Publication: Sticks and Carrots: Two Incentive Mechanisms Supporting Intra-group Cooperation
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Published
2009
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01651765
Date
2012-03-30
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In this note, we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra-group cooperation in the context of prisoner's dilemma payoffs: rewards for cooperating, and punishments for defection, where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship.
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