Publication: Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law
Date
2002-03
ISSN
Published
2002-03
Author(s)
Messick, Richard E.
Kleinfeld, Rachel
Abstract
The note looks at effective
anticorruption legal instruments, ensuring that laws are in
place to deter corruption. However, law enforcement measures
are not the first, or necessarily the preferred method of
defense. An informed citizenry, a government imbued with a
service ethic, and other measures can be more effective in
combating corruption. But tailoring the law to enforcement
capacity, generally encompass a variety of statutes that
prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts of interest, and
favoritism in the award of contracts, or the provision of
government benefits. And, writing such laws contain
"bright-line rules" that are contrasted with those
containing standards that are open to interpretation by
enforcement agencies. As an example of these
"bright-line rules" the note provides the recent
example from Argentina, where nepotism, and favoritism in
government hiring are perceived as serious problems.
Considerations to the inclusion of bright-line rules
include, the preclusion of receiving gifts or payments by
government employees; of interest in a corporation or entity
affected by that employee's decision; of hiring
relatives; and, that employees must publicly disclose assets hold.
Citation
“Messick, Richard E.; Kleinfeld, Rachel. 2002. Writing an Effective Anticorruption Law. Africa Region Findings & Good Practice Infobriefs; No. 203. © World Bank, Washington, DC. http://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/d9950107-b1ab-5070-9a6a-83947f407f09 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”