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Libya Economic Monitor, Fall 2024: Stabilizing Growth and Boosting Productivity
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025-01-06) World Bank
Libya’s economic outlook relies heavily on the oil and gas sector, which constitutes a significant portion of its GDP, government revenue, and exports. With oil production expected to average 1.1 mbpd in 2024, GDP is anticipated to shrink by 2.7 percent this year. As oil output recovers in 2025 and 2026, reaching 1.2 and 1.3 mbpd, respectively; GDP growth is expected to rebound to 9.6 percent and 8.4 percent in 2026. Meanwhile, non-oil GDP growth is estimated to grow by 1.8 percent in 2024 supported by private and public consumption, and average around 9 percent during 2025–2026 to reflect strong recovery in oil exports. Despite the fall in oil revenues in 2024, both the fiscal and external balances surpluses are expected to widen to 1.7 and 4.1 percent of GDP, respectively, due to contractionary public and capital spending and falling imports. The outlook is subject to significant downside, as well as upside risks. The recent CBL crisis highlights the fragility of the political situation which had a direct short-term impact on the economy. Prospects for political stability and consensus would be a major upside for the Libyan economy and citizens. In the medium term, the main challenge remains economic diversification and reducing dependence on hydrocarbons. Lower oil prices not only reduce government revenues but would also add fiscal burden through higher cost of subsidies. Intensification of regional conflicts in the Middle East may disrupt trade, FDI, and financial flows but may also create revenue windfalls for Libya through higher oil prices. Extreme climate events may cause loss of human lives, severe damage to infrastructure, lower growth, and financial instability. The Special Focus Section “Stabilizing Growth and Boosting Productivity” provides an overview of Libya’s past drivers of economic growth and productivity trends. For over a decade now, the conflictual transition has had a devastating impact on the Libyan economy, estimated at US$600 billion in constant 2015 dollars. In 2023, Libya’s GDP absent the conflict is estimated to be 74 percent higher than the realized GDP. The high reliance on the oil sector, weak diversification, low and falling productivity owing to inefficient allocation of labor and capital, and deteriorating health and education quality are some of the key challenges that are holding back Libya’s long term prosperity. In the short-term, priorities should be enhanced security, governance and stability. With GNI per capita at $7,570 (2023), Libya is classified as an upper-middle-income country, however, it falls behind its peers on most development indicators. With the global transition to cleaner and greener energy, Libya’s growth strategy should focus on promoting non-oil sectors with high value-added job opportunities to maintain its upper-middle-income status. This could be achieved by promoting private sector-led growth.
Algeria Economic Update, Spring 2024: Investing in Data for Diversified Growth
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2024-05-23) World Bank
Algeria’s growth was robust in 2023, and inflation started to decelerate. GDP growth accelerated to 4.1 percent, supported by hydrocarbon sector growth, as natural gas production compensated for successive crude oil production quota cuts. Non-extractive GDP growth reached 3.7 percent as investment growth accelerated, supported by a marked recovery in public investment, and leading to a surge in imports. Private consumption remained dynamic, stimulated by growing public sector wages, and pulling sectors serving households. Inflation remained at 9.3 percent over 2023 but moderated to 5.0 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2024, amidst a sustained decline in fresh food prices, a strong dinar, and lower import prices. Continuing to strengthen data systems would support investment and public policymaking. In 2023 and 2024, digitalization efforts accelerated, as did efforts from the Bank of Algeria and ONS to strengthen their publications, with notably the first GDP rebasing. The alternative data sources used in this report, such as satellite data on crop development or nighttime lights, represent a useful complement to conventional economic and social statistics. Yet, improving the availability, granularity, and timeliness of official economic data, most notably relating to activity, investment, and the labor market, remains of utmost importance. Enhanced data systems would support the authorities’ pivot towards performance-based budgeting and support evidence-based policymaking. They would also provide accurate and exhaustive economic data to researchers and analysts, potential domestic and international investors, alleviating economic uncertainty and fostering investment.
Lebanon Economic Monitor, Fall 2021: The Great Denial
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2022-01-24) World Bank
The scale and scope of Lebanon’s deliberate depression are leading to the disintegration of key pillars of Lebanon’s post-civil war political economy. Monetary and financial turmoil along with surging inflation continue to drive crisis conditions. Public finances improved in 2021 as spending collapsed faster than revenue. Lebanon urgently needs to adopt and implement a credible, comprehensive, equitable reform plan if it is to avoid a complete destruction of its social and economic networks and immediately stop irreversible loss of human capital.
Tunisia Economic Monitor, Winter 2021: Economic Reforms to Navigate Out of the Crisis
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2022-01-20) World Bank
The Economic Monitor examines four possible factors behind Tunisia’s slow recovery. First, the drop in mobility related to the pandemic may have been more harmful in Tunisia. However, mobility in Tunisia has dropped to a similar extent as other countries and it has now returned to pre-pandemic levels following the acceleration in the vaccination campaign since July. If anything, the mobility drop in Tunisia has resulted in a lower reduction in economic activity than in comparator countries as Algeria and Egypt. Second, it could be that the level of public support to the ailing firms and households may have been particularly low. However, at 2.3 percent of GDP, the Covid-19 stimulus package in 2020 was in the same ballpark as other comparators in the region. Third, the structure of the Tunisian economy, particularly its reliance on tourism, may have exposed it to the negative demand shock more than other countries. Indeed hotels, cafe and restaurant and transport are the sectors which have contracted the most since the start of the pandemic. The losses of these sectors explain a significant portion of the negative effects of the crisis in Tunisia, although they do not fully account for such slow recovery.
Mobilizing the Middle East and North Africa Diaspora for Economic Integration and Entrepreneurship
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016-12) Plaza, Sonia; Malouche, Mariem Mezghenni; Salsac, Fanny
This paper advocates for the need to rally the MENA professional and skilled diaspora. It discusses the findings of a unique outreach exercise to the MENA diaspora and provides policy recommendations. First, the paper highlights the linkages between the diaspora and trade, investment, and knowledge transfer based on the literature and concrete examples. Second, it describes the outreach and the profile of the diaspora members surveyed. Third, it presents the main findings of the survey of the MENA diaspora in four areas: (i) overall engagement, (ii) appetite for investment, (iii) trade, and (iv) the role of institutions. The paper concludes with policy recommendations.
Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee
(Washington, DC, 2015-09-30) World Bank
Palestinians are getting poorer on average for the third year in a row. As evidenced in previous World Bank reports, the competitiveness of the Palestinian economy has been progressively eroding since the signing of the Oslo accords, in particular its industry and agriculture. Even though donor aid had increased government-funded services and fueled consumption-driven growth during 2007 to 2011, this growth model has proved unsustainable. Donor support has significantly declined in recent years and, in any case, aid cannot sustainably make up for inadequate private investment. Thus, growth has started to slow since 2012 and the Palestinian economy contracted in 2014 following the Gaza war. In early 2015, GDP was still lower than it was a year ago. Due to population growth, real GDP per capita has been shrinking since 2013. Unemployment remains high, particularly amongst Gaza’s youth where it exceeds 60 percent, and 25 percent of Palestinians currently live in poverty. Against the backdrop of weak economic growth, reduced donor aid, and temporary suspension of revenue payments by the Government of Israel (GoI), the Palestinian Authority’s reform efforts have not been able to prevent another year with a financing gap. The persistence of this situation could potentially lead to political and social unrest. In short, the status quo is not sustainable and downside risks of further conflict and social unrest are high.