Publication:
Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore
dc.contributor.author | Vittas, Dimitri | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-08-13T15:35:01Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-08-13T15:35:01Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1996-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | In most countries, participation in a public pension system involving some kind of redistribution is compulsory, while participation in private pension schemes is voluntary. There are growing fears in many countries that the value of public pensions will not be sustained. There are similar fears about company pensions. The credibility of company pensions depends on the integrity and solvency of large employers, which can no longer be taken for granted. These problems point to a need to refine compulsory saving. Drawing on the experiences of countries in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, this Note provides some guidance on answering the following questions: 1) Whom to compel? 2) Defined contribution or benefit? 3) How large should compulsory contributions be? 4) Who should manage the funds? 5) What types of regulation are appropriate? 6) What state guarantees for what system? 7) How to offer tax incentives? | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/02/696755/designing-mandatory-pension-schemes-some-lessons-argentina-chile-malaysia-singapore | |
dc.identifier.citation | Viewpoint. -- Note no. 72 (February 1996) | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11631 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Viewpoint | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | AGENTS | |
dc.subject | ANNUITIES | |
dc.subject | ANNUITY | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL MARKETS | |
dc.subject | CAPITALIZATION | |
dc.subject | COMMISSIONS | |
dc.subject | CONTRIBUTION RATE | |
dc.subject | COVERAGE | |
dc.subject | DEFINED BENEFIT SCHEMES | |
dc.subject | DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SYSTEMS | |
dc.subject | DISCRIMINATION | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | FIDUCIARY | |
dc.subject | FRAUD | |
dc.subject | HOUSING | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS | |
dc.subject | INFLATION | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE | |
dc.subject | INSURANCE COMPANIES | |
dc.subject | INTEGRITY | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT GUIDELINES | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT RETURN | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT RETURNS | |
dc.subject | LIFE EXPECTANCY | |
dc.subject | LOW INFLATION | |
dc.subject | MANAGERS | |
dc.subject | MANDATORY RETIREMENT | |
dc.subject | MARKETING | |
dc.subject | MINIMUM PERIOD | |
dc.subject | MORAL HAZARD | |
dc.subject | NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE | |
dc.subject | OPERATING COSTS | |
dc.subject | PENALTIES | |
dc.subject | PENSION FUND | |
dc.subject | PENSION FUNDS | |
dc.subject | PENSION SCHEMES | |
dc.subject | PENSION SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | PENSIONS | |
dc.subject | PREMIUMS | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE PENSION | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE PILLAR | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE SECTOR | |
dc.subject | PROFITABILITY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC PILLAR | |
dc.subject | RATES | |
dc.subject | REPLACEMENT RATE | |
dc.subject | RESERVES | |
dc.subject | RETIREMENT | |
dc.subject | RISK TAKING | |
dc.subject | SAFETY | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL ASSISTANCE | |
dc.subject | SOLVENCY | |
dc.subject | STATE GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | TAX RATE | |
dc.subject | WAGE GROWTH | |
dc.subject | WORKERS PENSIONS | |
dc.subject | TAX INCENTIVES | |
dc.subject | PENSION FUNDS | |
dc.subject | INVESTMENT POLICY | |
dc.subject | TAX EXEMPTION | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL SECURITY | |
dc.subject | COMPANY PENSIONS | |
dc.subject | STATE GUARANTEES | |
dc.subject | COMPULSORY SAVING | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS | |
dc.title | Designing Mandatory Pension Schemes : Some Lessons from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Singapore | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research :: Viewpoint | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/02/696755/designing-mandatory-pension-schemes-some-lessons-argentina-chile-malaysia-singapore | |
okr.globalpractice | Social Protection and Labor | |
okr.globalpractice | Environment and Natural Resources | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Health, Nutrition, and Population | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000009265_3980420172853 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 696755 | |
okr.identifier.report | 16931 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/02/01/000009265_3980420172853/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf | en |
okr.region.administrative | Latin America & Caribbean | |
okr.region.administrative | East Asia and Pacific | |
okr.region.country | Singapore | |
okr.region.country | Malaysia | |
okr.region.country | Chile | |
okr.region.country | Argentina | |
okr.topic | Pensions and Retirement Systems | |
okr.topic | Insurance and Risk Mitigation | |
okr.topic | Health Monitoring and Evaluation | |
okr.topic | Banks and Banking Reform | |
okr.topic | Environmental Economics and Policies | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor | |
okr.topic | Health, Nutrition and Population | |
okr.topic | Environment | |
okr.unit | Financial Sctr Operations & Pol (OPD) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 1067ecbf-b217-4376-a77e-64594be2b212 |
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