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Irwin, Timothy Cressey

Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund
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Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund
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Last updated January 31, 2023
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Tim Irwin worked at the World Bank from 1995 to 2008, on among other things the regulation of utilities and the link between public financial management and privately financed infrastructure projects.

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 8 of 8
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    Avoiding Customer and Taxpayer Bailouts in Private Infrastructure Projects: Policy toward Leverage, Risk Allocation, and Bankruptcy
    (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-04) Ehrhardt, David ; Irwin, Timothy
    Many private infrastructure projects mix regulation that subjects the private company to considerable risk, a government or regulator that is reluctant to see the company go bankrupt, and high leverage on the part of the company. If all goes well, equityholders make a profit, debtholders are repaid, customers pay no more than they expected, and the government is not called on to bail the company out. If all goes badly enough, however, the prospect of bankruptcy will loom. Unwilling to see the company go bankrupt, however, the regulator will have to permit an unscheduled price increase, or the government will have to inject taxpayers' money into the firm. In other words, the combination means customers and taxpayers bear more risk than would appear from the regulations governing the private infrastructure project. The authors examine how these problems have played out in five cases. Then they describe how governments and regulators can quantify the extent of the problems and, using option-pricing techniques, value the customer and taxpayer guarantees involved. Finally, the authors analyze three options for mitigating the problem: making bankruptcy a more credible threat, limiting the private operator's leverage, and reducing the private operator's exposure to risk. The authors conclude that appropriate policy depends on the tax system, the feasibility of enforcing bankruptcy, and the benefits of risk transfer from taxpayer to the private sector.
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    Infrastructure for Poor People : Public Policy for Private Provision
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003) Brook, Penelope J. ; Irwin, Timothy C. ; Brook, Penelope J. ; Irwin, Timothy C.
    The chapters in this book examine the data on infrastructure and the poor in developing countries and consider how policies centered on private provision can address their needs. Many of the chapters focus on the extent to which the poor have access to infrastructure services of reasonable quality, for example, to water that is safe to drink, to a reliable source of electricity, and to a nearby telephone. Access to such services is, of course, not the only infrastructure issue that matters to the poor; the poor who already have access to modern services care, for instance, about the price and reliability of those services. However, in most developing countries access is the key issue. In these countries most of the poor have no access to standard infrastructure services provided by utilities. Instead they often pay high prices for lower-quality substitutes: they might buy water by the bucket from a private vendor and use candles instead of electricity for lighting. They would rarely make a telephone call. The lack of ready access to good basic infrastructure services can directly reduce the well-being of the poor.
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    Public Money for Private Infrastructure : Deciding When to Offer Guarantees, Output-based Subsidies, and Other Fiscal Support
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003-08) Irwin, Timothy
    When governments seek private investment in infrastructure projects, they usually find themselves asked to provide grants, guarantees, or other forms of fiscal support. Often they prefer to provide support in ways that limit immediate cash expenditure but sometimes generate large costs later. Seeking to provide support without any immediate spending of cash, for example, governments often agree to shoulder project risks and sometimes encounter fiscal problems later. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s in Spain, the government was obliged to pay $2.7 billion when the exchange-rate guarantees it had given private toll roads were called (Gomez-Ibanez 1993). More recently, the Indonesian government agreed to pay $260 million as a result of its agreements, through the electricity company it owns, to bear demand and foreign-exchange risks in private power projects. Yet even when governments have chosen to provide cash subsidies they have not always achieved their apparent goals: for example, over 80 percent of the Honduran government's "lifeline" electricity subsidies go to customers who aren't poor (Wodon et al. 2003). In still other cases, governments' decisions not to provide support may have caused problems.
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    Walking Up the Down Escalator : Public Investment and Fiscal Stability
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-03) Easterly, William ; Irwin, Timothy ; Servén, Luis
    Fiscal adjustment becomes like walking up the down escalator when growth-promoting spending is cut so much as to lower growth and thus the present value of future tax revenues to a degree that more than offsets the improvement in the cash deficit. Although short-term cash flows matter, a preponderant focus on them encourages governments to invest too little. Cash flow targets also encourage governments to shift investment spending off budget, by seeking private investment in public projects-irrespective of its real fiscal or economic benefits. To evade the action of cash flow targets, some have suggested excluding from their scope certain investments (such as those undertaken by public enterprises deemed commercial or financed by multilaterals). These stopgap remedies might sometimes help protect investment, but they do not provide a satisfactory solution to the underlying problem. Governments can more effectively reduce the biases created by the focus on short-term cash flows by developing indicators of the long-term fiscal effects of their decisions, including accounting and economic measures of net worth, and where appropriate including such measures in fiscal targets or even fiscal rules, replacing the exclusive focus on liquidity and debt.
