Publication: Regulatory Reform: Integrating Paradigms
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Published
2010
ISSN
13670271
Date
2012-03-30
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What were the market and regulatory issues that led to the subprime crisis? How should prudential regulation be fixed? The answers depend on the interpretive lenses--or 'paradigms'--through which one sees finance. The agency paradigm, which has dominated recent regulatory policy and provides the most popular interpretation of the crisis, seems to be influencing much of the emerging reform agenda. But collective welfare failures (particularly externalities) and collective cognition failures (particularly mood swings) were as important, if not more so, in driving the crisis. These three paradigms should therefore be integrated into a more balanced policy agenda. But doing so will be difficult because they often have inconsistent policy implications.
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Publication Regulatory Reform : Integrating Paradigms(2009-02-01)The Subprime crisis largely resulted from failures to internalize systemic risk evenly across financial intermediaries and recognize the implications of Knightian uncertainty and mood swings. A successful reform of prudential regulation will need to integrate more harmoniously the three paradigms of moral hazard, externalities, and uncertainty. This is a tall order because each paradigm leads to different and often inconsistent regulatory implications. Moreover, efforts to address the central problem under one paradigm can make the problems under the others worse. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and ensure that externalities are uniformly internalized, all prudentially regulated intermediaries should be subjected to the same capital adequacy requirements, and unregulated intermediaries should be financed only by regulated intermediaries. Reflecting the importance of uncertainty, the new regulatory architecture will also need to rely less on markets and more on "holistic" supervision, and incorporate countercyclical norms that can be adjusted in light of changing circumstances.Publication Containing Systemic Risk : Paradigm-Based Perspectives on Regulatory Reform(2011-01-01)Financial crises can happen for a variety of reasons: (a) nobody really understands what is going on (the collective cognition paradigm); (b) some understand better than others and take advantage of their knowledge (the asymmetric information paradigm); (c) everybody understands, but crises are a natural part of the financial landscape (the costly enforcement paradigm); or (d) everybody understands, yet no one acts because private and social interests do not coincide (the collective action paradigm). The four paradigms have different and often conflicting prudential policy implications. This paper proposes and discusses three sets of reforms that would give due weight to the insights from the collective action and collective cognition paradigms by redrawing the regulatory perimeter to internalize systemic risk without promoting dynamic regulatory arbitrage; introducing a truly systemic liquidity regulation that moves away from a purely idiosyncratic focus on maturity mismatches; and building up the supervisory function while avoiding the pitfalls of expanded official oversight.Publication Financial paradigms(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-11)What market and regulatory issues led to the subprime crisis? How should prudential regulation be fixed? The answers depend on the interpretative lenses or 'paradigms' through which one sees finance. The agency paradigm, which has dominated recent regulatory policy, seems to be influencing much of the emerging reform agenda. But collective welfare failures particularly externalities and collective cognition failures particularly mood swings were at least as important in driving the crisis. All three paradigms should therefore be integrated into a more balanced policy agenda. But doing so will be difficult because they often have inconsistent policy implications.Publication Bank Involvement with SMEs : Beyond Relationship Lending(2010)The "conventional wisdom" in academic and policy circles argues that, while large and foreign banks are generally not interested in serving SMEs, small and niche banks have an advantage because they can overcome SME opaqueness through relationship lending. This paper shows that there is a gap between this view and what banks actually do. Banks perceive SMEs as a core and strategic business and seem well-positioned to expand their links with SMEs. The intensification of bank involvement with SMEs in various emerging markets is neither led by small or niche banks nor highly dependent on relationship lending. Moreover, it has not been derailed by the 2007-2009 crisis. Rather, all types of banks are catering to SMEs and large, multiple-service banks have a comparative advantage in offering a wide range of products and services on a large scale, through the use of new technologies, business models, and risk management systems.Publication The Political, Regulatory, and Market Failures That Caused the US Financial Crisis: What Are the Lessons?(2010)The purpose of this paper is to discuss the key regulatory, market, and political failures that led to the 2008-2009 US financial crisis and to suggest appropriate recommendations for reform. The approach is to examine the underlying incentives that led to the crisis and to provide supporting data to support the hypotheses. While Congress was fixing the savings and loan crisis, it failed to give the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac normal bank supervisory power. This was a political failure as Congress was using government sponsored enterprise (GSE) resources and the resources of narrow constituencies for their own advantage at the expense of the public interest. Second, in the mid-1990s, to encourage home ownership, the Administration changed enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, effectively requiring banks to use flexible and innovative methods to lower bank mortgage standards to underserved areas. Crucially, this disarmed regulators and the risky mortgage standards then spread to other sectors of the market. Market failure problems ensued as banks, mortgage brokers, securitizers, credit rating agencies, and asset managers were all plagued by problems such as moral hazard or conflicts of interest.
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