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WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011
BACKGROUND PAPER




CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECURITY AND JUSTICE THEMATIC PAPER

Jake Sherman
Associate Director for Peace Operations
Center on International Cooperation, NYU


November 9, 2010




The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Development Report 2011
team, the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the
World Bank or the governments they represent.
Introduction

Strengthening the rule of law is widely regarded – among traditional donors, multilateral
institutions, and a growing number of middle income and fragile states – as a necessary
precondition for sustainable peace, poverty alleviation, and development. Crime and violence
deter investment and lower employment, undermine social institutions, and divert resources
through direct and indirect costs, all of which hinder development. It is likely to
disproportionately affect poor and marginalized populations by limiting access to basic services.

According to the United Nations, the rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable
to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”i This definition is
not universally accepted, however; several middle income countries and emerging economies
have enjoyed peace and prosperity without the political liberalism inherent in the
aforementioned definition. In the latter model, “the law exists not to limit the state but to serve
its power.”ii Common to both models is an emphasis on the role of formal state institutions in
upholding the law.

The formal criminal justice system is seen in many environments as failing to deliver justice.
Most states experiencing fragility do not have the capacity to effectively prevent crime, enforce
laws, or peacefully resolve disputes across the whole of their territories. State institutions –
particularly police and courts – may be difficult for communities to access due to their minimal
presence or weak capabilities (e.g., lack of skills, infrastructure (including court houses and jails),
and equipment), due to unfamiliar or poorly understood legal codes and procedures (possibly
complicated by linguistic or cultural differences), or due to ethnic, religious, or gender bias.

There is another powerful deterrent for communities to seek redress through state criminal
justice institutions: they are frequently a primary instrument for the government and elites to
maintain power and control through the perpetration of injustice. This occurs both in societies
suffering from “not enough state” (Afghanistan, Haiti, Papua New Guinea) and those with “too
much state” (Zimbabwe, Myanmar).iii Politicization of the police, judiciary, and correctional
facilities has led to arbitrariness, discrimination, predation, and abuse in numerous
environments; the criminal justice sector is accountable to and serves the needs of the ruling
elite rather than the public.

Yet, even if the formal criminal justice system were more accessible, fair, representative, and
transparent, many communities – particularly rural poor – would prefer the informal system,
which is usually community-based and seeks reconciliation or restorative justice rather than
punishment. Across large parts of rural sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, traditional authorities
and customary mechanisms remain the primary vehicle for conflict resolution (on issues as
varied as land disputes, family disputes, and inheritance issues). In addition, several African
states have (to varying degrees of success) incorporated customary law alongside modern legal
systems. Thus, there is a tension between the preponderance of external and internal
interventions aimed at strengthening or reforming formal criminal justice institutions, and the
type of justice and institutions that much of the public may prefer.


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The informal system, however, is alone insufficient to handle the pressing justice requirements
of fragile states, not least for preventing and responding to inter-communal conflict, to serious
organized and cross-border crime, and to public corruption and other “white collar” crime.

Rather than focusing exclusively on state institutions – or blindly rushing to support informal
systems, “justice reform must involve the public and be based on an understanding of the
demand for justice services, rather than merely projecting needs based on existing justice
system statistics that may not reflect the actual demand for services of this type.”iv

The WDR Framework

The following sections examine the criminal justice sector in the context of the WDR framework,
which, drawing on existing research on the causes of violence, is based on stresses, capabilities,
and expectations.

1. Stresses/Conflict Risks

The law enforcement and criminal justice sector represents a critical source of stress, whether
through omission – the inability to effectively prevent or minimize crime and violence – or
commission or collusion.

In societies marked by ethnic, political, or religious division – especially where these boundaries
coincide with geography and where the government is predominantly controlled by one group
(whether majority rule, as in Sri Lanka, or minority, as in Mindanao, Philippines) – those out of
power tend to lack access to the formal criminal justice system, be underrepresented among its
personnel (police, prosecutors, judges), and/or are discriminated against in its actions and
decisions. Different cultural norms, legal procedures, and language barriers within the formal
justice system further limit the accessibility to – or desirability of – different social groups and
communities. As a result, communities may actively contest the authority of the state to make
and enforce law.

Economic factors, including direct costs (court fees, legal representation, fines), time, and
availability of transportation – pose a further impediment to accessing the formal justice
system. In Sierra Leone, for instance, costs are too high for all be the most wealthy citizens. Even
the cost of customary courts is often still too high for most people, with limits on fees and fines
unenforced and unwritten, for example.v

Conflict and state policies limiting the legitimacy and/or jurisdiction of informal institutions has
also undermined their effectiveness. In many countries, customary institutions have at least
some legal recognition and standing – including Bolivia and Nicaragua, South Africa and Sierra
Leone, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. Other security and justice providers (like market or
taxi associations) have no statutory authority. Customary, community-based justice institutions,
like shuras and jirgas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been captured by warlords or aligned
with parties to conflict, limiting the independence and public legitimacy of their decisions. In
most developing countries, however, sources of law rarely include customary law, generating
conflicts of law between inherited “modern,” often post-colonial, and customary systems.



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Coercion by state security services, criminal groups, or insurgents for either personal or group
gain is a common source of stress. Where weapons are freely available and there is little rule of
law, identities are extremely fluid (and often multiple) between citizen, gang, militia, police, and
military. In many instances – “sobels”vi in Sierra Leone and “narco-captured” officials in Mexico –
the distinction between these categories has broken down so far as to become meaningless to
affected communities. This poses a fundamental challenge to DDR programs that tend to focus
narrowly on those defined as soldiers, and links to broader discussions around community
security and arms control. Particularly in authoritarian regimes, criminal justice institutions are
often above the law, reinforcing predation, abuse, and corruption through impunity.
Competitors for the spoils of power may turn to violence.

Rising levels of corruption, especially public corruption, of internal (Afghanistan’s narcotics
trade) or external (Latin American organized crime in West Africa) origin can have a devastating
impact on the performance of law enforcement and justice institutions, on the incidence of
criminality, on the local economy, and on public confidence in the state. To poorly paid, poorly
equipped, or poorly respected officials in the lower ranks of government, cooperation may
supplement meager incomes or may simply be a matter of avoiding the alternative: death. But
while tainting lower ranking personnel, corruption rarely flourishes without the complicity of
high-level government officials. In Mexico, for example, increased political competition since the
defeat of the PRI has upset long-standing state-syndicate accommodations, generating new
conflicts between organized criminal groups and federal and state governments in some areas.vii
In Guinea Bissau, the drug trade has flourished under protection from senior members of the
country’s armed forces and high-ranking politicians.viii

The economic costs of crime and violence for the state and society include not only rising costs
within the criminal justice sector (more police, more prisons), but in health care, lost earnings,
private security, and decreased competiveness. It has been estimated that Latin America during
the 1990s lost up to 14 percent of its GDP to crime and violence, for example.ix Criminal
trafficking in otherwise “licit” goods, like cigarettes, alcohol, vehicles and consumer goods,
denies tax revenues to the government, further affecting provision of services. Guinea-Bissau
and Guinea, meanwhile, have experienced sudden increases in foreign direct investment that
cannot be explained by the licit economy.x In poverty-affected countries, the incentive for
collusion has significant distortionary effects on the local economy, fueling the cycle of crime
and violence. Organized criminal groups can provide lucrative revenue streams to existing
insurgent groups, while elsewhere – as in Mali and Niger, it is insurgent groups that have sought
to capture and control illegal trafficking.

