despite the advantages of "targeting within universalism," evidence from around the world suggests that without at least some specific and targeted, effective policies to benefit the poor and disadvantaged, it is more difficult to build a strong base of human capital and helpreduce poverty. 105. There has been a stronger focus on tform' over `substance'. Even though 18 out of 35 major decrees passed during the 15-year period relate to `improving quality,' a careful review shows that specific interventionssuggestedemphasize `infrastructureand general regulations' (e.g., decrees concerning regulatinglibraries and experimental boarding schools) rather than classroom processesdesigned to improve learningoutcomes. Only 3 out of 35 decrees enacted were assessed as relevant for improvingclassroomteaching and learning. 106. Another example of this approach is in the area of ICT. ICT is increasinglyused with a variety of objectives in the education process and Egypt has recently started to focus on this area. There is no study that assesses the educational outcomes on the use of ICT in Egypt. However, early indications show that Egypt's strategy in ICT too-often follows the `install hardware first' form prior to `trainingon useby teachers' (substance). Evidence from numerous countries suggests that a `form over substance' strategy is less effective in producing good learning achievement results than one that emphasizes `substance over form'. In India, for example, students in the state of Uttaranchalsit on floor mats but teachers and supervisors are heavily engagedinthe educational process, ensuring that this state performs better on achievement scores than its neighbor, Uttar Pradeshwhere teacher and student engagement in classrooms is less strong). Fortunately,the MOE has shown both understanding of and ability to overcome this tendency. For instance, prior to installation, EEP trained teachers inbasic computer skills to prepare teachers for programs utilizing technology in the classroom. And again, the Strategic plan devotes an entire chapter to developing better ICT policies. 107. The implementation record of policies enactedhas been varied. It is difficult to assess the implementationprogress and impact of each of the major policies enacted. However, a conceptual framework is used to first categorize the key policies and present a general review of implementationsuccess amongthese categories. Page 49 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Figure 37: Policy Types (1991-2006) Policy Types: 1991-2006 I Engineering I rn Incentives I - 1991-1996 1996-2000 2000-2006 ' ' Source: StaffAnalysis 108. According to the World Bank's "MENA Education Flagship Report" (2007), three conceptual models could be used to systematize and sort the types of policies that have been enacted: (i)the `Engineering' model (includes interventions that have been tried to re-work the education system much like a mechanic would fix a car; e.g., re-organizing the educational levels, revising curriculum and teacher training models etc.); (ii)the `Incentives' model (includes interventions that are designed to motivate key players in the system such as principals, administrators, supervisors, and teachers); and (iii)the `Accountability' model (includes mechanisms that have been instituted to ensure accountability in the quantity and quality o f the education services provided by various public `service providers' (includes mechanisms to ensure community and parental participation in school related decision and monitoring o f school performance). 109. The 35 major policy decrees were categorized usingthis conceptual framework. As can be seen from the chart above, a substantial share of the policies over the three Phases are `Engineering' types (25), followed by `Incentives' types (6), and `Accountability' types (4). Evidence suggests that Egypt's implementation o f the `Engineering' policies have a sound record, while those pertaining to `Incentives' and `Accountability' are not only fewer, but their implementation performance i s weak. According to Gala1 (2002) and Steedman & Jups (2005), the Egyptian education system fails to motivate the actors involved to deliver good quality education. It leaves teachers with limited motivation to teach in the classroom because their salaries are low and follow a rigid civil service code. Their career development is not contingent on the results o f their students. They are not penalized for the poor performance o f students. At the same time they find it rewarding to teach outside the classroom. Similar motivational problems exist for other stakeholders in the educational process, including administrators and parents. Some progress has been made in creating a special category (cadre) for teachers within the civil service code, and the Strategic Plan proposes many excellent policies for improving accountability and incentives. The key, o f course, will be implementingthese proposals fully. 110. Among those policies that are related to `Incentives' and `Accountability,' most pertain to `top down' regulations (such as regulations on parental engagement or regulations related to NGO involvement in the education sector). Rarely are these policies directly related to real `incentives' and `accountability' structures. 111. Evidence also suggests that the government's ability to implement the `Engineering' types policies i s supported by discreet institutions (such as GAEB for construction), while `Incentives' Page 50 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note and `Accountability' types require interventions that have to agree among a larger set o f government institutions, such as Civil Service Ministry and Ministry o f Local Development, For these types o f policies to be implemented, therefore, it i s important to coordinate at a `national level'. 112. Overall, therefore, policies in Egypt have tended to focus on legislation for changing behaviors rather than the customarily more effective strategy o f incentives. 