Publication:
Exiting a Lawless State

dc.contributor.author Hoff, Karla
dc.contributor.author Stiglitz, Joseph E.
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-29T18:50:36Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-29T18:50:36Z
dc.date.issued 2008-02
dc.description.abstract An earlier paper showed that an economy could be trapped in an equilibrium state in which the absence of the rule of law led to asset-stripping, and the prevalence of asset-stripping led to the absence of a demand for the rule of law, highlighting a coordination failure. This paper looks more carefully at the dynamics of transition from a non-rule-of-law state. The paper identifies a commitment problem as the critical feature inhibiting the transition: the inability, under a rule of law, to forgive theft. This can lead to the perpetuation of the non-rule-of-law state, even when it might seem that the alternative is Pareto-improving. en
dc.identifier http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9048193/exiting-lawless-state
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10986/6589
dc.language English
dc.publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseries Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4520
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holder World Bank
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subject ABUSE
dc.subject ABUSE OF POWER
dc.subject AGENCY PROBLEMS
dc.subject ANTICORRUPTION
dc.subject ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS
dc.subject ASSASSINATION
dc.subject ASSET STRIPPING
dc.subject ASSET VALUES
dc.subject ASSETS
dc.subject AUTHORITARIAN RULE
dc.subject AUTHORITARIANISM
dc.subject AUTHORITY
dc.subject BENEFICIARIES
dc.subject BRIBE
dc.subject BUSINESSMEN
dc.subject CAPITAL INFLOWS
dc.subject CITIZENS
dc.subject CLAIMANT
dc.subject COLLAPSE
dc.subject COLONIAL COUNTRIES
dc.subject COMMERCIAL LAW
dc.subject COMMON PROPERTY
dc.subject COMMUNISM
dc.subject COMMUNIST
dc.subject COMMUNIST PARTY
dc.subject COMPENSATION
dc.subject CONSTITUENCIES
dc.subject CONSTITUENCY
dc.subject CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subject CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
dc.subject CORRUPTION
dc.subject COURT
dc.subject COURT DECISION
dc.subject CREDIT RATIONING
dc.subject CRIMINAL
dc.subject CRONIES
dc.subject DEMOCRACY
dc.subject DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
dc.subject DEPENDENT
dc.subject DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subject DICTATORSHIP
dc.subject EAST EUROPEAN
dc.subject ECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subject ECONOMIC HISTORIANS
dc.subject ECONOMIC REFORM
dc.subject ECONOMIC REFORMS
dc.subject ECONOMIC THEORY
dc.subject ECONOMICS
dc.subject EFFICIENT OUTCOMES
dc.subject ELECTED OFFICIALS
dc.subject EMPLOYMENT
dc.subject ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING
dc.subject EXTERNALITIES
dc.subject FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
dc.subject FISCAL COSTS
dc.subject FREE MARKET
dc.subject GANGS
dc.subject GOVERNMENT POLICIES
dc.subject GOVERNMENT SPENDING
dc.subject HISTORIANS
dc.subject ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
dc.subject INCOME
dc.subject INEQUALITY
dc.subject INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
dc.subject INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
dc.subject INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
dc.subject INTEREST RATE
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS
dc.subject INVESTIGATION
dc.subject INVESTIGATORS
dc.subject JUSTICE
dc.subject LABOR ADJUSTMENT COSTS
dc.subject LAW ENFORCEMENT
dc.subject LAWS
dc.subject LEADERSHIP
dc.subject LEGAL REFORM
dc.subject LEGAL SYSTEM
dc.subject LEGALITY
dc.subject LEGITIMACY
dc.subject LOBBYING
dc.subject MARKET ECONOMY
dc.subject MEDIA
dc.subject MINISTER
dc.subject MONETARY POLICY
dc.subject MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
dc.subject NATIONAL POLICIES
dc.subject NATIONALIZATION
dc.subject OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR
dc.subject PAYOFF
dc.subject PAYOFFS
dc.subject POLITICAL CONSENSUS
dc.subject POLITICAL CORRUPTION
dc.subject POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject POLITICAL RISKS
dc.subject POLITICIANS
dc.subject POSSESSION
dc.subject PRINCIPAL ASSETS
dc.subject PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
dc.subject PRIVATIZATION
dc.subject PROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subject PROSECUTION
dc.subject PROTECTION OF PROPERTY
dc.subject PUBLIC OFFICIALS
dc.subject PUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subject PUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subject RECAPTURE OF ASSETS
dc.subject RENTS
dc.subject REVOLUTION
dc.subject RULE OF LAW
dc.subject SECURITIES LAW
dc.subject SOCIAL COST
dc.subject SOCIAL WELFARE
dc.subject STATE ASSETS
dc.subject STATE ENTERPRISES
dc.subject STATE INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject STATE OWNERSHIP
dc.subject STATE POWER
dc.subject THEFT
dc.subject TIGHT MONETARY POLICY
dc.subject TRANSITION ECONOMIES
dc.subject TRANSITION ECONOMY
dc.subject VICTIMS
dc.subject VOTING
dc.subject WILL
dc.subject WORLD POLITICS
dc.title Exiting a Lawless State en
dspace.entity.type Publication
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea Jobs
okr.crosscuttingsolutionarea Gender
okr.doctype Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctype Publications & Research
okr.docurl http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/9048193/exiting-lawless-state
okr.globalpractice Social Protection and Labor
okr.globalpractice Finance and Markets
okr.globalpractice Governance
okr.identifier.doi 10.1596/1813-9450-4520
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum 000158349_20080303093321
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum 9048193
okr.identifier.report WPS4520
okr.language.supported en
okr.pdfurl http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/03/03/000158349_20080303093321/Rendered/PDF/wps4520.pdf en
okr.topic Gender :: Gender and Law
okr.topic Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures
okr.topic Finance and Financial Sector Development :: Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress
okr.topic Social Protections and Labor :: Labor Policies
okr.topic Governance :: National Governance
okr.topic Public Sector Development
okr.unit Development Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume 1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication 26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Thumbnail Image
Name:
English PDF
Size:
233.71 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
English Text
Size:
86.79 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description: