Working Paper
High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
| collection.link.5 |
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/9
| |
| collection.name.5 |
Policy Research Working Papers
| |
| dc.contributor.author |
Mishra, Ajit
| |
| dc.contributor.author |
Sarangi, Sudipta
| |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2015-07-17T20:55:45Z
| |
| dc.date.available |
2015-07-17T20:55:45Z
| |
| dc.date.issued |
2015-06
| |
| dc.date.lastModified |
2021-04-23T14:04:07Z
| |
| dc.description.abstract |
This paper uses a donor-provider-agent
framework to study the role of provider incentives for the
delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or
technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a
situation where credible communication by the provider is
the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use
of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of
communication between providers and agents, leading to
undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay
between incentives and communication in the presence of
typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain
situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.
| en |
| dc.identifier |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure
| |
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22225
| |
| dc.language |
English
| |
| dc.language.iso |
en_US
| |
| dc.publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC
| |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7345
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| dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO
| |
| dc.rights.holder |
World Bank
| |
| dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
| |
| dc.subject |
TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY
| |
| dc.subject |
TECHNOLOGY
| |
| dc.subject |
KNOWING
| |
| dc.subject |
RISK NEUTRAL
| |
| dc.subject |
MOTIVATION
| |
| dc.subject |
PRODUCTION
| |
| dc.subject |
WAGES
| |
| dc.subject |
BASIC
| |
| dc.subject |
PARTICIPATION
| |
| dc.subject |
INCOME
| |
| dc.subject |
KNOW-HOW
| |
| dc.subject |
VALUE
| |
| dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT
| |
| dc.subject |
CREDIT
| |
| dc.subject |
PROGRAMS
| |
| dc.subject |
INFORMATION
| |
| dc.subject |
TEXT
| |
| dc.subject |
SERVICES
| |
| dc.subject |
AGRICULTURE
| |
| dc.title |
High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure
| en |
| dc.type |
Working Paper
| en |
| okr.date.disclosure |
2015-06-29
| |
| okr.doctype |
Publications & Research
| |
| okr.doctype |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
| |
| okr.docurl |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24728266/high-powered-incentives-communication-failure
| |
| okr.globalpractice |
Poverty
| |
| okr.googlescholar.linkpresent |
yes
| |
| okr.identifier.doi |
10.1596/1813-9450-7345
| |
| okr.identifier.externaldocumentum |
090224b082fa249f_1_0
| |
| okr.identifier.internaldocumentum |
24728266
| |
| okr.identifier.report |
WPS7345
| |
| okr.language.supported |
en
| |
| okr.pdfurl |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/06/29/090224b082fa249f/1_0/Rendered/PDF/High0powered0i0ommunication0failure.pdf
| en |
| okr.topic |
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness
| |
| okr.topic |
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Economic Assistance
| |
| okr.topic |
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Economic Theory & Research
| |
| okr.topic |
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Foreign Aid
| |
| okr.topic |
Poverty Reduction :: Conditional Cash Transfers
| |
| okr.topic |
Poverty Reduction :: Services & Transfers to Poor
| |
| okr.topic |
Social Protections and Labor :: Safety Nets and Transfers
| |
| okr.unit |
Office of the Chief Economist, Development Economics Vice Presidency (DECVP)
|








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