

9

Recommendations


Making migration work better



Key messages

- There is significant scope for countries of origin, destination, and transit to manage cross-border movements in a strategic manner, thereby maximizing gains while mitigating costs (figure 9.1). Countries in all situations can adopt policies that enhance the development effects of migration on their societies (table 9.1).
- In most cases, the benefits of cross-border movements can be increased (and the costs mitigated) through international cooperation. Bilateral and multilateral approaches are needed.
- Although making policy on migration is often politically sensitive, lessons can be drawn from other countries to develop evidence-based approaches.
- The challenge is to determine not only what needs to be done, but also how to get it done. This will require better data and fit-for-purpose financing instruments, as well as ways to bring under-represented voices to the debate.

Figure 9.1 When strategically managed, migration maximizes gains while mitigating costs



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

Table 9.1 Main policy recommendations

WHEN MIGRANTS' AND REFUGEES' SKILLS ARE IN DEMAND (STRONG MATCH)		
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN Manage migration for poverty reduction	COUNTRY OF DESTINATION Maximize benefits, reduce costs	BILATERAL COOPERATION Strengthen match
<p>Strategy. Make emigration part of development strategies.</p> <p>Remittances. Leverage remittances for poverty reduction and reduce their costs.</p> <p>Knowledge. Work with the diaspora and returnees to spur knowledge transfers and to strengthen integration in the global economy.</p> <p>Skills development and brain drain mitigation. Expand education and training in skills that are in demand in both the national and global labor markets.</p> <p>Protection. Provide citizens abroad with protection. Support vulnerable family members left behind.</p>	<p>Strategy. Acknowledge labor needs. Build a consensus on the role of migration. Ensure policy coherence.</p> <p>Entry and status. Incentivize stronger match immigration. Ensure migrants have a formal status and rights.</p> <p>Economic inclusion. Facilitate labor market inclusion. Enhance recognition of migrants' qualifications. Combat exploitation and promote decent work.</p> <p>Social inclusion. Prevent segregation and facilitate access to services. Combat discrimination.</p> <p>Support to nationals. Support citizens who are negatively affected in terms of employment outcomes and public services through social protection and public investments.</p>	<p>Bilateral labor agreements. Structure and facilitate win-win movements. Reduce recruitment costs.</p> <p>Skills development. Partner to finance the development of skills that are in demand in both the national and global labor markets.</p>
WHEN REFUGEES' SKILLS ARE NOT IN DEMAND (WEAK MATCH, FEAR MOTIVE)		
HOST COUNTRY Manage with a medium-term perspective and enhance the match	INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Share the costs with hosting countries	
<p>Institutions and instruments. Mainstream refugee support through line ministries. Develop sustainable financing frameworks.</p> <p>Internal mobility. Facilitate and encourage refugees' movements toward opportunities.</p> <p>Self-reliance. Enable refugees to access jobs in the formal labor market.</p> <p>Inclusion in national services. Deliver education, health, and social services to refugees through national systems.</p>	<p>Responsibility-sharing. Prevent or resolve situations that cause refugees to flee. Provide adequate amounts of medium-term financing. Increase resettlement options. Broaden the base of support beyond current main contributors. Develop regional approaches.</p> <p>Solutions. Further work toward "durable solutions" (voluntary return, local integration or resettlement). Develop innovative statuses that provide state protection and access to opportunities over the medium term.</p>	
WHEN MIGRANTS' SKILLS ARE NOT IN DEMAND (WEAK MATCH, NO FEAR MOTIVE)		
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN Reduce the need for distressed movements	COUNTRY OF TRANSIT Coordinate with countries of destination	COUNTRY OF DESTINATION Respect migrants' dignity
<p>Resilience. Enhance social protection. Create domestic alternatives to international migration.</p> <p>Education. Build skills that allow people to have more options.</p> <p>Inclusion. Promote inclusive and green development. Foster adaptation to climate change.</p>	<p>Cooperation. Work with the destination country to absorb migrants or return them humanely (for last transit country).</p>	<p>Respect. Treat all migrants humanely.</p> <p>Complementary protection. Strengthen the coherence of the current system to protect people at risk who are not refugees.</p> <p>Legal pathways. Shift migrants' incentives by establishing legal pathways for workers in demand, including lower-skilled workers.</p> <p>Enforcement. Manage necessary returns humanely. Clamp down on smugglers and exploitative employers. Strengthen institutional capacity to process entries.</p>
MAKING MIGRATION POLICY DIFFERENTLY		
DATA AND EVIDENCE	FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS	NEW VOICES
<p>Harmonization. Harmonize data collection methods.</p> <p>Evidence-building. Invest in new types of surveys to inform policy making.</p> <p>Open data. Encourage research by making data widely available, while respecting migrants' and refugees' privacy.</p>	<p>New or expanded instruments. Develop medium-term instruments to support refugee-hosting countries. Provide external support to low- and middle-income countries receiving weaker match migrants.</p> <p>Enhanced use of existing instruments. Incentivize private sector engagement. Support origin countries in leveraging migration for development. Incentivize bilateral and regional cooperation.</p>	<p>Affected nations. Build coalitions among countries facing common challenges.</p> <p>Domestic stakeholders. Ensure participation of a broad range of stakeholders in decision-making processes.</p> <p>Migrants' and refugees' voices. Develop representation and accountability systems to organize migrants' and refugees' voices.</p>

Source: WDR 2023 team.

Introduction

This chapter summarizes key policy recommendations arising from the analysis presented in this Report. This summary draws on the underlying evidence developed in earlier chapters and provides a structured outline of critical policy directions rather than an exhaustive and nuanced collection of possible approaches and experiences.

Also included are policy examples adopted by a variety of countries. Some policies have succeeded and others only partly so. Many have been controversial. Evaluating some of these policies raises methodological challenges.¹ However, regardless of their imperfections, the examples convey a wealth of experience from which policy makers can learn, bearing in mind that there is no model approach. Policy making needs to be tailored to the specifics of each situation.

This chapter is organized according to the Match and Motive Matrix, providing specific recommendations for each type of cross-border movement. There are situations in which migrants or refugees bring skills and attributes that are a strong match for the needs of the destination country; situations in which people do not bring such skills but move because of fear in their country of origin (refugees); and situations in which migrants have neither skills in demand nor international protection needs (distressed migrants). The chapter also discusses some of the essential elements that can help make reform happen.

Under each type of cross-border movement are sections that include countries of origin, countries of destination, countries of transit, and refugee-hosting countries. However, these countries are often not distinct; many could fit into all four categories. Recommendations are thus geared toward the specific “functions” of each society rather than specific groups of countries.

Strong match: Maximize gains for all


When people bring skills and attributes in demand in the destination country, there are net gains for themselves, as well as for their countries of origin and destination. These gains materialize regardless of migrants’ motives, skill levels, or legal status. Countries of origin can proactively manage emigration as a force for poverty reduction in their own society. Countries of destination can also use immigration to meet their labor needs and contribute to their societies. Bilateral cooperation can help enhance the mutual gains of such movements.

Origin countries: Manage emigration for poverty reduction

Cross-border mobility can be a powerful force for reducing poverty in origin countries. The benefits for development arise from remittances, knowledge and technology flows, higher incentives and opportunities for human capital accumulation, and more efficient allocation of labor. But there are also economic, societal, and human costs when a large share of the adult population, including highly skilled professionals, emigrate, especially from smaller and poorer countries. The impacts of emigration on the country of origin—both positive and negative—are neither preset nor uniform within or across origin societies. Origin countries can shape these impacts for their own development (figure 9.2).

STRATEGY. *Make emigration part of development strategies.* In countries with relatively large numbers of current or potential labor emigrants, economic and development strategies should reflect the importance of the potential contribution of emigration to poverty reduction. These strategies should outline specific measures the government intends to take to maximize these benefits and to mitigate negative impacts. In preparing their strategies, governments would benefit from inputs from the private sector, labor unions, current and would-be migrants, and the diaspora. In some cases, dedicated institutions are needed to ensure the implementation of these strategies.

Figure 9.2 Countries of origin can manage emigration for poverty reduction



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

In the Philippines, successive governments have made labor migration an integral part of the country’s development strategy. The focus of such efforts has shifted with political priorities, but the determination to leverage or mitigate the complex effects of emigration has remained. Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022 aimed to mainstream migration, facilitate temporary movements, and support migrants’ return.² Philippine Development Plan 2023–2028 is directed at supporting returning migrants’ reentry into the economy and managing the social impacts of emigration, including by offering health and psychosocial services to migrants and their children. In parallel, the government set up two institutional structures to manage migration policy and regulation: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. They were recently consolidated into a single Department of Migrant Workers.³

The Bangladesh government set up a Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment in 2001. It is charged with strategic planning and programming to support regular and temporary labor migration.⁴ The government also offers potential migrants services such as information and awareness campaigns (including on recruitment agencies and safety) and skills training.

Once migrants are abroad, they have access to migration attaché offices in embassies and consulates in destination countries with large numbers of migrants. However, challenges remain to ensure the full use of such services.⁵

REMITTANCES. *Leverage remittances and reduce their costs.* Remittances reduce poverty by enabling investments in health, education, and entrepreneurship; providing insurance against income shocks; and increasing recipient households' access to formal financial markets. In countries where they account for a relatively large share of income, remittances contribute to macroeconomic stability and reduce fluctuations. Reducing remittance fees and enabling remittances to flow through formal channels are critical, as articulated in the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Policies that reduce remittance costs include increasing financial competition; introducing new financial products; expanding access to finance, especially in rural and poorer communities; and adopting digital payment technologies. These policies can be underpinned by cooperation with destination countries.

To facilitate remittance flows, the Group of Twenty (G20) has created a road map (G20 Plan to Facilitate Remittance Flows) for coordination between the public and private sectors and improvements in technological infrastructure.⁶ This road map includes efforts to (1) advance the provision of payment instruments and systems; (2) leverage technology to develop efficient and cheaper payment systems; and (3) increase accessibility and transparency.⁷ As of 2021, the 2014 target of reducing the global average cost of transferring remittances from 10 percent to 5 percent had still not been met (the G20 average cost is 8.12 percent).