“Bad neighborhoods” lead to regional spill over of conflict and crime in neighboring countries,
including the availability of weapons, trafficking and related social harms (e.g., from increased
drug addiction), displacement on populations and access to justice, among other dimensions. In
response to pressure, cross-border criminal activity – especially drug trafficking –has
demonstrated an ability to move around within a country or to another country in the same
market rather than being sharply diminished.xi

The absence of state institutions in large parts of the developing world, both urban and rural,
constitutes an important stress, as it provides political space for alternative forms of authority,
including warlords, rebel groups, criminal gangs, and terrorist organizations, to operate.


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Occasionally, rather than producing anarchy, these actors have provided policing, justice, and
other basic services to local populations under their control. As in Somaliland and Puntland, they
may even develop complex bureaucracies that approximate the absent state.xii Such groups may
still pose a conflict stress by engaging in violence and coercion within and/or outside of their
area of control, or by engaging in economic activities that are destabilizing to neighboring
regions – e.g., production of methamphetamines by the United Wa State Army rebel group in
Myanmar. Other groups – the RUF, the LRA – do not establish alternative government
structures, leaving populations under the control with limited recourse.

Finally, in circumstances of extreme institutional weakness, particularly in post-conflict, war to
peace transition, where countries have experienced high levels of destruction of infrastructure,
outmigration, and loss of human live (including technical cadres), rebuilding effective justice and
security capacity is challenging for two reasons. First, on a technical level, the amount of time
required to not just train or replace a judges, lawyers, investigators, and managers, but also to
acquire experience is years under the best of circumstances.xiii Second, as Carothers notes,
“honestly facing the underlying political constraints on reform tends to entail accepting greatly
reduced expectations about what aid is capable of achieving—[a] difficulty for donors, especially
in this era of heightened pressure to show results.”xiv

2. Capabilities to Respond

Following the framework of the WDR, this paper examines the short term and medium/long-
term interventions in the area of justice that are undertaken by local, national, regional, and
international actors to address stresses leading to violence.

Where violence exists within relatively functional sovereign states – Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, South Africa – there may be limited points of external engagement due to state
sovereignty. The type and purpose of external engagement can influence government
receptiveness. Southern governments may be more amenable to cooperation from other
Southern governments; examples of South-South cooperation include between Brazil and South
Africa on policing; or organized crime/money laundering combating initiatives in Southern Africa
(including South Africa). Unwanted external interference can be counter-productive, if not
destabilizing. The strength of the state is an important determinant for the extent of external
intervention and for national control over its design (compare, for example, engagement in
Serbia with that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo). However, where there is resistance from
the state, it may be possible for donors and civil society organizations to develop entry points. In
Albania, for example, small arms and light weapons (SALW) control initiatives were expanded to
encompass community safety, then to broader security and justice reform.xv UNDP’s “Support to
Security Sector Reform” program was built on the success of a popular, earlier small arms
collection and control program that offered collective incentives through community-based
development projects. Facing diminished political support, after five years, the SALW collection
program was broadened into the SSR program, drawing on UNDP’s established network of
contacts for a new purpose. The new program is focused on strengthening police capacity
against organized crime, trafficking and corruption, as well as on improving the image of the
police and its relationship with the public through greater transparency and accountability. xvi

There is a wide range of activities undertaken by local, national, regional, and international
actors to try to improve the effectiveness of the criminal justice in violence- and organized


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crime-effected contexts.xvii Nonetheless, despite this large toolbox of short and long-term
external responses – e.g., vetting, hybrid courts, legal reform, police and judicial training –
external activities in practice have often been donor-driven, under (or unevenly) financed,
poorly coordinated, unsustainable, and/or fallen short of their intended results.xviii

Moreover, there is a tension between institution-oriented approaches (revising laws, training
police and judges, building infrastructure, providing material support) and process-oriented
initiatives, including those aimed at improving working relationships among criminal justice
institutions, between oversight institutions (ministries, parliament, police boards) and service
providers, or between formal and informal systems; as well as fostering responsive, accountable
relationships between police and the public. Internal and external interventions overwhelmingly
appear to focus on the former at the expense of the latter.

    A. Short-term (Emergency and Quick Impact) Measures

Emergency, criminal justice efforts are frequently taken to control escalating crime, to regain (or
maintain) public confidence, or, particularly in post-conflict environments, to mitigate spoilers.
Yet, apart from emergency measures, there are efforts that have demonstrated short-term
impact on what may be, in fact, endemic cases of violence and crime.

External efforts tend to focus on quick-impact means of mitigating shortcomings in the formal,
state criminal justice system; efforts that have not always proven effective or sustainable (e.g.,
in DR Congo, Haiti, and Timor-Leste). However, efforts to facilitate local access to justice,
particularly “locally appropriate” justice, and to promote responsive, accountable policing have
demonstrated effective and sustainable results in many contexts across Latin America, Africa,
and Asia.

        Local-National Efforts:

Examples of relatively effective local and/or national efforts to meet immediate criminal justice
needs include:

In policing: The effectiveness of different measures depends, in part, on the goal – whether
interventions are aimed at overcoming legacies of police abuse through increased local
accountability, or at controlling or preventing crime and violence.

For the former, among the more effective local and national efforts are those that promote
community-level accountability by (a) initiating community policing (including establishment of
regular public-police forums, improving customer service within police stations, establishing
community oversight mechanisms). Where practiced successfully, it has enabled communities
to convey their concerns to authorities, to assist in finding solutions, to improve public relations
with the police and, importantly, to build trust and confidence, including in conflict- and crime-
affected communities.xix Progress in instituting community-based policing faces many hurdles,
however, not least the willingness of the police to embrace a service orientation and of the
public to accept this role. (b) Public-private partnerships have increased demand for quality
policing, creating a service-orientation among police, including in São Paulo and Nairobi, as
“business leaders can help keep these kinds of reforms on track, forming a sort of pressure
group to demand professional service from the police, regardless of who is in government.”xx(c)


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Extending police and justice presence to under-served areas. Police are often too few in
number, concentrated in population centers and thinly distributed across territory – usually with
too limited resources. Extending an effective and credible police and justice presence out of
major urban areas (or into city slums) is a challenge in many contexts, hindering the ability of
state institutions to prevent crime and deliver justice. Infrastructure is often lacking. Moreover,
extension of ineffective or predatory police may undermine state legitimacy. Reintroduction of
security and justice, however, must also be accompanied by civil authorities. In Sierra Leone,
election of paramount chiefs – a position of customary local authority recognized by the state,
was a key step in reestablishing civil authority. District recovery committees, comprised of
paramount chiefs, the Sierra Leone police, former combatants, property owners, and other
community stakeholders provided a platform for rebuilding district infrastructure and providing
basic services with the support of civil affairs officers from the then-deployed peace operation,
UNAMSIL.xxi

As there are also often insufficient numbers of qualified judges and other judicial personnel to
process detainees or to adjudicate cases. Victims have limited access to district or provincial
courts. Mobile courts have been successfully used to provide quick and effective supplementary
capacity to address priority justice needs (e.g., to address criminal cases, to review pretrial
detention, to serve a public information capacity). In DR Congo, a system of mobile military
courts has successfully prosecuted security personnel for sexual violence.xxii As a model of
service provision, mobile courts may also help address the absence of state-provided justice
services in non-conflict, historically neglected regions, and provide a longer-term solution
beyond interim service provision.

