Andres, Luis A.
Global Practice on Water
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Global Practice on Water
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Last updated January 31, 2023
Luis Andrés is Lead Economist in the Water Global Practice at the World Bank. Earlier, Dr. Andres held positions in the Sustainable Development Department for the Latin America and the Caribbean, and the South Asia Regions. His work at the World Bank involves both analytical and advisory services, with a focus on infrastructure, mainly in water and energy sectors, impact evaluations, private sector participation, regulation, and empirical microeconomics. He worked with numerous Latin American, South Asian, and East Europe governments. Before joining the World Bank, he was the Chief of Staff for the Secretary of Fiscal and Social Equity for the Government of Argentina and held other positions in the Chief of Cabinet of Ministries and the Ministry of Economy. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago and he has authored books, chapters in several books, monographs, and articles on development policy issues.
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Now showing 1 - 8 of 8
Publication(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-08) Araya, Gonzalo ; Schwartz, Jordan ; Andres, LuisThrough an empirical analysis of the relationship between private participation in infrastructure and country risk, the paper shows that country risk ratings are a reliable predictor of infrastructure investment levels in developing countries. The results suggest that a difference of one standard deviation in a country's sovereign risk score is associated with a 27 percent increase in the probability of having a private participation in infrastructure commitment, and a 41 percent higher level of investment in dollar terms. The predictive ability of country risk ratings exists for all sectors of infrastructure and for both greenfield and concessions. On average, energy investments exhibit a higher sensitivity to country risk than transport, telecommunications, and water investments. Concessions are more sensitive than greenfield investments to country risk, although country risk is a good predictor of investment levels for both contractual forms. Although foreign direct investment is found to be sensitive to country risk, the causal relationship is not nearly as sensitive as it is with private participation in infrastructure. Finally, an analysis of private participation in infrastructure patterns for those countries emerging from conflict reveals that conflict-affected countries typically require six to seven years to attract significant levels or forms of private investments in infrastructure from the day that the conflict is officially resolved. Private investments in sectors where assets are more difficult to secure--such as water, power distribution, or roads--are slower to appear or simply never materialize.
Publication(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-10) Andres, Luis ; Guasch, Jose Luis ; Straub, StephaneThis paper evaluates the impact of economic regulation on infrastructure sector outcomes. It tests the impact of regulation from three different angles: aligning costs with tariffs and firm profitability; reducing opportunistic renegotiation; and measuring the effects on productivity, quality of service, coverage, and prices. The analysis uses an extensive data set of about 1,000 infrastructure concessions granted in Latin America from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. The analysis finds that as the theory indicates, regulation matters. The empirical work here reported shows that in three relevant economic aspects-aligning costs and tariffs; dissuading renegotiations; and improving productivity, quality of service, coverage, and tariffs-the structure, institutions, and procedures of regulation matter. Thus, significant efforts should continue to be made to improve the structure, quality, and institutionality of regulation. Regulation matters for protecting both consumers and investors, for aligning closely financial returns and the costs of capital, and for capturing higher levels of benefits from the provision of infrastructure services by the private sector.
Assessing the Governance of Electricity Regulatory Agencies in the Latin American and the Caribbean Region : A Benchmarking Analysis(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-11) Andres, Luis ; Guasch, José Luis ; Diop, Makhtar ; Azumendi, Sebastián LopezThis paper focuses on an evaluation and benchmarking of the governance of regulatory agencies in the electricity sector in Latin American Countries (LAC). Using a unique database, we develop an index of regulatory governance and rank all the agencies in the LAC countries. The index is an aggregate number of the evaluation of four key governance characteristics: autonomy, transparency, accountability, and regulatory tools, including not only formal aspects of regulation but also indicators related to actual implementation. Based on 18 different indexes, we analyze the positions of agencies with regard to different aspects of their regulatory governance, considering not only performance in each variable but also scores in the different components of each category. This evaluation allows for the identification of particular country shortcomings regarding governance, and indicates needed improvements. Although the region shows an overall good governance design of their regulatory agencies, the implementation of the independent regulator model still faces several challenges. This is particularly evident in political autonomy and in the informal aspects of governance, where the region shows the largest number of countries with the lowest scores. Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil show the best results and Ecuador, Honduras, and Chile the poorest performances. The rest of the countries vary according to the different indexes. We give each governance variable equal weights and positively test the robustness of our approach using Principal Component Analysis.
Publication(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-05) Tuck, Laura ; Schwartz, Jordan ; Andres, LuisInfrastructure investment is a central part of the stimulus plans of the Latin America and Caribbean Region (LAC) as it confronts the growing financial crisis. This paper estimates the potential effects on direct, indirect, and induced employment for different types of infrastructure projects with LAC-specific variables. The analysis finds that the direct and indirect short-term employment generation potential of infrastructure capital investment projects may be considerable-averaging around 40,000 annual jobs per US$1billion in LAC, depending upon such variables as the mix of subsectors in the investment program; the technologies deployed; local wages for skilled and unskilled labor; and the degrees of leakages to imported inputs. While these numbers do not account for substitution effect, they are built around an assumed "basket" of investments that crosses infrastructure sectors most of which are not employment-maximizing. Albeit limited in scope, rural road maintenance projects may employ 200,000 to 500,000 annualized direct jobs for every US$1billion spent. The paper also describes the potential risks to effective infrastructure investment in an environment of crisis including sorting and planning contradictions, delayed implementation and impact, affordability, and corruption.
