Electoral Accountability, Fiscal Decentralization and Service Delivery in Indonesia

Published
2011-03-01
Journal
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Abstract
This paper takes advantage of the exogenous phasing of direct elections in districts and applies the double difference estimator to: (i) measure impacts on the pattern of public spending and revenue generation at the district level; and (ii) investigate the heterogeneity of the impacts on public spending. The authors confirm that the electoral reforms had positive effects on district expenditures and these effects were mainly due to the increases in expenditures in the districts outside Java and Bali and the changes in expenditures brought about by non-incumbents elected in the districts. Electoral reforms also led to higher revenue generation from own sources and to higher budget surplus. Finally, the analysis finds that in anticipation of the forthcoming direct elections, district governments tend to have higher current expenditures on public works.Citation
“Skoufias, Emmanuel; Narayan, Ambar; Dasgupta, Basab; Kaiser, Kai. 2011. Electoral Accountability, Fiscal Decentralization and Service Delivery in Indonesia. Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5614. World Bank. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/3381 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
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