Journal Article

Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work?

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collection.link.102
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2211
collection.name.102
A. World Bank Economic Review
dc.contributor.author
Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio
dc.contributor.author
Leslie, Heather M.
dc.contributor.author
Mack-Crane, Austen
dc.contributor.author
Nagavarapu, Sriniketh
dc.contributor.author
Reddy, Sheila M.W.
dc.contributor.author
Sievanen, Leila
dc.date.accessioned
2018-12-06T17:07:54Z
dc.date.available
2018-12-06T17:07:54Z
dc.date.issued
2017-06-01
dc.date.lastModified
2021-05-25T10:54:35Z
dc.description.abstract
Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling setting for theoretical and empirical analysis. A dynamic theoretical model demonstrates how fishing cooperatives’ management choices are shaped by the presence of property rights, the mobility of resources, and predictable environmental fluctuations. More aggressive management comes in the form of the cooperative leadership paying lower prices to cooperative members for their catch, as lower prices disincentivize fishing effort. The model's implications are empirically tested using three years of daily logbook data on prices and catches for three cooperatives from the Gulf of California. One cooperative enjoys property rights while the other two do not. There is empirical evidence in support of the model: compared to the other cooperatives, the cooperative with strong property rights pays members a lower price, pays especially lower prices for less mobile species, and decreases prices when environmental fluctuations cause population growth rates to fall. The results from this case study demonstrate the viability of cooperative management of resources but also point toward quantitatively important limitations created by the mismatch between the scale of a property right and the scale of a resource.
en
dc.identifier.citation
World Bank Economic Review
dc.identifier.issn
1564-698X
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30954
dc.publisher
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
dc.rights
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.subject
POPULATION GROWTH
dc.subject
INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY
dc.subject
ECOSYSTEM
dc.subject
FISHERIES
dc.subject
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
dc.subject
MARKETS
dc.subject
CORPORATE ENTITIES
dc.subject
COOPERATIVES
dc.subject
PROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.title
Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives
en
dc.title.subtitle
How (and How Well) Do They Work?
en
dc.type
Journal Article
en
okr.date.disclosure
2017-12-06
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Journal Article
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1093/wber/lhw001
okr.identifier.doi
10.1596/30954
okr.journal.nbpages
295-328
okr.language.supported
en
okr.peerreview
Academic Peer Review
okr.region.administrative
Latin America & Caribbean
okr.region.country
Mexico
okr.topic
Agriculture :: Fisheries & Aquaculture
okr.topic
Environment :: Marine Environment
okr.topic
Private Sector Development :: Organizational Management
okr.topic
Private Sector Development :: Private Sector Economics
okr.topic
Private Sector Development :: Social Entrepreneurship and Business Clusters
okr.unit
Development Economics Research Group
okr.volume
31(2)

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