Emigrants from Mexico enjoy relatively low remittance fees⁸ because of the large size of the US–Mexico corridor and the extent of competition. As part of a broader set of financial sector reforms that can further reduce the cost of sending remittances, Mexico introduced in 2018 the Financial Technology Law, which authorizes and governs financial technology (fintech) service providers in the country and enables innovation in this sector.⁹ The government also introduced a digital payments initiative, *Directo a Mexico*, for digital payments between Mexico and the United States. Several banks in Mexico also allow migrants to open accounts through online services¹⁰ and to deposit remittances in US dollars to ease this flow.¹¹ To improve access to finance in rural areas, the Mexican government has coordinated with banks in the *La Red de la Gente* (People's Network) program.¹²

KNOWLEDGE. *Engage the emigrant community to encourage knowledge transfers and global integration.* In countries that have a relatively large diaspora or regular flows of returnees, knowledge transfers can invigorate the domestic economy. Migrants and diasporas can contribute to further integrating their origin countries in the global economy and facilitate trade and foreign direct investment flows. Many returning migrants, regardless of their formal education level, bring back improved skills, assets, and knowledge. Most of these contributions stem from individual or private groups' initiatives, and there may be little that governments should do. In some cases, policy interventions could even disrupt market mechanisms. Still, governments can facilitate such initiatives by maintaining a favorable business environment and easy access to a strong formal financial sector and by connecting migrants with stakeholders involved in business incubation.

Vietnam has created mechanisms to engage its diaspora in contributing to the country's economic development plan.¹³ The State Committee for Overseas Vietnamese Affairs is tasked with leveraging relations with the diaspora in fields such as economy, science and technology, education and training, and culture. In 2021, the committee launched a comprehensive survey collecting the diaspora's opinions to inform the review of a set of laws and administrative procedures.¹⁴

In 2010, Moldova established the Programme for Attracting Remittances into the Economy (PARE 1+1).¹⁵ Under the program, returnees receive support to create enterprises, such as entrepreneurship and business development training, advisory and consultancy services, and matching financial resources (“one for one” up to a certain level).¹⁶ As of 2023, over 700 returnees have benefited from the program: 1,900 financing contracts have been issued and 397 million lei (US\$21.7 million) have been allocated, generating 1,153 billion lei (US\$62.8 million) in investments in the economy.¹⁷

BRAIN DRAIN. *Expand education and training in globally transferable skills, including to mitigate the effects of brain drain.*¹⁸

When potential migrants acquire skills in demand in destination economies, they are better matches with destination countries’ needs. Better-skilled migrants often have more access to regular entry channels, enter the destination labor market in a stronger position, and are paid higher incomes. Emigration of high-skilled professionals, however, can have adverse economic and social effects, especially if they are critical to the delivery of essential services such as health care. These effects are particularly pronounced in lower-income and smaller economies. The solution partly entails expanding training and education in these areas: even if some high-skilled workers leave, others will stay, and their numbers may be sufficient for the origin country. The challenge is twofold. First, ensure that skill-building initiatives are market-driven—for example, through consultations with private employers both in the origin country and at destinations. Second, secure sufficient financing, including by facilitating private sector engagement or requiring migrants to partially repay for publicly funded education and training. Some governments have also considered mandatory public service requirements that reduce emigration soon after graduation, but enforcement is often difficult. Such requirements could complement other measures to improve the domestic conditions of high-skilled professionals over time (for example, with regard to job prospects and wages in some occupations).

In response to the growing demand for health care workers in the United States between 2000 and 2007, the Philippines expanded its nursing education programs.¹⁹ When the United States rapidly expanded the availability of visas for foreign nurses and their families in 2000, enrollment and graduation in Philippine nursing programs experienced a significant boost.²⁰ Some students who were enrolled in postsecondary school switched from other fields to study nursing. Most of this response was driven by private schools, which opened or expanded nursing programs. This boost lasted until the United States returned to pre-2000 levels after 2007. For every nurse migrant, nine more nurses obtained their licenses.

PROTECTION. *Connect with and protect citizens, regardless of where they are.* Migration involves challenges and risks, including financial costs, a different language, unfamiliarity with a foreign culture and legal system, and, at times, discrimination and abuse. Migrants rely on multiple support mechanisms to overcome these challenges: friends, family, diaspora, civil society, and institutions in the destination country. Origin governments can strengthen such protection by providing migrants with accessible consular services, with properly trained staff, as well as by regulating the activities of recruitment agencies and other intermediaries.²¹ Both may also help maintain bonds with citizens living abroad, which can enhance remittances and knowledge transfers, business links, and trade and investment flows that migrants facilitate while abroad.

In 2017, the Indonesian government reformed the law governing emigration with a view toward strengthening workers’ protection.²² Under the new law, regional governments—instead of private companies—oversee the provision of predeparture vocational training and the placement of workers. The changes were aimed at reining in private recruitment firms that charge migrants substantial fees, tying workers to them until they pay off their debt.²³ Although there remain


many challenges to prevent the exploitation of migrant workers, the law was generally seen as an important step toward better protection.²⁴

The government of Papua New Guinea is making efforts to integrate liaison officer functions as part of its Pacific Labor Mobility Scheme, which facilitates labor migration to Australia. The officer’s role is to gather information on migrants’ grievances and bring them to the relevant entities for redress.

Destination countries: Maximize benefits, reduce costs

When immigrants’ skills and attributes match the needs of destination countries, there are net gains for both destination countries and the migrants themselves. For destination countries, the policy challenge is to maximize the benefits and reduce the costs of receiving such migrants through a multipronged agenda of economic and social integration and by supporting nationals who are negatively affected by migration (figure 9.3). This agenda applies to all migrants and to people who need international protection (refugees), as long as their skills and attributes are a strong match for the needs of destination societies.

Figure 9.3 Countries of destination can manage immigration for their benefit



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country. The dashed vertical line signifies that the five policy recommendations apply to both quadrants in the top row.

STRATEGY. *Identify and acknowledge labor needs and ensure policy coherence.* Many destination countries are facing demographic challenges and rising labor needs either because they are already aging (high-income countries) or because they are beginning to do so (middle-income countries). In most cases, automation, pro-natalist policies, and policy reforms in education, pension, and health care delivery will not be sufficient to address labor shortfalls, and some labor migration will be necessary. Each society must identify for itself the optimal combination of measures that can sustain its prosperity. Coherence of migration policies often requires coordination across multiple agencies, including with respect to migrants' entry and conditions of stay.

Canada has adopted a proactive approach to managing immigration needs. For the current period, this approach is reflected in its 2023–2025 Immigration Levels Plan.²⁵ The plan is based on identification of labor needs. It embraces immigration as a strategy to attract the skills required in key sectors, such as health care, skilled trades, manufacturing, and technology. It sets a target of receiving 465,000 permanent residents in 2023; 485,000 in 2024; and 500,000 in 2025, with a greater focus on attracting newcomers to different regions of the country, including small towns and rural communities.

To institutionalize coherence of migration policies and facilitate migrants' integration, Portugal has established a one-stop entity for migration-related issues, the National Immigrant Support Center (Centro Nacional de Apoio à Integração de Migrantes).²⁶ The center brings under one roof a wide range of government and support services related to immigration, independently of their legal status. It also provides other relevant support services for migrants in Portugal, such as support offices for family reunification, legal advice, and employment.²⁷

ENTRY. *Create incentives for immigration by workers whose skills and attributes are a strong match with countries' specific labor needs.* Many countries have established systems to regulate the entry of migrants into their territory with a view toward favoring those who are seen as potential net contributors. Yet these systems have had varying degrees of success. For example, over half of all tertiary-educated immigrants live in only four countries: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. And a number of destination countries have unmet needs for lower-skilled workers. Possible policy measures include putting in place inclusive processes to identify labor needs in consultation with employers and other stakeholders and establishing legal pathways that correspond to specific labor needs.

The United States has as many as 185 visa categories covering both temporary and permanent visas. They include visas for permanent high-skilled workers, agricultural seasonal laborers, family reunification, and temporary stay on humanitarian grounds, among others. To meet labor market needs, there are visas for persons employed in highly specialized fields (H1B), visas for persons with extraordinary abilities in certain fields (EB1) and potential investors (EB5), and temporary visas for intracompany managers or executives (L1), but also for low-skilled workers (EW3). Although the system is cumbersome, it allows for nuanced, comprehensive responses to a wide variety of situations and needs.

Australia's system for selecting and admitting migrants relies on consultation with employers.²⁸ It is adjusted regularly to respond to evolving needs and challenges.²⁹ Australia was one of the early adopters of a points-based system to attract skilled migrant workers via the "Skilled Independent" route.³⁰ In the system's early years, employment outcomes for points-tested migrants in Australia were positive, but they declined for recent cohorts because the points system did not adjust fast enough to the changing needs of the economy.³¹ In response, the government expanded the number of temporary visas as a way to test and ensure that migrants' skills and attributes match labor

market needs before providing a more permanent form of stay, especially for migrants with lower skills. Temporary migrants who can find employment and integrate are granted permanent visas. Meanwhile, some policy makers have recently called for further reforms to improve the system.³²

STATUS. Provide migrants whose skills and attributes are a strong match with the destination country's needs with a formal status. A regular legal status with the relevant rights and secure terms of stay are prerequisites for migrants to integrate, even temporarily, in the destination country. Granting such a status—without extended wait times—gives migrants incentives to learn the necessary skills and local language, as well as to socially integrate. Such an approach benefits not only the migrants themselves but also the destination society. Labor rights comparable to those of nationals and in line with the International Labour Organization's Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work are key to maximizing both migrants' welfare and their contribution to the destination economies.³³ A status not tied to an employer allows for movements across firms, which is more efficient for the destination economy and reduces the risk of exploitative working conditions.³⁴ Part of migrants' well-being and inclusion also rests on their ability to reunite with their families when they have demonstrated they can support themselves.

