Working Paper

Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 88 Developing Countries

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collection.link.5
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9
collection.name.5
Policy Research Working Papers
dc.contributor.author
Knack, Stephen
dc.contributor.author
Biletska, Nataliya
dc.contributor.author
Kacker, Kanishka
dc.date.accessioned
2017-06-05T20:57:48Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-05T20:57:48Z
dc.date.issued
2017-05
dc.description.abstract
There is relatively little systematic evidence on the links between procurement systems and outcomes such as competition and corruption levels. This paper adds to the evidence base, using data on almost 34,000 firms from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, in 88 countries that also have procurement systems data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments. The analysis finds that in countries with more transparent procurement systems, where exceptions to open competition in tendering must be explicitly justified, firms are more likely to participate in public procurement markets. Moreover, firms report paying fewer and smaller kickbacks to officials in countries with more transparent procurement systems, effective and independent complaint mechanisms, and more effective external auditing systems. These findings—particularly on kickbacks—are robust to the inclusion of many controls and to a range of sensitivity tests. The study finds evidence that better procurement systems matter more for smaller firms’ participation in procurement markets and payment of kickbacks to obtain contracts, consistent with the view that information and transactions costs that are incurred in learning about bidding opportunities and fulfilling bidding requirements are more onerous for smaller firms. Falsification tests show that other, non-procurement indicators from the PEFA assessments are not associated with procurement outcomes, and that the PEFA procurement indicators are not strongly associated with other “governance”-related outcomes in firm surveys that are unrelated to procurement.
en
dc.identifier
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/817871496169519447/Deterring-kickbacks-and-encouraging-entry-in-public-procurement-markets-evidence-from-firm-surveys-in-88-developing-countries
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26950
dc.language
English
dc.language.iso
en_US
dc.publisher
World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8078
dc.rights
CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subject
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
dc.subject
GOVERNANCE
dc.subject
CORRUPTION
dc.subject
BRIBERY
dc.subject
KICKBACKS
dc.subject
PEFA
dc.title
Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets
en
dc.title.subtitle
Evidence from Firm Surveys in 88 Developing Countries
en
dc.type
Working Paper
en
okr.date.disclosure
2017-05-30
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/817871496169519447/Deterring-kickbacks-and-encouraging-entry-in-public-procurement-markets-evidence-from-firm-surveys-in-88-developing-countries
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1596/1813-9450-8078
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum
090224b084c064d4_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum
27521557
okr.identifier.report
WPS8078
okr.imported
true
okr.language.supported
en
okr.pdfurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/817871496169519447/pdf/WPS8078.pdf
en
okr.topic
Public Sector Development :: Public Sector Management and Reform
okr.topic
Governance :: National Governance
okr.topic
Private Sector Development :: Corporate Governance and Corruption
okr.topic
Private Sector Development :: Legal Regulation and Business Environment
okr.topic
Public Sector Development :: Public Sector Corruption/Anticorruption Measures
okr.unit
Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group

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