113. Little attention has beenpaid to the role of theprivate and NGO sector. Only 1out o f 35 decrees i s aimed at incentivizing the NGOs and private sector. This i s a significant gap in Egypt's educational policies, as these organizations try to reach larger numbers o f students with better quality education, which would help the government in saving and targeting limited public resources towards the poor and disadvantaged. 114. Overall, the implementation of the policies enacted has had little traction in Egypt, for two key reasons. First, based on the evidence collected through reports written on capacity in the public sector in general and the education sector in particular, it i s evident that the general qualification o f the staff as well as the training that i s provided is very limited. On qualifications, while the MOE professional staff have higher education degrees, they are not necessarily in the specific areas that would qualify them to operate professionally. Furthermore, ongoing training o f middle level staff is limited. Anecdotal evidence through interviews o f staff in the decentralized levels suggests that training i s limited for those outside the central MOE, except when donor projects require such training be provided. As a result, the MOE i s composed o f a few middle-level managers who have been trained and re-trained through project funds and are also in high demand for new projects management, and there are many others who have never received professional training. Such a limited human resource base in the Ministry has not been conducive to efficiently and effectively implementing policies that are approved by the cabinets and Parliament. As discussed, the issue o f overstaffing in the MOE exasperates this issue. 115. Second, the MOE until recently only focused on specific studies and `theoretical' policy making exercises and did little to plan and prioritize the implementation o f these policies. The Strategic Planning process (2006-2007) in Egypt i s a welcome development and should provide the direction needed to implement complex decrees and policies. In order for the process to succeed, the proposals in strategic planning process-particularly those inthe Chapters on Human Resources and Professional development, School-Based Reform, and Monitoring and Evaluations-must be successfully implemented. The reforms are needed particularly in order to address the issue o f incentives to the various stakeholders in the education system, including the administrative staff as well as private stakeholders and NGOs in order to tap into their initiatives and approaches to address the education issues facing Egypt. Page 51 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION, TOWARD POLICY OPTIONS 116. Egypt's education system is the largest in the MENA region and one o f the largest in the world. As noted, at the pre-university level alone, the system enrolls over 16 million students and employs over 1.2 million teachers, administrators, and other workers. Total public as well as private spending on education is high by international standards. As a result, during the past decade, the government achieved increases in enrollment rates that were remarkable. Egypt is now facing new challenges in education: low and inequitably distributed educational quality. This could limit Egypt's potentialto compete ina global economy. 117. The general issue o f quality has been noted as a critical problem in Egypt's education system in scholarly papers, both local and international, as well as in sector reviews carried out by bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies supporting the education sector (UN,2002; World Bank, 2002). The issue o f inequality has been customarily framed in the context o f access to schools. Since most children now attend schools at the basic level, there is, rightly, a sense o f accomplishment in having reduced the gap between Upper and Lower Egypt, across urban and rural areas, by gender, and among income groups. What remains to be clarified i s whether the Egyptian system can improve quality for all students while also fostering relatively equal opportunities leadingto relatively equal educational outcomes. 118. This note has explored these issues at a level o f detail that is possible with available data. The key finding i s that learning achievement and labor market outcomes are significantly different for a large disadvantaged group that extends well beyond the extreme poor or even the poor (approximately the bottom income quintile). More than 40 percent o f eighth graders failed to reach the "low" threshold o f quality on the recent TIMSS, which i s relatively large when compared to other countries in the MENA region. Furthermore, the difference in learning outcomes o f the rich versus the poor i s among the greatest in the region. Finally, Egypt has the highest variation in MENAboth between students andbetween schools. 119. The Egyptian education system has built-in mechanisms for measuring differences in outcomes that have a significant effect on future labor market or educational opportunities. At the end o f preparatory school, two-thirds o f all graduates are oriented towards technical secondary schools. Thus, by definition, technical school students have performed less well, according to whatever measure is used to orient students. This tracking tends to correlate with income level, and thus poorer students tend to end up in technical schools. Although we do not have data that can show the relative learning achievement o f students once enrolled in secondary schools, the labor market outcomes o f technical vs. general school graduates i s telling: rates o f returns for technical school graduates are lower than others and falling. 