Publication: Which Firms Create the Most Jobs in Developing Countries? Evidence from Tunisia
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Published
2014-12
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0927-5371
Date
2014-12-16
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This paper examines private sector job creation in Tunisia over the period 1996–2010 using a unique database containing information on all registered private enterprises, including self-employment. In spite of stable GDP growth, overall net job creation was disappointing and firm dynamics were sluggish. The firm size distribution has remained skewed towards small firms, because of stagnation of incumbents and entrants starting small, typically as one-person firms (i.e. self-employment). Churning is limited, especially amongst large firms, and very few firms manage to grow. Post-entry, small firms are the worst performers in terms of job creation, even if they survive. Moreover, the association between productivity, profitability and job creation is feeble, pointing towards weaknesses in the re-allocative process. Weak net job creation thus appears to be due to insufficient firm dynamism rather than excessive job destruction.
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Publication Which Firms Create the Most Jobs in Developing Countries? Evidence from Tunisia(World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2014-10)This paper examines private sector job creation in Tunisia over the period 1996-2010 using a unique database containing information on all registered private enterprises, including self-employment. In spite of stable growth of gross domestic product, overall net job creation was disappointing and firm dynamics were sluggish. The firm size distribution has remained skewed toward small firms, because of stagnation of incumbents and entrants starting small, typically as one-person firms (self-employment). Churning is limited, especially among large firms, and few firms manage to grow. Post-entry, small firms are the worst performers for job creation, even if they survive. Moreover, the association between productivity, profitability, and job creation is feeble, pointing towards weaknesses in the re-allocative process. 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The evidence implies that Tunisia's industrial policy was used as a vehicle for rent creation for the president and his family.Publication All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-05)Understanding state-business relationships and how they have shaped the institutional architecture of countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) is crucial for the identification of systemic vulnerabilities and reform priorities. In this paper, the authors examine the relationship between regulation and the business interests of President Ben Ali and his family, using unique firm-level data from Tunisia for 1994 to 2010, and document how Tunisia s investment policy was abused to serve the president s family s private interests. In spite of widespread recognition of its importance, empirical evidence on state capture has been limited by a lack of data. 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