Person:
Inchauste, Gabriela
Author Name Variants
Fields of Specialization
Fiscal incidence analysis,
Poverty and social impact,
Economic and social mobility,
Informality,
Distributional analysis,
Public finance,
Inequality,
Development economics
Degrees
Departments
Global Practice on Poverty and Equity, The World Bank
Externally Hosted Work
Contact Information
Last updated
July 12, 2023
Biography
Gabriela Inchauste is a Lead Economist in the Poverty and Equity Global Practice of the World Bank. She currently leads work on Fiscal and Social Policies for poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Her research interests revolve around the distributional impact of fiscal policy, ex-ante analysis of the distributional impacts of policy reforms, and understanding the channels through which economic growth improves labor market opportunities for poverty reduction. Prior to joining the Bank, she worked at the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank where she contributed to operational and analytical activities in a number of countries covering topics such as macroeconomic forecasting, public expenditure policy, poverty and social impact analysis, fiscal and debt sustainability analysis, post-disaster needs assessments, and subsidy reform.She has published articles in academic volumes and journals on fiscal policy in low-income countries, decentralization, the distributional impacts of taxes and social spending, macroeconomic shocks and the poor, the informal sector, and the role of remittances in developing countries. A Bolivian national, she holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Texas at Austin.
Publication Search Results
1 - 3 of 3
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Publication
The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017-03-07)This book proposes a simple framework for understanding the political economy of subsidy reform and applies it to four in-depth country studies covering more than 30 distinct episodes of reform. Five key lessons emerge. First, energy subsidies often follow a life cycle, beginning as a way to stabilize prices and reduce exposure to price volatility for low-income consumers. However, as they grow in size and political power, they become entrenched. Second, subsidy reform strategies vary because the underlying political economy problems vary. When benefits are concentrated, satisfying or isolating) interest groups with alternative policies is an important condition for effective reform. When benefits are diffuse, it can be much harder to identify and manage the political coalition needed for reform. Third, governments vary in their administrative and political capacities to implement difficult energy subsidy reforms. Fourth, improvements in social protection systems are often critical to the success of reforms because they make it possible to target assistance to those most in need. Finally, the most interesting cases involve governments that take a strategic approach to the challenges of political economy. In these settings, fixing energy subsidies is central to the governments’ missions of retaining political power and reorganizing how the government delivers benefits to the population. These cases are examples of “reform engineering,” where governments actively seek to create the capacity to implement alternative policies, depoliticize tariffs, and build credibility around alternative policies. The most successful reforms involve active efforts by policy leaders to identify the political forces supporting energy subsidies and redirect or inoculate them. -
Publication
Intimate Partner Violence against Women: Prevalence, Formal Reporting, and Risk Factors in Chile
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2022-04)Intimate partner violence is among the most common forms of violence against women. In Chile, one in four women who have been in a partner relationship report having experienced some type of partner violence in the past 12 months, whether psychological, physical, sexual, or economic. However, only 22 percent of female victims of intimate partner violence file a formal complaint. This study analyzes the factors that determine the likelihood that a woman will be subject to violence perpetrated by her partner or ex-partner and the factors that determine the probability of reporting the abuse. Individual factors that increase women’s risk of experiencing intimate partner violence include being young, having fewer years of education, having a disability, and having been a victim of sexual abuse in childhood. Other factors include characteristics of partners or ex-partners associated with aggressive behavior in public spaces, having been a victim of intrafamily violence in childhood, and frequent alcohol consumption. The household dynamics that prevent women from participating in economic decision-making and the widespread acceptance of inequitable gender norms also significantly increase the risk that a woman will experience intimate partner violence. The likelihood that a woman will formally report intimate partner violence is mainly determined by the frequency of the episodes, characteristics of the partners or ex-partners, economic empowerment, and whether she has support networks. -
Publication
Energy Subsidy Reform Assessment Framework: Assessing the Political Economy of Energy Subsidies to Support Policy Reform Operations
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018-06-30)This note comes in three sections. First, the information required for political economy analysis of energy subsidy reforms is presented. Second, a summary is given of the information that can usually be obtained through desk research to provide the context for subsequent interviews and another field research. Third, information that probably requires interviews and field data collection is provided. The ultimate audience of the proposed types of analysis lies with policy reformers themselves and with external development and policy institutions that are seeking to help governments adopt more sustainable reforms. However, the direct audience for this note are those commissioning political economy analysis of energy subsidies, and technocrats, researchers, and advisers to policy makers carrying out the analysis. Often, a team made up of sector experts and political economy experts will provide a greater depth of analysis. Significant attention is devoted here to the origins and operation of existing subsidies since that history conditions what is possible for the adoption and sustainability of future reforms. The main interest and audience for this note is forward-looking, people and institutions who need to understand what is politically possible and how to realign political forces around successful reform. The authors are mindful that this role is perhaps different from other more technocratic roles of agencies and institutions focused on technical analysis and thus they also devote some attention to the processes needed to obtain and manage sensitive information and political insights since mismanagement in that realm can, itself, affect the political prospects for reform and harm the standing of reform agents in the process. In contrast to desk research or analysis of existing datasets, field research on political economy will always be an intervention in the local system, which needs to be managed well to increase and not decrease the space for reform and coalition building.