Publication: Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services
Date
2005-03-01
ISSN
Published
2005-03-01
Author(s)
Keefer, Philip
Khemani, Stuti
Abstract
The incentives of politicians to provide
broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries.
Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to
divert resources to political rents and private transfers
that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These
distortions can be traced to imperfections in political
markets that are greater in some countries than in others.
This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impact
on political incentives of incomplete information for
voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and
social polarization. The analysis has implications for
policy and for reforms to improve public goods provision and
reduce poverty.
Citation
“Keefer, Philip; Khemani, Stuti. 2005. Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services. World Bank Research Observer. © Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank. http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16407 License: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO.”
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