Person:
Shah, Anwar

Global Practice for Governance, The World Bank

Fields of Specialization

governance; public sector reform; budgetary accountability;

Departments

Global Practice for Governance, The World Bank

Last updated January 31, 2023

Full item page

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 12

Fiscal Decentralization in Developing and Transition Economies: Progress, Problems, and the Promise

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-04) Shah, Anwar

The author discusses the revolution in public sector thinking that is transforming the public sectors of developing and transition countries. Countries are reconsidering their fiscal systems and searching for the right balance between central government control and decentralized governance. Political decentralization has advanced in most countries. Subnational expenditures in developing countries as a percentage of total public expenditures have also increased over the past two decades. However, the process is far from complete. In many countries, the central government is still involved in the delivery of local services, local governments have few sources of own-revenues, local governments have limited access to borrowing for capital projects, and the design of intergovernmental transfers does neither address regional fiscal equity nor convey appropriate incentives for fiscal discipline, improved service delivery performance, and accountability to citizens. Decentralized public governance can help realign public sector incentives through greater accountability to citizens, and attenuate the "democracy deficit" caused by globalization and the role of supranational institutions and regimes. However, this requires careful examination of the entire fiscal system. Elements of a comprehensive package of fiscal system reforms would include: (a) Clarifying roles of various levels of government in public service delivery; (b) Reassigning taxing responsibilities to ensure local revenue autonomy, accountability, and efficiency without endangering an internal common market; (c) Designing fiscal transfers to ensure regional fiscal equity and to create an enabling environment for innovative and competitive service delivery; (d) Facilitating responsible credit market access to subnational governments; (e) Designing institutional arrangements for intergovernmental fiscal relations to better coordinate policies; and (f) Aligning operational capacity with the authorizing environment through the "accountability for results" framework of public management.
Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours, and Road Closures

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-06) Shah, Anwar ; Thompson, Theresa

During the past two decades, a silent revolution in public sector governance has swept across the globe aiming to move decision making for local public services closer to the people. The countries embracing and adapting to this silent revolution have had diverse motives and followed even more diverse approaches. This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and approaches used to strengthen local governance. The quest for the right balance, i.e. appropriate division of powers among different levels of government, is not always the primary reason for decentralizing. There is evidence that the decentralization decision may have more to do with short-term political considerations than the long-run benefits of decentralization. To take stock of progress worldwide, we take a comparative look at developments in political, fiscal and administrative decentralization for a selected group of countries. Most of the decentralization literature deals with normative issues regarding the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of government and the design of fiscal transfers. The process of decentralization has not received the attention it deserves as the best laid plans can fail due to implementation difficulties. We revisit major controversies regarding preferred approaches to obtaining a successful outcome. Key approaches examined are big push versus small steps; bottom up vs. top down; and uniform vs. asymmetric decentralization. Finally, Indonesia's 1999 big bang decentralization program is evaluated. The program should be commended for its achievements over a short period of time, however incentives are lacking for local governments to be accountable and responsive to their residents.
Grant Financing of Metropolitan Areas : A Review of Principles and Worldwide Practices

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-03) Shah, Anwar

In the new information age in the globalized and interconnected world, metropolitan areas hold the key to the future prosperity and growth of nations. This paper takes a closer look at grant-financing regimes faced by metropolitan areas and their role in facilitating or hindering improvements in economic and social outcomes of residents of metropolitan areas. A review of 42 large metropolitan areas worldwide shows that, with a few notable exceptions, metropolitan areas in general are hamstrung from playing their potential role in economic advancement. Metro areas have large economic bases and therefore little a priori needs for grant financing, yet they have strong dependence on central transfers. This is because of the highly constrained fiscal autonomy given to these areas, especially in developing countries, with the singular exception of metro areas in China. Such a strong reliance on transfers undermines local autonomy and local accountability. General purpose transfers are formula based , transparent and predictable yet they discriminate against metropolitan areas as they utilize a one size fit all (common formula) for all local governments -- large or small. Such formula typically incorporate equal per jurisdiction component that discriminates against large metropolitan areas. Compactness is rarely rewarded and the greater needs of metro areas for transportation, education, health, culture and welfare go unrecognized. Overall the emphasis in grant financing of metro areas deals with vertical fiscal gaps or project based specific purpose grants. To ensure that metropolitan areas can play their dual roles in improving economic and social outcomes for residents, it is important to strengthen their fiscal autonomy while at the same time enhancing their accountability to local residents. The paper argues that results based grant financing of social and transportation services and tournament based approaches to encourage inter-jurisdictional competition need to be given serious consideration to ensure metropolitan autonomy while strengthening citizen based accountability.
The Reform of the Intergovernmental Transfer System to Achieve a Harmonious Society and a Level Playing Field for Regional Development in China