120. There are intrinsic and extrinsic causes to this purported disparity in outcomes and opportunities: it is, in part, due to the inequitable distribution o f income and wealth and to the quality o f instruction. Disentangling these factors is difficult, particularly in the Egyptian case where there is insufficient data to develop well substantiated conclusions. Nevertheless, several findings seem to indicate that certain characteristics of the education system contribute to the disparities discussed above. The analysis conducted inChapter 4 suggests three such factors: (i)a two-tiered education system that tracks students rigidly into different parts o f the education system, using poor instruments o f assessment and helps perpetuate the inequalities noted earlier; (ii)an inefficient and inequitable distribution o f human resources; and (iii)the prevalence o f tutoring, which augments the effect o f income on outcomes and opportunities. The policy options proposed Page 52 Emut Education Sector Policy Note below aim to address these proximate variables of disparities in educational outcomes and opportunities. Policy Options for Reducingunequalopportunitiesand outcomes 121. This Note has a pragmatic (Stewart, 199754) focus that takes the contextual, temporal, and historical domains into account. A review of policies (Chapter 5) shows that Egypt has tried over the decades to address the general issue of quality (among others), but has not focused adequately on its underlying determinants or on the problem of unequal outcomes. However, Egypt i s potentially at a historic "reform moment" when the adoption and implementation o f neededpolicy changes i s more likely. Egypt is currently undergoing political as well as economic and sector reforms. Even civil service reform, for decades the elephant in the reform arena, appears to be seriously on the table for discussion. Inthis context, there is recognition of the need to develop a labor force that is adaptable, and with a capacity for life-long learning and flexibility. This offers a real window of opportunity for long lasting reforms inthe education sector. 122. The following policy options are, in part, inspired by the recently completed MENA Education Flagship Report prepared by the World Bank. That report asserts that reforms in the past have tended to focus on the engineering o f the education system (building schools, printing textbooks, hiringteachers), whereas today's reforms should rely more on the use o f incentives and accountability measures. By using incentives (e.g., new career structures, changes in examination policy) reform programs would be more likely to change the behavior of key agents of education systems. By introducing more ways - from the ministry to the school - to make the education system more accountable to stakeholders for results (e.g., better dissemination of information on the performance o f the education system, more oversight by local actors), education providers would become more focused on continually producing higher quality instruction. Together with good engineering, the right incentive structure and effective accountability mechanisms can contribute more to successful reform. I:Addressstructuralissues entrenchedin thecurrentsystem andthatperpetuateinequalitiesin education quality. 123. The number and proportion of technical secondary graduates in the Egyptian education system is large by international standards. As discussed in previous chapters, the examination system tracks lower performing students (of lower economic income status) who are unable to pass the high stakes examinations into the technical secondarytrack. These graduates find themselves in a system that is second-rate and one that does not prepare them to enter and excel in the labor market. Two key strategies can be considered to address these issues: a. Improve the linkages between the general and technical secondary tracks. There is consensus among international scholars55 that technical tracks of secondary education should be better integrated and linked with the general stream. Increasingly more employers (including in Egypt) are looking for basic and generic skills among graduates rather than specific skills. In most countries, this has led to a blurring of differences between general and technical secondary education. Technical secondary schools should ensure that more core skills are taught, as these skills are in demand in the private sector. Furthermore, students should be provided greater flexibility to move between the technical and general tracks. 54Elementsof Knowledge:Pragmatism, Logic, and Inquiry, ArItiur Ir,iiihliri Stcu,ir(. I097 55 ExpandingOpportunitiesand Building Competencies for Young People: A New Agenda for Secondary Education, Cuadra, E. & Moreno,.I. M,2005 Page 53 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note Allowing such transfers will provide students (especially those inthe technical track) more time to choose and change their study interests and career choices. Finally, the private sector and other local economic actors should be involved in shaping technical school programs and curricula to ensure relevance to market needs.56 b. Reform the examination system. It will be difficult to transform the general-technical linkages or improve the general quality o f education in Egypt until a major transformation o f the current examination system is undertaken. First, the examination system needs to move away from rote memorization and more towards the evaluation o f cognitive skills, problem solving, and readiness for life-long learning. Assessments should call upon students to write, make oral presentations, and work with other students to solve real-world problems. Furthermore, the ThanawiyaAmma needs to be replaced or complemented by systematic and continuous assessments o f student learning and achievement. A student's entire future should not depend on one test. Changing the examination system will be difficult, as any new instrument will need to develop the same level o f legitimacy as the current approach. Thus examination reform will need to complement other improvements in education quality and engage in a formidable process o f policy dialogue with all education stakeholders. II.Improvetheeffectiveness andefficiency of educationpersonnel. 