Do They Do As They Say?: Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program De Martino, Samantha Kondylis, Florence Pagiola, Stefano Zwager, Astrid 2016-10-17T22:05:02Z 2016-10-17T22:05:02Z 2016-06
dc.description.abstract Use of conditional cash transfers has become widespread in development policy given their success in boosting health and education outcomes. Recently, conditional cash transfers are being used to promote pro-environmental behavior. While many of these Payments for Environment Services (PES) programs have been successful, it has been hypothesized that those with less favorable outcomes have been subject to low additionality, whereby landholders already conserving their land self-select into the program. Insights from the behavioral economics literature suggest that an external incentive, such as PES, has the potential to crowd in or crowd out individual behavior differentially across the initial distribution of intrinsic motivations (Frey, 1992). Thus, to increase the impact of PES, program administrators might gain from a better understanding of both the pre-existing motivations and existing baseline conservation behavior of potential participants. This paper contributes to the literature by disentangling and measuring intrinsic motivations, specifically: Pro-Environment, Pro-Social, Pro-Government, and Social Norms. Controlling for observable opportunity costs, we use these latent motivations to analyze behavioral determinants of take up for a conservation program in São Paulo, Brazil. The payments are an incentive to comply with the Brazil Forest Code. We find that Pro-Social and Pro-Environment landholders are both more likely to be conserving private land not under legal protection before the program is introduced, whereas only Pro-Social landholders are already conserving land under legal protection. With respect to enrollment in the PES program, we find Pro-Social landholders are less likely to enroll while Pro-Environment landholders are more likely to enroll. Thus we expect some level of additionality from the PES program. We discuss these findings in light of the theoretical framework on Self-Determination Theory (SDT). en
dc.language English
dc.language.iso en_US
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder World Bank
dc.subject conservation
dc.subject crowding out
dc.subject intrinsic motivations
dc.subject extrinsic incentives
dc.subject self-determination theory
dc.title Do They Do As They Say? en
dc.title.subtitle Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.type Document de travail fr
dc.type Documento de trabajo es
dspace.entity.type Publication
okr.crossref.title Do They Do As They Say? 2016-09-26
okr.doctype Publications & Research
okr.doctype Publications & Research :: Working Paper
okr.identifier.doi 10.1596/25177
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum 090224b0845bdd5c_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum 26816716 108523
okr.imported true
okr.language.supported en
okr.pdfurl en
okr.region.administrative Latin America & Caribbean Brazil
okr.sector Agriculture, fishing, and forestry
okr.theme Environment and natural resource management :: Environmental policies and institutions
okr.theme Rural development :: Rural policies and institutions
okr.topic Energy :: Energy Conservation & Efficiency
okr.topic Environment :: Environmental Economics & Policies
okr.topic Poverty Reduction :: Poverty, Environment and Development
okr.topic Rural Development :: Natural Resources Management and Rural Issues
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