53312 POVERTY THE WORLD BANK REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT NETWORK (PREM) Economic Premise FEBRUARY 2010 · Number 2 Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Migration and Remittances Sanket Mohapatra and Dilip Ratha Remittances to developing countries are estimated to have declined by 6.1 percent in 2009 as a result of weak job markets in major destination countries. Although new migration has fallen, it is still positive. The stock of international migrants, therefore, has continued to grow and remittances have remained resilient. Going forward, remittance flows to Latin America are expected to recover, whereas those to East Asia and South Asia are likely to slow. Policy responses should involve efforts to facilitate migration and remittances to make these flows cheaper, safer, and more productive for both the sending and the receiving countries. Remittances sent by international migrants worldwide are an and income opportunities for migrants. For the first time since important source of external finance for many developing the 1980s, remittances to developing countries are estimated countries. The global financial crisis has raised fears of a slow- to have declined by a modest 6.1 percent in 2009. Unlike pri- down or even a reversal of migration flows and a consequent vate capital flows, remittance flows have remained resilient decline in remittance flows, especially to low-income coun- through the crisis and have become even more important as tries. In this note, we present recent trends in, and the outlook a source of external financing in many developing countries. for, migration and remittance flows for 2010­11. Historically, remittances have been noted to be stable or even countercyclical, and have tended to rise in times of fi- Recent Trends in Remittances in 2009 nancial crises and natural disasters because migrants living abroad send more money to help their families back home. Officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries For example, remittance inflows increased to Mexico fol- in 2008 reached $338 billion (see table 1). This is three times lowing its financial crisis in 1995, to the Philippines and as large as overall official development assistance to devel- Thailand after the Asian crash in 1997, and to Central Amer- oping countries, and larger than private capital inflows in ica after Hurricane Mitch in 1998. many countries. The true size of flows, including unrecorded Unlike past emerging market crises, however, the current flows through formal and informal channels, is even larger. crisis started in the high-income countries and has spread to For many states, remittances are now the largest and least the developing countries, resulting in a global crisis. Migrant volatile source of foreign exchange, and for some countries-- destinations in both the North and South have been affected such as Lesotho, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Tonga--they ex- to varying degrees; and that, in turn, is affecting employment ceed one third of national income. 1 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise Table 1. Remittance Flows to Developing Countries, 2006­11 Remittance flows 2006 2007 2008 2009a 2010b 2011b pines, a surge in the last quarter of 2009 increased remit- ($ billions) tances by 5.6 percent (figure 1) as migrants sent money to Developing countries 235 289 338 317 322 334 help their families affected by typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng.1 East Asia and Pacific 58 71 86 85 85 89 Remittance flows to countries in the Latin America and Europe and Central 37 51 58 49 51 53 the Caribbean region in 2009 show larger declines than were Asia Latin America and 59 63 65 58 59 61 expected earlier. In Mexico, they fell by 15.7 percent in Caribbean 2009; and flows to El Salvador decreased by 8.5 percent (fig- Middle East and 26 31 35 32 33 34 ure 2). However, the decline in flows appears to be bottom- North Africa South Asia 43 54 73 72 73 76 ing out in most countries across the region. This reflects the Sub-Saharan Africa 13 19 21 21 21 22 fact that the crisis in the United States and Spain (particu- Low-income countries 20 25 32 32 33 34 larly in the construction sector)--key destination countries Middle-income 215 265 306 285 289 300 for Latin American migrants--started sooner than the crisis countries World 317 385 444 420 425 441 in other parts of the world. Growth rate (%) The Europe and Central Asia region is estimated to have Developing countries 18.3 22.9 16.7 ­6.1 1.4 3.9 experienced the largest decline in remittance flows among East Asia and Pacific 14.1 23.8 20.8 ­1.5 0.8 3.7 all developing regions in 2009, in part because of deprecia- Europe and Central 24.1 36.0 13.8 ­14.7 2.7 5.0 tion of the Russian ruble, relative to the U.S. dollar. Asia Latin America and 18.1 6.8 2.3 ­9.6 0.5 3.5 Caribbean Middle East and 4.6 20.1 10.6 ­7.2 1.5 3.3 Figure 1. Remittance Flows to Bangladesh, Pakistan, North Africa and the Philippines South Asia 25.3 27.1 35.6 ­1.8 1.7 4.1 50 Sub-Saharan Africa 34.7 47.6 13.4 ­2.9 1.8 3.9 year-on-year growth (%) Low-income countries 23.9 23.4 28.3 0.7 2.6 4.6 Bangladesh Middle-income 17.8 22.9 15.6 ­6.8 1.2 3.8 40 countries World 15.3 21.3 15.3 ­5.3 1.2 3.7 30 Pakistan Source: Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2009). 