124. Egyptian education staff are characterized by a key structural problem: they are the least paid in the region (compared to GDP per capita) and have the highest teacher: non-teacher ratio in the world (1:1,2), Thus, the most important resource o f the educational system, the teacher, is neither motivated nor deployed so that instruction can improve in the classroom. Left on its own, this configuration is expected to only get worse, as the teaching force is young: senior teachers tend to teach fewer hours and most chances for promotion lead to administrative duties. Teachers are the key to any reform effort in order for Egyptian teachers to be transformed into professionals. Hence, any improvement in quality will depend on the professionalization o f teachers (see Box below) and thus the right incentives will need to be put in place for teachers to make this transition. We propose the following four policy options in this regard. a. Develop a new career structure for teachers. Transforming teachers into professionals will require a very different incentive structure than what is presently in place. International experience shows that no changes in human resource management will be politically feasible or otherwise likely to succeed without some significant concessions on salaries and enhancements to working conditions for teachers. On the other hand, no concessions should be made without equally significant efficiency gains.57 Teacher salaries will most certainly need to rise, but future career development will need to be pegged to qualifications and performance. The current seniority-based system o f promotion will need to be augmented or eventually replaced by one based on level o f competency and professional standards. As noted earlier, a large proportion o f the stock o f teachers is less than 44 years o f age, which implies that any success inprofessionalizingteachers will have a longterm effect. b. Establish a new professionaldevelopment infrastructure for teachers. Ifcareer structures are changed to reflect competency as well as experience, then teacher support services and administration will need to be modified as a consequence. Traditional teacher training is 56 The Mubarak-Kohl initiative is a good example of the linkages to the private sector and lessons learned and innovations from this and similar initiatives could be scaled-up; 57 In future,detailed simulation modeling could lend insight into the financial costs of both concessions/enhancements and efficiency gains. Page 54 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note usually provided by grouping teachers together and providing all with identical content. If teachers are expected to meet specific criteria for promotion, then the organization o f training must change in order to cater to the particular needs o f individual teachers. Furthermore, establishing and maintaining new teacher standards will require new research and evaluation capacity. Finally, human resources management will need to be upgraded. c. Reduce the number of non-teaching staff over time. This will admittedly be the most difficult strategy to implement. If a new teacher career structure is successfully implemented, the pressure to become administrators may lessen in the future. For the present, the government may want to consider attrition, early retirement, or incentives to return to teaching (also possible with a new career structure). While such policies can be implemented on a pilot or even an ad hoc basis, eventually civil service reform will be required along with improved incentives and career prospects. Box 1. Teacher Professionalization: Critical Factors for a Focus on Quality Teachers are widely regarded as a key determinant o f education quality. They are at once th pillars on which reforms are built and, at times, the biggest obstacles. In that respect, "th motivation, skills and competences of teachers, trainers, other teaching staff and guidance an welfare services, as well as the quality of school leadership, are key factors in achieving hig quality learning outcomes. The efSorts of teaching staff should be supported by continuoh professional development and by good cooperation with parents, pupil welfare services and th wider community, In addition, high quality teaching and learning environments ensure goo conditionsfor learning and contribute topositive learning outcomes" (Council o f EU2006). Teacher professi~nalization~~ is part o f the policy dialogue and development o f teacher quality. focuses on upgrading concrete professional skills and thus upgrading the teacher profession; identity and status. In particular, professionalization in developing countries is seen as a way t build pride among teachers and encourage them to take greater responsibility for the outcomes c schooling. Key requirements for teacher profesionalization include: (i)the establishment c teacher standards; (ii)a high level preparation (initial training); (3) a high level o f profession; development; and (iv) research based evidence on best practices o f teaching. Also, teachei themselves have to help shape the standards o f professional practice (Levine 1988; Darlini Hammond 1987). Education research suggests that achieving teaching quality requires a comprehensive teachc policy approach that leads to a creation o f an equitably distribution professional teacher corps. Th key consideration o f such an approach are: (a) the hiringand deployment system and teacher profile; (b) teacher working conditions - especially in disadvantaged schools; (c) the role o fteacher education and professional development in shaping teacher skills; (d) teacher capacity to renew professional practices (pedagogical practices); (e) the extent to which teachers are involved actors in the reform process. 58According to the international bibliography Professionalization is the process by which an occupation becomes a profession and it is distinct from Professionalism that refers to the quality of practice (Sockett 1990) Page 55 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note IIL Reducethe opportunitycost of educationfor disadvantagedfamilies. 125. It is difficult for the education system to `undo' the negative impact o f general poverty on children. The first priority o f the government, therefore, should be to improve the overall economic conditions o f families. In addition, reforms in the areas noted above will also help improve inequality o f quality (and therefore success) for poorer children. Still, there are others ways in which the government can ensure that the children in poorer quintiles have educational opportunities similar to those who are in higher economic groups. Overall, political strategies involving "targeting within universalism" that benefit Egyptians o f all incomes should be coupled with smaller, explicitly pro-poor policies inthe education sector (See Chapter 6). Inaddition to the structural issues mentioned above--improving the linkages between the general and technical secondary tracks and reforming the examination system-two key strategies can be considered: a. Promote the development of school-based management. Much international research suggests that improving quality begins at the school level. By allowing schools to determine what i s needed to improve outcomes and making resources available to implement these plans, programs are tailored to address specific constraints to education success. This i s also true o f schools serving disadvantaged households. Whereas some degree o f uniformity and safeguards are essential, shifting key decision making to those who are closest to the education process will engender (a) taking greater `ownership' among staff and teachers o f the education process and students outcomes and (b) more role for parents in the education process, including taking greater engagement in major school decisions and in demanding excellence. This approach, particularly when entwined with the notion o f decentralization, i s sometimes deemed as risky where capacity i s low and parents are poor and uneducated (see Box 2); it is not a panacea to reducing differences in school outcomes and opportunities. However, evidence from countries as diverse as Bangladesh to the United States shows that school-based management is especially effective in improving the academic achievement and social skills o f low-income students. Preliminary evidence from the programs tried in Egypt shows similar results and a key strategy to consider i s scaling-up these successful approaches. When hard work is rewarded and institutions are held accountable for performance, even the most disadvantaged communities see their schools imwove in aualitv. Box 2. Decentralization for improving inequality of quality Inthe policy dialogue, decentralization is often advocated as "quality and efficiency enhancer." What is not discussed in detail is that decentralization may also exacerbate inequities across Egypt has now considerable experiences o f smaller pilot projects and specific donor-supported efforts, and these prove instructive. However, the timing may be opportune to concentrate on potential reforms that can be implemented (short-, medium-and long-term) across the entire school system, and there is considerable risk in drawing too directly from such pilot experiences to date without carefully considering the differing contexts across schools and governorates as well as the total costs o f such reforms. And o f course, decentralization reforms are really an amalgamation o f hundreds o f key decisions that must be woven into a coherent strategy. The devil is in the details, as the saying goes, and to date, details are scarce. Decentralization and governance issues have received considerable attention in myriad reports by both donors and the government, so we do not devote extensive coverage to it here. It is clear that Page 56 Emut Education Sector Policy Note the MOE is going to implement a "decentralization" reform, perhaps in conjunction with a broader decentralization o f government (WE3 PER report, 2005). While there i s potential for improved service provision - both in terms o f efficiency and equity - decentralization should not be considered the major education reform particularly to improve quality. "Decentralization is a means, not an ends" has become a clichC with all too much continued salience. Absent other reforms that have received more emphasis in this report, decentralization i s likely to achieve little more than "de-responsibility" for the problems inherent in the system. Decentralization must, therefore, be done carefully in a manner consistent with and support o f such reforms. The most contentious issues are likely to revolve around financing -in particular what revenues are going to be given to what level to control. Here, governors will certainly make a strong pitch to control resources and as mentioned, it i s not clear that this would be beneficial to the education system (perhaps school construction and maintenance would be more clear cut candidates for decentralization, but that, too, would depend upon a transparent and enforceable set o f guidelines and controls). Compensatory financing to overcome inequities will be crucial, and the central government must be committed to providing sufficient funds to do so, otherwise, equity will surely suffer under decentralization. In our view, the single most important issue with respect to decentralization, however, will be effective monitoring and evaluation, in particular the measurement o f quality o f instruction and student achievement. International experience clearly