Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan

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collection.link.5
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9
collection.name.5
Policy Research Working Papers
dc.contributor.author
Jacoby, Hanan G.
dc.contributor.author
Mansuri, Ghazala
dc.date.accessioned
2012-06-22T19:14:20Z
dc.date.available
2012-06-22T19:14:20Z
dc.date.issued
2006-02
dc.date.lastModified
2017-12-14T05:09:37Z
dc.description.abstract
When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem.
en
dc.identifier
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8825
dc.language
English
dc.publisher
World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3826
dc.rights
CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject
ADVERSE SELECTION
dc.subject
AGRICULTURAL LAND
dc.subject
AGRICULTURE
dc.subject
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
dc.subject
CONTRACT THEORY
dc.subject
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS
dc.subject
COST FUNCTIONS
dc.subject
CREDIT
dc.subject
DISCOUNT RATE
dc.subject
DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subject
EVICTION
dc.subject
EXPROPRIATION
dc.subject
HOUSEHOLDS
dc.subject
HUMAN CAPITAL
dc.subject
INCENTIVE EFFECTS
dc.subject
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
dc.subject
INEFFICIENCY
dc.subject
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
dc.subject
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
dc.subject
LAND TENURE
dc.subject
LANDLORD
dc.subject
LANDLORDS
dc.subject
LANDOWNERS
dc.subject
LEASE
dc.subject
LEASING
dc.subject
LIABILITY
dc.subject
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
dc.subject
MORAL HAZARD
dc.subject
OPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subject
OPTIMAL CONTRACT
dc.subject
PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
dc.subject
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
dc.subject
PROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subject
RENTS
dc.subject
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
dc.subject
RISK
dc.subject
RISK AVERSION
dc.subject
RISK-NEUTRAL
dc.subject
STATEMENTS
dc.subject
TENANCY
dc.subject
TENANTS
dc.subject
WEALTH
dc.title
Incomplete Contracts and Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy in Pakistan
en
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.docurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/6541576/incomplete-contracts-investment-study-land-tenancy-pakistan
okr.globalpractice
Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpractice
Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience
okr.globalpractice
Governance
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1596/1813-9450-3826
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum
000016406_20060118155055
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum
6541576
okr.identifier.report
WPS3826
okr.language.supported
en
okr.pdfurl
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/01/18/000016406_20060118155055/Rendered/PDF/wps3826.pdf
en
okr.region.administrative
South Asia
okr.region.country
Pakistan
okr.topic
Communities and Human Settlements :: Real Estate Development
okr.topic
Economic Theory and Research
okr.topic
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Investment and Investment Climate
okr.topic
Urban Development :: Municipal Housing and Land
okr.topic
Law and Development :: Contract Law
okr.unit
Development Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume
1 of 1

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