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Fernandes, Ana Margarida

Development Research Group, The World Bank
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Trade, Export dynamics, Export diversification, Productivity, Innovation
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Development Research Group, The World Bank
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Last updated: January 17, 2024
Biography
Ana Margarida Fernandes is a Lead Economist in the Trade and International Integration Unit of the Development Research Group at the World Bank. She joined the World Bank as a Young Economist in 2002. Her research examines the consequences of openness to trade and FDI for firm-level productivity, innovation and quality upgrading. Her work has also focused on the impact evaluation of trade-related policy interventions such as export promotion and customs reforms around the globe (Albania, Serbia, Madagascar, Tunisia). Since 2011 she has been managing the Exporter Dynamics Database project and studying the links between exporter growth and dynamics, development, policies, and shocks. She is currently working on deep trade agreements and on corruption in customs and tax evasion.
Citations 253 Scopus

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Professional Services and Development : A Study of Mozambique
    (2009-03-01) Fernandes, Ana Margarida
    Professional skills are scarce in Mozambique, even by the standards of low-income countries. The solution, however, is not necessarily to create more Mozambican training institutions but to address market-specific problems. Where skills are already the binding constraint (for example, in auditing and engineering), policy action is indeed needed to remedy supply-side problems: capital market imperfections that inhibit investment in training institutions by entrepreneurs and in education by individuals; weakness in upstream school education, which handicaps Mozambican students in their pursuit of higher education; inadequacies in professional education and training, including curricula not attuned to industry needs; and a fragmentation of the regional education market by regulatory and language differences that prevent the emergence of regional institutions that can exploit economies of scale.Where skills may be limited but are not yet the binding constraint, the priority is to stimulate demand for appropriate skills. In this respect, the emergence of professional guilds offers opportunities, but also creates risks. The guilds can design, with government support, a regulatory framework, for example, in accounting and basic engineering, which is more attuned to the needs of Mozambican firms. They can also help make firms more aware of the benefits of professional help, for example, in accounting and information technology. The risk is that guilds will create unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry, particularly for foreign or foreign-trained professionals. Greater coherence between policies affecting professional services and international migration policy can help deal with both supply-side and demand-side problems.
  • Publication
    Learning from the Experiments That Never Happened : Lessons from Trying to Conduct Randomized Evaluations of Matching Grant Programs in Africa
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-12) Campos, Francisco; Coville, Aidan; Fernandes, Ana M.; Goldstein, Markus; McKenzie, David
    Matching grants are one of the most common policy instruments used by developing country governments to try to foster technological upgrading, innovation, exports, use of business development services and other activities leading to firm growth. However, since they involve subsidizing firms, the risk is that they could crowd out private investment, subsidizing activities that firms were planning to undertake anyway, or lead to pure private gains, rather than generating the public gains that justify government intervention. As a result, rigorous evaluation of the effects of such programs is important. The authors attempted to implement randomized experiments to evaluate the impact of seven matching grant programs offered in six African countries, but in each case were unable to complete an experimental evaluation. One critique of randomized experiments is publication bias, whereby only those experiments with "interesting" results get published. The hope is to mitigate this bias by learning from the experiments that never happened. This paper describes the three main proximate reasons for lack of implementation: continued project delays, politicians not willing to allow random assignment, and low program take-up; and then delves into the underlying causes of these occurring. Political economy, overly stringent eligibility criteria that do not take account of where value-added may be highest, a lack of attention to detail in "last mile" issues, incentives facing project implementation staff, and the way impact evaluations are funded, and all help explain the failure of randomization. Lessons are drawn from these experiences for both the implementation and the possible evaluation of future projects.