Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina

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Political economy of development, Politics of taxation, Fiscal transparency
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Last updated: January 31, 2023
Cristina Corduneanu-Huci is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public Policy at the Central European University, Budapest. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Duke University. Her research focuses on the political economy of non-democratic regimes, development policies, state capacity, and government transparency. Her work has appeared in Comparative Sociology, the World Bank Policy Research Working Papers series, and several edited volumes. She is the co-author of Understanding Policy Change: How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice, a book that explores the complex relationship between politics and economic development.

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
  • Publication
    The Political Economy of Healthcare Litigation : Model and Empirical Application to Uruguay
    (2011-09-01) Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina; Masses-Ferrer, Issel
    The political economy of health care is complex, as stakeholders have conflicting preferences over efficiency and equity. This paper formally models the preferences of consumer and producer groups involved in priority setting and judicialization in public health care. It uses a unique dataset of stakeholder perceptions, from Uruguay, to test whether these hypotheses are consistent with empirical evidence. The results suggest that the expectations of the political economy literature are supported: 1) regulators of public healthcare are less concerned with efficiency considerations than consumers; and 2) less organized groups are more concerned about equity than more organized interest groups. With respect to the consequences of health litigation, the findings are only partially consistent with the health care governance literature. Consumers perceive litigation as more beneficial than health care providers and regulators do. Counter-intuitively, powerful interest groups seem less willing to use litigation to shape policy outcomes.
  • Publication
    Rules on Paper, Rules in Practice: Enforcing Laws and Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016-07-19) Al-Dahdah, Edouard; Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina; Raballand, Gael; Ababsa, Myriam
    The primary focus of this book is on a specific outcome of the rule of law: the practical enforcement of laws and policies, and the determinants of this enforcement, or lack thereof. Are there significant and persistent differences in implementation across countries? Why are some laws and policies more systematically enforced than others? Are “good” laws likely to be enacted, and if not, what stands in the way? We answer these questions using a theoretical framework and detailed empirical data and illustrate with case studies from Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. We believe that the best way to understand the variation in the drafting and implementation of laws and policies is to examine the interests and incentives of those responsible for these tasks – policymakers and bureaucrats. If laws and their enforcement offer concrete benefits to these ruling elites, they are more likely to be systematically enforced. If they don't, implementation is selective, discretionary, if not nil. Our first contribution is in extending the application of the concept of the rule of law beyond its traditional focus on specific organizations like the courts and the police, to economic sectors such as customs, taxation and land inheritance, in a search for a direct causal relationship with economic development outcomes. Instead of limiting ourselves to a particular type of organization or a legalistic approach to the rule of law, we present a broader theory of how laws are made and implemented across different types of sectors and organizations. Our second contribution is in demonstrating how powerful interests affect implementation outcomes. The incentives elites have to build and support rule-of-law institutions derive from the distribution of power in society, which is partly a historical given. The point we make is that it is not deterministic. Realigning the incentive structures for reform among key actors and organizations, through accountability and competition, can dramatically improve the chances that rule-of-law institutions will take root. On the other hand, building the capacity of organizations without first changing institutional incentives is likely to lead to perverse outcomes.
  • Publication
    Understanding Policy Change : How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013) Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina; Ferrer, Issel Masses
    The introductory chapter sets the stage and outlines the logic of the rest of the handbook. First, we present the main learning objectives; second, we introduce the pedagogical approach, methodology, and structure of the book. This handbook is intended to introduce the concepts of political economy to a wide audience of development practitioners, including civil society activists, journalists, students, and bureaucrats. Since the target readers vary widely in their previous exposure to the subject matter, the book summarizes a vast academic field and presents a comprehensive repertoire of concepts, theories, and empirical examples. Rather than offering a 'do-it-yourself' framework, we opted for developing a step-by-step analytical puzzle. First, the paper introduces the core mechanisms of political economy and their inner logic, and, subsequently, we help our readers learn how to recognize these mechanisms in their daily development-related work. By the end of the book, the authors hope that readers will be able to: recognize core development problems stemming from the political-economic environment; link theoretical concepts to real-life situations; diagnose the symptoms and the root causes of malfunctions; and understand the short-term and long-term consequences of poor governance and low institutional equilibria. This handbook is also designed to provide trainers with some of the pedagogical materials they need to develop an introductory course on political-economy analysis for policy practitioners. The content focuses on the what, the why, and the how to of policy change. The readers or trainees will encounter key theories and concepts and learn how to apply the analysis to an understanding of their own policy-making environment. Pedagogically, the handbook uses interactive classroom exercises and the case study method to reinforce learning objectives and to capture the concepts, methods, experiences, and challenges relevant for practitioners. Structured learning activities at the end of most chapters and a comprehensive group exercise in appendix D will also give readers and trainers the opportunity to apply the knowledge and tools of political economy to simulated or specific development puzzles.
  • Publication
    Selective Control: The Political Economy of Censorship
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018-08) Hamilton, Alexander; Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina
    In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targets that provide information to politically consequential audiences, while allowing media that caters to elite audiences to report freely. Second, the paper hypothesizes that coercion and inducements are substitutes, with censorship being employed primarily when bribes and ownership fail to control information. To test these hypotheses, a new data set was built of 9,000 salient censorship events and their characteristics across 196 countries between 2001 and 2015. The study finds strong empirical support for the theory of media market segmentation.