In 2004, the Republic of Korea established the Employment Permit System, which allows lower-skilled workers to enter and work in the country legally.³⁵ In 2022, more than 264,000 migrants were working in the country on such visas.³⁶ Since introduction of the system, the cost of hiring foreign workers has declined substantially, and migrants' households have substantially increased their spending on education and health care, as well as their savings.³⁷

Experience in the United Arab Emirates highlights that migrants need not just a status, but also a set of labor rights. In 2022, the country amended its labor legislation. It now gives migrants the right to keep their legal status even if they change their employer or sponsor and allows them to stay in the country to find another job for 180 days after the termination of a work contract. Although much remains to be done to improve working conditions, this allowed workers to better negotiate renewal of their contracts and obtain higher wages.³⁸

ECONOMIC INCLUSION. Facilitate economic and labor market inclusion. Access to decent work is critical to migrants' and destination economies' medium-term gains from migration. Labor market inclusion depends primarily on the economic conditions in the destination society and the labor market's flexibility to rapidly match supply and demand. It also depends on migrants' skills and their complementarity with those already available at the destination. High-skilled labor migrants typically need support to have their educational degrees and professional credentials recognized. Low-skilled migrants, especially those who move to low- and lower-middle-income countries, need labor rights and a range of ancillary rights, such as the ability to move freely within the country to places where there are jobs, to open a bank account, to obtain a driver's license, and to establish a company, among other things. Support programs such as matching migrants with potential employers or facilitating language acquisition also enhance migrants' productivity.

Germany has implemented foreign qualifications recognition to improve skills matching and reduce the disadvantages faced by immigrants with foreign qualifications. Under its Federal Law on Recognition of Foreign Qualifications, prospective migrants can have their foreign qualifications evaluated before their arrival in the country. Three years after recognition, immigrants who have had their credentials recognized earn 19.8 percent more and have a 24.5 percentage point greater chance of being employed than comparable immigrants.³⁹

In the United States, several states are adopting policies to facilitate immigrants' economic inclusion.⁴⁰ For example, Colorado and Pennsylvania⁴¹ passed safety standards and protections for immigrant workers, such as preventing unfair labor practices, particularly for agricultural workers in Colorado.⁴²

SOCIAL INCLUSION. *Prevent segregation and facilitate access to services and inclusion.* Social inclusion can take different forms, depending on the nature of migration—permanent or temporary, with or without family—and the nature of the social contract in the destination society. Often, labor market inclusion and antidiscrimination efforts go a long way toward supporting social inclusion. Other steps include avoiding segregation of large numbers of migrants in less desirable neighborhoods and expanding opportunities for migrants and nationals to engage with one another in daily and civic life. Providing migrants with access to public services such as education or health care facilitates inclusion and reduces the risks of marginalization. Dedicated resources are often needed to expand service delivery capacity while maintaining quality. In parallel, many migrants are facing challenges arising from racism, xenophobia, or other forms of discrimination, whether overt or implicit. Political leadership to forge a constructive narrative on migration issues is key, and programs to combat discrimination need to be adjusted to each context and set of circumstances.

In Germany, the government adopted a range of measures to support social integration in the wake of the arrival of Syrian refugees and other asylum-seekers in 2015. Economic inclusion is viewed as a critical element of such broader social integration, but it has also been complemented by a range of policies and programs such as language training courses and swift integration of migrants into the health and education systems. Decentralization played a key role in this effort. Despite being under significant stress, subnational governments proved to be best placed to address emerging challenges, including local communities' concerns. Political leadership and transparent communication, integrated responses across policy areas, and the engagement of civil society were also instrumental in success.⁴³

In Colombia, the government adopted an integral integrated communications strategy in 2021 to preempt and counter negative perceptions of Venezuelan migrants.⁴⁴ The strategy relied on a migration narrative for use by government and allied partners, social media campaigns, outreach through influencers and celebrities, public dialogues with diverse actors, and even cultural and gastronomical events, among other outlets.

SUPPORT FOR AFFECTED NATIONALS. *Support nationals who are negatively affected by migration.* Migration can adversely affect the jobs and wages of some citizens of the destination country. Those whose skills are similar to those of migrants, who have relatively low skill levels, or who cannot easily move are especially vulnerable, and some may lose their jobs or receive lower pay. When labor markets are flexible, people are better able to move to other jobs, occupations, sectors, or regions, and the adverse effects dissipate more rapidly. Social protection systems, such as unemployment insurance, training subsidies, and employment support programs, also help. But affected nationals also typically live in neighborhoods with high concentrations of migrants. The public services they access—such as schools and health facilities—often face pressures that can affect quality. Proactive public investment policies are needed to prevent negative impacts on nationals under such conditions.

In many member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), governments use a variety of tools to help citizens cope with shocks.⁴⁵ A number of programs, including Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs), are designed to encourage employment whenever possible.⁴⁶ Strong social protection systems can boost economic productivity by


allowing individuals to invest in physical and human capital and they can be targeted to particular groups.⁴⁷ They can also increase demand and stimulate local economies by supporting economic activity.⁴⁸ Yet several lessons can be learned from trade adjustment assistance programs that provide financial and training support to workers affected by growing international competition: the adjustment is often difficult, and it may take years.⁴⁹

To support public investments in lower-income neighborhoods, which often include a large share of migrants, France has implemented a targeted program, *Politique de la Ville*.⁵⁰ The program includes infrastructure investments in, for example, public housing and public transportation. It is paralleled by dedicated efforts to improve public education, including through wage premiums for teachers assigned to “priority education zones.” A recent evaluation by the Court of Auditors pointed to some progress, but also highlighted areas where more needs to be done.⁵¹

Bilateral cooperation: Strengthen the match of migrants’ skills and attributes

Because international mobility involves at least two countries, bilateral cooperation will help manage it effectively (figure 9.4). Labor migration is often disorganized and based on individual choices, noneconomic factors, and aggressive brokers driving destination choices instead of labor market needs. When countries with surpluses in certain sectors and skill sets are matched with countries with shortages,

Figure 9.4 Bilateral cooperation can improve the match of migrants’ skills and attributes with destination country needs



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

there can be great benefits. However, migration policy has often been designed and implemented unilaterally by destination countries, despite some high-profile exceptions such as the free internal mobility scheme within the European Union. Joint policy design and implementation to structure mutually beneficial movements can yield substantive gains.

BILATERAL LABOR AGREEMENTS. *Facilitate mutually beneficial movements.* Cooperation between countries of origin and destination can be formalized through bilateral agreements. Countries typically consider bilateral labor agreements within the context of temporary migration schemes. Such agreements increase the benefits of migration for both parties—and for the migrants themselves—by specifying the terms under which migrants are admitted in order to reduce the complexity and costs of admission; by providing legal guarantees and protection against abuse and exploitation; and by regulating access to a range of services in the destination countries. Bilateral agreements should also include redress and inspection mechanisms in line with international labor standards. Where appropriate, they can also be used to reduce recruitment costs by, among other objectives, involving government in intermediation⁵² or encouraging transparency and competition among intermediaries. Bilateral labor agreements can be underpinned by a range of complementary efforts by the origin country, such as posting labor attachés in embassies to provide nationals with protection and developing training programs to help prepare people for migration before they move.⁵³ Some destination countries have sought to link the establishment of legal channels for regular migrants with cooperation by origin countries in receiving the forced return of irregular migrants.

Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program brings in 20,000 workers yearly to work on Canadian farms for six weeks to eight months. The program allows member countries of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), as well as Anguilla, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico, to negotiate worker contract terms annually.⁵⁴ Workers are paid at or above a minimum wage; are eligible for health insurance, pension plans, and other benefits; and pay taxes.⁵⁵ Both workers and employers can be barred from participating in the program in the future if issues are brought to the attention of government agencies or workers' organizations.⁵⁶ However, this scheme has also been criticized for its lack of provisions on recognizing migrants' particular skills and for its lack of cooperation on protecting workers' rights.⁵⁷

Malaysia and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding in 2012 to coordinate a foreign worker program that facilitated the legal migration of Bangladeshi workers to Malaysia to work in the palm oil sector. The program began in early 2013 and was ended by Malaysia in 2018.⁵⁸ Although the program benefited fewer than 10,000 workers, program participants tripled their income and saw their per capita consumption increase by 22 percent.⁵⁹

SKILLS PARTNERSHIPS. *Cooperate to build skills that are in demand globally.* Several pilots of Global Skills Partnership (GSP) schemes have been developed whereby the governments or the private sector in higher-income destination countries finance skill-building programs in origin countries with the understanding that the graduates of these programs will be offered an opportunity to obtain a work visa.⁶⁰ Some graduates of these programs choose to stay in their country of origin—or to return after a few years of migration—which contributes to the origin country's economy and mitigates possible brain drain concerns. These programs facilitate the movement of skilled labor across countries and their smooth inclusion in the labor market. However, the private sector must be involved to ensure that a program remains demand- and market-driven. Complementary actions can be taken at the regional level such as through regional qualification frameworks that facilitate the employment of migrants at their skill level.

The 15-member Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has developed a scheme for mutual skills recognition under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) initiative.⁶¹ In the scheme, CARICOM nationals who fall within a set of approved categories⁶² and seek to work in another participating CSME member state can apply for a Certificate of Recognition of Caribbean Community Skills Qualification (Skills Certificate).

In a pilot program between Germany and Ethiopia, Bauverbände NRW, the umbrella organization of the construction firms in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, is partnering with a network of local partners in Ethiopia to recruit young unemployed Ethiopians for Germany's vocational and educational training system.⁶³ Potential trainees are provided with German classes and a cultural introduction. Upon graduation, they receive visas, transportation, and health insurance so they can complete their professional training and seek employment in Germany.

Weak match and fear motive: Ensure the sustainability of refugee-hosting, including through responsibility-sharing


When people do not bring skills and attributes in demand at their destination, the costs to destination countries often exceed the benefits. However, under international law destination countries are obligated to host people who have a “well-founded fear” of persecution and violence in their country of origin—refugees—regardless of the costs. Thus, the challenge is to manage such costs. Because refugee situations tend to last for years or even decades, prudent policy making requires adopting approaches to providing international protection that can be sustained over time, both financially and socially. Economic outcomes for both refugees and their host communities are largely determined by host countries' policies, as well as by the international community's effectiveness in sharing responsibilities equitably.

Hosting country: Manage refugee situations with a medium-term perspective

Because they flee for safety, most refugees cross only one border. As a result, a few countries—typically low- or middle-income countries neighboring the countries of origin—host a disproportionate share of people in need of international protection. For such refugee-hosting countries, the challenge is to manage situations that can last for years—that is, provide international protection but also address refugees' specific vulnerabilities and support host communities in their own development efforts (figure 9.5). Refugee-hosting countries need to take a medium-term development perspective from the outset of a crisis, including in their institutional setups and financing arrangements. They should also aim to strengthen the match of refugees' skills and attributes with their own labor market needs. This requires permitting internal mobility, supporting access to the labor market and self-reliance, and facilitating the inclusion of refugees in national service delivery systems.

INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS. *Ensure that institutional setups and financing instruments support a medium-term framework.* For host countries, adequate institutional arrangements are essential for managing refugee situations with a medium-term perspective. Some countries have established ad hoc agencies, often with external support, that manage refugee camps, deliver assistance, and provide education and health services. Other countries are mainstreaming these functions through relevant sectoral ministries, with a relatively small coordination structure to ensure the consistency of such distinct programs within the context of a broader strategic approach. Such models are typically more conducive

Figure 9.5 Refugee-hosting countries should from the outset adopt a medium-term perspective



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

to the sustainability of efforts over time. In some cases, they can include a preparedness element—for example, when refugee crises are looming or have become chronic. However, they need to be supported through medium-term financing instruments, including for external financing.

Colombia is implementing a medium-term strategy to respond to the Venezuelan migration crisis. In 2018, the government adopted the Strategy for the Response to Migration from Venezuela (CONPES 3950), which confirmed the government’s commitment to improving institutional coordination in critical areas of service provision. The government also established the Border Management Office (Gerencia de Frontera) to coordinate the response and regularize Venezuelans’ migratory status and access to markets and services.⁶⁴ In March 2021, the government initiated a new phase in its strategy, focusing on the long-term integration of Venezuelans in Colombia, including by providing them with a 10-year Temporary Protected Status (Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos, ETPV).

Uganda is among the first countries to integrate refugees into its national development planning under the 2016–20 and 2021–25 National Development Plans.⁶⁵ The government adopted a whole-of-government approach involving government ministries, departments, and agencies to provide integrated development solutions for refugees and host communities. The National Development Plans foresee district-level interventions to serve the entire population, both Ugandan nationals and refugees. Uganda is also pioneering an effort to strengthen the country’s ability to absorb new population inflows as part of a preparedness effort.

INTERNAL MOBILITY. *Facilitate and encourage refugee movements toward economic opportunities.*

Maintaining refugees in border areas, which are often lagging economically, has often intensified pressures on host populations, increasing financing needs and social tensions. By contrast, permitting internal mobility (also referred to as “freedom of movement within the host country”) could transform the management of refugee situations and their outcomes. When refugees can move freely to places where they can find a job, their skills and attributes more closely match the needs of the destination society, the pressure on communities in the areas of first arrival is dramatically lessened, and the financial costs of supporting refugees are reduced. However, permitting internal mobility can also require rethinking the ways in which international protection is provided and refugees are supported when refugees are dispersed across the country. This rethinking typically requires strengthening the focus on policies and national institutions.

As part of its strategy, Colombia has granted Venezuelans the rights to free movement and work within the country. These rights make it possible for Venezuelans to establish themselves where their skills and attributes match the demand of the labor market and thus contribute to the economy and become self-sufficient. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that by 2030 this policy could increase Colombia’s gross domestic product (GDP) by up to 4.5 percentage points.⁶⁶

In Türkiye, Syrian refugees mostly resided during the initial stages of the crisis in large temporary accommodation centers constructed along the Turkish-Syrian border. As the number of refugees continued to grow, the Turkish government changed its accommodation policy to an “out-of-camp” approach, allowing refugees to freely move within most parts of Türkiye. Refugees thus began to relocate based on economic incentives and location preferences, which generated a large movement from the border regions to more dynamic areas where refugees could better use their skills (mostly western regions and metropolitan areas).⁶⁷ To manage such movements, the government set a 20 percent ceiling on the share of foreign nationals allowed to live in each neighborhood. In spite of such limitations, internal mobility greatly improved the economic situation of the refugees and, as a result, lessened the financial impact on the Turkish government.

SELF-RELIANCE. *Promote refugees’ access to jobs.* Refugees’ self-reliance reduces the need for financial assistance. It also enables refugees to lead dignified lives and helps preparations for durable solutions. Self-reliance relies on several legal and regulatory measures such as providing refugees with predictable, secure terms of stay so they can make plans and invest in their future; granting refugees the right to work as early as possible with unhindered access to the labor market; and allowing refugees to effectively engage in the labor market, such as by allowing them to open a bank account and obtain a driver’s license. These rights, however, may not be sufficient if incentives are not in place. Refugees should be encouraged to work, and humanitarian aid should focus on those who are unable to do so. Complementary incentives for the private sector can help improve the environment in which refugees can find jobs.

Uganda has long encouraged refugees’ self-reliance by offering refugee households with agricultural experience a plot of land to farm.⁶⁸ This policy has been implemented with the support of host communities and with the understanding that these communities would benefit from public investments in their areas. It has helped reduce refugees’ dependency on external assistance, even though poverty rates remain high—and higher than among nationals.⁶⁹ The higher rates are linked in part to the remoteness of the areas in which refugees are hosted, the demographic composition of many households (with many working-age men having stayed behind), as well as social and language barriers.⁷⁰

Ukrainians who moved to Poland after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were guaranteed at least an 18-month stay in the country and were allowed to be employed in the formal sector, start businesses, and receive training services and job placement support. They also received access to selected social protection programs, including health care.⁷¹ As of June 2022, under this policy 185,000 Ukrainian refugees were able to find jobs,⁷² although additional efforts were needed to help refugees access childcare and schooling and overcome a combination of skills mismatch and language barriers.⁷³

INCLUSION IN NATIONAL SERVICES. *Deliver education, health, and social services through national systems.* To ensure fairness with nationals and prevent the emergence of social tensions, refugees should be included wherever possible in national systems for the delivery of education, health, and other social services as opposed to establishing parallel service delivery systems. Such an approach can significantly lower the costs of providing such services, even though in some countries it will require strengthening national systems. In those countries with sufficient institutional capacity, even support for the most vulnerable refugees can be provided through the regular social protection system rather than through parallel humanitarian funding.

In Ethiopia, the 2019 Refugee Proclamation provides refugees with access to public education on par with that of nationals. The sixth Education Sector Development Plan (ESDP VI, 2020–25) includes refugee education for the first time. Ethiopia also pledged to issue work permits to refugee teachers, to build and improve essential services in refugee-hosting areas, and to expand the enrollment of refugee children at all levels of the education system.⁷⁴ In addition, as of June 2022 about 1,500 refugees were enrolled in 40 public universities across the country.⁷⁵


In Poland, in addition to being granted the right to work, Ukrainians are entitled to access public services, including free health care, and to enroll their children in schools. As of September 2022, about 185,000 Ukrainian refugee children were enrolled in Polish schools.⁷⁶ Some of these schools offer separate classes for Ukrainian students or have hired assistants who speak Ukrainian and can work with children who need extra help.

Multilateral cooperation: Share responsibilities

Mutual accountability and cooperation frameworks are critical to ensuring the sustainability of refugee-hosting efforts (figure 9.6). International efforts are often needed to resolve the situations—typically conflicts—that caused refugees to flee and to restore conditions under which refugees can return to their country of origin. Parallel efforts are needed to strengthen norms—and ensure they reflect economic and development considerations—and to agree on shared goals. Such efforts can strengthen the impetus and sustainability of reforms at both the national and international levels. Two critical areas of focus are responsibility-sharing—to provide adequate support to host countries—and solutions—to help resolve refugee situations in a satisfactory manner.

RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING. *Join forces to manage large refugee flows and share costs related to hosting.* Responsibility-sharing requires providing financial and other resources to refugee-hosting countries, especially low- and middle-income, to help manage the costs of hosting refugees whose skills and attributes may not be a good match for the needs of the host economy. Countries that are not refugees' initial destinations need to increase the numbers of refugees they accept in order to help reduce

Figure 9.6 Multilateral cooperation is key to the sustainability of refugee-hosting efforts



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: *Match* refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. *Motive* refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

costs in the main host countries. In a context of tensions within the international community, global action needs to be complemented by regional initiatives. Successful initiatives share a focus on a concrete set of issues that can be managed collectively; a constituency of countries that broadly share similar challenges and perspectives and have a history of working together; and a practical and action-oriented agenda. Additional forms of bilateral or multilateral frameworks for cooperation and mutual accountability have emerged. For example, the Global Compact on Refugees established regional support platforms to mobilize a group of like-minded stakeholders around a specific refugee situation.

At the global level, the Global Compact on Refugees has called for enhanced responsibility-sharing using a variety of approaches.⁷⁷ Much remains to be done, however, including to broaden the base of contributing countries. Three donors (European Union institutions, Germany, and the United States) account for almost two-thirds of the total bilateral assistance,⁷⁸ and four countries (Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States) for almost three-quarters of all resettlements.

Under the Quito Process, a group of Latin American countries agreed in November 2018 on a regional mobility scheme to respond to the Venezuelan migration crisis based on information exchange and regional policy coordination.⁷⁹ Eleven countries signed the Quito Declaration: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. It made it possible to achieve a degree of coherence of national approaches and to share hosting responsibilities beyond the countries of first arrival with large numbers of Venezuelan migrants moving beyond Colombia and other neighboring countries to other destinations across the region.

SOLUTIONS. *Combine state protection and access to opportunities.* Solutions are typically framed in strict terms of protection, with a focus on voluntary return and reintegration, local integration, and resettlement. However, in many cases such solutions have been elusive, and they do not always take into account refugees' economic needs and aspirations. When the situation allows, refugee-hosting societies can work with the origin country and the international community to help refugees achieve durable solutions, including voluntary returns once the situation that prompted refugees to flee has been resolved. Innovative approaches can also help improve outcomes, including approaches that disentangle citizenship and residency—political and socioeconomic rights—or that strengthen refugees' skills and attributes, for example through Global Skills Partnerships.