20 Note: Remittances are defined as the sum of workers' remittances, compen- sation of employees, and migrant transfers. For data definitions and the entire 10 data set, see http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. Philippines a. Estimated. 0 b. Forecast. t. 7 c. 7 b. 7 r. 8 n. 8 g. 8 t. 8 c. 8 b. 8 r. 9 n. 9 g. 9 t. 9 c. 9 09 Oc 00 De 200 Fe 200 Ap 00 Ju 200 Au 200 Oc 00 De 200 Fe 200 Ap 00 Ju 200 Au 200 Oc 00 De 200 20 2 2 2 2 2 g. Au Based on high-frequency data for the first three quarters Sources: Central banks of the countries represented. of 2009, we estimate that remittance flows to developing Note: Growth of three-month moving average. countries reached $317 billion in 2009, marking a 6.1 percent decline from 2008. This decline, however, masks significant Figure 2. Remittance Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean variation across the developing regions. Remittance flows to South Asia grew strongly in 2008, despite the global eco- Dominican Rep. Jamaica El Salvador Mexico nomic crisis; but now there are risks that they may slow down 25 Guatemala Nicaragua year-on-year growth (%) in a lagged response to a weak global economy. East Asia and Honduras 15 Sub-Saharan Africa also face similar risks. By contrast, remit- tance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean and to the 5 Middle East and North Africa were weaker than anticipated ­5 in 2009; but they appear to have reached a bottom already, with the expectation of a recovery in 2010 and 2011. ­15 Remittance flows to South Asia and East Asia have proved to be stronger than our earlier expectations. Flows to Pakistan ­25 8 g. 07 t. 7 c. 07 07 n. 8 g. 08 t. 8 c. 08 b. 8 r. 9 n. 9 g. 09 t. 9 c. 09 09 increased by 23.9 percent in 2009, and flows to Bangladesh 00 Oc 200 Ju 200 Oc 200 Fe 200 Ap 200 Ju 200 Oc 200 Au 20 De 20 20 Au 20 De 20 Au 20 De 20 20 b.2 n. r. and Nepal increased by 19.4 percent and 13.2 percent, re- Fe Ap Ju spectively (figure 1). Remittance flows to the East Asia and Sources: Central banks of the countries represented. Pacific region were also stronger than expected. In the Philip- Note: Growth of three-month moving average. 2 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise Figure 3. U.S.-Mexico Border Controls and Mexican Migrants' Duration of Stay in the United States Remittances to the Middle East and North Africa region 16 16 were also weaker than anticipated. Flows to Egypt (the 14 12 largest recipient in the region) declined by 15 percent; and thousands months 12 to Morocco, they fell by 9 percent in 2009. Sub-Saharan 8 Africa did relatively better, with flows to Nigeria, Kenya, and 10 Uganda showing higher growth or smaller declines than ex- 4 8 pected. Remittances to Cape Verde declined in U.S. dollar 6 0 terms in 2009, but were almost flat in local currency terms. 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 border patrol agents (left scale) migration duration (right scale) Sources: U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mexican Migration Project. Factors That Affected Migration and Remittance Flows in 2009 more recently (figure 3). In part, the reluctance to return The trends in global migration and remittance flows in 2009 also reflects the significantly higher incomes that migrants appear to have been influenced by the following factors: (1) are earning in the rich countries, despite the crisis. effects of the economic crisis on migrant stocks, (2) efforts Financial incentives to encourage return migration are by migrants to cut consumption, and (3) currency effects. also not working as expected in the Czech Republic, Japan, These factors are discussed below. and Spain. In part because of the weak response to financial incentives, Spain and other European countries are now con- Effect of current crisis on migration stocks and flows sidering stronger immigration restrictions. Anecdotally, em- Contrary to popular perception, remittance flows in a given ployers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries year are not directly related to migration flows during the are also offering unpaid leave to migrant workers to encour- same year; instead, remittances are sent by almost the entire age them to return home until the economy recovers; but existing stock of migrants (that is, cumulated flows of mi- there appear to be few takers. grants over the years). In understanding factors that influ- New migration flows (Nt ) from many countries appear to ence the impact of the current crisis on remittance trends, have been affected by the financial crisis and weak job mar- it is helpful to examine the impact of the crisis on the stock kets in the destination countries, although flows are still pos- of international migrants. The following stock-flow equation itive.2 There has been a large fall in new deployments in for migration is useful in this