Brixi, Hana

Global Practice on Social Protection and Jobs
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Public sector governance, Public finance, Public service delivery, Human development, Social Protection and Labor
Global Practice on Social Protection and Jobs
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Last updated January 31, 2023
As Practice Manager, Dr. Brixi leads the World Bank engagement on social protection and employment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In her career in the World Bank, Dr. Brixi has been advancing analytic and operational contribution to human development, service delivery, and public sector governance. She led the Global Solutions Group on Public Service Delivery and a Thematic Group on Quality of Fiscal Adjustment; and held senior technical positions across regions, including Program Leader for the Gulf countries, Lead Economist for Human Development in the MENA region, and Senior Economist in China and in countries of Europe and Central & South East Asia. Based in China during 2001-10, she served as World Health Organization’s Sector Leader for Health Sector Development and UNICEF Social Policy Chief; and she taught international development as a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and Management, in Beijing. She published several books, including Trust, Voice and Incentives on governance and service delivery and Government at Risk on contingent liabilities and fiscal risk management (Oxford University Press), and numerous articles on topics of public finance, governance, and human development in professional journals.

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    Contingent Liabilities : A Threat to Fiscal Stability
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1998-11) Polackova, Hana
    The economic policy note discusses the issue of serious fiscal instability faced by many governments as a result of their contingent liabilities, which are associated with major hidden fiscal risks. Direct liabilities are predictable obligations that will arise in any event, and are the main subject of conventional fiscal analysis. Conversely, contingent liabilities are obligations triggered by a discreet but uncertain event, and are not always accounted for fully. The note further discusses explicit and implicit liabilities of a central government, suggesting ways to reduce fiscal risks for the policy makers.