Publication: The Politics of Financial Development: Evidence from Trade Liberalization
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Published
2008
ISSN
00221082
Date
2012-03-30
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Incumbents in various industries have different incentives to promote or oppose financial development. Changes in the relative strength of promoter and opponent industries thus result in changes in the political equilibrium level of financial development. We conduct an event study using a sample of 41 countries that liberalized trade during 1970 to 2000, and show that the strengthening of promoter relative to opponent industries resulting from liberalization is a good predictor of subsequent financial development. The benefits of developing the financial system are insufficient for financial development, and rents in particular hands appear to be necessary to achieve it.
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Publication Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Financial Development(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-02)A well developed financial system enhances competition in the industrial sector by allowing easier entry. The impact varies across industries, however. For some, small changes in financial development quickly induce entry and dissipate incumbents' rents, generating strong incentives to oppose improvement of the financial system. In other sectors incumbents may even benefit from increased availability of external funds. The relative strength of promoters and opponents determines the political equilibrium level of financial system development. This may be perturbed by the effect of trade liberalization in the strength of each group. Using a sample of 41 trade liberalizers the authors conduct an event study and show that the change in the strength of promoters vis-a-vis opponents is a very good predictor of subsequent financial development. The result is not driven by changes in demand for external funds, or by the success of the trade policy. The relationship is mediated by policy reforms, the kind that induces competition in the financial sector, in particular. Real effects follow not so much from capital deepening but mainly through improved allocation. The effect is stronger in countries with high levels of governance, suggesting that incumbents resort to this costly but more subtle way of restricting entry where it is difficult to obtain more blatant forms of anti-competitive measures from politicians.Publication Banking on Politics(2009-04-01)This paper presents new data from 150 countries showing that former cabinet members, central bank governors, and financial regulators are many orders of magnitude more likely than other citizens to become board members of banks. Countries where the politician-banker phenomenon is more prevalent have higher corruption and more powerful yet less accountable governments, but not better functioning financial systems. Regulation becomes more pro-banker where this happens more often. Furthermore, a higher fraction of the rents that are created accrue to bankers, former politicians are not more likely to be directors when their side is in power, and banks are more profitable without being more leveraged. Rather than supporting a public interest view, the evidence is consistent with a capture-type private interest story where, in exchange for a non-executive position at a bank in the future, politicians provide for beneficial regulation.Publication Banking on Politics(World Bank, 2010-08-30)New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. At the micro level, banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. At the country level, this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development. Controlling for this, the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable. Bank regulation tends to be more pro-banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher. A benign, public-interest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns.Publication Liberalization of Trade in Financial Services : Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean(2008-01-01)This policy note is based on a project on financial services and trade agreements in the Latin America and Caribbean Region. It emphasizes that the liberalization of trade in financial services is helpful to, but is not a panacea for, domestic financial system modernization. It adds that the means of liberalizing trade in financial services may also determine the extent of the benefits that can be attained and that any trade commitments in financial services will need to be aligned with China's financial system condition and policy objectives. The author points out however, that China can also draw useful policy lessons from the Latin America and Caribbean (LCR) experience when negotiating financial services in Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTAs) by firstly, the inclusion of financial services which depends greatly on the existence of offensive interests and of asymmetric bargaining powers between the negotiating counterparts; secondly, the case studies which strongly indicate the importance of initial conditions and historical experience in shaping a country's financial services trade strategy; thirdly, the scheduling approach of the (typically self-contained) financial services chapter which both contributes to, and is determined by, the willingness to liberalize; and finally the authorities should be cognizant of important nuances between the two main negotiating templates.Publication Liberalization of Trade in Financial Services : Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean(Washington, DC, 2008-01)This policy note is based on a project on financial services and trade agreements in the Latin America and Caribbean Region. It emphasizes that the liberalization of trade in financial services is helpful to, but is not a panacea for, domestic financial system modernization. It adds that the means of liberalizing trade in financial services may also determine the extent of the benefits that can be attained and that any trade commitments in financial services will need to be aligned with China's financial system condition and policy objectives. The author points out however, that China can also draw useful policy lessons from the Latin America and Caribbean (LCR) experience when negotiating financial services in Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTAs) by firstly, the inclusion of financial services which depends greatly on the existence of offensive interests and of asymmetric bargaining powers between the negotiating counterparts; secondly, the case studies which strongly indicate the importance of initial conditions and historical experience in shaping a country's financial services trade strategy; thirdly, the scheduling approach of the (typically self-contained) financial services chapter which both contributes to, and is determined by, the willingness to liberalize; and finally the authorities should be cognizant of important nuances between the two main negotiating templates.
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