Working Paper

Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

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collection.link.5
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9
collection.name.5
Policy Research Working Papers
dc.contributor.author
Cordella, Tito
dc.contributor.author
Onder, Harun
dc.date.accessioned
2016-11-01T19:10:45Z
dc.date.available
2016-11-01T19:10:45Z
dc.date.issued
2016-10
dc.date.lastModified
2021-04-23T14:04:29Z
dc.description.abstract
This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest.
en
dc.identifier
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314
dc.language
English
dc.language.iso
en_US
dc.publisher
World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7869
dc.rights
CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject
natural resources
dc.subject
conflict
dc.subject
redistribution
dc.subject
aggregative games
dc.subject
oil windfalls
dc.subject
political violence
dc.subject
subsidies reform
dc.subject
subnational governance
dc.title
Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
en
dc.type
Working Paper
en
okr.crossref.title
Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
okr.date.disclosure
2016-10-19
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1596/1813-9450-7869
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum
090224b08464c2ac_2_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum
26875985
okr.identifier.report
WPS7869
okr.imported
true
okr.language.supported
en
okr.pdfurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/551551476899338541/pdf/WPS7869.pdf
en
okr.topic
Conflict and Development :: Conflict and Fragile States
okr.topic
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Commodities
okr.topic
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Political Economy
okr.topic
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Subnational Economic Development
okr.topic
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Taxation & Subsidies
okr.topic
Social Development :: Social Conflict and Violence
okr.unit
Operations and Strategy Team, Development Economics Vice Presidency; and the Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice Group

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