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2006-12) Shah, Anwar ; Shen, Chunli

In China, most of the service delivery responsibilities are assigned to the subnational governments. Yet for reasons of efficiency in tax collection and administration, the central government collects revenues far in excess of its expenditure needs. In 2003 the central government collected 70 percent of consolidated revenues but accounted for only 30 percent of consolidated expenditures. The initial fiscal surplus of the central government enables it to use its spending power to provide financing to subnational jurisdictions for the achievement of national objectives and to influence local priorities. This paper examines the incentives associated with the design of such transfers and their implications for the efficiency and equity of public service provision and accountable local governance in China. The paper argues that the existing design of such transfers is not consistent with efficiency and equity considerations. It further undermines local autonomy without enhancing local accountability while creating incentives for imprudent fiscal management. Its main limitations include a complex and opaque system, a piecemeal approach to gap filling, lack of consistency of design with objectives, focus on input controls without regard for output accountability, incentives to support an antiquated management paradigm, a one-size-fits-all approach to local financing, and lack of transparency and regulatory framework for the intergovernmental transfer system. The paper makes specific suggestions on a reform of this system to overcome these limitations and on better use of fiscal transfers to create responsive, responsible, equitable, and accountable local governance in China.
A Practitioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2006-10) Shah, Anwar

Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant feature of subnational finance in most countries. They are used to ensure that revenues roughly match the expenditure needs of various orders (levels) of subnational governments. They are also used to advance national, regional, and local area objectives, such as fairness and equity, and creating a common economic union. The structure of these transfers creates incentives for national, regional, and local governments that have a bearing on fiscal management, macroeconomic stability, distributional equity, allocative efficiency, and public services delivery. This paper reviews the conceptual, empirical, and practice literature to distill lessons of policy interest in designing the fiscal transfers to create the right incentives for prudent fiscal management and competitive and innovative service delivery. It provides practical guidance on the design of performance-oriented transfers that emphasize bottom-up, client-focused, and results-based government accountability. It cites examples of simple but innovative grant designs that can satisfy grantors' objectives while preserving local autonomy and creating an enabling environment for responsive, responsible, equitable, and accountable public governance. The paper further provides guidance on the design and practice of equalization transfers for regional fiscal equity as well as the institutional arrangements for implementation of such transfer mechanisms. It concludes with negative (practices to avoid) and positive (practices to emulate) lessons from international practices.
A Framework for Evaluating Alternate Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Equalization Transfers

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-12) Shah, Anwar

Fiscal equalization programs are fairly common features of intergovernmental fiscal relations in industrial countries. Some developing countries have also recently introduced these programs and still others are contemplating such programs. Institutional arrangements for fiscal equalization vary across countries with wide variations in the form and membership of the relevant decisionmaking bodies. This paper provides a simple neo-institutional economics framework for assessing alternative institutional arrangements for their impacts on simplicity, transparency, and objectivity of the equalization program, as well as transaction costs for various parties involved. Comparing institutional arrangements across different countries is a daunting task. The success of these arrangements depends on a multitude of factors. The success of governance structures for fiscal matters may depend not only on the incentives regime associated with their inner structures but also their interactions with other formal and informal institutions in the country. This paper presents a simple framework to understand these incentives and interactions and draw implications for their impacts on transactions costs for the society as a whole and achievement of societal objectives. An application of these concepts to the specific case of institutional arrangements for fiscal equalization transfers are carried out and the predictions based on the theory are compared with observed experiences in major federal countries. The paper demonstrates that the simple new institutional framework presented here has a significant power for predicting potential impacts. The paper concludes, both in theory and practice, that the case for independent grants commission to enhance the transparency, equity, and accountability of the intergovernmental finance system is vastly exaggerated.
Public Services and Expenditure Need Equalization : Reflections on Principles and Worldwide Comparative Practices

