Freund, Caroline

Person:
Freund, Caroline

Macroeconomics Trade & Investment

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Macroeconomics Trade & Investment

Last updated: November 1, 2023

Biography

Caroline Freund is Director of Trade, Regional Integration and Investment Climate. Previously she was a Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. She has also worked as Chief Economist for the Middle East and North Africa at the World Bank, after working for nearly a decade in the international trade unit of the research department. Freund began her career in the international finance division of the Federal Reserve Board and spent a year visiting the research department of the IMF. She has published extensively in academic journals and is the author of Rich People Poor Countries: The Rise of Emerging Market Tycoons and their Mega Firms. She is a US national and received a PhD in economics from Columbia University.

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 10

All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-03) Nucifora, Antonio; Rijkers, Bob; Freund, Caroline
This paper examines the relationship between regulation and the business interests of President Ben Ali and his family, using firm-level data from Tunisia for 1994-2010. Data on investment regulations are merged with balance sheet and firm-level census data in which 220 firms owned by the Ben Ali family are identified. These connected firms outperform their competitors in terms of employment, output, market share, profits, and growth and sectors in which they are active are disproportionately subject to authorization requirements and restriction on foreign direct investment. Consistent with theories of capture, performance differences between connected firms and their peers are significantly larger in highly regulated sectors. In addition, the introduction of new foreign direct investment restrictions and authorization requirements in narrowly defined five-digit sectors is correlated with the presence of connected firms and with their startup, suggesting that regulation is endogenous to state capture. The evidence implies that Tunisia's industrial policy was used as a vehicle for rent creation for the president and his family.
The Trade Performance of the Middle East and North Africa
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011-07) Behar, Alberto; Freund, Caroline
This paper characterizes the trade performance of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) over the past 15 years. Cross-section results show that MENA's exports to the outside world were only one third of their potential in recent years, after controlling for the standard determinants of trade. Results from panel data show that MENA's exports have been expanding more rapidly than exports from the rest of the world, offering some evidence of convergence. Still, at historical growth rates, it would take 20 years for MENA countries to reach potential trade. When we exclude natural resources, exports are also only one third of the benchmark, but the improved export performance over time is much slower and implies it could take twice as long to reach potential. Interestingly, while MENA also under-trades within the region, the extent of under-trading is less acute than with the outside world. There is, however, no indication of more rapid regional integration over time, suggesting that recent trade agreements among MENA countries have not stimulated regional trade to a greater extent than external trade. Finally, the report examines intra-industry trade, which has characterized world trade growth over the period. East Asia and Europe show large and rising intra-industry trade, both globally and regionally, reflecting increased trade in differentiated goods and the expansion of supply chains. Despite neighboring these regions, the MENA countries have been largely left out of this transformation.
All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2014-05) Nucifora, Antonio; Rijkers, Bob; Freund, Caroline
Understanding state-business relationships and how they have shaped the institutional architecture of countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) is crucial for the identification of systemic vulnerabilities and reform priorities. In this paper, the authors examine the relationship between regulation and the business interests of President Ben Ali and his family, using unique firm-level data from Tunisia for 1994 to 2010, and document how Tunisia s investment policy was abused to serve the president s family s private interests. In spite of widespread recognition of its importance, empirical evidence on state capture has been limited by a lack of data. To redress this lacuna, the authors merge data on investment regulations with balance sheet and firm-level census data in which 220 firms owned by the Ben Ali family are identified. The data set assembled allows identifying the relationship between investment policies and the business interests of Tunisia's politicians. Tunisians today literally continue to pay the price of privileges extended to an elite group of entrepreneurs. Reform efforts have not yet resulted in an opening up of economic opportunities for all, which is unfortunate since this was one of the central demands of those who took the streets a little over three years ago.
Which Firms Create the Most Jobs in Developing Countries? Evidence from Tunisia
(World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2014-10) Arouri, Hassen; Rijkers, Bob; Nucifora, Antonio; Freund, Caroline
This paper examines private sector job creation in Tunisia over the period 1996-2010 using a unique database containing information on all registered private enterprises, including self-employment. In spite of stable growth of gross domestic product, overall net job creation was disappointing and firm dynamics were sluggish. The firm size distribution has remained skewed toward small firms, because of stagnation of incumbents and entrants starting small, typically as one-person firms (self-employment). Churning is limited, especially among large firms, and few firms manage to grow. Post-entry, small firms are the worst performers for job creation, even if they survive. Moreover, the association between productivity, profitability, and job creation is feeble, pointing towards weaknesses in the re-allocative process. Weak net job creation thus appears to be due to insufficient firm dynamism rather than excessive job destruction.
Which Firms Create the Most Jobs in Developing Countries? Evidence from Tunisia
(Elsevier, 2014-12) Rijkers, Bob; Freund, Caroline
This paper examines private sector job creation in Tunisia over the period 1996–2010 using a unique database containing information on all registered private enterprises, including self-employment. In spite of stable GDP growth, overall net job creation was disappointing and firm dynamics were sluggish. The firm size distribution has remained skewed towards small firms, because of stagnation of incumbents and entrants starting small, typically as one-person firms (i.e. self-employment). Churning is limited, especially amongst large firms, and very few firms manage to grow. Post-entry, small firms are the worst performers in terms of job creation, even if they survive. Moreover, the association between productivity, profitability and job creation is feeble, pointing towards weaknesses in the re-allocative process. Weak net job creation thus appears to be due to insufficient firm dynamism rather than excessive job destruction.
