Publication:
Exiting a Lawless State
dc.contributor.author | Hoff, Karla | |
dc.contributor.author | Stiglitz, Joseph E. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-29T18:50:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-05-29T18:50:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping, and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving. | en |
dc.identifier | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9048193/exiting-lawless-state | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6589 | |
dc.language | English | |
dc.publisher | World Bank, Washington, DC | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4520 | |
dc.rights | CC BY 3.0 IGO | |
dc.rights.holder | World Bank | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ | |
dc.subject | ABUSE | |
dc.subject | ABUSE OF POWER | |
dc.subject | AGENCY PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | ANTICORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS | |
dc.subject | ASSASSINATION | |
dc.subject | ASSET STRIPPING | |
dc.subject | ASSET VALUES | |
dc.subject | ASSETS | |
dc.subject | AUTHORITARIAN RULE | |
dc.subject | AUTHORITARIANISM | |
dc.subject | AUTHORITY | |
dc.subject | BENEFICIARIES | |
dc.subject | BRIBE | |
dc.subject | BUSINESSMEN | |
dc.subject | CAPITAL INFLOWS | |
dc.subject | CITIZENS | |
dc.subject | CLAIMANT | |
dc.subject | COLLAPSE | |
dc.subject | COLONIAL COUNTRIES | |
dc.subject | COMMERCIAL LAW | |
dc.subject | COMMON PROPERTY | |
dc.subject | COMMUNISM | |
dc.subject | COMMUNIST | |
dc.subject | COMMUNIST PARTY | |
dc.subject | COMPENSATION | |
dc.subject | CONSTITUENCIES | |
dc.subject | CONSTITUENCY | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS | |
dc.subject | CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | COURT | |
dc.subject | COURT DECISION | |
dc.subject | CREDIT RATIONING | |
dc.subject | CRIMINAL | |
dc.subject | CRONIES | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRACY | |
dc.subject | DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE | |
dc.subject | DEPENDENT | |
dc.subject | DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | DICTATORSHIP | |
dc.subject | EAST EUROPEAN | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC GROWTH | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC HISTORIANS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC REFORM | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC REFORMS | |
dc.subject | ECONOMIC THEORY | |
dc.subject | ECONOMICS | |
dc.subject | EFFICIENT OUTCOMES | |
dc.subject | ELECTED OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | EMPLOYMENT | |
dc.subject | ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING | |
dc.subject | EXTERNALITIES | |
dc.subject | FINANCIAL PROBLEMS | |
dc.subject | FISCAL COSTS | |
dc.subject | FREE MARKET | |
dc.subject | GANGS | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT POLICIES | |
dc.subject | GOVERNMENT SPENDING | |
dc.subject | HISTORIANS | |
dc.subject | ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN | |
dc.subject | INCOME | |
dc.subject | INEQUALITY | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS | |
dc.subject | INSTITUTIONAL REFORM | |
dc.subject | INTEREST RATE | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL | |
dc.subject | INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS | |
dc.subject | INVESTIGATION | |
dc.subject | INVESTIGATORS | |
dc.subject | JUSTICE | |
dc.subject | LABOR ADJUSTMENT COSTS | |
dc.subject | LAW ENFORCEMENT | |
dc.subject | LAWS | |
dc.subject | LEADERSHIP | |
dc.subject | LEGAL REFORM | |
dc.subject | LEGAL SYSTEM | |
dc.subject | LEGALITY | |
dc.subject | LEGITIMACY | |
dc.subject | LOBBYING | |
dc.subject | MARKET ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | MEDIA | |
dc.subject | MINISTER | |
dc.subject | MONETARY POLICY | |
dc.subject | MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA | |
dc.subject | NATIONAL POLICIES | |
dc.subject | NATIONALIZATION | |
dc.subject | OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR | |
dc.subject | PAYOFF | |
dc.subject | PAYOFFS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL CONSENSUS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL CORRUPTION | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | POLITICAL RISKS | |
dc.subject | POLITICIANS | |
dc.subject | POSSESSION | |
dc.subject | PRINCIPAL ASSETS | |
dc.subject | PRIVATE OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | PRIVATIZATION | |
dc.subject | PROPERTY RIGHTS | |
dc.subject | PROSECUTION | |
dc.subject | PROTECTION OF PROPERTY | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC OFFICIALS | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC SECTOR | |
dc.subject | PUBLIC SPENDING | |
dc.subject | RECAPTURE OF ASSETS | |
dc.subject | RENTS | |
dc.subject | REVOLUTION | |
dc.subject | RULE OF LAW | |
dc.subject | SECURITIES LAW | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL COST | |
dc.subject | SOCIAL WELFARE | |
dc.subject | STATE ASSETS | |
dc.subject | STATE ENTERPRISES | |
dc.subject | STATE INSTITUTIONS | |
dc.subject | STATE OWNERSHIP | |
dc.subject | STATE POWER | |
dc.subject | THEFT | |
dc.subject | TIGHT MONETARY POLICY | |
dc.subject | TRANSITION ECONOMIES | |
dc.subject | TRANSITION ECONOMY | |
dc.subject | VICTIMS | |
dc.subject | VOTING | |
dc.subject | WILL | |
dc.subject | WORLD POLITICS | |
dc.title | Exiting a Lawless State | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Jobs | |
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea | Gender | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper | |
okr.doctype | Publications & Research | |
okr.docurl | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9048193/exiting-lawless-state | |
okr.globalpractice | Social Protection and Labor | |
okr.globalpractice | Finance and Markets | |
okr.globalpractice | Governance | |
okr.identifier.doi | 10.1596/1813-9450-4520 | |
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum | 000158349_20080303093321 | |
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum | 9048193 | |
okr.identifier.report | WPS4520 | |
okr.language.supported | en | |
okr.pdfurl | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/03/03/000158349_20080303093321/Rendered/PDF/wps4520.pdf | en |
okr.topic | Gender :: Gender and Law | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures | |
okr.topic | Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress | |
okr.topic | Social Protections and Labor :: Labor Policies | |
okr.topic | Governance :: National Governance | |
okr.topic | Public Sector Development | |
okr.unit | Development Research Group (DECRG) | |
okr.volume | 1 of 1 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87 |
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