Canada's Private Sponsorship of Refugees program, adopted in 1979, allows Canadians to resettle specific individuals or families who qualify as refugees under Canada's refugee and humanitarian program. These privately sponsored refugees are accepted by Canada, in addition to those resettled under government programs. Sponsoring groups are responsible for providing refugees with the settlement assistance and material and financial support needed for the duration of the sponsorship period—usually up to one year from the date they arrive in Canada.⁸⁰

In 1979, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formally adopted an agreement facilitating freedom of movement and settlement across its member states.⁸¹ This agreement and subsequent protocols grant ECOWAS citizens the right to enter any other ECOWAS state with residency rights (including the possibility of creating and managing enterprises and companies, as well as the principle of nondiscrimination). Both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and ECOWAS have stated that this agreement also applies to refugees.⁸² While some member states have been reluctant to regularize the stay of refugees who are ECOWAS citizens,⁸³ many refugees from Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo have chosen not to repatriate but to remain in ECOWAS member states.⁸⁴ Although implementation of the agreement has been lagging due to administrative capacities and other challenges, such legal frameworks can provide an alternative to a long-term refugee status in some situations.⁸⁵


Weak match and no fear motive: Respect dignity and reduce the need for distressed movements

When people do not bring skills and attributes that are in demand at their destination, the costs to destination countries often exceed the benefits. In addition, if they are not moving because of a well-founded fear of violence and persecution in their country of origin, destination countries have no obligation under international law to accept them in their territory. Such distressed movements are often associated with suffering for those involved, and they raise difficult policy challenges for the destination country. Those who are involved in distressed migration deserve to be treated humanely. Ultimately, the challenge is to reduce the need for such movements, including by strengthening the match of migrants' skills and attributes with the needs of the destination country. This requires a combination of actions by countries of origin, countries of destination, and countries of transit.

Origin countries: Use development to reduce distressed movements

For origin countries, distressed migration brings no overall benefits, and it is prejudicial to many migrants who take high risks and can end up in exploitative situations. Over time, development can help reduce the need for distressed movements by strengthening resilience and thus the ability to absorb shocks without having to engage in high-risk international migration; by enhancing potential migrants' skills and thus their match with the needs of the destination economy; and by improving conditions in the country of origin and thus reducing the need to embark on desperate journeys (figure 9.7).

Figure 9.7 Development progress reduces the need for distressed cross-border movements



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: *Match* refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. *Motive* refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

RESILIENCE. Enhance social protection and create domestic alternatives to international migration.

Many countries across all income levels have developed social protection systems. These systems play an important role in reducing the pressure for people to engage in high-risk movements as a desperate response to a sudden shock such as a natural disaster, a bad harvesting season, a disease affecting a family member, or an accident, and they can be further strengthened. Development can create additional options for internal migration so that people do not have to engage in high-risk international migration. For example, in many lower-income countries workers and households move from rural to urban areas or from lagging to booming regions in search of better jobs and public services. Such movements, if they are successful, can reduce the need for distressed migration. Their outcome largely depends on whether destination areas are able to accommodate sizable and continuous flows of people in terms of infrastructure, housing, and service delivery, as well as local governance and institutions. Creating options for successful domestic migration is particularly important in parts of the world projected to have the largest demographic and urban growth, such as Sub-Saharan Africa.

Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme reaches about 9 million people every year. It is designed to enhance food security and stabilize asset levels through both public works employment for working-age adults, for example, to build roads, water systems, and community infrastructure, and unconditional cash transfers to households that have elderly members or are otherwise unable to work. The program has allowed beneficiaries to strengthen resilience and improve food security and nutrition, even though the effect on asset accumulation has been more modest.⁸⁶

Experience in Bangladesh has illustrated the potential of internal migration to enhance the resilience of rural households. In some areas, rural households face a high incidence of poverty during the lean period between the planting and harvesting seasons. Under a pilot program

implemented by a nongovernmental organization, rural villagers were offered a subsidy for round-trip transportation to a nearby urban area.⁸⁷ Twenty-two percent of households took advantage of this opportunity and sent a seasonal migrant. This resulted in a significant increase in the household's consumption. Beneficiary households who sent a seasonal migrant were more likely to send seasonal migrants to urban areas in subsequent years, even after the incentive was removed.

EDUCATION. *Enhance skills match through development.* Economic development is almost always accompanied by improvements in human capital such as education and skills. As countries become wealthier, people and governments invest more in education. In turn, the better-educated workforce becomes an engine of economic development and growth. Higher educational attainment shifts migration patterns toward better-educated and higher-skilled workers. Emigrants from more developed countries therefore tend to be a stronger match for the needs of destination labor markets. This factor can help reduce distressed movements and shift migration toward mutually beneficial outcomes.

As Bangladesh's GDP per capita more than doubled between 1960 and 2015, the average years of schooling for the adult population increased drastically—from 1.0 years to 6.9 years—and the share of adults with some tertiary education grew—from 0.33 percent to 8.6 percent.⁸⁸ This experience matches that of almost all low- or middle-income countries that have experienced economic growth. Especially important are higher-education opportunities. Youth with post-secondary education living in middle- and low-income countries have a much higher chance of finding a decent job than those with only secondary or primary education.⁸⁹

Rwanda followed a similar progression as it developed. Primary enrollment rates climbed to over 95 percent of primary school-age children. Enrollment in tertiary education increased from about 1.3 percent in 2000 to 7.6 percent in 2021.⁹⁰ In parallel, the government created a dedicated agency—the Skills Development Fund—to upskill Rwanda's workforce for long-term economic transformation and help increase the supply of skills in high demand in the labor market by offering training programs across multiple sectors, from hospitality to construction to mining to information and communication technology, among others.⁹¹

INCLUSION. *Promote inclusive and green development.* Not all development trajectories have the same impact on migration. Inclusive development, which aims to provide opportunities to all, can help lift all groups within a society, reduce pressures that lead to high-risk migration among the poorest or marginalized communities, and improve options for voluntary migration. By contrast, uneven development that concentrates resources in the hands of a minority may result in further chaotic movements. Meanwhile, some countries are heavily exposed to climate risks, and they need to invest in climate adaptation to avoid the devastating impacts of flooding or sea level rises, for example, and to reduce the need for high-risk movements. Small Island Developing States at risk of being submerged may need special initiatives. Although these are extreme cases involving a relatively small number of people, managing the challenges they face will require planning.

In the face of high climate-related risks, Vanuatu proactively integrated climate change-related mobility into national policy frameworks. In 2018, Vanuatu adopted its National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement, which encompasses a comprehensive set of actions addressing return and reintegration, local integration, and planned relocation.⁹²

In São Tomé and Príncipe, the government is implementing a program aimed at strengthening the resilience of people living along the shoreline in 10 coastal communities that are directly exposed to the threat of coastal erosion and flooding. The program is part of a Multi-Sector


Investment Plan, which includes policy reforms for sustainable and adaptive management of the coastal zones, a new institutional framework for disaster risk management, and strong community engagement for coastal protection.

Destination countries: Reduce distressed movements while respecting migrants' dignity

All migrants deserve fair and humane treatment, including those whose skills and attributes do not meet the needs of destination societies and who do not qualify for international protection as refugees. Most destination countries are unwilling to grant such migrants legal entry, and many distressed migrants turn to irregular channels and to the growing smuggling industry, along with the exploitative labor market it feeds. The challenge is to reduce the incentives for such movements, while preserving the dignity of all migrants (figure 9.8).

RESPECT. *Respect migrants' and refugees' dignity.* Many destination countries face difficult policy challenges to restrict the entry of migrants whose skills and attributes do not match their needs. When economic and other pressures in the countries of origin are high, people are pushed to engage in distressed migration, and difficult trade-offs can emerge to enforce entry policies while respecting migrants' dignity. Countries are addressing such situations in a variety of ways, but their responses should respect migrants' fundamental rights under applicable international laws and norms.

Figure 9.8 Human dignity should remain the yardstick of migration policies



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant's skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a "well-founded fear" of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) has adopted international labor standards over the years that are important for safeguarding the dignity and rights of migrant workers. These standards include the eight fundamental rights conventions of the ILO identified in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; standards of general application, such as those addressing protection of wages and occupational safety and health, as well as the governance conventions concerning labor inspection, employment policy, and tripartite consultation; and instruments containing specific provisions on migrant workers such as the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181); the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189); and social security instruments.

The judiciary can play a critical role in ensuring that migrants' rights are respected. For example, in 2016 the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea found that detention of migrants and asylum-seekers on Manus Island transferred from Australia contravened Papua New Guinea's constitution.⁹³ The court ruled the incarceration of asylum-seekers and refugees was in breach of their personal liberty and ordered the governments of both Papua New Guinea and Australia to immediately arrange to move people out of detention. At the time, there were about 850 men in the detention center on the island, about half of whom have been found to be refugees.⁹⁴

COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION. *Strengthen the coherence of the current system of ad hoc arrangements for protection.* Some distressed migrants have international protection needs, although not to a level that would qualify them as refugees. These migrants may need some form of protection for reasons that fall outside of the 1951 Refugee Convention—for example, if they are fleeing acute humanitarian crises. Amid what has become a human and political crisis, several countries have developed ad hoc legal instruments to provide temporary or subsidiary protection for distressed migrants who cannot be returned safely to their country. Such complementary protection schemes, however, remain partial, ad hoc, and often inconsistent. They should be extended in a coherent manner. Asylum-seekers should also be provided with pathways to enter their destination countries legally.

The United States first granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Honduran nationals in 1998 following Hurricane Mitch. TPS is granted to eligible foreign-born individuals who are unable to return home safely due to conditions or circumstances preventing their country from adequately handling the return. As of 2023, over 80,000 Hondurans had been granted TPS, making them eligible to receive both employment and travel authorization.⁹⁵ About 85 percent of them are in the US labor force,⁹⁶ contributing over US\$1 billion in GDP annually.⁹⁷

The wide variation in the recognition rates for Afghan asylum-seekers observed across European Union countries in 2021—ranging from 100 percent in Estonia, Latvia, Portugal, and Spain to about 20 percent in Denmark⁹⁸—suggests a need for improved coherence and consistency across different legal instruments and interpretations of refugee law.⁹⁹ Current disparities may contribute to increased vulnerabilities for some distressed migrants who would otherwise be granted international protection.

LEGAL ENTRY PATHWAYS. *Shift migrants' incentives through the development of legal pathways for skills that are in demand, including for lower-skilled workers.* Workers with lower levels of skills are in high demand in many destination labor markets in, for example, the agriculture, home care, food preparation, and construction sectors. Many OECD member countries have very limited legal entry pathways for such individuals, which is partly fueling irregular migration. Establishing legal pathways helps to better steer and monitor entries, to shift the incentives for people who would otherwise engage in high-risk movements, and to address the concerns of those nationals who fear loss of control of their border.

In designing such legal pathways, destination countries need to closely reflect labor market needs. Temporary migration is often part of the possible pathways, but it is appropriate mainly for temporary or seasonal jobs where job-specific human capital is not necessary.

