Goyal, Sangeeta

Global Practice on Education, The World Bank
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Early childhood education, Education, Tertiary education
Global Practice on Education, The World Bank
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Last updated: January 31, 2023
Sangeeta Goyal has a Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University. Her areas of interest include human capital and development economics. 

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Does Information Improve School Accountability? Results of a Large Randomized Trial
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-12) Pandey, Priyanka; Goyal, Sangeeta; Sundararaman, Venkatesh
    This study evaluates a community-based randomized controlled trial (RCT) to determine the impact of an information campaign on learning and other school outcomes. The study was conducted in three Indian states, Uttar Pradesh (UP), Madhya Pradesh (MP), and Karnataka. UP and MP are two large north and central Indian states, respectively, and lag behind in economic and social outcomes, while Karnataka in southern India is economically and socially more developed. Even though all three states have devolved oversight roles to the community with respect to government schools, they differ in the extent to which such devolution has taken place. The information campaign disseminated state specific information to the community on its oversight roles in schools and education services that parents are entitled to. Information was disseminated in 11-14 public meetings in each treatment village over a period of two and a half years.
  • Publication
    Contract Teachers in India
    (Taylor and Francis, 2011-06-24) Goyal, Sangeeta
    In this paper, we use non‐experimental data from government schools in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, two of the largest Indian states, to present average school outcomes by contract status of teachers. We find that contract teachers are associated with higher effort than civil service teachers with permanent tenures, before as well as after controlling for school fixed effects. And higher teacher effort is associated with better student performance after controlling for other school inputs and student characteristics. Given that salaries earned by contract teachers are one‐fourth or less of civil service teachers, contract teachers may be a more cost‐effective resource. However, contracts ‘as they are’ appear weak. Not only do contract teachers have fairly low average effort in absolute terms, but those who have been on the job for at least one full tenure have lower effort than others who are in the first contract period.