Person:
Chukwuma, Adanna
Author Name Variants
Fields of Specialization
HEALTH SYSTEM,
HEALTH FINANCING,
SERVICE DELIVERY,
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
ARMENIA,
RUSSIA
Degrees
ORCID
External Links
Departments
World Bank Health, Nutrition, and Population Global Practice
Externally Hosted Work
Contact Information
Last updated
September 14, 2023
Biography
Adanna is a Senior Health Specialist in the Health, Nutrition, and Population Global Practice, where she leads the design, implementation, and evaluation of investment operations. She has over ten years of experience advising national reforms to improve access to high-quality health care, through service delivery organization, strategic purchasing, revenue mobilization, and demand generation, including in Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, India, Moldova, Tajikistan, the South Caucasus Countries, and Romania. She has published on health care financing, access, and quality in peer-reviewed journals, including the Bulletin of the World Health Organization and Social Science and Medicine. Adanna obtained a medical degree from the University of Nigeria, a Master of Science in Global Health from the University of Oxford, and a Doctor of Science in Health Systems from Harvard University.
Publication Search Results
1 - 4 of 4
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Publication
Challenges and Opportunities for Purchasing High-Quality Health Care: Lessons from Armenia
(Taylor and Francis, 2021-04-29)This paper examines how purchasing decisions in Armenia may contribute to barriers in using high-quality health care, particularly for non-communicable diseases, drawing on a review of the literature and key informant interviews. The paper adapts the strategic health purchasing progress framework, to examine how characteristics of purchasing, the health system, and the political, administrative, and macro-fiscal environment may have facilitated or hindered the attainment of service delivery goals. We conclude with six lessons for reforms aimed at improving the coverage and quality of health care in Armenia. First, increasing the political priority of access to quality of health care is a pre-requisite to advancing reforms to address these issues. Second, improved purchasing governance in Armenia will require a purchaser that can make decisions without political interference, with appropriate accountability mechanisms, improvements in technical capacity, and the routine use of data systems. Third, there is a need for the regulatory framework to ensure that revisions of the benefits package contribute to reducing the disease burden and improving access to care. Fourth, regulations governing quality-related criteria for provider selection should be enforced and include considerations for process quality. Fifth, payment incentives should be revised to encourage an increase in the supply of primary health care, reduce bypassing for hospital care, and improve the quality of services. Sixth, the potential of purchasing to improve service delivery will be dependent on increased pre-paid and pooled funds and better governance of the quality of care. -
Publication
Invitations and Incentives: A Qualitative Study of Behavioral Nudges for Primary Care Screenings in Armenia
(Springer Nature, 2020-12)Non-communicable diseases account for a growing proportion of deaths in Armenia, which require early detection to achieve disease control and prevent complications. To increase rates of screening, demand-side interventions of personalized invitations, descriptive social norms, labeled cash transfers, and conditional cash transfers were tested in a field experiment. Our complementary qualitative study explores factors leading to the decision to attend screening and following through with that decision, and experiences with different intervention components. An individual’s decision to screen depends on 1) the perceived need for screening based on how they value their own health and perceive hypertension and diabetes as a harmful but manageable condition, and 2) the perceived utility of a facility-based screening, and whether screening will provide useful information on disease status or care management and is socially acceptable. Following through with the decision to screen depends on their knowledge of and ability to attend screenings, as well as any external motivators such as an invitation or financial incentive. Personalized invitations from physicians can prompt individuals to reconsider their need for screening and can, along with financial incentives, motivate individuals to follow through with the decision to screen. The effect of descriptive social norms in invitations should be further studied. Efforts to increase preventive screenings as an entry point into primary care in Armenia may benefit from implementation of tailored messages and financial incentives. -
Publication
Generating Political Priority for Primary Health Care Reform in Romania
(Taylor and Francis, 2021-08-17)This paper examines how political priority was generated for comprehensive reforms to address inequitable access to high-quality primary health care (PHC) in Romania. We apply John Kingdon’s model of political agenda setting to explore how the convergence of problems, solutions, and political developments culminated in the adoption of a government program that included critical PHC reforms and approval of a results-based funding instrument for implementation. We draw on a review of the gray and peer-reviewed literature and stakeholder consultations, and use content analysis to identify themes organized in line with the dimensions of Kingdon’s model. We conclude this paper with three lessons that may be relevant for generating political priority for PHC reforms in other contexts. First, national PHC reforms are likely to be prioritized when there is political alignment of health reforms with the broader political agenda. Second, the availability of technically sound and feasible policy proposals makes it possible to seize the political opportunity when the window opens. Third, partners’ coordinated technical and financial support for neglected issues can serve to raise their priority on the political agenda. -
Publication
Provider Payment Reforms for Improved Primary Health Care in Romania
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021-08)Romania faces high levels of amenable mortality reflecting, in part, the relatively low utilization rates of high-quality primary health care (PHC), particularly for non-communicable disease (NCD) prevention and treatment. Provider payment mechanisms do not reward the high-quality care provision and may incentivize bypassing of PHC for hospitals, exacerbating challenges presented by physical, financial, and social barriers to accessing essential care. This paper assesses provider payment mechanisms at the PHC level, by examining their design features and implementation arrangements, and exploring their implications for PHC performance in terms of access and quality of care. The authors conclude with policy recommendations to address the constraints identified. To increase the supply of preventative care and case management, the authors recommend that volume thresholds for fee-for-service payments reflect both the number of enrollees and physicians in a practice; laboratory tests required for case management be reduced in scope and their costs be reimbursed; and the law on health care reform be amended to enable the introduction of new payment mechanisms, such as performance-based payments. To expand the scope of PHC and strengthen care coordination with hospitals, periodic reviews by physician commissions should aim to expand the scope of PHC care in line with provisions in other European Union (EU) countries for ambulatory-care sensitive conditions; capitation payments should be adjusted for gender and historical service use to reduce incentive for over-referrals; and payment mechanisms that reward coordination of care, including bundled payments, should be introduced. To establish an enabling environment for provider payment reforms, health information systems should be strengthened by unifying diagnosis coding, establishing quality standards, and ensuring referral module functionality; payment reforms should be informed by extensive consultations with providers at all service delivery levels; and PHC spending should be increased to support higher reimbursement levels for providers and match expenditure levels in high-performing EU health systems.