shows that the role o f the central ministry in this regard is crucial for successful decentralization efforts. Performing this function well always requires the central ministry to evolve and upgrade its capacity in monitoring and evaluation. The MOEwill need to develop a set o f measurable and reliable indicators for the on-going performance and results-based monitoring o f decentralized units to ensure accountability; however, this issue relates closely to the need to redirect the entire school system in terms o f the kinds o f results and measures o f performance that a modern, transformed (and perhaps decentralized) education system in Egyptwould look like. That is, student performance will have to be measured at the school level (and perhaps at the classroom level) through both testing and other means o f comprehensive assessment. Teacher performance will also need to be evaluated. Ifthe overall driver o f the system remains the high-stakes testing benchmarks, culminating in the Thanawiya Amma, then there is little hope that even the best designed evaluation mechanisms will have the kind o f impact (both formative and summative) that is necessary for the promise o f decentralization to be fulfilled. b. Reduce the need for tutoring. Essentially, tutoring arises where students believe they are not receiving classroom education necessary to succeed, compensating for a shortcoming in the system. And the need to turn to tutoring has greater consequences for the poor. Hopefully, a great many o f the strategies described earlier should lessen the need to turn to tutoring: a fairer examination system; more diversity in educational opportunities; better incentives to display their competencies inthe classroom; and better school management. While these measures will likely release the pressures `fueling' the private tutoring phenomenon, the effect will probably be in the long term. Consequently, the government must find other ways to control this phenomenon. Banning tutoring is usually an ineffectual move. However, many countries have regulated tutoring, controlling the quality and providing limits to whom and how often a teacher may tutor. Many other countries have successfully turned tutoring from a scourge into a profession. The success o f such efforts will nevertheless depend in part on the implementation o f the strategies discussed above. Page 57 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note I K Improve monitoring of educationalOpportunities and outcomes. 126. A principal challenge faced by the researcherscompiling the information necessaryfor this Note is the paucity of good information on the quality of education and the distribution of that quality. Due to anecdotal evidence, long experience with the sector, and observation o f many Egyptian stakeholders, we are sure that a much more convincing argument regarding disparities of educational outcomes could have beenmade. 127. As mentioned earlier, the World Bank's most recent work on education in the MENA region advocates for a greater use of incentives and accountability measures to achieve reform goals. However, for such approachesto work, decision makers and the public need accurate, timely and widely disseminated information about the education system:59 a. Gather more information regarding the distribution of inputs. This Note has not empirically established that there are significant disparities in educational resources and inputs across governorates. As mentioned above, there i s much anecdotal evidence from within and outside of Egypt, that educational inputs, such as qualified teachers and administrators, as well as financial resources (both public and private), appear to be scarcer in rural disadvantaged areas. Such disparities in inputs are likely to produce significant impact on the achievement of students inthese areas. Since not much is known about these disparities, specific studies would be recommended to investigate in greater detail both the allocation and use of financial and human resources in different governorates. This would include resources such as teachers and their qualifications, inspectors and their qualifications, levels of financial and technical support to schools, construction budgets, and sources of revenue for operations and maintenancea6' b. Monitor education outcomes and opportunities at the household, school and national levels. hformation systems need to be designed with the goal of monitoring the disparity in educational outcomes and opportunities. The government does not need to be the only source of data collection or analysis, and it is to everyone's advantage if sources of information and analysis can be diversified. Thus, the government can encourage civil society organizations to monitor education progress and report their findings. C. Participate in internationallyrecognized achievement, evaluation and testing exercises. It i s critical for Egypt to continue to participate in the TIMSS, including the 4th grade evaluation. With the data currently available through the most recent TIMSS, extensive analysis can be conducted to detect what might be differentiating Egypt from its neighbors in terms of educational outcomes and opportunities. Consideration should be given to participating in PIIUS, with its focus on reading and early learning. PISA participation is crucial because it assesses students near the end of compulsory education, i s considered by many analysts to be a benchmark o f overall educational quality (see Hanushek 2004), and for Egypt, PISA correlates most closely with the age of students taking the ThanawiyaAmma. Thus participating inPISA would allow the most direct assessment of how well or poorly the testing system in Egypt encourages students to learn what is neededto be competitive in a global economy. 59 When the status of education and achievementsoutcomes(especiallyfor those who are poor anddisadvantaged) havebeen reportedby civil society groups, crucialchanges were initiated among districts andgovernorates in countries such as Peruand India. 