Infrastructure and Employment Creation in the Middle East and North Africa
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-01) Freund, Caroline; Ianchovichina, Elena
The report estimates Middle East and North Africa's (MENA's) infrastructure investment and maintenance needs through 2020 at 106 billion dollars per year or 6.9 percent of the annual regional gross domestic product (GDP). Developing oil exporting countries (OEC) will need to commit almost 11 percent of their GDP annually ($48 billion) on improving and maintaining their national infrastructure endowments, while the oil importing countries (OIC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) oil exporters need approximately 6 and 5 percent of their GDP, respectively. Infrastructure investment has the potential to create jobs quickly, while providing a foundation for future growth. This is especially important in the oil importing countries, where the infrastructure gap is the greatest and employment needs are growing. However, it is also likely to be most difficult in these countries because of strained finances. Going forward, government decisions on what types of spending to expand and what to contract to achieve balanced budgets will have important implications for jobs. Prudent infrastructure development will be critical for short and long-term growth and job creation.
All in the Family: State Capture in Tunisia
(Elsevier, 2017-01) Rijkers, Bob; Freund, Caroline
We examine the relationship between entry regulation and the business interests of former President Ben Ali’s family using firm-level data from Tunisia. Connected firms account for a disproportionate share of aggregate employment, output and profits, especially in sectors subject to authorization and restrictions on FDI. Quantile regressions show that profit and market share premia from being connected increase along the firm-size distribution, especially in highly regulated sectors. These patterns are partly explained by Ben Ali’s relatives sorting into the most profitable sectors. The market shares of connected firms are positively correlated with exit and concentration rates in highly regulated sectors. Although causality is difficult to establish, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Ben Ali clan abused entry regulation for private gain at the expense of reduced competition.
Champions Wanted: Promoting Exports in the Middle East and North Africa
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015-04-08) Jaud, Mélise; Freund, Caroline
While other emerging regions were thriving, MENA's aggregate export performance over the past two decades has been consistently weak. Using detailed firm-level export data from Customs administrations, this report explains why. One central finding is that the size distribution of MENA's exporting firms is suggestive of a critical weakness at the top. With the exception of the top firm, MENA's elite exporters are smaller and weaker compared to their peers in other regions. The largest exporter is alone at the top-Zidane without a team. MENA countries have failed to nurture a group of export superstars which critically contribute to export success in other regions. Part of the reason behind weak export performance is the lack of a competitive real exchange rate. The deleterious effects of an uncompetitive currency can be traced all the way down to the firm, hurting expansion at the intensive and extensive margin and preventing the emergence of export take-offs. The lack of heavy weight exporters at the top of the distribution also reflects the region's failure to push for trade and business climate reforms energetically. Finally, MENA's prevalent cronyism and corruption under pre-Arab Spring regimes (at least) confirms that business-government ties led to distortionary allocation of favors and rent dissipation by beneficiary firms, with little evidence that those firms developed into national champions or helped lift the region's export performance. The possibility of state capture in itself should call for caution when advocating any form of government intervention. In contrast, some interventions, like export promotion programs show effects on small exporters. However, because these firms are marginal in trade, such programs cannot be game changers. More broadly, the success of MENA countries in promoting export growth and diversification as well as generating jobs depends heavily on their ability to create an environment where large firms can invest and expand exports and new, efficient firms can rise to the top.
MENA Regional Economic Update
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-05) Freund, Caroline; Ianchovichina, Elena
Regional events continue to affect the short-term economic prospects in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), while major developments in the global economy over the past six months have put the region on a two-track growth path for 2012. These developments include a significant rise in crude oil prices on fears of oil supply disruptions and weak economic activity in the Eurozone. Economic growth of MENA's oil exporting countries will be strong as it rebounds from the average of 3.4 percent in 2011 to 5.4 percent in 2012. In sum, growth in MENA will rebound and approach 4.8 percent in 2012, rising about 2 percentage points relative to growth in 2011. This aggregate outcome however hides a two-track growth forecast. Oil exporters will grow much faster relative to oil importers and relative to 2011, provided oil prices remain strong. Oil importers, especially those recovering after political turbulence, remain in vulnerable positions and will grow at half the pace registered by oil exporters. Risks are multiple and reflect the heterogeneous domestic conditions across MENA, especially in the oil importers and in the global economy.
The Middle East and North Africa : A Year in Transition
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-12) Wood, Christina; Freund, Caroline; Ianchovichina, Elena; Mottaghi, Lili
This note is based on report entitled Looking Ahead after a Year in Transition that was issued by the Chief Economist s office of the Middle East and North Africa region of the World Bank. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen are given special attention because each of them experienced a revolution and a major political change in 2011 and is undergoing a process of political transition toward democracy. In each of the four focus countries, the transition authorities have been charged with implementing agreed time-bound actions leading to democratic elections for new constitutions, presidents and /or parliamentary bodies. Tunisia s new elections are expected to be held no later than June 30, 2013. Egypt lacks a full constitution and parliament, and the transition framework remains uncertain, having been reshaped multiple times by a series of constitutional declarations, laws, decrees, legal challenges and court rulings. Libya barring major disruptions appears to be on track to adopt its new constitution in 2013. In Yemen the new government led by President Hadi is overseeing a two year transition period that is to end with elections.