Other measures to promote accountability for the police have included: legislative provision for
and establishment of an ombudsmen, empowered to independently investigate complaints of
improper or criminal conduct by police; citizen-based police complaint/review boards, likewise
empowered, and human rights cells established within police stations to investigate allegations
of improper police conduct.

In justice provision: Interventions that facilitate access to the local-level, formal justice system
have demonstrated positive results, including reducing fees, allowing legal self-representation
for certain cases, and training community-based paralegals (with oversight from lawyers,
community boards, or courts) to provide legal assistance,xxiii as well as by providing alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and arbitration. (Increasing access to the
informal or non-statutory justice system is addressed below.) In the area of corruption and
public legitimacy, publicizing disciplinary proceedings against corrupt officials can signal to the
public and to other civil servants that such action is not condoned, provided that such actions
are seen as genuine rather than politically motivated.

In corrections: Short-term interventions include (i) pre-trial detention/case management
committees to address overcrowding and/or illegal detention, which can be undertaken
regardless of the condition of infrastructure or status of legal provisions. No less important, but
requiring infrastructure (if via temporary facilities) is the separation of pretrial detainees from
convicted criminals, and providing separate facilities for men, women, and children.

Improved community-police trust can increase the likelihood of community members providing
information to law enforcement investigations, as well as support for police action – even in


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communities that have previously refused cooperation with the police.xxiv But community
policing and crime prevention approaches are not appropriate responses to all forms of crime
and violence, for example organized crime and drug trafficking.xxv

Indeed, short-term efforts to halt cross-border flows of weapons, drugs, and cash (money-
laundering) have proven extremely difficult, even for states with relatively strong capabilities
(e.g., US-Mexico). For many countries, the extreme disproportion of revenue generated by
criminal groups relative to budget allocations for policing, let alone for counter-narcotics and
counter-organized crime,xxvi as well as the rapidly evolving use of technology to by criminal
groups to stay one step ahead of law enforcement poses a significant obstacle.

Different sectoral and cross-sectoral approaches to preventing and addressing crime and
violence have emerged, particularly in the context of urban violence. The former include
criminal justice, public health, conflict transformation, and human rights; the latter community-
driven development and citizen security.xxvii There are drawbacks to sectoral approach that is
overly focused on criminal justice – on law enforcement and punishment – as simply increasing
the size or resources available to weak or ineffective security and justice institutions is
ineffective – not least because such interventions are rarely holistic. As Mexico demonstrates, a
overly security-oriented approach can actually escalate violence, with negative short-term
consequences for public safety. There, escalating drug violence has claimed the lives of more
than 28,000 civilians since the government initiated its offensive against drug cartels, forcing it
to acknowledge in August 2010 that the strategy was not working. Generally, investments in
crime prevention, rather than control or repression, have proven more cost-effective – but tend
to be more medium- to long-term in impact.xxviii A study of the cost-effectiveness of violence
prevention programs in Brazil found that the secondary (targeting high risk groups; e.g.,
reintegration of street children, training for parents of at-risk youth, homicide control, anti-
violence/drug programs for youth) and tertiary (targeting victims and offenders, including
alternative sentencing) programs evaluated were more cost effective than the police control
program in terms of the number of serious crimes prevented versus program cost.xxix

Non-state/local policing and justice.xxx The proper place of informal justice institutions
alongside those of the state is among the major issues facing national, regional, and global
actors seeking to support rule of law generally and criminal justice specifically. According to the
OECD, some 80 percent of the population of fragile states relies on the non-state sector for
provision of security and justice.xxxi The issue cuts to the heart of how to assist conflict- and
crime-affected states. Assistance which focuses exclusive on these institutions is insufficient.
Moreover, the cost of formal institutions may be unsustainable once foreign assistance declines
and international advisors are withdrawn. As Dinnen et al. note in Papua New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands, neither are likely to be able to operate or extend formal state justice systems
without permanent external assistance.xxxii Yet, in spite of rhetorical adherence among donors to
“the importance of local context and capacity,” programs remain overwhelmingly western and
Weberian in approach.xxxiii This is in stark contrast to the reality of security and justice service
delivery on the ground in most post-conflict, post-colonial states. As Scheye observes,

        “Attempts to implement a justice and security statebuilding agenda grounded
        upon a Western regarding of the state are inherently fraught and prone to
        ineffectiveness given that basic Western governance concepts such as the
        separation of powers, civil society, monopoly control over the means of


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        violence, and the distinction between criminal and civil law may not be readily
        comprehensible in or applicable and transferable to a fragile, post-colonial
        context, given its different histories, structures, and norms.”xxxiv

Proponents of supporting the development of non-state policing argue that, rather than viewing
such support as a threat to state authority or as an entry point for legal pluralism (which, in fact,
already exists in many locales), it is instead a pragmatic, locally-understood, context-
appropriate, more sustainable, means of improving individual security.xxxv This is not to argue
that non-state security and justice is not highly context-specific. In some cases, as in Sierra
Leone, it is not only the means to which the majority of people has best access, but may be their
preference, as well.xxxvi

But, importantly, non-state institutions are not always the public’s first choice – nor should
support exclusively focus on these mechanisms. In Nepal, for example, ninety percent of the
population favors state security provision, rather than informal provision, in spite of
shortcomings, viz. limited presence, ineffectiveness, corruption, and poor professionalism. xxxvii
The establishment of police posts builds public confidence, but whether this confidence will be
sustained will quickly depend on police effectiveness.

        International Efforts

Short-term international efforts generally fall into one of two categories: providing financial and
technical assistance to local/national initiatives, like those identified above, or more direct
interventions that, for reasons of sovereignty, are most often only conducted in the context of
an international (or regional) peace operation. Such interventions are not necessarily
sustainable, nor meant to be, but rather are intended to curb immediate forms of violence and
to build confidence. Often, these early activities provide an entry point for broader institutional
reforms aimed at establishing or strengthening longer-term solutions.

