Publication:
Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements

dc.contributor.author Limão, Nuno
dc.contributor.author Saggi, Kamal
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-21T21:38:25Z
dc.date.available 2012-06-21T21:38:25Z
dc.date.issued 2006-04
dc.description.abstract The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system. The authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes. If bonds can be posted with a third party, they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation. en
dc.identifier http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/04/6683376/tariff-retaliation-versus-financial-compensation-enforcement-international-trade-agreements
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8734
dc.language English
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3873
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder World Bank
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
dc.subject BALANCE OF CONCESSIONS
dc.subject BENCHMARK
dc.subject BILATERAL TRADE
dc.subject BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT
dc.subject BONDS
dc.subject CENTRAL AMERICAN
dc.subject COLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subject CONCESSIONS
dc.subject CONSUMER
dc.subject CONSUMER SURPLUS
dc.subject DEMAND ELASTICITY
dc.subject DISCOUNTED VALUE
dc.subject DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
dc.subject DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
dc.subject DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
dc.subject ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
dc.subject ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
dc.subject EQUILIBRIUM
dc.subject ESCROW
dc.subject EXCESS DEMAND
dc.subject EXPORT
dc.subject EXPORT CARTELS
dc.subject EXPORT SUPPLY
dc.subject EXPORTERS
dc.subject EXPORTS
dc.subject EXTERNALITIES
dc.subject FOREIGN COUNTRY
dc.subject FORMAL ANALYSIS
dc.subject FREE RIDER
dc.subject FREE RIDER PROBLEM
dc.subject HOME COUNTRY
dc.subject IMPORT PRICES
dc.subject IMPORT TARIFF
dc.subject INCENTIVE CONSTRAINT
dc.subject INCENTIVE CONSTRAINTS
dc.subject INCOME
dc.subject INEFFICIENCY
dc.subject INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL LAW
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERS
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL TRADE
dc.subject LEGAL SCHOLARS
dc.subject LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subject LIABILITY
dc.subject LOW TARIFFS
dc.subject MARKET CLEARING
dc.subject MARKET SHARE
dc.subject MEMBER COUNTRIES
dc.subject OPPORTUNITY COST
dc.subject OPTIMAL TARIFF
dc.subject OPTIMAL TARIFFS
dc.subject POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject PREFERENTIAL TRADE
dc.subject PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
dc.subject PROOF OF PROPOSITION
dc.subject PROVISIONS
dc.subject PUBLIC GOOD
dc.subject RECIPROCITY
dc.subject REMEDIES
dc.subject RENEGOTIATION
dc.subject ROYALTIES
dc.subject TARIFF CONCESSION
dc.subject TARIFF CONCESSIONS
dc.subject TARIFF REDUCTION
dc.subject TARIFF REDUCTIONS
dc.subject TAX
dc.subject TAX REVENUE
dc.subject TERMS OF TRADE
dc.subject THIRD PARTIES
dc.subject THIRD PARTY
dc.subject TOTAL VALUE
dc.subject TRADE AGREEMENT
dc.subject TRADE AGREEMENTS
dc.subject TRADE BARRIERS
dc.subject TRADE CONCESSIONS
dc.subject TRADE DISPUTE
dc.subject TRADE DISPUTES
dc.subject TRADE EFFECT
dc.subject TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
dc.subject TRADE PARTNER
dc.subject TRADE POLICY
dc.subject TRADING PARTNER
dc.subject TRADING SYSTEM
dc.subject URUGUAY ROUND
dc.subject UTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subject WORLD PRICE
dc.subject WORLD PRICES
dc.subject WORLD TRADE
dc.subject WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
dc.subject WTO
dc.title Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements en
dspace.entity.type Publication
okr.date.disclosure 2006-03-24
okr.doctype Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctype Publications & Research
okr.docurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/04/6683376/tariff-retaliation-versus-financial-compensation-enforcement-international-trade-agreements
okr.globalpractice Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpractice Governance
okr.globalpractice Trade and Competitiveness
okr.identifier.doi 10.1596/1813-9450-3873
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum 000160016_20060324163518
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum 6683376
okr.identifier.report WPS3873
okr.language.supported en
okr.pdfurl http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/03/24/000160016_20060324163518/Rendered/PDF/wps3873.pdf en
okr.topic Economic Theory and Research
okr.topic Law and Development :: Contract Law
okr.topic International Economics and Trade :: International Trade and Trade Rules
okr.topic International Economics and Trade :: Free Trade
okr.topic Law and Development :: Tax Law
okr.topic International Economics and Trade
okr.topic Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
okr.unit Development Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume 1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Thumbnail Image
Name:
English PDF
Size:
309.16 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
English Text
Size:
76.36 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description: