Publication:
Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements

dc.contributor.authorLimão, Nuno
dc.contributor.authorSaggi, Kamal
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-21T21:38:25Z
dc.date.available2012-06-21T21:38:25Z
dc.date.issued2006-04
dc.description.abstractThe authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/04/6683376/tariff-retaliation-versus-financial-compensation-enforcement-international-trade-agreements
dc.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3873
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/8734
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 3873
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
dc.subjectBALANCE OF CONCESSIONS
dc.subjectBENCHMARK
dc.subjectBILATERAL TRADE
dc.subjectBILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT
dc.subjectBONDS
dc.subjectCENTRAL AMERICAN
dc.subjectCOLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subjectCONCESSIONS
dc.subjectCONSUMER
dc.subjectCONSUMER SURPLUS
dc.subjectDEMAND ELASTICITY
dc.subjectDISCOUNTED VALUE
dc.subjectDISPUTE SETTLEMENT
dc.subjectDISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
dc.subjectDISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
dc.subjectENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
dc.subjectENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectESCROW
dc.subjectEXCESS DEMAND
dc.subjectEXPORT
dc.subjectEXPORT CARTELS
dc.subjectEXPORT SUPPLY
dc.subjectEXPORTERS
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectEXTERNALITIES
dc.subjectFOREIGN COUNTRY
dc.subjectFORMAL ANALYSIS
dc.subjectFREE RIDER
dc.subjectFREE RIDER PROBLEM
dc.subjectHOME COUNTRY
dc.subjectIMPORT PRICES
dc.subjectIMPORT TARIFF
dc.subjectINCENTIVE CONSTRAINT
dc.subjectINCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINEFFICIENCY
dc.subjectINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL LAW
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subjectLEGAL SCHOLARS
dc.subjectLESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subjectLIABILITY
dc.subjectLOW TARIFFS
dc.subjectMARKET CLEARING
dc.subjectMARKET SHARE
dc.subjectMEMBER COUNTRIES
dc.subjectOPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subjectOPTIMAL TARIFF
dc.subjectOPTIMAL TARIFFS
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPREFERENTIAL TRADE
dc.subjectPREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
dc.subjectPROOF OF PROPOSITION
dc.subjectPROVISIONS
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectRECIPROCITY
dc.subjectREMEDIES
dc.subjectRENEGOTIATION
dc.subjectROYALTIES
dc.subjectTARIFF CONCESSION
dc.subjectTARIFF CONCESSIONS
dc.subjectTARIFF REDUCTION
dc.subjectTARIFF REDUCTIONS
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTAX REVENUE
dc.subjectTERMS OF TRADE
dc.subjectTHIRD PARTIES
dc.subjectTHIRD PARTY
dc.subjectTOTAL VALUE
dc.subjectTRADE AGREEMENT
dc.subjectTRADE AGREEMENTS
dc.subjectTRADE BARRIERS
dc.subjectTRADE CONCESSIONS
dc.subjectTRADE DISPUTE
dc.subjectTRADE DISPUTES
dc.subjectTRADE EFFECT
dc.subjectTRADE NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subjectTRADE PARTNER
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY
dc.subjectTRADING PARTNER
dc.subjectTRADING SYSTEM
dc.subjectURUGUAY ROUND
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectWORLD PRICE
dc.subjectWORLD PRICES
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE
dc.subjectWORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectWTO
dc.titleTariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreementsen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.crossref.titleTariff Retaliation Versus Financial Compensation In The Enforcement Of International Trade Agreements
okr.date.disclosure2006-03-24
okr.date.doiregistration2025-04-10T09:14:56.649678Z
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/04/6683376/tariff-retaliation-versus-financial-compensation-enforcement-international-trade-agreements
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.globalpracticeTrade and Competitiveness
okr.guid153561468315288712
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-3873
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000160016_20060324163518
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum6683376
okr.identifier.reportWPS3873
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/03/24/000160016_20060324163518/Rendered/PDF/wps3873.pdfen
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicLaw and Development::Contract Law
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade::International Trade and Trade Rules
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade::Free Trade
okr.topicLaw and Development::Tax Law
okr.topicInternational Economics and Trade
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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