Person:
Zaki, Chahir
Author Name Variants
Fields of Specialization
international economics; trade policy; trade and finance; trade and labor market; gravity models; computable general equilibrium models
Degrees
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Contact Information
Last updated
January 31, 2023
Biography
Chahir Zaki is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University (Egypt) and a part-time Economist at the Economic Research Forum (Egypt). He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics (France). He has been also working as a consultant for the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the International Trade Centre and the CEPII (Centre des Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales). His fields of specialization are mainly international economics, trade policy issues, trade and finance, trade and labor market issues, gravity models and computable general equilibrium models. Regionally, his main research is on Egypt and MENA countries. Zaki has authored several refereed research papers in high quality economic journal such as
Economic Modeling, International Economic Journal, International Trade Journal, Applied Economics and the Journal of North African Studies.
Publication Search Results
1 - 4 of 4
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Publication
Egypt Economic Monitoring Note, Fall 2012
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-09)Egypt is in a precarious economic situation reflecting a difficult external environment, political uncertainty, and weak economic policies. International reserves have been declining rapidly to a low level, driven by a sizeable current account deficit and large capital outflows. Large spending increases are driving up the fiscal deficit to unsustainable levels, with high real interest rates and weak growth adding to the mounting debt burden. And weak growth is fueling social pressures. Strong financial support from Arab bilateral donors has been holding the country afloat so far, but the leaking cannot continue much longer and the authorities have been forced to seek support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors. Egypt is in a precarious economic situation reflecting a difficult external environment, political uncertainty, and weak economic policies. International reserves have been declining rapidly to a low level, driven by a sizeable current account deficit and large capital outflows. Large spending increases are driving up the fiscal deficit to unsustainable levels, with high real interest rates and weak growth adding to the mounting debt burden. And weak growth is fueling social pressures. Strong financial support from Arab bilateral donors has been holding the country afloat so far, but the leaking cannot continue much longer and the authorities have been forced to seek support from the IMF and other donors. -
Publication
Why Don’t Banks Lend to Egypt’s Private Sector?
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2012-06)Bank credit to Egypt's private sector decreased over the last decade, despite a recapitalized banking system and high rates of economic growth. Recent macro-economic turmoil has reinforced the trend. This paper explains the decrease based on credit supply and demand considerations by 1) presenting stylized facts regarding the evolution of the banks' sources and fund use in 2005 to 2011, noting two different cycles of external capital flows, and 2) estimating private credit supply and demand equations using quarterly data from 1998 to 2011. The system of simultaneous equations is estimated both assuming continuous market clearing and allowing for transitory price rigidity entailing market disequilibrium. The main results are robust to the market clearing assumption. During the global financial crisis, a significant capital outflow stalled bank deposit growth, which in turn affected the private sector's credit supply. At the same time, the banking sector increased credit to the government. Both factors reduced the private sector's credit supply during the period under study. After the trough of the global crisis, capital flowed back into Egypt and deposit growth stopped being a drag on the supply side, but bank credit to the government continued to drive the decrease in the private sector's credit supply. Beginning in the final quarter of 2010, capital flows reversed in tandem with global capital markets, and in January 2011 the popular uprising that ousted President Hosni Mubarak added an Egypt-specific shock that accentuated the outflow. Lending capacity dragged again, accounting for 10 percent of the estimated fall in private credit. Credit to the government continued to drain resources, accounting for 70 - 80 percent of the estimated total decline. Reduced economic activity contributed around 15 percent of the total fall in credit. The relative importance of these factors contrasts with that of the preceding capital inflow period, when credit to the government accounted for 54 percent of the estimated fall, while demand factors accounted for a similar percentage. -
Publication
The External Wealth of Arab Nations: Structure, Trends, and Policy Implications
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020-01)The paper makes two main contributions. First, it analyzes net foreign assets and liabilities in selected Arab countries over the past two decades, emphasizing the relative significance of direct versus portfolio investment. It distinguishes between foreign direct investment, portfolio equity investment, official reserves, and external debt. Second, the paper examines the effects of policy variables that affect the accumulation of net foreign assets and its components, analyzing how the existence of a sovereign wealth fund, the country's exchange rate regime, and the development of its financial system affect its net foreign assets. The main findings show that the presence of a sovereign wealth fund is positively and statistically significantly associated with foreign direct investment in Arab countries. Financial development (defined as credit to the private sector as a percentage of gross domestic product) is also statistically significant across various regressions. The more financially developed a country is, the more it should invest in riskier assets, such as portfolio assets. But Arab investors are more risk averse than investors elsewhere. Oil-exporting countries tend to invest more in debt assets than in portfolio assets. For oil-importing countries, financial development is the most important determinant of foreign direct investment. -
Publication
Why Don't Banks Lend to Egypt's Private Sector?
(Elsevier, 2013-04-09)Bank credit to Egypt's private sector decreased over the last decade, despite a recapitalized banking system and high rates of economic growth. Recent macro-economic turmoil has reinforced the trend. This paper explains the decrease based on credit supply and demand considerations by 1) presenting stylized facts regarding the evolution of the banks' sources and fund use in 2005 to 2011, noting two different cycles of external capital flows, and 2) estimating private credit supply and demand equations using quarterly data from 1998 to 2011. The system of simultaneous equations is estimated both assuming continuous market clearing and allowing for transitory price rigidity entailing market disequilibrium. The main results are robust to the market clearing assumption. During the global financial crisis, a significant capital outflow stalled bank deposit growth, which in turn affected the private sector's credit supply. At the same time, the banking sector increased credit to the government. Both factors reduced the private sector's credit supply during the period under study. After the trough of the global crisis, capital flowed back into Egypt and deposit growth stopped being a drag on the supply side, but bank credit to the government continued to drive the decrease in the private sector's credit supply. Beginning in the final quarter of 2010, capital flows reversed in tandem with global capital markets, and in January 2011 the popular uprising that ousted President Hosni Mubarak added an Egypt-specific shock that accentuated the outflow. Lending capacity dragged again, accounting for 10% of the estimated fall in private credit. Credit to the government continued to drain resources, accounting for 70–80% of the estimated total decline. Reduced economic activity contributed around 15% of the total fall in credit. The relative importance of these factors contrasts with that of the preceding capital inflow period, when credit to the government accounted for 54% of the estimated fall, while demand factors accounted for a similar percentage.