Where national government does not have the capacity to project its authority across the entire
country, police and broader rule of law components of peacekeeping missions have played an
important function not only in providing interim security and justice services. Here, principle
tools wielded in the past have included executive policing/justice, which can both extend state
authority where absent and provide an impartial police presence linked to the criminal justice
sector.xxxviii (It could be more selectively/narrowly focused on priority areas (e.g., anti-
corruption, counter-narcotics, trafficking, and organized crime, or for sexual violence). Hybrid
courts have been established – as in Kosovo and Timor – to address serious and organized
crime. The presence of internationals can reinforce public perceptions that the court will be
independent and fair (provided the right balance of nationals to internationals can be struck),
but the arrangement has often been one of political necessity (both domestic and
internationally), rather than strategy.xxxix

Other short-term measures including legal system monitoring; establishment of coordination
mechanisms between key national institutions (e.g., Ministries of Justice, Offices of Attorneys
General, and Supreme Courts); witness/informant protection; emergency legal training; quick
impact infrastructure rehabilitation and provision of materiel (e.g., “quick start” packages); and
vetting (albeit having faced legal and other challenges in Bosnia and Timor-Leste). External



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donor support to alternative dispute resolution within a state-institution framework –
restorative justice, mediation, arbitration, is also growing.

There are innovative examples of hybrid justice arrangements without executive authority, such
as the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), established to support
the prosecutor’s office and national police to help investigate and bring to trial cases involving
illegal security groups. CICIG set up a special prosecutors office and identified and trained a
corps of 20 national police assigned to the prosecutors office; the rest of the Guatemalan
National Civilian Police (PNC), including the organized crime unit, and much of the justice and
correctional system is regarded as deeply infiltrated. CICIG has initiated criminal proceedings,
the first in Guatemala’s history, to remove corrupt officials from justice sector institutions. xl The
Commission provides a potential model for integrating an international response to endemic,
high-level corruption and criminality, within national institutions.

    B. Medium- to long-term

        Local-National efforts

Importantly, the five medium to long-term initiatives identified here refer not to prioritization
and sequencing, but to the timeframe required to see improvement; the longer the delay in
their commencement, in theory the longer until they bear results: First, reform of the national
legal framework (e.g., modernization of the police act, adopting anti-corruption and anti-
organized crime legislation, criminal and penal code reform. Incorporating restorative justice
principles – e.g., allowing for compensation to victims instead of penal sanctions – through
alternative dispute mechanisms, both formal and, where relevant, customary may be an
appropriate mode of legal reform where retributive justice is at odds with local norms and
customs, or exacts a high social cost. Ceding more jurisdiction to the customary system would
legally recognize institutions that, in many locales, are already publically used and accepted. As
experience from Liberia suggests, a uniform system of law does not always best serve the aim of
ending historical discrimination, but customary law may be ineffective where “litigants are not
members of the same community, or... when they are ethnically or religiously diverse. Egregious
cases, considered beyond social repair, are likewise poor candidates for customary resolution.” xli
Other key reforms include: decentralization of highly centralized authority within the police
service (albeit while maintaining a unified national structure), though this entails higher costs
than a centralized system; improving gender, ethnic, linguistic, religious representation among
security and justice professionals; increase legal aid assistance; (vi) bolstering
witness/informant protection (as in Mexico and Colombia); (re)establishment of legal
professional associations; and vetting and review of appointment processes, which may be a
precondition for deeper reforms.

“Problem-solving policing,” in which patrol officers, often working together with designated
community problem-solving groups, are empowered to proactively identify and address the root
causes of crimes occurring in “hot spots.” Across Latin America, (Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador),
what has been described as a “public health approach” to addressing and preventing violencexlii
has been taken by combining data collection on incidents with a multi-sectoral approach beyond
law-enforcement, including working with at-risk-adolescents and youth, providing life skill and
employment programs, conflict resolution training, and penal/juvenile justice reform. The
establishment of crime and violence observatories, as in Colombia and Jamaica,xliii have enabled


                                                  9
under-staffed and under-resourced police services to identify “hot spots,” to better analyze
crime data, and to better design and monitor the impact of interventions. Similarly, public
safety initiatives –like that in Bogota, where homicide rates were reduced more than 50 percent
from 1994-2000—combine the public health approach with increased investment in the criminal
justice system, including crime and violence observatories, supporting Ministries of Home
Affairs, community interventions, and corrections reform.

Joint “organized crime task forces” have proven successful at coordinating investigations by
different agencies (e.g., police, customs, revenue, prosecutors) at national and subnational
levels – an approach also applied to counter-terrorism. Where organized crime is deeply rooted,
social inequalities prevalent, and corruption accepted by political elite, strictly criminal justice
approaches to anti-corruption – legislation and enforcement – have limited capacity to reduce
the scope of the problem. In Medellin, Colombia, reversal of organized crime was possible
through a combination of law enforcement and “reordering of civic and political culture,” xliv
where the latter has included promoting active civil society, public accountability, and
reclamation of public space.

        International efforts

Rather than covering the extensive medium- to long-term external interventions, this section
highlights several under-attended to areas that have nonetheless demonstrated significant
impacts on improving the capabilities of the criminal justice sector in fragile environments.

First, external technical assistance, including mentoring and training has insufficiently addressed
management capacity of criminal justice institutions – from police and courts administrators, to
ministries. Core skills like human resource and financial management may require an entry
point, but have lead to organizational streamlining and cost-savings, as well as to increased
professionalism and anti-corruption, as in Serbia.xlv

Second, legal reform assistance – police and detention reform acts, criminal and procedural
codes, recruitment laws – is important, but more attention has been placed on the outcome,
than on the process. External interventions have tended to focus on revising past laws, but not
on developing indigenous law-making and oversight capacity. Here, common challenges
include: the individually-driven, technical manner in which capacity building is undertaken,
without sufficient regard to informal norms and practices, high-turnover among legislators, and,
especially for interim/transitional parliaments in post-conflict environments, high levels of
inexperience and often low levels of educational attainment. In Liberia, for example, few
legislators “have previous legislative experience and some have educational deficits that prevent
full comprehension of print material. The quality of parliamentary debate is low and ill-
informed.”xlvi Investing in institutionalized law-making expertise in the form of professional
committee staff can provide expertise from which legislators can draw and learn. It also
provides continuity of expertise that remains even when MPs are shuffled or not reelected. They
can also develop contacts with executive agencies, facilitating legislative-executive relations.
Supporting access to basic legal information, including model laws is also critical, but limited.xlvii

Corrections system reform has been the most neglected rule of law sector. In post-conflict
countries, correctional facilities are often damaged; detainees and prisoners end up in
overcrowded prisons, police holding cells, or make-shift facilities without adequate separation


                                                 10
of men, women and children, or pretrial detainees from convicted criminals, nor facilities – like
health clinics, private visitation areas, or access to legal materials – necessary for long-term
internment. Few prisons systems in fragile states are set up to provide for social rehabilitation –
e.g., by providing life-skills and employment training. As a bare minimum, the restoration of
prisons can have a positive impact on public confidence, as it may alleviate overcrowding or
transferal to more hospitable conditions, as was the case in Kosovo, following the rehabilitation
of the central prison in 2000. Overcrowding in prisons, however, is frequently a symptom of
problems elsewhere in the criminal justice system – an example of why a multi-institutional
approach to criminal justice reform is necessary.