The experience with the US Bracero program in the 1960s highlights the pitfalls of closing legal entry pathways. Under the program, which was initiated in 1942, seasonal agricultural and railroad migrant workers from Mexico were granted a temporary work status. The program was discontinued in 1964 as part of an effort to boost employment among US nationals. However, profits among farms that had used Bracero workers fell,¹⁰⁰ and there is little evidence that US workers benefited.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the discontinuation of this program also resulted in more migrants without legal status.¹⁰²

Spain and Morocco entered into an agreement on labor migration in 2001 to facilitate repeated seasonal migration for agriculture. Gradual progress in implementation of the agreement increased both the demand for seasonal migrant workers in southern Spain and the interest of low-skilled Moroccan workers (often women) in seeking an additional source of income.¹⁰³ Over 21,000 workers participated annually in 2006–08. Seasonal migration declined after the 2008 economic crisis as jobs in agriculture became desirable for a growing number of unemployed nationals and settled migrant workers. In 2013, a broader Mobility Partnership Agreement was signed between several European Union Member States (notably, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and Morocco that allowed some low-skilled migrants to access opportunities in the signatory countries, including Spain.¹⁰⁴

ENFORCEMENT. *Manage involuntary returns humanely and penalize smugglers and exploitative employers.* In addition to developing legal pathways for entry—and to ensure their sustainability—destination countries need to enforce existing laws and regulations aimed at discouraging irregular entries. This effort should include combating smuggling and exploitative employment by enforcing rules and regulations that often already exist. In some cases, destination countries may choose to return some distressed migrants who do not face risks in their countries of origin as a signal to both citizens and would-be migrants that rules are enforced. Such forced returns should be managed humanely, and they may be easier if countries of destination and origin cooperate within the context of migration arrangements that are mutually beneficial. Some destination countries have also attempted to accompany involuntary returns with reintegration support, with mixed results.


To combat human smuggling and trafficking, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has highlighted the importance of long-term efforts that incorporate various interventions in the countries of origin, transit, and destination, with a focus on both demand and supply factors.¹⁰⁵ On the demand side, possible measures include expanding options for legal migration and simplifying the process of obtaining travel documents. On the supply side, countries should penalize and bring to justice migrants' smugglers and seize their unlawfully acquired assets,¹⁰⁶ as well as decriminalize migrants who use smugglers. Improved border management procedures and capacity and information-sharing systems are key in these efforts.

In recent years, Germany has deported migrants from The Gambia who do not have legal status. Germany has also supported training and reintegration opportunities in The Gambia to encourage voluntary return and reduce the incentives for irregular migration, but the results have been limited.¹⁰⁷ Despite the risk of deportation, many Gambian migrants still feel they are better off in Germany than returning.¹⁰⁸ Cooperation with the country of origin has proved both important and difficult. For example, in 2021 about 2,000 Gambian returnees were denied entry by the Gambian government due to the potential economic and social impacts of their return.¹⁰⁹

Transit countries: Reduce distressed movements while respecting migrants' dignity

Some distressed migrants travel through several countries before reaching their destination. In some cases, they merely pass by for a few days or a few weeks. In others, they stay longer—a few months or a few years—to earn the resources needed to pay for the next stage of their travel. In still other cases, they try to settle, and it is only when they fail to do so that they engage in further movements. These different situations call for various responses from transit countries (figure 9.9).

Figure 9.9 Cooperation between destination and “last border transit countries” is needed



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: *Match* refers to the degree to which a migrant's skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. *Motive* refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

BILATERAL COOPERATION. Work with the destination countries to manage distressed movements.

Restrictive entry policies by destination countries can raise difficult challenges for the “last border transit countries” on a corridor. Many distressed migrants are stranded in these countries, sometimes for years. Last border transit countries are faced with having to accommodate an often vulnerable population, which comes at a cost. The challenges faced by last border transit countries and the intended destination countries are inextricably linked, and they cannot be resolved unilaterally. Cooperation is required to manage distressed migrants' movements in an integrated manner and to ensure that the respective entry and asylum policies of the destination and last border transit countries—and their implementation—are consistent (although not necessarily identical). There are only a few examples of such cooperation, and they have been imperfect and controversial.

- Migration issues have been a consistent part of the negotiations between Mexico and the United States with a view toward developing coordinated approaches. Migration-related issues are

typically discussed as part of a broader set of areas of shared interest, including economic cooperation, trade and investment, and the fight against organized crime. In the January 2023 North American Leaders' Summit, discussions focused on steps to encourage migrants to apply for legal status rather than using smugglers as they make the journey north. Such steps included the establishment of an online platform to give migrants “streamlined access to legal pathways,” as well as a new legal center in southern Mexico backed by private sector funding.¹¹⁰

In 2016, Türkiye and the European Union entered into an agreement to return irregular migrants who had crossed from Türkiye into the Greek islands and whose applications for asylum had been declared inadmissible. As part of this cooperation, the European Union committed to resettling an equivalent number of Syrian refugees processed through regular channels, to provide financial support for the hosting of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, and to facilitate the issuance of Schengen visas to Turkish citizens.¹¹¹

Essentials for reform

The international legal architecture for migration and forced displacement has been adjusted regularly over past decades to reflect changes in the patterns of movements. It is set to evolve further as part of the ongoing implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted by the United Nations in 2018.¹¹² Under the Global Compacts, forums are held to discuss states' commitments and emerging normative issues. Development considerations should be an integral part of these global conversations.¹¹³

At the country level, migration reform is often a complex endeavor that requires making difficult decisions. Reform can be supported by data and evidence that can help inform both public debates and policy making; financial support that can help mitigate short- or even medium-term costs as they arise; and greater engagement by all stakeholders so that a broader range of voices can be heard and contribute to policy debates in the domestic and international arenas. Such efforts are especially important when debates are highly polarized and when there are multiple competing priorities—among them, climate change, food security, and an ongoing global economic slowdown.

Improve data and evidence

Informed decision-making requires systematic, comprehensive data collection and analysis on migrants and their impacts on origin and destination societies. The first objective of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration is to improve the collection and use of data for evidence-based policy making. But several critical dimensions of data collection, processing, dissemination, and analysis need improvement in order to enhance evidence-building in priority areas (box 9.1).

HARMONIZATION. *Harmonize data collection methodologies.*¹¹⁴ Censuses, specialized surveys, and administrative sources are among the building blocks of migration-related data. And yet methodologies and databases are inconsistent across countries, making aggregation, integration, and cross-country or even cross-sector comparisons impossible. In refugee situations, multiple actors, including international agencies and civil service organizations, collect at great cost a range of data with little consistency and comparability. Further technical efforts are needed to harmonize data collection systems on definitions, questions, sampling, or postenumeration surveys, and to strengthen the capacity of national statistical offices where needed. Special attention should be paid to the ethics of biometric data collection, particularly in refugee settings.

Box 9.1 Priorities for research ahead

In line with the analysis developed in this Report and to support the design and implementation of a forward-looking agenda that can help enhance the development effects of cross-border movements, evidence is needed in several priority areas, including:

- Drivers of movements and their evolutions, including a better understanding of noneconomic factors; the compounding effects of climate change; and the nature of development trajectories that can reduce the need for distressed movements.
- Possible responses and adaptation strategies by countries at all income levels to manage emerging demographic imbalances.
- Skills complementarity and effects of labor migration to low- and middle-income destination countries.
- Social impacts of both labor and distressed migration on destination countries and variations across those countries at different levels of income.
- Gender dimensions and impacts of cross-border movements.
- Policy evaluations (including using longitudinal surveys of migrant, refugee, or national populations over time) in areas such as support for knowledge transfers and brain drain mitigation in countries of origin; economic inclusion, social inclusion, and support of nationals that are negatively affected in destination and refugee-hosting countries; durable solutions (including innovative approaches) for refugee situations; and, in situations of distressed migration, cross-border cooperation between transit and destination countries, establishment of legal pathways for entry, complementary protection mechanisms, and humane returns.

The Expert Group on Refugee, IDP and Statelessness Statistics (EGRIS) set up under the United Nations Statistical Commission has published a set of recommendations to harmonize definitions and methodologies in the collection of data on forcibly displaced populations.¹¹⁵ This effort is underpinned by a set of initiatives aimed at strengthening the capacity of the relevant statistical offices, including through the Joint Data Center of the World Bank and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The International Labour Organization has been collecting migration-related data. In 2018, it adopted the Guidelines Concerning Statistics of International Labour Migration, with the objective of helping countries develop their national statistical systems by collecting comparable statistics on international labor migration.¹¹⁶ These efforts culminated in creation of the ILOSTAT database on International Labour Migration Statistics (ILMS), a set of indicators describing the numbers and profiles of international migrant workers, their situation in the labor market and employment patterns, their main origin and destination countries, and the magnitude of inward and outward migration flows.¹¹⁷

EVIDENCE-BUILDING. Invest in new types of surveys. Current data collection exercises remain incomplete. Additional types of surveys are needed to fully understand migration and to inform possible responses. For example, many of the ongoing efforts are directed at capturing a picture of the migration situation at a given moment. Such efforts are useful, but they do not help assess, among other critical policy issues, the impact of specific regulatory measures on the inclusion of migrants or the ways in which social bonds develop between migrants and their communities over time. The reason is that such effects

take time to materialize. To build evidence and to determine what works, longitudinal surveys—surveys that track a given individual, household, or community over time—are critical. Similarly, most official surveys do not capture data for hard-to-reach populations, such as undocumented migrants and smaller or marginalized groups, and so new dedicated efforts are needed. Finally, because all migration-related data are currently collected in either origin or destination countries, it is not possible to follow individuals as they cross borders and to fully investigate the drivers and impacts of their mobility. This will require better coordination between origin and destination countries in their data collection efforts.

■ In Chad, the Refugees and Host Communities Household Survey is fully integrated into the national household surveys as an integral part of the refugee policy dialogues among the government, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and development partners.¹¹⁸

■ Longitudinal studies of Mexican migrants are helping to better understand the impact of migration and integration processes.¹¹⁹ For example, the Mexican Family Life Survey tracks migrants over time,¹²⁰ and the Mexican Migration Project follows migrants across borders.¹²¹

OPEN DATA. *Encourage research by making data available.* Collecting data is only a first step—the analysis is what really matters for building evidence for effective policy reform. Experience with other areas of development points to the significance of making databases and raw data publicly available to everyone, especially researchers and policy makers, with appropriate protections of confidentiality. And yet many migration data remain difficult to access, impeding efforts to determine what works best in managing cross-border movements. Open data have the potential to transform migration research and policies in some contexts, as long as adequate steps are taken to protect individual confidentiality and privacy. Countries should also upload existing data sets in a user-friendly manner.