context: many migrant-sending countries; in Bangladesh, for exam- ple, migration fell by nearly half in 2009, compared with the Mt = (1­d )Mt-1 ­ Rt + Nt , (Eq. 1) number of migrants in the previous year. New migration where Mt = new migrant stock, Mt-1 = existing stock of mi- from Poland and other accession countries to the United grants, Rt = return migration, Nt = new migration, and d is Kingdom has fallen, and the number of workers from those the death rate (plus assimilation rate, as applicable) of mi- countries employed in the United Kingdom has plateaued grants in the host countries. Equivalently, since the start of the crisis. Developing countries with migrants in the GCC coun- DMt = Nt ­ Rt ­ d Mt-1, (Eq. 2) tries, such as Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and the where DMt is the change in migrant stock. In other words, Philippines, have experienced smaller declines in remittance the change in migrant stock equals new migration net of re- flows. Dubai, which has been worst affected by the crisis, is turn migration and deaths (and assimilation) of existing mi- only one of the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates; grants. and the only one that does not have oil. The substantial fi- There is little evidence of return migration (Rt ) as a result nancial resources and long-term infrastructure development of the financial crisis in Europe and the United States. On plans of the GCC countries imply that they will continue the contrary, there are widespread reports that migrants are to demand migrant workers. unwilling to return to their countries of origin, fearing that Some developing countries are also important destina- they may not be able to reenter once they leave because of tions for migrants--for example, India, Malaysia, the Russian tighter immigration controls (See Awad [2009], Fix et al. Federation, and South Africa. Resource-rich developing [2009], and Green and Winters [forthcoming]). Data from countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Nige- the Mexican Migration Project show that the duration of ria, and Sudan are also becoming attractive destinations for migration for Mexican migrants in the United States has in- migrants. It is hard to predict how outward remittances from creased from 8 months in the early 1990s to 15 months these destination countries in the South will be affected by 3 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise Figure 4. Widening Interest Rate Differentials and Exchange Rate Depreciation in India the crisis, but some interesting cases involving currency ef- a. Interest rates fects are discussed below. 10 9 Efforts by migrants to cut consumption 8 India policy rate Remittances are a small share of migrants' incomes, and they 7 percent typically continue to send remittances even when hit by in- 6 5 come shocks. Interviews with migrants in Dubai suggest that 4 U.S. policy rate many migrant workers have sent their families back home 3 LIBOR 6-months and have reduced their daily expenditures in response to 2 1 wage cuts by employers. Migrants are also sharing accom- 0 modations to enable them to send remittances. Many mi- M 006 Ju 007 Se 007 c. 7 M 007 Se 008 c. 8 M 008 Ju 009 Se 009 c. 9 09 Ju 008 De 00 De 00 De 00 20 grants who have lost jobs are not leaving; rather, they are 2 .2 2 2 2 2 2 2 .2 2 2 .2 c. n. p. n. p. n. p. ar ar ar De taking lower-paying jobs with other employers, and often staying on illegally. There are anecdotal reports of family Note: LIBOR = London interbank offered rate. members sending "reverse remittances" to help migrants. b. India exchange rate Currency effects 52 Exchange rate movement can be an important factor affect- 50 ing the U.S. dollar valuation of remittances. For example, in rupees/US$ 48 U.S. dollar terms, remittance flows to the Kyrgyz Republic, 46 Armenia, and Tajikistan declined by 15 percent, 33 percent, 44 and 34 percent, respectively, in the first half of 2009, com- 42 pared with the same period in 2008. However, the Russian 40 ruble lost 25 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar in the first half of 2009, compared with its average value in the 38 same period the previous year. If measured in ruble terms, 07 07 08 08 07 09 09 09 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 remittances to the Kyrgyz Republic actually increased 17 g. c. r. g. c. r. g. c. Ap Ap Au De Au De Au De percent in the first half of 2009 on a year-on-year basis. In Source: Development Prospects Group, World Bank. Armenia, the year-on-year fall in ruble terms was only 8 per- cent; and in Tajikistan, it was 10 percent. Similarly, a signif- icant part of the decline in remittance flows to Poland can global slump that began in 2008. Although recovery will be explained by the weakening of the British pound against gather pace, according to the forecasts, growth will remain the U.S. dollar. weak in 2010 and 2011, and is unlikely to reach the brisk Exchange rate movements also affect remittances through pace seen before the crisis. In line with this outlook, and their impacts on consumption/investment motives. As