Experience in Haiti, among other locations, has demonstrated that sustainable progress in one
dimension of the justice sector is contingent upon reform across the others – the police,
prosecutors, public defenders, judiciaries, court administrators, prisons and ministry leadership
must be linked in an integrated approach. Despite early UN success in recruiting, training, and
mentoring the new Haitian National Police, its integrity and professionalism were gradually
undermined by the absence of equivalent progress in the judiciary and correctional system.
Senior police commanders, moreover, were subjected to intense pressure by politicians and
political elite, highlighting the risks of technical reform without concomitant political reform. By
the deployment of MINUSTAH in 2004, most past progress had been lost.xlviii By contrast, the
strategy in El Salvador following the 1992 peace accords focused on the police, judiciary, and
prison service, and included efforts to improve coordination among the three. The country
continues to face significant challenges, but has improved.xlix

Other forward-looking interventions include: strengthening law enforcement capability (inc.
criminal investigation), adjudicatory capability, legal education through mentoring and training;
(iii) legal education and training (e.g., in the status and implementation of law); (iv) home
ministry, intelligence, and corrections reforms (including depoliticization of organizational
structures); (v) support to civil society, (not just human rights groups, but security/justice-
oriented institutions, which are important for regional linkages, too, as in the Balkans); (vi)
essential justice infrastructure development; and (vii) support to witness protection.

    C. Regional and Global Approaches and Mechanisms

Illegal trafficking is a major obstacle to criminal justice reform in a variety of contexts. Conflict
has made small arms readily available beyond borders, subjecting entire regions to crime and
insecurity. Transnational threats require regional and international responses, in addition to the
local and national level capabilities described above.

The nexus between (i) natural resource management and illegal trafficking and (ii) the criminal
justice sector works in both directions. First, revenue from illegal trafficking activities is a
primary means of corrupting/capturing state criminal justice institutions. Similarly, illegal
weapons are used against in criminal activities, as well as against law enforcement officials,
including as a means of coercion. Second, the criminal justice system most often the lead means
of combating illegal criminal activity, its perpetrators, and beneficiaries. Border management
often falls institutionally within the national policing structure, albeit as a distinct, specialized
branch.




                                                 11
International and regional organizations lack the analytical and operational capabilities
necessary to understand and, thus, respond effectively to the linkages between organized crime,
conflict, and corruption. Responses are largely criminal justice-related: legislative and law
enforcement. But, “even where international organizations do identify criminal networks, they
have few tools at their disposal to fight them, and little leverage over national law-enforcement
tools.”l

        Regional

Standardized legal regimes are an important starting point for coordinated action. In addition
to a robust international legal framework, for example, on counter-narcotics, corruption,
organized crime, and human trafficking, regional and sub-regional organizations and groups
(esp. in Africa and Latin America) have also promoted both binding and non-binding conventions
and protocols. Ratification, however, does not signal compliance. The African Peer Review
Mechanism assesses base-line compliance among its participants with the Declaration on
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, including on judicial independence.
However, only a handful of countries have undertaken the review, in some cases tightly
controlling the process and results. Further, countries have often failed to implement
recommendations made through the review process.

Regional task forces on crime and security, as in the Caribbean, have undertaken regional-level
analysis of major causes of crime and recommended remedial interventions, including
coordination and cooperation in intelligence sharing. Law enforcement cooperation
agreements, like the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO), the Southern African
Regional Police Chiefs Committee (SARPCCO), and the Association of Caribbean Commissioners
of Police (ACCP), have strengthened police cooperation, though effectiveness is contingent both
on ministerial support and improved operational arrangements. Examples of south-south
experience sharing and learning on security and judicial reform and oversight also exist: civil
society groups like the African Security Sector Network have facilitated dialogue among
parliamentary committee members from Ghana and Liberia, for instance. li

        International

A number of policy initiatives have been developed over the past ten years in response to the
linkage between corruption, conflict, and resources.lii The Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI), for example, is an international mechanism involving governments, industry,
and civil society to improve the transparency of oil, gas, mining revenues. It seeks to build
accountability into the management of payments to government, though does not address the
allocation of extraction rights. Other policy frameworks include the IMF Guide on Resource
Revenue Transparency and the Natural Resource Charter. To address the role of resource
exploitation in fueling the war in the DR Congo, the UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) has
begun monitoring and inspecting trade in natural resources in eastern DRC, in cooperation with
government counterparts; also centralizing mineral trading and bringing greater government
oversight via establishment of trading centers.liii

Under the recently established West African Coast Initiative, four UN missions in the region
(UNOCI, UNIPSIL, UNMIL, and UNIOGBIS) have partnered with the Department of Political
Affairs’ UN Office in West Africa, Interpol, UNODC, and ECOWAS in an effort to limit the


                                               12
corrosive influence of organized and transnational crime through “international mentoring [of
national police], regional coordination, and local ownership.”liv

Nonetheless, there are risks associated with external efforts that, by default, seek to disrupt or
criminalize illicit economies. In post-conflict environments like West Africa, for example, such
measures may be destabilizing, due to the practice by pre-conflict regimes of integrating their
control over criminality with their overall strategy of political control.lv Reno suggests that those
involved in illicit markets are adept at manipulating external measures to suit their own self-
interest.lvi Where corruption is accepted by political elite, as is increasingly the case in
Afghanistan, anti-corruption legislation and enforcement have limited capacity to reduce the
scope of the problem. Moreover, “ill-governed states are intractable to most practicable
interventions; the activity is more easily moved around-within the country or to another country
in the same market – than sharply diminished.”lvii Nonetheless, there may be symbolic value in
expanding efforts, since corruption arrests, if publicly perceived as genuine rather than
politically motivated, do signal the non-acquiescence of government to corruption.lviii

Drug enforcement is still predominantly a bilateral undertaking between supplier or transit
nations and either the US or European partners, focused on interdiction and supply reduction.
Cross-border policing and extradition, as between Mexico and the US, has enable law
enforcement officials to break up narcotics trafficking-related criminal organizations and gangs
with operations on both sides of the border. Corrupting enforcement agents is inseparable from
high-profit organized criminal activity, especially drug trafficking – as demonstrated by
Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, Guinea Bissau, and elsewhere. For this reason, anti-corruption
initiatives can reinforce anti-narcotics enforcement, but the contrary less true, as increased
enforcement pressure increases the opportunity (and financial incentive) for corrupt
enforcement officials to ignore or protect illegal activity. lix

Although not criminal justice per se, the international anti-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia
(and, increasingly further afield) bears mention. There (as in the Straits of Malacca), piracy
endangers international shipping routes and has provoked multinational response. UN Security
Council Resolution 1838 (2008) called on nations with naval vessels and military aircraft in the
area to repress piracy. Joining naval patrols from a growing number of nations, the European
Union launched its first maritime operation, “Operation Atalanta.”lx

3. Gaps in International Supplementary Capacity

Research by the World Banks and OSI suggests a number of gaps and “imbalances” common in
donor support to criminal justice. The study cites lack of clarity and agreement among donors on
goals; top-down, supply-side, acontextual planning; lack of strategic prioritization and
sequencing; inattention to government commitment; insufficient coordination; failure to learn
lessons; repetition of others’ failures by newcomers; avoidance of complexity in favor of
expediency or visibility; and inadequate monitoring and evaluation. Prisons and traditional
justice mechanisms have been neglected (though attention to the both is now increasing). IFIs
and many development donors are restricted from supporting police reform, despite this being
an obvious priority for rule of law. lxi

Understanding of Local Context. International engagement often misses the political and
political economy dimensions of security and justice provision, and is overwhelmingly focusing


                                                 13
on sector-specific technical experts – police officers, prison officials, border guards – who can
provide advice, training and mentoring, as well as conduct assessments and reporting. In part,
this is driven by the need to “do something” and its corollary, the need to be seen doing
something.