■ The World Bank Open Data Initiative, launched in April 2010, has shown the potential of making data available to policy makers, researchers, and civil society so they can measure results, increase knowledge, and work together to find solutions to development problems. The initiative includes a range of reforms enabling free access to more than 7,000 development indicators, as well as a wealth of information on World Bank projects and finances. It is premised on the recognition that transparency and accountability are essential to the development process.¹²²


■ The Development Data Partnership is a collaboration between international organizations and technology companies to facilitate the efficient and responsible use of third-party data in international development. It includes a set of rules, data license agreements, and shared secure architecture to facilitate the exchange of privately owned data.¹²³

Expand financial instruments

Dedicated, medium-term development financing is required to better manage migration (figure 9.10). Such financing could be approached in the broader context of discussions around the financing of global challenges and global public goods. Additional streams of resources—over and above what is available through regular national programs—are often needed.

NEW—OR EXPANDED—FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS. *Provide medium-term support to low- and middle-income countries who host noncitizens, either economic migrants or refugees.* To manage refugee situations with a medium-term perspective, host countries should implement a range of policies that can be sustained over time—and many need predictable, sustained external funding to make such commitments.¹²⁴ Similarly, financing is required in low- and middle-income countries that receive economic

Figure 9.10 New financing instruments and expanded use of development resources are needed to better manage migration



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

migrants for a range of activities, such as service delivery or infrastructure. Over time, migrants’ economic contributions will provide the necessary resources, but there may be funding gaps in the short to medium term, especially when migrants work primarily in the informal sector or when their skills and attributes are not in high demand in the labor market. For countries hosting migrants or refugees, medium-term financing instruments are needed. These instruments should be (1) grounded in the legal international protection agenda (for refugees) and respect for human dignity (for migrants); (2) underpinned by sound government policy frameworks; (3) covering both affected nationals as well as migrants and refugees; and (4) predictable over the medium term with a high degree of concessionality because such resources largely benefit nonnationals.

Within the International Development Association (IDA), the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) is an example of an instrument that finances medium-term development activities in countries that host significant refugee populations.¹²⁵ It aims to help eligible host countries create meaningful medium- to long-term development opportunities and sustainable

solutions for refugees and host populations. To be eligible for support from the WHR, IDA countries must adhere to an adequate framework for the protection of refugees and have an action plan or strategy with concrete steps, including possible policy reforms for long-term solutions that benefit refugees and host communities.¹²⁶ To date, 17 countries have benefited from the WHR.¹²⁷

Similarly, the World Bank–managed Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) provides development support on concessional terms to middle-income countries affected by refugee crises. It channels donor resources to provide a grant element that improves the terms and conditions of development loans for projects benefiting host communities and refugees. Benefitting countries—which are currently Colombia, Ecuador, Jordan, Lebanon, and Moldova—must support refugees and host communities as part of their development agenda. To date, US\$725 million in grant funding has been approved.¹²⁸


ENHANCED USE OF EXISTING INSTRUMENTS. *Use development resources to maximize the development impacts of cross-border movements.* Efforts are needed in several directions. First, development resources can be used to create incentives for and facilitate private sector engagement. The necessary support may include a mix of guarantees and concessional loans for projects that would largely benefit refugees or migrants, conditional on maintaining a strong link to the protection and dignity agenda. In lower-income countries, or when migrants and refugees live in economically lagging regions, tailored support is also needed for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Second, development resources can help origin countries better leverage migration for poverty reduction—for example, by supporting financial sector reforms to reduce the costs of sending remittances, by building skills, or by supporting SMEs to facilitate knowledge transfers. Development resources that can help reduce the pressure for high-risk migration, including in terms of social protection, urbanization, climate adaptation, and inclusive development programs, can complement these forms of assistance. Finally, development resources can incentivize regional cooperation. Financing arrangements should be tailored to specific situations and activities, according to the potential distribution of their benefits. For example, for a bilateral labor agreement or a Global Skills Partnership, the destination country that benefits from better-skilled workers may be best placed to finance the corresponding activities in the origin country, if such financing is needed. But in other cases, such as supporting regional cooperation among origin countries or acting as an incentive to formalize relationships across countries, regional financing instruments are important.

IDA has established a Private Sector Window to catalyze private sector investment in IDA-only countries, with a focus on fragile and conflict-affected states, including in refugee-hosting situations. The Window is based on the recognition that the private sector is central to achieving development impacts, but that a range of uncertainties and risks need to be mitigated for the private sector to engage at scale in such difficult environments.¹²⁹

Bring in new voices

In an area as polarized as migration, political economy considerations often dictate the extent to which reforms can be implemented. In many countries, the current environment is difficult. Migration is an increasingly prominent topic in public debates, and the polarization of viewpoints and constituencies is growing. In the most extreme cases, the dominant political discourse has been infused with xenophobic—or even racist—vitriol. Some political forces are explicitly advocating restrictions on migration. Fewer voices are calling for a liberalization of cross-border movements. Many political leaders are seeking an intermediate position that typically balances humane considerations and calls for firm control of borders.

Figure 9.11 New voices are needed to transform migration debates



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: *Match* refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. *Motive* refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

To make change happen, new voices must emerge (figure 9.11). Social changes and reforms rarely occur simply through the presentation of data and evidence. When new stakeholder groups come to the forefront to make their voices heard, the terms of the debate shift. This has been true for climate change, but also for a range of controversial social issues across countries. Simply put, unless new parties join the debate, the focus and the tone of the migration debates are unlikely to change. New, and stronger, voices are needed, directed at three sets of issues, as discussed below.

AFFECTED NATIONS. Enhance negotiating positions through coalitions. The effective management of migration and forced displacement requires international negotiations—multilateral discussions, for example, on normative frameworks and bilateral arrangements. Developing countries, especially low-income ones, often come to the negotiating table in a relatively weak position, which undermines their ability to safeguard their interests. At times, they are constrained to remain passive witnesses in discussions that affect them, or they are pressured to help implement policies that primarily benefit destination countries. Yet low- and middle-income countries—as origin countries, destination countries, and refugee-hosting countries—have a key role to play in better managing migration. Coalition-building can help to strengthen their ability to influence the debate and make their voices better heard in international discussions, whether global, regional, or bilateral. Forming such groups, such as of the

main origin countries of migrants to a particular destination, would make it easier for these countries to negotiate bilateral labor agreements that best reflect their needs and protect the interests of their citizens while they are abroad.

Refugee-hosting countries with more than 300,000 refugees recently formed an informal group in Geneva—with a rotating chair. This “300 k + group” is aiming to coordinate the positions of large refugee-hosting countries to increase their influence in international discussions on forced displacement and to shape the dialogue with donor countries and other key stakeholders.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been working closely with its member states (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda) to address the root causes and strengthen the management of forced displacement in the region, as well as advocate for more equitable international burden- and responsibility-sharing.¹³⁰ In 2019 at the first Global Refugee Forum, the IGAD Support Platform was launched as a mechanism to sustain the momentum and galvanize additional support for the implementation of IGAD’s 2017 Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia, as well as subsequent declarations and plans of action on education (2017 Djibouti Declaration) and jobs (2019 Kampala Declaration).

DOMESTIC STAKEHOLDERS. *Ensure the participation of a broad range of domestic stakeholders in decision-making processes.* Policy making is enhanced by including multiple perspectives and achieving a degree of social consensus that can facilitate implementation. Both require engaging a wide range of stakeholders in the process. In destination countries, and to some extent in origin countries, migration should be managed by involving the entire government, not just the border control apparatus; engaging with the private sector and other social partners to assess medium-term labor needs and to identify ways to meet them; and supporting local authorities, which often are at the forefront in dealing with the response and integration challenges. The challenge for many underrepresented stakeholders is to organize themselves to make their voices heard. This is especially important when the debate is dominated by the concerns, worldviews, and proposals of constituencies that do not represent the full range of relevant stakeholders. The result may be detrimental outcomes for both underrepresented groups and society at large. Stakeholder engagement can take multiple forms that need to be adapted to each country’s situation and each constituency.

The United Kingdom established a Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) in 2007 to review labor needs in selected sectors and advise the government on the potential use of immigration as a response to those needs.¹³¹ For example, as part of a 2023 review of MAC’s Shortage Occupation List (SOL), the committee is reaching out to professional organizations to solicit inputs on migrant workers’ roles and salaries and the implications of possible policy changes in order to make recommendations on (1) whether the salary requirements for occupations on the SOL should be revised; (2) which occupations on the current SOL should continue to be included and which should be removed; and (3) which occupations, if any, should be added to the SOL.¹³²

In formulating its labor force policies, Singapore continually engages stakeholders through “tripartism,” which emphasizes cooperation among the government, employers, and labor unions in sustaining employment, business growth, and wage growth. Singapore created a joint task force formed by the National Trades Union Congress and the Singapore National Employers Federation, the two primary organizing bodies for unions and employers, to examine labor market policy concerns for professionals, managers, and executives. The task force consulted with more than 10,000 people and issued nine recommendations for labor market policy reform.¹³³

MIGRANTS' AND REFUGEES' VOICES. *Develop systems of representation and accountability to structure migrants' and refugees' voices.* Foreign nationals typically do not have coordination mechanisms that allow their multiple voices to be represented in policy debates in the same way that elected officials represent citizens or labor unions represent workers in domestic labor markets. Migrants and refugees seldom have a forum to speak for themselves. Several countries, both origin and destination, have recognized that their decision-making process can be enhanced by listening to migrants' representatives, even if other interests and viewpoints eventually prevail. The challenge is to ensure that such "delegates" are selected in a manner that makes them genuinely representative of and accountable to the people they represent. But such mechanisms are often lacking.