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-03) Shah, Anwar

This paper reviews the conceptual challenges as well as lessons from worldwide experiences in implementing public services and expenditure need compensation in fiscal equalization transfers with a view to developing guidance for practitioners. The paper concludes that while in theory a strong case for a comprehensive fiscal equalization can be made, in practice fiscal need equalization as part of a comprehensive equalization program introduces significant complexity. This works against the simplicity, transparency and general acceptability of the program. This does not imply that fiscal need equalization should be abandoned in the interest of simplicity and transparency. Instead simplicity, transparency and local autonomy are preserved by having fiscal need equalization through public service oriented (specific purpose block transfers) output based fiscal transfers that impose no spending requirements for any functions or objects of expenditures. Such transfers contrast with traditional earmarked transfers, which impose conditions on spending for specific purposes or objects of expenditure and subsequent verification/certification of such expenditures. Such output-based block transfers would further enhance citizen based accountability for results and thereby offer potential for enhancing public confidence and trust in government operations.
Autonomy with Equity and Accountability : Toward a More Transparent, Objective, Predictable and Simpler (TOPS) System of Central Financing of Provincial-Local Expenditures in Indonesia

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-03) Shah, Anwar

During the past decade, Indonesia has transformed itself from centralized governance to decentralized local governance. Local governments were given extensive expenditure responsibilities while keeping the tax system centralized. To finance decentralized provincial-local expenditures, Indonesia implemented a new system of intergovernmental finance. This paper provides a review of the equity and efficiency implications of the current system of central-provincial-local transfers. It finds that the system of intergovernmental finance represents one of the most complex systems ever implemented by any government in the world. The system is primarily focused on a gap-filling approach to provincial-local finance to ensure revenue adequacy and local autonomy but without accountability to local residents for service delivery performance. This is done through a great degree of academic rigor using highly complex procedures. The complexity leads to a lack of transparency, inequity and uncertainty in allocation as well as creating incentives for jurisdictional fragmentation and reducing own-tax effort. Simpler alternatives are available that have the potential to address equity objectives while also enhancing efficiency and citizen-based accountability. Such alternatives would represent a move away from complex gap filling and special allocation approaches to simple, output based transfers to finance operating expenditures. These would be complemented by capital grants to deal with infrastructure deficiencies, and fiscal capacity equalization as a residual program with an explicit standard to ensure that all local jurisdictions have adequate means to deliver reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of tax burdens across the country. The paper argues that such an alternative system of intergoveernmental finance would preserve autonomy, while enhancing equity, simplicity, objectivity, transparency and accountability.
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers : Principles and Practice

(Washington, DC : World Bank, 2007) Boadway, Robin ; Shah, Anwar

The design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has a strong bearing on efficiency and equity of public service provision and accountable local governance. This book provides a comprehensive one-stop window/source of materials to guide practitioners and scholars on design and worldwide practices in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and their implications for efficiency, and equity in public services provision as well as accountable governance.
Local Governance in Industrial Countries

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006) Shah, Anwar

Local government refers to specific institutions or entities created by national constitutions (Brazil, Denmark, France, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden), by state constitutions (Australia, the United States), by ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government (New Zealand, the United Kingdom, most countries), by provincial or state legislation (Canada, Pakistan), or by executive order (China) to deliver a range of specified services to a relatively small geographically delineated area. Local governance is a broader concept and is defined as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level. Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by defining the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, and delivery of local public services.