Missing are those who are involved in the overarching political dimensions of the process,
coordination, system-wide monitoring and evaluation – and who also bring awareness of the
local context and its implications for implementation strategy.lxii Dinnen has noted that
Australian support to the criminal justice sector in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands,
for example, “risk[s] being undermined by the strength and resilience of the informal mores and
practices of dispute resolution prevailing at local levels, many of which conflict with state
notions of law and order.”lxiii Australian experience has indicated the importance of context-
specific knowledge (sociocultural, linguistic) in building policing that is both sustainable and
appropriate, including engagement with non-state actors.lxiv The lesson is equally valid for other
donors and multilateral institutions. In this regard, donors have generally failed to support,
strengthen, and utilize Southern capacity. As security and justice assistance to crime and
violence affected countries has become more common, the pool of experience within these
countries has also grown, holding the potential for significantly greater south-south learning.

Funding gaps and disequilibria. The criminal justice sector is chronically underfunded by
donors; sub-sectors like corrections, even more so.lxv Analysis of funding gaps is hampered by
lack of data; there is no single source for identifying how much donor assistance is allocated for
criminal justice reform worldwide.52 The OECD database is regarded as the most comprehensive
data source. Disaggregating data is complicated, however, by the fact that criminal justice often
is reported by donors under multiple program areas. OSI notes that in a DFID’s report on aid
spending, the word justice does not even appear, despite justice being a major aspect of its
portfolio.56

The types of reform pushed by donors, has left countries with unsustainable salary and
equipment maintenance costs. In Afghanistan, an extreme case, given the police role in US
counter-insurgency strategy, recurrent costs for the national security forces (police and army)
are estimated at $10 billion/year; in 2009, the IMF estimated the licit 2007-2008 GDP of
Afghanistan at $12 billion.lxvi In Sierra Leone, the UK provided £20m between 2001-2005. Even
with 50 percent of its budget supported by donors, Sierra Leone is struggling to cover recurrent
costs, while donor commitments have fallen far short of need.lxvii

A joint World Bank-Open Society Institute study identifies several additional issues. First,
“absolute expenditures are not always relevant as some activities cost more than others, and
some of the most important ones may cost donors very little.” Sectoral government expenditure
tends to be disproportionately on police, which cost more than courts, prosecutors, or public
defense; courts more than prosecutors.lxviii The study also notes that it is usually prisons, public
defense, prosecution, and police, that face under-runs, but that domestic public attention to the
latter two drives government allocation at the expense of the former two.

Measuring Results and Outcomes. Early international interventions often demonstrate
concrete, positive results – police reform in Haiti and Bosnia, for instance – but are rarely
sustained, without long-term results that matter to recipient populations. There is no agreed
upon framework for measuring progress in the criminal justice reform, either across donors or


                                                14
discreet areas of focus (e.g., comprehensive measure of justice sector reform, as opposed to
benchmarks and indicators for police reform, judicial reform.) Broad indicators that are
applicable across countries are necessary for comparative analysis and to monitor the status of
implementing international norms, but not internationally-agreed upon set of indicators yet
exists (though the UN is currently piloting a Rule of Law Indicators Project in Liberia and Haiti.)
At the same time, there is a risk that indicators that are broad enough to the fulfill this criteria
will not sufficiently capture local context and needs.lxix Jones et al. identify a number of
“outcomes” – the consequences of efforts, international, regional, national, or local, to
reconstruct internal security, including: (i) crime rates (including homicides and violent crime);
(ii) other crime indicators (e.g., drug production, trafficking); (iii) incidence of political violence;
(vi) number of casualties, and (v) public perceptions of security, rule of law, and corruption.lxx
They acknowledge, however, that there be significant methodological hurdles in terms of the
absence of reliable data (due to poorly or no functioning government) and causality.lxxi

There is considerable skepticism about quantitative metrics, in fact. According to Meharg,
metric-based progress reporting “tend[s] either to measure internal project progress…or more
vaguely, to measure external progress according to the perceived impact of a project.”lxxii
Dinnen et al. echo this in their review of Australian policing interventions in the Asia Pacific,
noting, “Numerical indicators such as the number of officers completing training and the
number of planning workshops held were useful for assessing the output of advisors…However,
such activities did little to demonstrate the actual impact or outcome of such activities, an issue
further complicated by the limited availability of benchmark data.”lxxiii

Metric-based performance indicators have resulted in more institutional receptiveness to
monitoring, where the political willingness to do so exists. The creation of the South African
Police Service provided an opportunity to establish and track progress towards performance
indicators that had several weaknesses (too many indicators, lack of capacity for analysis, weak
feedback mechanism), but which helped inculcate a culture of performance measurement
within the SAPS.lxxiv

5. Expectations

The WDR posits that public expectations in the legitimacy of government actions are essential
for any sustained success. With respect to the criminal justice system, several dimensions bear
highlighting:

First, there is a clear link between public confidence in the ability of the justice system to
prevent and fairly and effectively resolve criminality. Vigilante or extrajudicial justice, as well as
blood feuds, and retaliatory violence are often responses to the absence of effective remedy,
leading to escalation into violence.

Second, police are often are the public face of the state – particularly in rural areas. Police
behavior is a critical first step towards encouraging trust in the state. Overcoming a legacy of
low public trust in the police is a gradual process, easily undermined.lxxv International efforts to
extend state authority in response to fragility can be destabilizing when the government is seen
as the source of social problems, rather than the solution.




                                                  15
Third, in post-settlement environments, public optimism that recovery is “on the right track” has
been correlated to improvements in law and order.lxxvi Conversely, pessimism has been
correlated not just to deteriorations in law and order, but to lack of progress.lxxvii Yet, public
expectations for improvements in their personal security and for reform of government
institutions are usually high. Sustaining this optimism is more difficult, however, as there is often
a gap between expectations and the ability of state – or international – institutions to match
expectations. Actions that have undermined confidence and legitimacy frequently stem from
poorly conceived conceptualization or implementation of the mechanisms described above. In
Sierra Leone, for instance, post settlement, the existing police force was maintained despite its
past legacy of abuse during and prior to the war. No vetting mechanism was put in place, though
both a complaints mechanisms and internal investigations department were established.

Fourth, there is a risk that reform initiatives, whether local or international, will raise
expectations that do not translate into dramatic reductions in crime, improvements in safety,
reductions in discrimination. This impacts not only internal state legitimacy, but that of external
actors as well. Yet, there have been occasions – Kosovo, DR Congo – where exigent action and
under-attention to corrections by peacekeepers, for example has resulted in violation of
international standards. Repeated, failed interventions – in Haiti, in Timor-Leste – influence the
receptiveness of the government and public to new rounds of reform.