6oThis note has not concentratedon school constructionbecause several other reports do so in great detail (See Moll 2006 and World Bank, PER, 2005). Overall, the construction program remains large and poorly targeted in Egypt, leading to many pre-schools and schools remaining empty while becoming overcrowded, an issue that requires thoroughstudy. Page 58 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note V. Adopt a sector-wideperspective 128. The agenda proposed above is ambitious. Although this may be a "reform moment" as argued earlier, the Ministry o f Education cannot be expected to undertake these policies alone. They will require the implication o f the entire Egyptian polity and society. The Ministry will need to be engaged in significant advocacy within and outside o f government to muster support for this agenda. 129. Inthisvein, one ofthe most important factors for the successofthisreformagenda, which essentially focuses on improving the quality o f pre-university education, will be the involvement o f the post-secondary sector. Many o f the issues that have been discussed inthis Note in fact lie at the interface o f pre-university and higher education. As mentioned in Chapter 3, students are "pulled" through the different levels o f education by the labor market and by the higher levels o f the education system. As a consequence, the signals sent by universities shape the priorities throughout the levels o f instruction. In the case o f Egypt (which i s not unique in this respect), these signals emphasize selection over the transfer o f fundamental skills for all. Few o f the policy options discussed in this Note will be effective if corresponding decisions are not taken at the level o f higher education. Developing a sector-wide perspective i s particularly important for the following four areas: a. Admissions policy: N o change to the examination system at pre-university levels will be accepted by the general public if there i s not a corresponding change to the university admissions policy. The Thanawiya Amma is a high stakes exam because there is no other instrument that determines university admission and, more importantly, acceptance to the faculties with the highest demand. Ifthe ThanawiyaAmma is changed (e.g., the exam becomes more focused on skills and competencies rather than repetition o f facts; the fact that the score o f the Thanawiya Amma i s partly determined by marks at secondary school), then the way in which universities select candidates will have to change as well (e.g., varying admissions criteria by faculties and universities, such as the oral interviews conducted by Colleges o f Educationprior to admission). b. Technicalvs. generaleducation: The problem o f technical and general secondary education is duplicated at the subsequent level o f education, with similar issues. Technical college is the destination o f those graduates who scored the least well on the ThanawiyaAmma and a small group o f technical school graduates. Essentially, the problem at both levels is the lack o f opportunity (either for further study or for gainful employment). However, to address this vicious circle o f successive orientation o f the least performing students, it will be necessary to establish a comprehensive perspective o f the overall place o f technical education within the entire education sector. Any changes to the relationship o f technical to general education (e.g., rules for transfer; opportunities for a more comprehensive education) will require coordination on both sides. c. Teacher policy: Personnel issues at the higher education level are not all that different from those found in primary and secondary school: low pay; overstaffing; few incentives to change behaviors or provide a higher quality o f instruction; and parallel economic activities. It will likely be difficult for the issues that affect both ministries to be addressed simultaneously without a general framework o f civil service reform. However, in the area o f teacher support services, new linkages should be created with the universities, particularly with the faculties o f education. The MOE will require assistance establishing the professional development services required by a new career structure. Faculties o f education could play a new role o f being at the Page 59 Egypt Education Sector Policy Note service o f any effort to professionalize the teacher corps by providing support in the areas o f research, training design and assessment d. Comprehensive planning: Strategic planning has traditionally been undertaken separately, Le., the MOHE prepares for the future development o f the universities and colleges while the MOE does the same for primary and secondary schools. Considering the above points and the future objectives o f government, working in silos is inefficient and can be counterproductive. Never before has it been so important for the two ministries to program and plan in a synchronized manner. Conclusion 130. The MOE has recently developed a Strategic Plan for the next five years. It aims to put front and center the problematic o f quality. Many o f the policy options proposed earlier are already included in the Strategic Plan. The Plan includes twelve programs, o f which four include similar strategies: (i) secondary education modernization; (ii) school-based reform; (iii) teacher cadre; and (iv) strategic management. The general design o f these programs has been established and the implementation plans and priorities are inthe process o f elaboration. 131. The policies discussed earlier are only a starting point for a true transformation o f an education system which puts the learner front and center. It has always been the intent of government to have all children in the country learn equally well. 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