Publication: Whither La Plata? Assessing the State of Transboundary Water Resource Cooperation in the Basin
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Date
2008
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0165-0203
Published
2008
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In many ways, current treaty arrangements for cooperation over shared water resources among Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay - the five riparian states in South America's La Plata basin - have been relatively successful. These arrangements, mostly bilateral and trilateral partial coalition agreements and institutions that operate under the aegis of the 1969 La Plata River Treaty, have led to significant economic gains from the treaty arrangements for all five riparian states. But these economic gains have also generated significant externalities - particularly, severe environmental degradation - suggesting that alternate cooperative arrangements may be more optimal. Current work suggests that grand coalitions following principles of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) may provide the most efficient means of distributing the benefits and costs of water resource cooperation equitably across riparian states. Using a theoretical framework developed by Just and Netanyahu (1998), we find that the arrangement of partial coalitions that exists in the La Plata Basin is preferable to a grand coalition because of its higher degree of stability. Finally, given the ways in which these partial coalitions are beginning to incorporate IWRM techniques, gaining experience and international recognition, we consider whether it is likely that partial coalitions will lead to a grand coalition in the foreseeable future.
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