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    Price Structures, Cross-Subsidies, and Competition in Infrastructure
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 1997-02) Irwin, Timothy
    Governments often regulate not only the overall level of prices charged by infrastructure firms but also the relationship between prices for different services or customers. Prices can differ among different types of customers, even when no customers can be said to be subsidizing another, for example, when one asset is used to supply a service to two or more groups of customers. One of the hurdles that governments must overcome in introducing competition in infrastructure is dealing with the social and political implications of changing price structures, or rate rebalancing. Generally, competition should reduce overall costs in the sector, lessening the need to compensate groups hurt by price increases resulting from rate rebalancing. But if the efficiency gains are not enough to offset the price increases for some groups and the government is worried about the political and social costs of rate balancing, it has three basic options: 1) preserving the old price structure; 2) funding price subsidies from general tax revenue rather than from transfers within the firm or industry; and 3) relying on social safety nets rather than price subsidies. Whichever option a government chooses should stand up against the following four tests: 1) Do subsidies reach the people the government most wants to support? 2) are the costs clear and measurable? 3) Are the administrative costs as low as possible? 4) Is the revenue raised from the source that entails the least cost to the economy? This Note looks at the three options in practice and reviews how they measure up against the four criteria. It concludes that governments should eliminate price subsidies if politically feasible. But even if they cannot, they can still reap the benefits of competition.
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    Estimating the Fiscal Risks and Costs of Output-Based Payments : An Overview
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-07) Boyle, Glenn ; Irwin, Timothy
    Output-based payments are an important tool of government policy. Sometimes governments offer "output-based aid" to subsidize services sold to households. Because output-based payments are tied to the delivery of outputs, they have an obvious advantage over input-based payments. In agreeing to make such payments, however, governments assume a liability not unlike that created by taking on debt. Moreover, in some cases the payment amounts are subject to considerable uncertainty. As a result governments may benefit from estimating both the costs of these commitments, and the new fiscal risks they create-and comparing these costs and risks with those of alternative policies. Output-based payments come in many forms, as do the risks they present. However, measuring the risks and costs of output-based schemes is feasible but also, inevitably, mathematical. Quantifying risk necessarily involves some knowledge, and application of probability and statistics; estimating the cost of uncertain payments that occur at different points in time, requires asset pricing techniques from modern finance theory. Nevertheless, most of the important issues are conceptual, rather than technical.
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    Techniques for Estimating the Fiscal Costs and Risks of Long-Term Output-Based Payments
    (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005-06) Boyle, Glenn ; Irwin, Timothy
    Long-term commitments to make output-based payments for infrastructure can encourage private investors to provide socially valuable services. Making good decisions about such commitments is difficult, however, unless the government understands the fiscal costs and risks of possible commitments. Considering voucher schemes, shadow tolls, availability payments, and access, connection, and consumption subsidies, this paper considers measures of the fiscal risks of such commitments, including the excess-payment probability and cash-flow-at-risk. Then it illustrates techniques, based on modern finance theory, for valuing payment commitments by taking account of the timing of payments and their risk characteristics. Although the paper is inevitably mathematical, it focuses on practical applications and shows how the techniques can be implemented in spreadsheets.
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    Public-Private Partnerships in the New EU Member States
    (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007) Budina, Nina ; Polackova Brixi, Hana ; Irwin, Timothy
    Public-private partnerships (PPPs) operate at the boundary of the public and private sectors, being neither fully public nor fully private. PPPs are defined in this paper as privately financed infrastructure projects in which a private firm either: (i) sells its services to the government; or (ii) sells its services to third parties with significant fiscal support in the form of guarantees. Despite these common elements of PPPs across sectors, there are differences in the type of arrangements that are typical in each sector. This study focuses on whether and when using PPPs can create fiscal space for additional infrastructure investments in the EU8. In doing so, the paper will examine the fiscal risks of PPPs and the role of fiscal institutions in this regard, including how these affect the use and design of PPPs and thus the potential for creating fiscal space while promoting investment in infrastructure. Chapter 2 distinguishes the illusory from the real fiscal effects of PPPs. Chapter 3 relates the extent to which PPPs reduce fiscal costs to the nature of fiscal institutions. Chapter 4 explains how fiscal institutions can be improved to encourage fiscal prudence in the use and design of PPPs. Chapter 5 concludes.