In the 1970s, several West German municipalities introduced Foreign Citizens' Advisory Councils (FCACs, *Ausländerbeiräte*). Residents with a foreign passport were entitled to elect a board from their own ranks that advised the municipalities on issues that especially concerned foreign nationals. Today, about 400 FCACs are in place in 12 of the 16 federal states. And yet the number of candidates standing for election to the FCACs has declined over the last few years because opportunities for political participation have increased, in particular for European Union citizens eligible to vote locally since 1992 and for the growing number of naturalized citizens. Greater social, ethnic, and national heterogeneity among migrants has also made representativity more difficult to achieve.

In 1997, the Dominican Republic amended its constitution to allow citizens living abroad to vote in general elections from their country of residence. It also established seats for senators and deputies representing citizens abroad.¹³⁴ Under this arrangement, Dominican citizens are allowed to vote for the president, vice president, and the seven members of Parliament that represent the constituencies abroad.¹³⁵ In the 2020 general elections, there were nearly 600,000 registered Dominican voters abroad.¹³⁶

Notes

1. See spotlight 3.
2. NEDA (2021).
3. Ang and Tiongson (2023).
4. IOM (2020).
5. IOM (2020).
6. FSB (2020).
7. DWG (2021).
8. "Sending Money from United States to Mexico," Remittance Prices Worldwide (dashboard), World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/corridor/United-States/Mexico>.
9. GPFI (2021).
10. Méndez Maddaleno (2021).
11. GPFI (2021).
12. GPFI (2021).
13. Government of Vietnam, Decree No. 74-CP on the 30th of July, 1994 of the Government on the Tasks, Authority and Organization of the Apparatus of the Committee for Overseas Vietnamese.
14. VNA (2021).
15. "The Programme for Attracting Remittances into Economy (PARE 1+1)," Organization for the Development of Entrepreneurship (Organizația pentru Dezvoltarea Antreprenoriatului), Chișinău, Moldova, <https://www.odimm.md/en/the-programme-for-attracting-remittances-into-economy>.
16. ETF (2021).
17. "The Programme for Attracting Remittances into Economy (PARE 1+1)," Organization for the Development of Entrepreneurship (Organizația pentru Dezvoltarea Antreprenoriatului), Chișinău, Moldova, <https://www.odimm.md/en/the-programme-for-attracting-remittances-into-economy>.
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19. Abarcar and Theoharides (2021).
20. Cortés and Pan (2015).
21. Fernando and Lodermeier (2021).
22. Indonesia replaced its Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Overseas with Law No. 18/2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers.
23. Missbach and Palmer (2018).
24. UN Women (2019).
25. IRCC (2022).
26. See Centro Nacional de Apoio à Integração de Migrantes, National Immigrant Support Center (website), CNAI, Lisbon, <https://www.acm.gov.pt/-/cnai-lisboa>.

- Details about the Lisbon support center can be found at Centros Nacionais de Apoio à Integração de Migrantes, National Immigrant Support Centers (website), CNAIM, Lisbon, <https://lisboaacolhe.pt/apoio-ao-a-imigrante/centros-nacionais-de-apoio-a-integracao-de-migrantes-cnaim/>.
27. “One-Stop-Shop / National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAI),” European Website on Integration, European Commission, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/integration-practice/one-stop-shop-national-immigrant-support-centres-cnai_en.
 28. Crock and Parsons (2023).
 29. Crock and Parsons (2023).
 30. Department of Home Affairs (2023).
 31. Crock and Parsons (2023).
 32. Haydar (2023).
 33. ILO (2022).
 34. This has been discussed extensively in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. For example, the United Arab Emirates (2011), Qatar (2020), and Saudi Arabia (2021) have relaxed the *kafala* sponsorship system and are now allowing migrants to seek other employers once their initial contract has expired.
 35. Employment Permit System (dashboard), Global Skill Partnerships, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, <https://gsp.cgdev.org/legalpathway/employment-permit-system-eps/>; Park (2017).
 36. Employment Permit System (dashboard), Global Skill Partnerships, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, <https://gsp.cgdev.org/legalpathway/employment-permit-system-eps/>; MOEL (2022).
 37. Clemens and Tiongson (2017).
 38. HRW (2014).
 39. Brücker et al. (2021).
 40. Figueroa and Hinh (2022).
 41. An Act amending the act of June 1, 1937 (P.L. 1168, No. 294), known as the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act.
 42. Colorado General Assembly, SB21-087, Agricultural Workers’ Rights: Concerning agricultural workers’ rights, and, in connection therewith, making an appropriation.
 43. Koch et al. (2023).
 44. Rossiasco et al. (2023).
 45. OECD (2018).
 46. Tesliuc (2006).
 47. OECD (2019).
 48. DFAT (2014).
 49. Park (2012); Schochet et al. (2012).
 50. Politique de la Ville (dashboard), Agence nationale de la cohésion des territoires, Paris, <https://agence-cohesion-territoires.gouv.fr/politique-de-la-ville-97>.
 51. Cour des Comptes (2020).
 52. For example, when the government of Bangladesh experimented in 2013 with direct recruitment of migrant workers to work in Malaysia, it was able to bring down migration costs to a sixth of the market costs (Mobarak, Sharif, and Shrestha 2023).
 53. Sáez (2013).
 54. See Canada.ca (2023).
 55. Canada.ca (2023); IOM (2008).
 56. *Rural Migration News* (2019).
 57. Hennebry and Preibisch (2012).
 58. Malaysia-Bangladesh G2G Program (dashboard), Global Skill Partnerships, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, <https://gsp.cgdev.org/legalpathway/malaysia-bangladesh-g2g-program/>.
 59. Shrestha (2019).
 60. Clemens (2015).
 61. CARICOM (2017).
 62. According to Article 46 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the following categories of CARICOM nationals have the right to seek employment in any of the participating CSME Member States: university graduates, artists, musicians, media workers, sportspersons, nurses, teachers, artisans, holders of associate degrees, domestic workers, agricultural workers, and private security officers. See CARICOM (2001).
 63. There is an oversupply of workers in the Ethiopian labor market, but few permanent positions are available. Thus many unemployed civil engineers are interested in undergoing technical training in the German construction sector and working there as specialists.
 64. Rossiasco et al. (2023).
 65. Government of Uganda (2020).
 66. Alvarez et al. (2022).
 67. Tumen (2023).
 68. Momodu (2019).
 69. Betts et al. (2019).
 70. UNHCR (2021b).
 71. Government of Poland, Amendment to the law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of the country, March 26, 2022.
 72. EC (2022).
 73. Jacoby (2022).
 74. Bengtsson (2018).
 75. UNHCR (2022).
 76. Maza (2023).
 77. United Nations (2018).
 78. OECD (2021).
 79. MREMH (2018).
 80. UNHCR (2021a).
 81. Under its 1979 Protocol A/P.1/5/79 relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment. In terms of the free movement of people, Article 27 (1) of the founding treaty clearly spells out the objective of establishing a free movement zone. It states: “Citizens of Member States shall be regarded as Community citizens and accordingly Member States undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the Community.”
 82. See, for example, the final report of the meeting of the ECOWAS Trade, Customs and Free Movement of Persons Committee in Accra, Ghana, September 25–27, 2007. It endorses the views that refugee status and ECOWAS residence are not incompatible and urges ECOWAS member states to issue travel documents to

- their nationals who are refugees; that host states formally confer the right of residence on ECOWAS citizens who are refugees; and that the validity of such residence be for three years and renewable (paras. 21–23). See ECOWAS (2007a, 2007b).
83. Adepoju, Boulton, and Levin (2010).
 84. ECOWAS (2007b).
 85. Jegen and Zanker (2020).
 86. Abay et al. (2023); Berhane et al. (2014); Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2021).
 87. Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2014).
 88. Barro-Lee estimates of educational attainment in the world (Barro and Lee 2013); Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Penn World Table (database version 10.0), Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands, <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/>.
 89. Sparreboom and Staneva (2014).
 90. School Enrollment, Primary (% Gross): Rwanda (dashboard), World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRR?locations=RW>.
 91. “Who We Are” (website), Rwanda Skills Development Fund, Kigali, Rwanda, <https://sdfwanda.rw/newsite/who-we-are>.
 92. NDMO (2018).
 93. *Namah v. Pato*, SCA 84 (Supreme Court of Justice of Papua New Guinea, 2013).
 94. Tlozek and Anderson (2016).
 95. National Immigration Forum (2023).
 96. Warren and Kerwin (2017).
 97. Baran and Magaña-Salgado (2017).
 98. Refugee Data Finder (dashboard), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://popstats.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/>.
 99. Some of the differences stem from the way these rates are computed.
 100. San (2023).
 101. Clemens, Lewis, and Postel (2018).
 102. Meissner (2004).
 103. Triandafyllidou, Bartolini, and Guidi (2019).
 104. Triandafyllidou, Bartolini, and Guidi (2019).
 105. UNODC (2018).
 106. IOM (2017).
 107. Dreyer and Scheibach (2020); Hunt (2020).
 108. Hunt (2020).
 109. African Courier (2021); Mefo Takambou (2021).
 110. Shear, Sullivan, and Jordan (2023).
 111. EC (2015); European Council (2016).
 112. United Nations (2018, 2019).
 113. Under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the first International Migration Review Forum was held in 2022 with the participation of a broad range of stakeholders. It will meet every four years. Under the Global Compact on Refugees, the first Global Refugee Forum was held in 2019 and will also meet every four years.
 114. Molnar (2020).
 115. See “About,” Expert Group on Refugee, IDP and Statelessness Statistics, EGRIS, UN City, Copenhagen, <http://egrisstats.org/about/>.
 116. ILO (2018).
 117. International Labour Migration Statistics (database), ILOSTAT, International Labour Organization, Geneva, <https://ilostat.ilo.org/resources/concepts-and-definitions/description-international-labour-migration-statistics/>.
 118. Nguyen, Savadogo, and Tanaka (2021).
 119. UNECE (2020).
 120. Rubalcava et al. (2008).
 121. Durand and Massey (2006).
 122. World Bank (2012).
 123. Verhulst and Young (2017). Also see Development Data Partnership (dashboard), World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://datapartnership.org/>.
 124. This problem was flagged during the 2015 World Humanitarian Summit and in the discussions leading to the 2019 Grand Bargain between some of the largest donors and humanitarian organizations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian action.
 125. For more on the Window for Host Communities and Refugees, see IDA (2022). See also Window for Host Communities and Refugees, International Development Association, World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://ida.worldbank.org/en/replenishments/ida19-replenishment/windows-host-communities-refugees>.
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