Person:
Brixi, Hana

Global Practice on Social Protection and Jobs
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Public sector governance, Public finance, Public service delivery, Human development, Social Protection and Labor
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Global Practice on Social Protection and Jobs
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Last updated: January 31, 2023
Biography
As Practice Manager, Dr. Brixi leads the World Bank engagement on social protection and employment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In her career in the World Bank, Dr. Brixi has been advancing analytic and operational contribution to human development, service delivery, and public sector governance. She led the Global Solutions Group on Public Service Delivery and a Thematic Group on Quality of Fiscal Adjustment; and held senior technical positions across regions, including Program Leader for the Gulf countries, Lead Economist for Human Development in the MENA region, and Senior Economist in China and in countries of Europe and Central & South East Asia. Based in China during 2001-10, she served as World Health Organization’s Sector Leader for Health Sector Development and UNICEF Social Policy Chief; and she taught international development as a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and Management, in Beijing. She published several books, including Trust, Voice and Incentives on governance and service delivery and Government at Risk on contingent liabilities and fiscal risk management (Oxford University Press), and numerous articles on topics of public finance, governance, and human development in professional journals.

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Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    Public-Private Partnerships in the New EU Member States
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007) Budina, Nina; Polackova Brixi, Hana; Irwin, Timothy
    Public-private partnerships (PPPs) operate at the boundary of the public and private sectors, being neither fully public nor fully private. PPPs are defined in this paper as privately financed infrastructure projects in which a private firm either: (i) sells its services to the government; or (ii) sells its services to third parties with significant fiscal support in the form of guarantees. Despite these common elements of PPPs across sectors, there are differences in the type of arrangements that are typical in each sector. This study focuses on whether and when using PPPs can create fiscal space for additional infrastructure investments in the EU8. In doing so, the paper will examine the fiscal risks of PPPs and the role of fiscal institutions in this regard, including how these affect the use and design of PPPs and thus the potential for creating fiscal space while promoting investment in infrastructure. Chapter 2 distinguishes the illusory from the real fiscal effects of PPPs. Chapter 3 relates the extent to which PPPs reduce fiscal costs to the nature of fiscal institutions. Chapter 4 explains how fiscal institutions can be improved to encourage fiscal prudence in the use and design of PPPs. Chapter 5 concludes.
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    Government at Risk : Contingent Liabilities and Fiscal Risk
    (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2002) Schick, Allen; Polackova Brixi, Hana; Polackova Brixi, Hana; Schick, Allen
    Conventional fiscal analysis fails to address contingent fiscal risk. The government budget process and documentation generally fail to scrutinize the substantial claims on public resources that are associated with government contingent liabilities, realized and potential. This report fills gaps on our understanding of fiscal risks and develops suitable frameworks for managing them. It offers new analytical concepts, presents country case studies, and based on country case studies, provides a menu of practical ideas for policymakers and scholars to bring fiscal risk within the ambit of public finance. The book is divided into two parts: Part I of this book gives an overview of different approaches to dealing with government fiscal risks. The country examples in this part offer additional conceptual approaches and illustrate some of the discussion in the earlier chapters. Part II presents analytical and institutional approaches that governments might consider when facing risks in specific government programs or sectors. The book indicates that countries differ greatly in their treatment of contingent liabilities and other fiscal risks. In this respect, the book illustrates that contemporary practices have yet to be standardized.
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    Monitoring Fiscal Risks of Subnational Governments
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2002-03) Ma, Jun; Polackova, Hana
    Growing experience with decentralization indicates that a country's public finance system suffers when subnational governments expose themselves to excessive risk. But central governments often lack the information needed to monitor the fiscal risks of subnational governments. Several countries, having experienced subnational fiscal crises, have established systems to monitor such risks. These systems assess subnational fiscal health and call for central government attention-and possible intervention-if preset indicators of fiscal imprudence are exceeded. In developing countries such systems also provide useful information for subnational credit ratings. This note describes several country experiences with indicators of subnational fiscal risks, identifies some limitations of such indicators, and suggests alternative indicators.
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    Contingent Liabilities : A Threat to Fiscal Stability
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1998-11) Polackova, Hana
    The economic policy note discusses the issue of serious fiscal instability faced by many governments as a result of their contingent liabilities, which are associated with major hidden fiscal risks. Direct liabilities are predictable obligations that will arise in any event, and are the main subject of conventional fiscal analysis. Conversely, contingent liabilities are obligations triggered by a discreet but uncertain event, and are not always accounted for fully. The note further discusses explicit and implicit liabilities of a central government, suggesting ways to reduce fiscal risks for the policy makers.