Publication:
Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

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dc.contributor.authorCordella, Tito
dc.contributor.authorOnder, Harun
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-01T19:10:45Z
dc.date.available2016-11-01T19:10:45Z
dc.date.issued2016-10
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-7869
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper;No. 7869
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectnatural resources
dc.subjectconflict
dc.subjectredistribution
dc.subjectaggregative games
dc.subjectoil windfalls
dc.subjectpolitical violence
dc.subjectsubsidies reform
dc.subjectsubnational governance
dc.titleSharing Oil Rents and Political Violenceen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.typeDocument de travailfr
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleSharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
okr.date.disclosure2016-10-19
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence
okr.guid551551476899338541
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-7869
okr.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7869
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum090224b08464c2ac_2_0
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum26875985
okr.identifier.reportWPS7869
okr.importedtrue
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/551551476899338541/pdf/WPS7869.pdfen
okr.topicConflict and Development::Conflict and Fragile States
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Commodities
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Political Economy
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Subnational Economic Development
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Taxation & Subsidies
okr.topicSocial Development::Social Conflict and Violence
okr.unitOperations and Strategy Team, Development Economics Vice Presidency; and the Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice Group
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationd61c0c55-6729-5ba5-aa32-ba74610c7f12
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryd61c0c55-6729-5ba5-aa32-ba74610c7f12
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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