Journal Article

Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia

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collection.link.102
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2211
collection.name.102
A. World Bank Economic Review
dc.contributor.author
Friebel, Guido
dc.contributor.author
Guriev, Sergei
dc.date.accessioned
2014-01-03T18:13:10Z
dc.date.available
2014-01-03T18:13:10Z
dc.date.issued
2005-10-05
dc.date.lastModified
2021-04-23T14:03:29Z
dc.description.abstract
External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise 'attachment' strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature. The article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. An analysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federation corroborates the theory.
en
dc.identifier
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17747612/attaching-workers-through-in-kind-payments-theory-evidence-russia
dc.identifier.citation
World Bank Economic Review
dc.identifier.other
doi:10.1093/wber/lhi012
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16475
dc.language
English
dc.language.iso
en_US
dc.publisher
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
dc.rights
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder
World Bank
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.subject
labor markets
dc.subject
migration
dc.subject
in-kind payments
dc.title
Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
en
dc.type
Journal Article
en
okr.date.disclosure
2013-05-23
okr.doctype
Publications & Research :: Journal Article
okr.doctype
Publications & Research
okr.docurl
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17747612/attaching-workers-through-in-kind-payments-theory-evidence-russia
okr.googlescholar.linkpresent
yes
okr.identifier.doi
10.1093/wber/lhi012
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum
000333037_20130523125415
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum
17747612
okr.identifier.report
77487
okr.journal.nbpages
175-202
okr.language.supported
en
okr.pdfurl
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/23/000333037_20130523125415/Rendered/PDF/774870JRN020050C00Attaching0Workers.pdf
en
okr.peerreview
Academic Peer Review
okr.region.administrative
Europe and Central Asia
okr.region.country
Russian Federation
okr.topic
Social Protections and Labor :: Labor Management and Relations
okr.topic
Social Protections and Labor :: Labor Markets
okr.topic
Social Protections and Labor :: Labor Standards
okr.topic
Social Protections and Labor :: Wages, Compensation & Benefits
okr.unit
DEC Resource Management (DECRM)
okr.volume
19(2)

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