Publication(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2009-07) Schwartz, Jordan ; Andres, Luis ; Dragoiu, GeorgetaInfrastructure investment is a central part of the stimulus plans of the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region as it confronts the growing financial crisis. This paper estimates the potential effects on direct, indirect, and induced employment for different types of infrastructure projects with LAC-specific variables. The analysis finds that the direct and indirect short-term employment generation potential of infrastructure capital investment projects may be considerable averaging around 40,000 annual jobs per United States (U.S.) 1 billion dollars in LAC, depending upon such variables as the mix of subsectors in the investment program; the technologies deployed; local wages for skilled and unskilled labor; and the degrees of leakages to imported inputs. While these numbers do not account for substitution effect, they are built around an assumed basket of investments that crosses infrastructure sectors most of which are not employment-maximizing. Albeit limited in scope, rural road maintenance projects may employ 200,000 to 500,000 annualized direct jobs for every U.S. 1 billion dollars spent. The paper also describes the potential risks to effective infrastructure investment in an environment of crisis including sorting and planning contradictions, delayed implementation and impact, affordability, and corruption.
Publication(World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2014-09) Andres, Luis ; Biller, Dan ; Herrera Dappe, MatiasIf the South Asia region hopes to meet its development goals and not risk slowing down or even halting growth, poverty alleviation, and shared prosperity, it is essential to make closing its huge infrastructure gap a priority. Identifying and addressing gaps in the data on expenditure, access, and quality are crucial to ensuring that governments make efficient, practical, and effective infrastructure development choices. This study addresses this knowledge gap by focusing on the current status of infrastructure sectors and geographical disparities, real levels of investment and private sector participation, deficits and proper targets for the future, and bottlenecks to expansion. The findings show that the South Asia region needs to invest between US$1.7 trillion and US$2.5 trillion (at current prices) to close its infrastructure gap. If investments are spread evenly over the years until 2020, the region needs to invest between 6.6 and 9.9 percent of 2010 gross domestic product per year, an estimated increase of up to 3 percentage points from the 6.9 percent of gross domestic product invested in infrastructure by countries in the region in 2009. Given the enormous size of the region's infrastructure deficiencies, it will need a mix of investment in infrastructure stock and supportive reforms to close its infrastructure gap. One major challenge will be prioritizing investment needs. Another will be choosing optimal forms of service provision, including the private sector's role, and the decentralization of administrative functions and powers.
Publication(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015-10) Andres, Luis ; Biller, Dan ; Herrera Dappe, MatiasPolicy makers are often confronted with a myriad of factors in the investment decision-making process. This issue is particularly acute in infrastructure investment decisions, as these often involve significant financial resources and lock-in technologies. In regions and countries where the infrastructure access gap is large and pubic budgets severely constrained, the importance of considering the different facets of the decision-making process becomes even more relevant. This paper discusses the trade-offs policy makers confront when attempting to prioritize infrastructure investments, in particular with regard to economic growth and welfare, and proposes a methodological framework for prioritizing infrastructure projects and portfolios that holistically equates such trade-offs, among others. The analysis suggests that it is not desirable to have a single methodology, providing a single ranking of infrastructure investments, because of the complexities of infrastructure investments. Rather, a multidisciplinary approach should be taken. Decision makers will also need to account for factors that are often not easily measured. While having techniques that enable logical frameworks in the decision-making process of establishing priorities is highly desirable, they are no substitute for consensus building and political negotiations.
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Regulatory Governance and Sector Performance : Methodology and Evaluation for Electricity Distribution in Latin America(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2008-01) Andres, Luis ; Guasch, José Luis ; Lopez Azumendi, SebastiánThis paper contributes to the literature that explores the link between regulatory governance and sector performance. The paper develops an index of regulatory governance and estimates its impact on sector performance, showing that indeed regulation and its governance matter. The authors use two unique databases: (i) the World Bank Performance Database, which contains detailed annual data for 250 private and public electricity companies in Latin America and the Caribbean; and (ii) the Electricity Regulatory Governance Database, which contains data on several aspects of the governance of electricity agencies in the region. The authors run different models to explain the impacts of change in ownership and different characteristics of the regulatory agency on the performance of the utilities. The results suggest that the mere existence of a regulatory agency, regardless of the utilities' ownership, has a significant impact on performance. Furthermore, after controlling for the existence of a regulatory agency, the ownership dummies are still significant and with the expected signs. The authors propose an experience measure in order to identify the gradual impact of the regulatory agency on utility performance. The results confirm this hypothesis. In addition, the paper explores two different measures of governance, an aggregate measure of regulatory governance, and an index based on principal components, including autonomy, transparency, and accountability. The findings show that the governance of regulatory agencies matters and has significant effects on performance.