Working Paper

Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?

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collection.link.5
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9
collection.name.5
Policy Research Working Papers
dc.contributor.author
Chalendard, Cyril
dc.contributor.author
Duhaut, Alice
dc.contributor.author
Fernandes, Ana M.
dc.contributor.author
Mattoo, Aaditya
dc.contributor.author
Raballand, Gael
dc.contributor.author
Rijkers, Bob
dc.date.accessioned
2020-05-28T15:30:43Z
dc.date.available
2020-05-28T15:30:43Z
dc.date.issued
2020-05
dc.date.lastModified
2021-12-05T12:11:52Z
dc.description.abstract
This paper examines how providing better information to customs inspectors and monitoring their actions affects tax revenue and fraud detection in Madagascar. First, an instrumental variables strategy is used to show that transaction-specific, third-party valuation advice on a subset of high-risk import declarations increases fraud findings by 21.7 percentage points and tax collection by 5.2 percentage points. Second, a randomized control trial is conducted in which a subset of high-risk declarations is selected to receive detailed risk comments and another subset is explicitly tagged for ex-post monitoring. For declarations not subject to third-party valuation advice, detailed comments increase reporting of fraud by 3.1 percentage points and improve tax yield by 1 percentage point. However, valuation advice and detailed comments have a significantly smaller impact on revenue when potential tax losses and opportunities for graft are large. Monitoring induces inspectors to scan more shipments but does not result in the detection of more fraud or the collection of additional revenue. Better information thus helps curb customs fraud, but its effectiveness appears compromised by corruption.
en
dc.identifier
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/554091590075089654/Does-Better-Information-Curb-Customs-Fraud
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33817
dc.language
English
dc.publisher
World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9254
dc.rights
CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subject
TARIFF EVASION
dc.subject
TAX ENFORCEMENT
dc.subject
THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION
dc.subject
PERFORMANCE MONITORING
dc.subject
RISK MANAGEMENT
dc.subject
INFORMATION PROVISION
dc.subject
RANDOMIZED CONTROL TRIALS
dc.subject
CUSTOMS INSPECTION
dc.subject
TAX FRAUD
dc.title
Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?
en
dc.type
Working Paper
en
okr.crossref.title
Does Better Information Curb Customs Fraud?
okr.date.disclosure
2020-05-21
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/554091590075089654/Does-Better-Information-Curb-Customs-Fraud
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1596/1813-9450-9254
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum
090224b087968558_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum
32057094
okr.identifier.report
WPS9254
okr.imported
true
en
okr.language.supported
en
okr.pdfurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/554091590075089654/pdf/Does-Better-Information-Curb-Customs-Fraud.pdf
en
okr.region.administrative
Africa
okr.region.country
Madagascar
okr.statistics.combined
1095
okr.statistics.dr
554091590075089654
okr.topic
Public Sector Development :: Public Sector Administrative and Civil Service Reform
okr.topic
International Economics and Trade :: Customs and Trade
okr.topic
Law and Development :: Tax Law
okr.topic
Private Sector Development :: Corporate Governance and Corruption
okr.unit
Development Research Group; the Development Impact Evaluation Group; and the Governance Global Practice

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