Person:
Gertler, Paul Jerome

Loading...
Profile Picture
Author Name Variants
Fields of Specialization
Impact evaluation, Health economics
Degrees
External Links
Externally Hosted Work
Contact Information
Last updated: January 31, 2023
Biography
Paul Gertler is the Li Ka Shing Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley where he holds appointments in the Haas School of Business and the School of Public Health. He is also the Scientific Director of the UC Center for Effective Global Action. Dr. Gertler is an internationally recognized expert in impact evaluation. Dr. Gertler was Chief Economist of the Human Development Network of the World Bank from 2004-2007 and the Founding Chair of the Board of Directors of the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) from 2009-2012.  At the World Bank he led an effort to institutionalize and scale up impact evaluation for learning what works in human development. He is the author of the bestselling textbook Applied Impact Evaluation published by the World Bank Press. He has been a Principal Investigator on a large number of at-scale multi-site impact evaluations including Mexico’s CCT program, PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES, and Rwanda’s Health Care Pay-for-Performance scheme. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Wisconsin and prior to UC Berkeley has held academic appointments at Harvard, RAND, and SUNY Stony Brook.
Citations 490 Scopus

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Publication
    Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2013-02) Bautista-Arredondo, Sergio; de Walque, Damien; Kwan, Ada; Gertler, Paul J.; de Dieu Bizimana, Jean; Binagwaho, Agnès; Vermeersch, Christel; Condo, Jeanine
    Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a paying for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. This study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing and counseling and using data from a prospective quasi-experimental design. The study finds a positive impact of paying for performance with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. This positive impact is stronger for married individuals: 10.2 percentage points. The results also indicate larger impacts of paying for performance on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples (14.7 percentage point increase) in which only one of the partners is HIV positive.
  • Publication
    Paying Primary Health Care Centers for Performance in Rwanda
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010-01) Basinga, Paulin; Gertler, Paul J.; Soucat, Agnes L.B.; Binagwaho, Agnes; Soucat, Agnes L.B.; Sturdy, Jennifer R.; Vermeersch, Christel M.J.
    Paying for performance (P4P) provides financial incentives for providers to increase the use and quality of care. P4P can affect health care by providing incentives for providers to put more effort into specific activities, and by increasing the amount of resources available to finance the delivery of services. This paper evaluates the impact of P4P on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery, and child preventive care using data produced from a prospective quasi-experimental evaluation nested into the national rollout of P4P in Rwanda. Treatment facilities were enrolled in the P4P scheme in 2006 and comparison facilities were enrolled two years later. The incentive effect is isolated from the resource effect by increasing comparison facilities' input-based budgets by the average P4P payments to the treatment facilities. The data were collected from 166 facilities and a random sample of 2158 households. P4P had a large and significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care. The authors find no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. P4P had the greatest effect on those services that had the highest payment rates and needed the lowest provider effort. P4P financial performance incentives can improve both the use of and the quality of health services. Because the analysis isolates the incentive effect from the resource effect in P4P, the results indicate that an equal amount of financial resources without the incentives would not have achieved the same gain in outcomes.
  • Publication
    Using Provider Performance Incentives to Increase HIV Testing and Counseling Services in Rwanda
    (Elsevier, 2014-12-12) de Walque, Damien; Gertler, Paul J.; de Dieu Bizimana, Jean; Vermeersch, Christel; Condo, Jeanine
    Paying for performance provides financial rewards to medical care providers for improvements in performance measured by utilization and quality of care indicators. In 2006, Rwanda began a pay for performance scheme to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. Using a prospective quasi-experimental design, this study examines the scheme's impact on individual and couples HIV testing. We find a positive impact of pay for performance on HIV testing among married individuals (10.2 percentage points increase). Paying for performance also increased testing by both partners by 14.7 percentage point among discordant couples in which only one of the partners is an AIDS patient.