How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru

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collection.link.5
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9
collection.name.5
Policy Research Working Papers
dc.contributor.author
Kaufmann, Daniel
dc.contributor.author
Montoriol-Garriga, Judit
dc.contributor.author
Recanatini, Francesca
dc.date.accessioned
2012-05-25T20:51:51Z
dc.date.available
2012-05-25T20:51:51Z
dc.date.issued
2008-01
dc.date.lastModified
2021-04-23T14:02:31Z
dc.description.abstract
When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it.
en
dc.identifier
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/01/8968936/bribery-affect-public-service-delivery-micro-evidence-service-users-public-officials-peru
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6476
dc.language
English
dc.publisher
World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4492
dc.rights
CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject
ABUSE
dc.subject
ABUSES
dc.subject
ACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subject
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION
dc.subject
AGGREGATING GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
dc.subject
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
dc.subject
ANTI-CORRUPTION
dc.subject
AVERAGE INCOME
dc.subject
AVERAGE LEVEL
dc.subject
BAD GOVERNANCE
dc.subject
BASIC SERVICE
dc.subject
BASIC SERVICES
dc.subject
BRIBE
dc.subject
BRIBERY
dc.subject
BRIBES
dc.subject
BUDGET MANAGEMENT
dc.subject
BURDEN OF TAXES
dc.subject
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
dc.subject
CITIES
dc.subject
CITIZEN
dc.subject
CITIZEN VOICE
dc.subject
CITIZENS
dc.subject
CIVIL SERVANTS
dc.subject
COMMUNISM
dc.subject
COMPLAINT
dc.subject
COMPLAINTS
dc.subject
CORRUPT
dc.subject
CORRUPT ACT
dc.subject
CORRUPT PRACTICES
dc.subject
CORRUPTION
dc.subject
CORRUPTION ACT
dc.subject
CORRUPTION ACTS
dc.subject
CORRUPTION IN LAWS
dc.subject
CORRUPTION INDICATOR
dc.subject
CORRUPTION SURVEY
dc.subject
DATA COLLECTION
dc.subject
DECENTRALIZATION
dc.subject
DISCLOSURE
dc.subject
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject
ECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subject
FOREIGN AID
dc.subject
FOREIGN INVESTORS
dc.subject
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
dc.subject
GOOD GOVERNANCE
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE DIMENSION
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE INDICATOR
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE ISSUES
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES
dc.subject
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
dc.subject
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
dc.subject
HUMAN CAPITAL
dc.subject
INCOME
dc.subject
INCOME LEVEL
dc.subject
INEQUALITY
dc.subject
INFANT MORTALITY
dc.subject
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
dc.subject
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
dc.subject
JUDICIARY
dc.subject
JUSTICE
dc.subject
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
dc.subject
LOCAL REVENUE
dc.subject
MEASUREMENT ERROR
dc.subject
MERITOCRACY
dc.subject
MONOPOLY
dc.subject
MUNICIPAL AGENCIES
dc.subject
MUNICIPAL SERVICES
dc.subject
PENALTY
dc.subject
POLICE
dc.subject
POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject
POLITICAL PARTY
dc.subject
POOR GOVERNANCE
dc.subject
POVERTY REDUCTION
dc.subject
PRIMARY EDUCATION
dc.subject
PRIVATE GAIN
dc.subject
PROCUREMENT
dc.subject
PUBLIC
dc.subject
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
dc.subject
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
dc.subject
PUBLIC AGENCIES
dc.subject
PUBLIC AGENCY
dc.subject
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
dc.subject
PUBLIC CORRUPTION
dc.subject
PUBLIC ECONOMICS
dc.subject
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
dc.subject
PUBLIC HOSPITALS
dc.subject
PUBLIC INSTITUTION
dc.subject
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
dc.subject
PUBLIC OFFICIAL
dc.subject
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
dc.subject
PUBLIC RESOURCES
dc.subject
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
dc.subject
PUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subject
PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
dc.subject
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
dc.subject
PUBLIC SERVICE
dc.subject
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
dc.subject
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
dc.subject
PUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subject
RULE OF LAW
dc.subject
SOCIAL NETWORKS
dc.subject
SOCIAL SECURITY
dc.subject
STATE AGENCIES
dc.subject
STATE INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject
STATE POWER
dc.subject
TAX
dc.subject
TAX ADMINISTRATION
dc.subject
TAX BASE
dc.subject
TRANSPARENCY
dc.subject
YOUNG PEOPLE
dc.title
How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru
en
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.docurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/01/8968936/bribery-affect-public-service-delivery-micro-evidence-service-users-public-officials-peru
okr.globalpractice
Governance
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1596/1813-9450-4492
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum
000158349_20080128090947
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum
8968936
okr.identifier.report
WPS4492
okr.language.supported
en
okr.pdfurl
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/01/28/000158349_20080128090947/Rendered/PDF/wps4492.pdf
en
okr.region.administrative
Latin America & Caribbean
okr.region.country
Peru
okr.topic
Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures
okr.topic
Public Sector Management and Reform
okr.topic
Governance :: National Governance
okr.topic
Governance :: Governance Indicators
okr.topic
Public Sector Economics and Finance
okr.topic
Public Sector Development
okr.unit
Development Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume
1 of 1

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