How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Cigno, Alessandro

doi:10.1093/wber/lhr038

Publication: How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

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Date

2012-01-18

ISSN

1564-698X

Published

2012-01-18

Author(s)

Cigno, Alessandro

Abstract

Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.

Citation

“Cigno, Alessandro. 2012. How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country. World Bank Economic Review. © World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309 License: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO.”