6. Principle Recommendations

    A. Addressing Legitimacy, Reinforcing Capabilities

        Interventions designed to strengthen the performance of local state law enforcement
        and justice institutions should focus beyond just criminal justice to encompass a broader
        range of local justice requirements, including mediation and conflict resolution, property
        and family dispute resolution.

        Where informal linkages between state justice systems and “non-state” providers
        already exist or where there are opportunities to do so, interventions should seek to
        incorporate these relationships into legislation and procedures, while reinforcing local
        accountability mechanisms and capabilities for problem-solving.

    B. Addressing Corruption, Organized, and Transnational Crime

        To counter organize and cross-border crime and associated violence, strengthening
        criminal justice legislation and enforcement is necessary, but not sufficient. Multi-
        sectoral, longer-time horizon interventions – creating opportunities for civil society,
        promoting local accountability, transforming public space, addressing disparities and at-
        risk youth – are required.




Endnotes




                                                 16
i
    United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies,” S/2004/616, August 2004.
ii
    Thomas Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival,” in Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of
Knowledge, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
iii
    The notion of “how much state” is enough, or rather what role and functions the state should serve vis-à-vis other
forms of formal and informal authority is a growing debate with respect to internal and external “statebuilding”
interventions – an issue raised in this paper in the context of what Scheye (2010) refers to as “second state” and
“non-state” security and justice providers.
iv
    Jan Perlin and Michelle India, “Towards a New Consensus on Justice Reform: Mapping the Criminal Justice Sector,”
Open Society Justice Initiative, July 2008, p. 26. Emphasis added.
v
    Pamela Dale, “Barriers to Justice in Sierra Leone,” Justice for the Poor, Vol. 1 (4), World Bank: September 2007.
vi
    I.e., “Soldiers by day, rebels by night.”
vii
      Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Combating Organized Crime in Mexico and Latin America,“
March 2009, conference summary at http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.item&news_id=514334
viii
     International Crisis Group, “Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State,” Crisis Group Africa Report No. 142, July 2007, p. 22,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/Guinea-
Bissau%20In%20Need%20of%20a%20State.pdf.
ix
    The World Bank, “Urban Crime and Violence in LAC: Status Report on Activities,” 2008, p. 3.
x
    UNODC, “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” July 2009, p. 69.
xi
    Jonathan Caulkins, Mark Kleiman, and Jonathan Kulick, “Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and
Security and Governance in Afghanistan, Center on International Cooperation, March 2010.
xii
     Zachariah Mampilly, “Stationary Bandits: Understanding Rebel Governance,” Doctoral Dissertation, UCLA 2007, on
file with the author.
xiii
     For example, to become a judge, one typically first has to train and practice as a lawyer – a minimum of five years
in the British education system.
xiv
     Thomas Carothers, “The Elusive Synthesis,” Journal of Democracy, 21 (4) October 2010, p. 23.
xv
         For an overview, see UNDP’s “Support to Security Sector Reform – SSSR” Project,
http://www.undp.org.al/index.php?page=projects/project&id=38
xvi
      BICC, “You Have Removed the Devil from our Door: An Assessment of the UNDP Small Arms and Light Weapons
Control                          (SALWC)                       project                       in                     Albania.”
http://intra.undp.org.al/ext/elib/download/?id=505&name=BICC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20SALWC%20Evaluation%2E
pdf
xvii
      In this section, focuses narrowly on the credibility of the state criminal justice system, rather than on (i) technical
processes to improve its effectiveness – e.g., working level coordination meetings among criminal justice institutions,
or macro-level legitimacy issues, e.g., whether the criminal justice support in question is being delivered under a
UNSC mandate.
xviii
        Linn Hammergren, “Balanced Justice and Donor Programs: Lessons from Three Regions of the World,” Open
Society Justice Initiative, via
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/criminal_justice/articles_publications/publications/justice_20081124/j
ustice_20081124b.pdf
xix
      In post-war Sierra Leone, for example, 85 percent of the urban population believed that police behavior had
improved since the end of the war, according to a 2004 perception survey. Bruce Baker, “The African post-conflict
policing agenda in Sierra Leone,” Conflict, Security, and Development, Vol. 6(1) pp: 25-49.
xx
     Chitra Bhanu and Christopher Stone, “Public Private Partnerships for Police Reform,” Vera Institute of Justice, p. 4.
xxi
     Mark Malan and Sarah Meek, “Extension of Government Authority and National Recovery,” in Malan et al., Sierra
Leone: Building the Road to Recovery, Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003, via
http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=1537.
xxii
      See, for example, American Bar Association, “DRC’s Mobile Courts Strike a Blow Against Rape and Related Crimes,”
November 2009,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/news/news_drc_mobile_courts_strike_blow%20against_crimes_1109.shtml.
xxiii
       In Nicaragua, crime has reportedly fallen by ten percent in areas where a paralegal program is run. Quintanilla,
2004, cited in Eric Scheye, “State-Provided Service, Contracting Out, and Non-State Networks: Justice and Security as
Public and Private Goods and Services,” OECD, 2009. Via www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/8/43599221.pdf
xxiv
      OSCE, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships, 2008, p. 33.
xxv
      UN Office on Drugs and Crime and The World Bank, “Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy
Options         in     the     Caribbean,”      Report     No.      37820,     March       2007,      pp.   149-150,      via
www.unodc.org/pdf/world%20bank%20C&V%20Report.pdf