high- based on our methodology of forecasting remittances using lighted in Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2009), the depre- a bilateral migration matrix and the World Bank's forecasts ciation of the Indian rupee and the Philippine peso produced of nominal GDP growth, we have revised our forecasts for a "sale effect" on housing, bank deposits, stocks, and other as- remittances. Flows to developing countries are expected to sets back home. Indeed, as the Indian rupee has depreciated remain almost flat in 2010 (with a modest increase of 1.4 more than 25 percent against the U.S. dollar, there has been percent) and grow by 3.9 percent in 2011 (table 1). With a surge in remittance flows to India (figure 4). There are signs this sluggish pace of recovery, remittance flows are unlikely that a similar surge in investment-related remittance flows is to reach the 2008 level even by 2011. happening in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Moldova, Nepal, Pak- The decline in remittance flows to Latin America and the istan, the Philippines, and Tajikistan. Caribbean appears to be bottoming out. However, partly be- cause of the large declines in 2009, flows to Europe and Central Asia and to Latin America and the Caribbean by Outlook for Migration and Remittances 2011 are unlikely to recover to the pre-crisis levels of 2008. in 2010­11 Flows to other developing regions are expected to remain weak in 2010­11. Although the outcome for remittances in World Bank and International Monetary Fund estimates 2009 turned out better than expected, the recovery in the show that economic growth is beginning to recover after the coming years is expected to be more shallow. 4 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise One source of risk to this outlook is that the crisis could sending countries in East Asia and South Asia. Although a re- last longer than expected. The emerging recovery in con- covery in oil prices and fiscal stimulus implemented by GCC struction and other sectors in the United States may not be governments is likely to help maintain employment levels for sustained after the effects of the stimulus package wear off. existing migrants, new migration flows are unlikely to grow The recovery in construction employment in the United over the next two years. Therefore, remittances from the States has been driven in part by a credit to new home buy- GCC countries may remain stable, but they are unlikely to ers that has stabilized migrant employment in that sector grow rapidly for a year or two. (figure 5). If this subsidy proves unsustainable, it could have A second source of risk to the outlook presented here is a dampening impact on the housing market. The recovery that weak job markets and persistently high rates of unem- in migrant employment in construction during the summer ployment in the destination countries may lead to further may also be seasonal. A slowdown in construction activities tightening of immigration controls especially for low-skilled in the United States tends to affect remittance flows to Mex- migrants. Many economists are predicting a "jobless" global ico with a lag of four to six months (figure 6). recovery. The labor market in the United States is expected Other migrant-sending countries may also experience a to remain weak in the medium term, and unemployment lagged slowdown in remittance flows in response to slowing rates are expected to remain high. If employment recovers activities in other destination countries. A deceleration in con- only with a substantial lag to the recovery in economic out- struction activities in the GCC countries may affect migrant- put, then it is likely to have an impact on the employment levels and incomes of migrants--and, in turn, on their ability to send remittances. Figure 5. U.S. Migrant Employment in Construction and Manufacturing A third source of risk is that currency movements are construction highly unpredictable. If the currencies of receiving countries manufacturing start appreciating with respect to the U.S. dollar, then the migrant employment (millions) 3.2 restaurants and hotels "sale effect" (remittances for investment in cheaper assets) 3.0 wholesale and retail trade may reverse. This especially applies to India, which experi- 2.8 enced a surge in such flows during 2008. The abnormal 2.6 surge in remittances to Bangladesh and Tajikistan during 2.4 2007­08 may also prove unsustainable for the same reasons. 