Publication:
Why Central Bank Independence Matters
dc.contributor.author | Bandaogo, Mahama Samir | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-07T22:36:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-12-07T22:36:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-11-30 | |
dc.description.abstract | Deep economic crises - the global financial crisis and the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic - have put some strains on and rekindled an older debate about the costs and benefits of central bank Independence. Central banks have been accorded more independence since the 1970s, which has helped bring down and keep inflation low and reduced the risk of fiscal crises. However, as their interventions in the economy with unconventional policies expand further beyond their original mandate, especially those pertaining to financial stability, critics have called for more oversight of their activities. That is because some of the central banks’ newfound responsibilities such as financial stability does not have a precise and unambiguous target or measure, making accountability difficult. The evidence in support of central bank independence remains strong, as highlighted in this brief. However, in light of the expansion of central banks’ power, reforms should aim to institute oversight of the newfound powers. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/36672 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Malaysia | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Research and Policy Brief;No. 53 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL BANK GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC DEBT | |
dc.subject | FISCAL DEFICIT | |
dc.subject | CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE | |
dc.subject | OVERSIGHT | |
dc.title | Why Central Bank Independence Matters | en |
dc.type | Brief | en |
dc.type | Fiche | fr |
dc.type | Resumen | es |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.date.disclosure | 2021-11-30 | |
okr.date.lastmodified | 2021-11-30T00:00:00Z | en |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research :: Brief | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/undefined/284641638334557462/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters | |
okr.guid | 284641638334557462 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 090224b088bd7953_1_0 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 33651579 | |
okr.identifier.report | 166500 | |
okr.imported | true | en |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/284641638334557462/pdf/Why-Central-Bank-Independence-Matters.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | East Asia and Pacific | |
okr.region.country | Malaysia | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Development :: Public Financial Management | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Strategic Debt Management | |
okr.topic | Governance :: Governance and the Financial Sector | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Fiscal & Monetary Policy | |
okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Macroeconomic Management | |
okr.unit | EFI-EAP-MTI-MacroFiscal-2 (EEAM2) |
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