Publication:
When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption
| dc.contributor.author | Basu, Kaushik | |
| dc.contributor.author | McGavock, Tamara | |
| dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Boyang | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-02T21:58:01Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-02T21:58:01Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-09 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The paper develops a simple model to demonstrate that, paradoxically, greater competition may exacerbate the problem of corruption. Market participants engaging in corrupt practices enjoy lower production costs -- maybe because they pay a bribe to avoid installing the environmental safeguards required by law -- such that honest players are driven out of the market when the market becomes sufficiently competitive. | en |
| dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16047 | |
| dc.language | English | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | |
| dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6596 | |
| dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
| dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
| dc.subject | BRIBE | |
| dc.subject | BRIBERY | |
| dc.subject | BRIBES | |
| dc.subject | COLLUSION | |
| dc.subject | COMPETITIVENESS | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPT | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPT PEOPLE | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPT PRACTICES | |
| dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
| dc.subject | CRIME | |
| dc.subject | DISCRIMINATION | |
| dc.subject | ENTREPRENEUR | |
| dc.subject | ENTREPRENEURS | |
| dc.subject | ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS | |
| dc.subject | FIRMS | |
| dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL LAW | |
| dc.subject | INVISIBLE HAND | |
| dc.subject | JUSTICE | |
| dc.subject | MARKET COMPETITION | |
| dc.subject | MARKET FAILURES | |
| dc.subject | MARKET PRICE | |
| dc.subject | MARKET STRUCTURE | |
| dc.subject | POLICE | |
| dc.subject | SHOP | |
| dc.subject | SHOPS | |
| dc.subject | SURPLUS | |
| dc.subject | WILL | |
| dc.subject | industrial organization | |
| dc.title | When Competition Corrupts : A Theoretical Analysis of Market Structure and the Incidence of Corruption | en |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Gender | |
| okr.date.disclosure | 2013-09-01 | |
| okr.doctype | Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper | |
| okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
| okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18221190/competition-corrupts-theoretical-analysis-market-structure-incidence-corruption | |
| okr.globalpractice | Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management | |
| okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
| okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
| okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
| okr.globalpractice | Water | |
| okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-6596 | |
| okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20130909095108 | |
| okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 18221190 | |
| okr.identifier.report | WPS6596 | |
| okr.language.supported | en | |
| okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/09/09/000158349_20130909095108/Rendered/PDF/WPS6596.pdf | en |
| okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Microfinance | |
| okr.topic | Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures | |
| okr.topic | Gender :: Gender and Law | |
| okr.topic | Water Resources :: Water and Industry | |
| okr.topic | Macroeconomics and Economic Growth :: Markets and Market Access | |
| okr.topic | Public Sector Development | |
| okr.unit | Development Economics Vice Presidency | |
| okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
| relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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