2.2 2.0 1.8 Policy Responses Ap 08 08 08 Oc 08 08 08 Ap 09 09 09 Oc 09 De 009 09 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 With lower levels of foreign aid and investment likely over 2 b. r. n. g. t. c. b. r. n. g. t. c. Au De Au Fe Ju Fe Ju the short term, remittances will have to shoulder an increas- Source: U.S. Census Bureau. ing percentage of local development needs. Unfortunately, the greatest risk to remittance flows does not come from the economic downturn itself; instead, it comes from protec- Figure 6. Correlation between U.S. Construction Sector Activity and tionist measures taken by many destination countries, in- Remittances to Mexico cluding those in the developing world. There are risks that 35 20 year-on-year growth (%) year-on-year growth (%) more immigration controls to protect native workers might 25 0 imply a trade-off between protecting native workers from 15 job competition and protecting businesses facing falling rev- 5 ­20 enues. In the short term, allowing employers flexibility in ­5 hiring and firing decisions may help them cut costs and sur- ­40 vive the crisis. In the medium term, that might result in a ­15 more sustainable recovery. ­25 ­60 Many migrant-sending countries are worried about large 06 07 07 08 08 09 09 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 return migration prompted by weak job markets in destina- l. n. l. n. l. n. l. n. Ju Ju Ju Ju Ju Ju Ju Ju tion countries. Return migration in the current crisis appears remittances to Mexico housing starts, four months to be negligible so far; but if it happens, the workers coming (left scale) earlier (right scale) back home will return with skills, entrepreneurial energy, Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; Banco de Mexico. and capital (see box 1). These workers should be provided 5 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise Box 1. Resilience of Remittance Flows, Relative to Other Types of Flows during the Current Crisis Despite the prospect of a sharper decline in remittance inflows have been the case in India during the Gulf War of 1990­ than anticipated earlier, these flows have remained more resilient 91, which forced a large number of Indian workers in the than many other types of resource flows (such as private debt Gulf to return home (Ratha 2003). Also, the "safe haven" and equity flows and foreign direct investment that declined factor or "home bias" may cause remittances for invest- sharply in 2009 as foreign investors pulled out of emerging mar- ment purposes to return home during an economic down- kets). There are several reasons for the resilience of remittances turn in the host country. Migrants not only bring back in the face of economic downturns in host countries: savings; they also bring business skills. Jordan's economy performed better than many observers had expected be- · Remittances are sent by the cumulated flows of migrants tween 1991 and 1993 because of the return of relatively over the years, not only by the new migrants of the last skilled workers from the Gulf. year or two. This makes remittances persistent over time. If new migration stops, then remittances may stop growing · Most high-income remittance source countries in the Or- over a period of a decade or so. But they will continue to ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development increase as long as migration flows continue. have undertaken large fiscal stimulus packages in re- sponse to the financial crisis. This increase in public ex- · Remittances are a small part of migrants' incomes, and penditure, if directed to public infrastructure projects, will migrants continue to send remittances when hit by in- increase demand for both native and migrant workers. come shocks. Taylor (2000) has found that public income transfer pro- grams in the United States resulted in increased remit- · Because of a rise in anti-immigration sentiments and tances to Mexico: when all other things are equal, tighter border controls, especially in Europe and the United immigrant households that received social security or un- States, the duration of migration appears to have in- employment insurance were more likely to remit than creased. Those people staying in the host country are were other immigrant households. Also, documented mi- likely to continue to send remittances. grants are likely to send more remittances to their families · If migrants do return to their home countries, they are to compensate for a fall in remittances by undocumented likely to take accumulated savings with them. This may migrants. with help in setting up small businesses and reintegrating phone networks. However, significant regulatory challenges into their communities, not be made the object of envy or related to anti-money-laundering initiatives and efforts to fear of job competition. counter the financing of terrorism remain for cross-border To compensate for any reduction in new migration flows, transfers using mobile phone networks. some migrant-sending countries are trying to establish guest A standard remittance is a simple financial transaction worker programs with destination countries. India is negoti- that--if lightly regulated and processed using modern technol- ating mobility partnerships with some European countries. ogy--can cost as little as 1 percent of the amount transferred. Bangladesh and Nepal are trying to negotiate the continua- Many remittance providers currently charge fees of more than tion of immigration quotas with Malaysia and the Republic 10 percent. Reducing remittance costs would require improv- of Korea, respectively. The Philippines is actively searching ing competition and transparency in the remittance market, for new migrant destinations. applying a simpler and identical set of regulations across Several countries are beginning to look at facilitating re- state and national boundaries, and increasing the use of mittances in the face of external financing constraints, includ- postal networks and mobile phone companies. Exclusive ing introducing incentives to send more remittances through partnership arrangements between money-transfer compa- formal channels. For example, Pakistan has introduced a pro- nies and the postal and banking networks of most countries gram that subsidizes remittance service providers for a cer- are a hindrance to competition among firms offering remit- tain part of their marketing expenses, depending on the tance services. Sharing of payment platforms with multiple volumes transferred. Countries are also trying to facilitate partners should be encouraged. cheaper and faster remittances. One of the potentially cheap- If funds were transferred through banks and other finan- est and quickest options is money transfer using mobile cial intermediaries, migrants and their beneficiaries would 6 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise Figure 7. International Remittances Agenda 1. Monitoring, analysis, projection · size, corridors, channels · countercyclicality · effects on poverty, education, health, investment · policy (costs, competition, exchange 3. Financial access controls 4. Capital market access · deposit and saving products · private banks and corporations · loan products (mortgages, (securitization) consumer loans, microfinance) · governments (diaspora bonds) · credit history for MFI clients · sovereign credit rating · insurance products 2. Retail payment systems · payment platforms/instruments · regulation (clearing, settlement, capital adequacy, exchange controls, disclosure, cross0border arbitration) · anti-money-laundering/countering financing of terrorism Source: Authors' elaboration. Note: MFI = microfinance institution. be encouraged to save and invest. Intermediary banks could period and the Great Depression in the 1930s), and con- also use remittance inflows as collateral to borrow larger clude that host-country economic factors usually were a sums in international credit markets for local investments. much stronger determinant of migration than were origin- The development community can leverage remittance country factors. Passel and Suro (2005) report a similar find- flows for development by making them cheaper, safer, and ing for Mexican migration to the United States in the more productive for both the sending and the receiving coun- 1992­2004 period. (See also Hatton and Williamson 2009.) tries. An "International Remittances Agenda," as summarized in figure 7, would involve (1) monitoring, analysis and pro- About the Authors jections, (2) improving retail payment systems through use of Sanket Mohapatra is an economist and Dilip Ratha is a lead better technologies and appropriate regulatory changes, (3) economist in the Development Prospects Group of the World linking remittances to financial access at the household level, Bank. This note draws on Migration and Development Briefs 8 and (4) leveraging remittances for capital market access at the through 11, published between November 2008 and November institutional or macroeconomic level. 2009 (coauthored with Ani Silwal), http://go.worldbank.org/SS W3DDNLQ0; and on "Dollars Without Borders" by Dilip Notes Ratha, published in Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2009, http:// 1. Remittance flows to Haiti are also likely to surge in 2010, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65448/dilip-ratha/dollars- in response to the devastating earthquake in January; see without-borders. For more information, see the PeopleMove blog http://www.ssrc.org/features/pages/haiti-now-and-next/13 at http://peoplemove.worldbank.org. 38/1438/. 2. Green and Winters (forthcoming) have examined mi- gration trends during several past crises (in the 1831­1913 7 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise References Passel, Jeffrey S., and Roberto Suro. 2005. "Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends Awad, Ibrahim. 2009. The Global Economic Crisis and Migrant Workers: Im- in U.S. Immigration 1992­2004." Pew Hispanic Center, Washington, pact and Response. Geneva, Switzerland: International Migration Pro- DC. http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf. gramme, International Labour Organization. Ratha, Dilip. 2003. 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"Do Government Programs `Crowd In' Remit- Hatton, Timothy, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2009. "Global Economic Slumps tances?" Inter-American Dialogue and the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, and Migration." Vox EU, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3512. Washington, DC. The Economic Premise note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on topics related to economic policy. It is produced by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank. The notes are available at www.worldbank.org/economicpremise.