Publication:
Small Is Beautiful, at Least in High-Income Democracies : The Distribution of Policy-Making Responsibility, Electoral Accountability, and Incentives for Rent Extraction

dc.contributor.authorHamilton, Alexander
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-29T17:44:31Z
dc.date.available2013-01-29T17:44:31Z
dc.date.issued2013-01
dc.description.abstractWhy is there significant variation in rent extraction among high-income democracies? A large number of political economy investigations into this research question have found that a long period of democratic rule and high per capita income are associated with less rent extraction among public policy-makers. However, attempts to explain the residual, yet significant, variation in rent extraction among countries that possess both these characteristics have been significantly more circumspect and disputed. This paper explores how the distribution of policy-making responsibilities between electorally accountable decision-makers and their electorally unaccountable public policy-making counterparts determines the optimal level of rents extracted in any given high-income democracy context. Specifically, the paper formally models how: (1) variation in the ratio of electorally accountable decision-makers to electorally unaccountable decision-makers, by altering (2) voters' evaluation of incumbent competency, changes (3) the incentives that policy-makers, wishing to remain in office, have to minimize their short-term level of rent extraction in order to signal their competency and hopefully retain office. Given these "career concerns," the theoretical model predicts that an increase or decrease in the ratio will be associated with more or less rent extraction. This hypothesis is then tested empirically. Establishing that the ratio does robustly predict variation in rent extraction is a significant finding, as it can enable analysts to predict how changes in policy-making contexts may affect the incentives for good governance in this sub-set of countries.en
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17151026/small-beautiful-least-high-income-democracies-distribution-policy-making-responsibility-electoral-accountability-incentives-rent-extraction
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/12197
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 6305
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights.holderWorld Bank
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.subjectABUSE
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectAFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
dc.subjectBRIBERY
dc.subjectBUREAUCRACY
dc.subjectCAPITALISM
dc.subjectCETERIS PARIBUS
dc.subjectCIVIL LIBERTIES
dc.subjectCIVIL SOCIETY
dc.subjectCONFIDENCE
dc.subjectCONSTITUENTS
dc.subjectCORRUPTION
dc.subjectCORRUPTION PERCEPTION
dc.subjectCORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX
dc.subjectCORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
dc.subjectCORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
dc.subjectCPI
dc.subjectCPI SCORE
dc.subjectCPI SCORES
dc.subjectDECISION TREE
dc.subjectDEMOCRACIES
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subjectDISCRETION
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectECONOMIC OUTCOMES
dc.subjectECONOMICS
dc.subjectELECTION
dc.subjectELECTIONS
dc.subjectELECTORAL PROCESS
dc.subjectELECTORATES
dc.subjectEQUILIBRIUM
dc.subjectEXPECTED VALUE
dc.subjectEXPENDITURES
dc.subjectEXPORTS
dc.subjectFREE MEDIA
dc.subjectFREE PRESS
dc.subjectFUTURE RESEARCH
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGOOD GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectGRAFT
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINCUMBENT
dc.subjectINFLATION
dc.subjectINVESTIGATIONS
dc.subjectLAWS
dc.subjectLOBBYING
dc.subjectLOBBYISTS
dc.subjectMARGINAL UTILITY
dc.subjectMEDIA
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectOFFICE HOLDERS
dc.subjectOPTIMIZATION
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CONTROL
dc.subjectPOLITICAL CORRUPTION
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL LIFE
dc.subjectPOLITICIAN
dc.subjectPOLITICIANS
dc.subjectPOSITIVE EFFECTS
dc.subjectPRICE CONTROLS
dc.subjectPRIVATE GAIN
dc.subjectPRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOODS
dc.subjectPUBLIC OFFICIALS
dc.subjectPUBLIC POLICY
dc.subjectPUBLIC SECTOR
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectREGRESSION ANALYSES
dc.subjectREGRESSION ANALYSIS
dc.subjectREGULATORY BURDEN
dc.subjectRENT SEEKING
dc.subjectRENTS
dc.subjectTARIFF BARRIERS
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTAX REVENUE
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTRADE-OFF
dc.subjectTRANSACTION COSTS
dc.subjectTRANSPARENCY
dc.subjectUNEMPLOYMENT
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectWAGES
dc.subjectWTO
dc.titleSmall Is Beautiful, at Least in High-Income Democracies : The Distribution of Policy-Making Responsibility, Electoral Accountability, and Incentives for Rent Extractionen
dspace.entity.typePublication
okr.date.disclosure2013-01-01
okr.doctypePublications & Research::Policy Research Working Paper
okr.doctypePublications & Research
okr.docurlhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17151026/small-beautiful-least-high-income-democracies-distribution-policy-making-responsibility-electoral-accountability-incentives-rent-extraction
okr.globalpracticeMacroeconomics and Fiscal Management
okr.globalpracticeGovernance
okr.identifier.doi10.1596/1813-9450-6305
okr.identifier.externaldocumentum000158349_20130107132037
okr.identifier.internaldocumentum17151026
okr.identifier.reportWPS6305
okr.language.supporteden
okr.pdfurlhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/01/07/000158349_20130107132037/Rendered/PDF/wps6305.pdfen
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Investment and Investment Climate
okr.topicGovernance::Parliamentary Government
okr.topicEconomic Theory and Research
okr.topicMacroeconomics and Economic Growth::Political Economy
okr.topicPublic Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures
okr.topicPublic Sector Development
okr.unitDevelopment Research Group (DECRG)
okr.volume1 of 1
relation.isSeriesOfPublication26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery26e071dc-b0bf-409c-b982-df2970295c87
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