                                                            17
xxvi
       According to Douglas Farah, illegal drug revenue exceeds counternarcotics budgets in Latin America 50-to-1.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, op cit.
xxvii
       World Bank and UNODC, “Crime Violence and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean,
Report No. 37820, March 2007, pp. 141-142.
xxviii
       World Bank, “Crime, Violence and Economic Development in Brazil: Elements for Effective Public Policy,” Report
No. 36525, June 2006.
xxix
      Eric Scheye notes that “From Timor-Leste to southern Sudan, Jamaica to Nepal, non-state/local justice and security
networks are associated, however obscurely/tenuously, with state systems, often in ‘law’ and, more often, ‘in
practice.’ It is as inaccurate, therefore, hermetically to characterize one set of justice and safety providers ‘state’ and
the other ‘non-state,’ when they overlap.” Scheye (2009) op cit., p. 11.
xxxi
            OECD,      “Enhancing      Security     and     Justice    Service     Delivery,”     OECD,      2007,      via
www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/publications/servicedelivery
xxxii
        Sinclair Dinnen, Abby McLeod, and Gordon Peake, “Police-Building in Weak States: Australian Approaches in
Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands,” in Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye, and Alice Hills, eds., “Managing Insecurity:
Field Experiences of Security Sector Reform,” A special issue of Civil Wars, Vol. 8(2), p. 104.
xxxiii
        Bryn Hughes, “Moving beyond rethinking the ‘state of the state’: To the challenge of reshaping international
contributions to peace operations,” draft on file with author, p. 6.
xxxiv
        Eric Scheye, “Pragmatic Realism in Justice and Security Development,” Clingendael Institute, July 2009, p. ii.
xxxv
        See for example Bruce Baker, “The African post-conflict policing agenda in Sierra Leone,” Conflict, Security &
Development, 6(1).
xxxvi
       Baker, op cit., p. 38.
xxxvii
         Interdisciplinary Analysis and Saferworld, “On track for improved security? A survey tracking changing
perceptions of public safety, security and justice provision in Nepal,” pp. v, 5, via
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/On_track_for_improved_security_English_2009.pdf. According to
the study, the Nepali police are regarded as the most effective institution for protecting people from crime, despite
the fact that (i) 46 percent of Nepalis surveyed do not have police posts in their municipality, (ii) public trust in and
respect for the police is not high (due to corruption, partially, rudeness), and (iii) 78 percent of those polled believe
the police are unreliable at bringing criminals to justice. (p. 3)
xxxviii
          UN operations in Port-au-Prince, for instance, successfully targeted criminal gangs, enabling the Haitian
government to assert its authority across the capital.
xxxix
        According to Stromseth, “they may, for instance, enjoy greater legitimacy among affected local populations than
either international prosecutions far away, or domestic prosecutions before the justice system of limited means for
credibility. International participation and resources can help ensure that the participation can give citizens of the
country most affected a greater stake and sense of ownership.” Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks,
Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007 ed.), p. 275.
xl
    CICIG, “Two Years of Work: Our Commitment is to Justice,” via http://cicig.org/index.php?page=two-years-of-work;
Andrew Hudson and Alexandra Taylor, “A New Model for International Criminal Justice? Guatemala's Commission
against Impunity,” J Int Criminal Justice, via
 http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/mqq003v1.pdf?ijkey=MQl9MfQ1lz3tQ87&keytype=ref
xli
     Deborah Isser, Stephan Lubkemann, Saah N’Tow, “Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and Perceptions of
Local Justice Options,” USIP, 2009.
xlii
      This involves four steps: “defining the problem and collecting reliable data, identifying causes and risk factors for
violent behavior, developing and implementing interventions, and analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of
violence prevention interventions.” UNODC and World Bank, op cit., p. 142.
xliii
      See for example www.vpajamaica.com/crimeobv/CRIME%20OBSERVATORY%20PROJECT.pdf
xliv
      Woodrow Wilson Center, op cit.
xlv
      Mark Downes, “Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service,” OSCE,
January 2004. See, in particular, chapter six.
xlvi
       Henriette von Kaltenborn-Stachau, “The Missing Link: Fostering Positive Citizen-State Relations in Post-Conflict
Environments,”The World Bank Communication for Governance and Accountability Program, 2008,
pp. 77-78.
xlvii
       Jake Sherman, Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa, Center on International Cooperation,
March 2009, via http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peace_ssr/docs/SSR_W.Africa.pdf
xlviii
       Stromseth, p. 215.
xlix
      OECD/DAC, “Handbook on Security System Reform,” (Paris: OECD, 2007), p. 195.



                                                           18
l
   International Peace Institute, “Transnational Organized Crime,” Blue Book No. 2, (New York: IPI, 2009), p. 4.
li
    Thomas Jaye, “Liberia: Parliamentary Oversight and Lessons Learned from Internationalized Security Sector Reform,”
Center             on         International        Cooperation,          March          2009,          p.        13.       Via
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/Liberia_SSR.pdf
lii
     See for example, Philippe Le Billon, Jake Sherman, and Marcia Hartwell, “Regulating Resource Flows to Civil Wars: A
review and analysis of current policies & legal instruments,” International Peace Academy Policy Paper, October 2002;
Global Witness, “Lessons UNLearned,” 2010.
liii
     Global Witness, “Lessons UNLearned,” January 2010.
liv
     Paraphrasing comments of the former UN Police Advisor at the WACI launch ceremony, New York, July 8, 2009.
lv
     William Reno, “Understanding Criminality in West African Conflicts,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16 (1), pp. 47-
61.
lvi
     Ibid.
lvii
      In Thailand and Pakistan, for instance, drug-crop cultivation has been reduced, but both have moved up the value
chain to become transit points for refined opiates. In Afghanistan and Myanmar, the national government has little
control over territory where drug production is greatest, complicating enforcement. Kaulkins et al., op cit.
lviii
      Ibid.
lix
     Ibid.
lx
     See EU NAVFOR Somalia, via http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en.
lxi
     Lynn Hammergren, “Balanced Justice and Donor Programs: Lessons from Three Regions of the World., pp. 1-2.
lxii
      Mark Sedra, “Narrowing the Policy-Practice Divide,” draft paper for the e-conference, The Future of SSR, p. 11.
lxiii
      Dinnen et al., op cit. p. 104.
lxiv
      Ibid.
lxv
      Stromseth, p. 62. As Stromseth et al. note, “Many past rule of law efforts have suffered from being underresourced
relative to their actual needs, [but] even underresourced programs have huge price tags.”
lxvi
       Sources for: planned size of ANSF, ANA, ANP; ultimate recurrent cost (internal USG documents place it at $11
bn/year); current Afghan GDP (most recent IMF report on Afghanistan on the Afgh page of the IMF website).
lxvii
       Baker, op cit., pp. 41-42.
lxviii
        The Council of Europe (CEPEJ, 2005 and 2006) found that “the annual expenditures on courts, prosecution, and
legal aid by 46 European countries never reach more that 0.5 percent of the GDP, except for two countries (Bosnia
and Herzegovina at 1.2 percent and Moldova at 2.3 percent). Data currently being processed by the World Bank place
many Latin American court budgets (exclusive of prosecution and defense) between 0.5 and 0.8 percent of GDP.14
While the Guatemalan judiciary’s 0.23 percent is lower, it still stands up well against the European averages.” Cited in
Hammergren, pp. 13-14.
lxix
      OSI , “Towards a New Consensus on Access to Justice,” Summary of Brussels Workshop, 29-30 April 2008.
lxx
      Seth Jones, Andrew Rathmell, and Jeremy Wilson, “Establishing Law and Order after Conflict,” RAND Corporation,
2005, p. 24.
lxxi
      Dinnen et al. echo this in their review of Australian policing interventions in the Asia Pacific, noting, “Measuring the
impact of specific programme initiatives, or, indeed, the project as a whole, is difficult. Numerical indicators such as
the number of officers completing training and the number of planning workshops held were useful for assessing the
output of advisors…However, such activities did little to demonstrate the actual impact or outcome of such activities,
an issue further complicated by the limited availability of benchmark data.” See Dinnen, et al. op cit., p. 93.
lxxii
       Sarah Meharg, Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management, (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), p.
lxxiii
       Dinnen, McLeod, and Peake in Peake, Scheye, Hills, p. 93
lxxiv
        OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform, pp. 80-81.
lxxv
       For example, by lack of progress elsewhere in the justice system; unrealistic community expectations relative to
police capacity – especially in rural areas; rotation of police, preventing relationship-building and stretching human
and financial resources; low poor morale, in part due to low wages; resistance to change by government and police
services; poor oversight and lack of accountability, including on use of firearms and detention; and failure to link
police reform to public reliance on traditional justice mechanisms
lxxvi
        Notably, improved perceptions of security have also been observed without actual improvement, according to
initial findings of an ongoing evaluation of the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan.
lxxvii
        Interdisciplinary Analysis and Saferworld, op cit.




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