Publication: Social Health Insurance Reexamined
Abstract
Social health insurance (SHI) is enjoying something of a revival in parts of the developing world. Many countries that have in the past relied largely on tax finance (and out-of-pocket payments) have introduced SHI, or are thinking about doing so. And countries with SHI already in place are making vigorous efforts to extend coverage to the informal sector. Ironically, this revival is occurring at a time when the traditional SHI countries in Europe have either already reduced payroll financing in favor of general revenues, or are in the process of doing so. This paper examines how SHI fares in health care delivery, revenue collection, covering the formal sector, and its impacts on the labor market. It argues that SHI does not necessarily deliver good quality care at a low cost, partly because of poor regulation of SHI purchasers. It suggests that the costs of collecting revenues can be substantial, even in the formal sector where nonenrollment and evasion are commonplace, and that while SHI can cover the formal sector and the poor relatively easily, it fares badly in terms of covering the nonpoor informal sector workers until the economy has reached a high level of economic development. The paper also argues that SHI can have negative labor market effects.
Link to Data Set
Digital Object Identifier
Associated content
Other publications in this report series
Journal
Journal Volume
Journal Issue
Citations
Collections
Related items
Showing items related by metadata.
Publication Social Health Insurance Reexamined(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-01)Social health insurance (SHI) is enjoying something of a revival in parts of the developing world. Many countries that have in the past relied largely on tax finance (and out-of-pocket payments) have introduced SHI, or are thinking about doing so. And countries with SHI already in place are making vigorous efforts to extend coverage to the informal sector. Ironically, this revival is occurring at a time when the traditional SHI countries in Europe have either already reduced payroll financing in favor of general revenues, or are in the process of doing so. This paper examines how SHI fares in health care delivery, revenue collection, covering the formal sector, and its impacts on the labor market. It argues that SHI does not necessarily deliver good quality care at a low cost, partly because of poor regulation of SHI purchasers. It suggests that the costs of collecting revenues can be substantial, even in the formal sector where nonenrollment and evasion are commonplace, and that while SHI can cover the formal sector and the poor relatively easily, it fares badly in terms of covering the nonpoor informal sector workers until the economy has reached a high level of economic development. The paper also argues that SHI can have negative labor market effects.Publication Europe and Central Asia's Great Post-communist Social Health Insurance Experiment : Aggregate Impacts on Health Sector Outcomes(2009)The post-Communist transition to social health insurance in many of the Central and Eastern European and Central Asian countries provides a unique opportunity to try to answer some of the unresolved issues in the debate over the relative merits of social health insurance and tax-financed health systems. This paper employs regression-based generalizations of the difference-in-differences method on panel data from 28 countries for the period 1990-2004. We find that, controlling for any concurrent provider payment reforms, adoption of social health insurance increased national health spending and hospital activity rates, but did not lead to better health outcomes.Publication Social Health Insurance vs. Tax-Financed Health Systems—Evidence from the OECD(2009-01-01)This paper exploits the transitions between tax-financed health care and social health insurance in the OECD countries over the period 1960-2006 to assess the effects of adopting social health insurance over tax finance on per capita health spending, amenable mortality, and labor market outcomes. The paper uses regression-based generalizations of difference-in-differences and instrumental variables to address the possible endogeneity of a country's health system. It finds that adopting social health insurance in preference to tax financing increases per capita health spending by 3-4 percent, reduces the formal sector share of employment by 8-10 percent, and reduces total employment by as much as 6 percent. For the most part, social health insurance adoption has no significant impact on amenable mortality, but for one cause-breast cancer among women-social health insurance systems perform significantly worse, with 5-6 percent more potential years of life lost.Publication Europe and Central Asia's Great Post-Communist Social Health Insurance Experiment : Impacts on Health Sector and Labor Market Outcomes(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-10)The post-communist transition to social health insurance in many of the Central and Eastern European and Central Asian countries provides a unique opportunity to try to answer some of the unresolved issues in the debate over the relative merits of social health insurance and tax-financed health systems. This paper employs a regression-based generalization of the difference-in-differences method and instrumental variables on panel data from 28 countries for the period 1990-2004. The authors find that, controlling for any concurrent provider payment reforms, adoption of social health insurance increased national health spending and hospital activity rates, but did not lead to better health outcomes. The authors also find that adoption of social health insurance reduced employment in the economy as a whole and increased unemployment, although it did not apparently increase the size of the informal economy.Publication Estimating Health Insurance Impacts under Unobserved Heterogeneity : The Case of Vietnam's Health Care Fund for the Poor(2010)Vietnam's health care fund for the poor (HCFP) uses government revenues to finance health care for the poor, ethnic minorities living in selected mountainous provinces, and all households living in communes officially designated as highly disadvantaged. As of 2006, the program, which started in 2003, covered around 60% of those eligible. Those who were covered (about 20% of the population) were disproportionately poor, and around 80% of those covered were eligible. Estimates of the program's impact were obtained using a method that takes into account unobserved heterogeneity--including unobserved idiosyncratic returns--but requires minimal assumptions. The downside is that it provides an estimate only of the program's impact on those covered by it; it cannot therefore answer the question of how those currently uncovered will fare when they are eventually covered. The results suggest that HCFP has had no impact on use of services, but has substantially reduced out-of-pocket spending.
Users also downloaded
Showing related downloaded files
No results found.