Publication:
Why Central Bank Independence Matters

dc.contributor.author Bandaogo, Mahama Samir
dc.date.accessioned 2021-12-07T22:36:46Z
dc.date.available 2021-12-07T22:36:46Z
dc.date.issued 2021-11-30
dc.description.abstract Deep economic crises - the global financial crisis and the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic - have put some strains on and rekindled an older debate about the costs and benefits of central bank Independence. Central banks have been accorded more independence since the 1970s, which has helped bring down and keep inflation low and reduced the risk of fiscal crises. However, as their interventions in the economy with unconventional policies expand further beyond their original mandate, especially those pertaining to financial stability, critics have called for more oversight of their activities. That is because some of the central banks’ newfound responsibilities such as financial stability does not have a precise and unambiguous target or measure, making accountability difficult. The evidence in support of central bank independence remains strong, as highlighted in this brief. However, in light of the expansion of central banks’ power, reforms should aim to institute oversight of the newfound powers. en
dc.identifier http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36672
dc.language English
dc.publisher World Bank, Malaysia
dc.relation.ispartofseries Research and Policy Brief;No. 53
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder World Bank
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo
dc.subject CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE
dc.subject PUBLIC DEBT
dc.subject FISCAL DEFICIT
dc.subject CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
dc.subject OVERSIGHT
dc.title Why Central Bank Independence Matters en
dc.type Brief en
dc.type Fiche fr
dc.type Resumen es
dspace.entity.type Publication
okr.date.disclosure 2021-11-30
okr.date.lastmodified 2021-11-30T00:00:00Z en
okr.doctype Publications & Research
okr.doctype Publications & Research :: Brief
okr.docurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters
okr.guid 284641638334557462
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum 090224b088bd7953_1_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum 33651579
okr.identifier.report 166500
okr.imported true en
okr.language.supported en
okr.pdfurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/284641638334557462/pdf/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters.pdf en
okr.region.administrative East Asia and Pacific
okr.region.country Malaysia
okr.topic Public Sector Development :: Public Financial Management
okr.topic Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Strategic Debt Management
okr.topic Governance :: Governance and the Financial Sector
okr.topic Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Fiscal & Monetary Policy
okr.topic Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Macroeconomic Management
okr.unit EFI-EAP-MTI-MacroFiscal-2 (EEAM2)
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