Insolvency Assessment

12 items available

Permanent URI for this collection

https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7801

Items in this collection

Now showing 1 - 10 of 12

Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, 2021 Edition
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021-04-22) World Bank
Effective creditor and debtor rights and insolvency systems are an important element of financial system stability. The World Bank Group accordingly has been working with partner organizations to develop principles for insolvency and creditor and debtor rights systems. The principles for effective insolvency and creditor and debtor regimes are a distillation of international best practice on design aspects of these systems, emphasizing contextual, integrated solutions and the policy choices involved in developing those solutions. The principles have been designed as a broad-spectrum assessment tool to assist countries in their efforts to evaluate and improve core aspects of their commercial law systems that are fundamental to a sound investment climate, and to promote commerce and economic growth. Efficient, reliable, and transparent creditor and debtor regimes and insolvency systems are of key importance for the reallocation of productive resources in the corporate sector, for investor confidence, and for forward-looking corporate restructuring.
A Toolkit for Out-of-Court Workouts
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2017-11) World Bank Group
A Toolkit for Out-of-Court Workouts was created to achieve two objectives: (1) to provide policy makers with tools to develop a corporate restructuring framework and culture in their country; and (2) to help stakeholders implement informal corporate restructuring principles to try to rescue failing enterprises. It is accordingly aimed primarily at policy makers, financial institutions, and insolvency representatives, as well as enterprises. The Toolkit generally examines different models for restructuring, in the understanding that there is no such thing as a "one size fits all" approach, and countries have the ability to develop flexible and varied solutions to meet their specific financial sector needs. Specifically, the focus of the Toolkit is on workouts, which for the purposes of this publication is taken to mean two types of restructuring models: (1) those that involve no judicial involvement (i.e., that are purely out-of-court mechanisms [OCWs]); and (2) those that involve some institutional or judicial involvement (hybrid procedures). Focusing on these models is designed to provide stakeholders with a broader understanding of restructuring and the varied models that different countries are implementing. Included in the Toolkit are sample documents typically used in a workout. These are included only to illustrate certain practicalities and considerations in conducting a workout, and should not be used without legal advice in the jurisdiction of their intended use.
Bulgaria Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes: Insolvency and Creditor-Debtor Regimes
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2016-06) World Bank Group
The World Bank Group assessed the insolvency and creditor/debtor regimes (‘ICR’) of Bulgaria pursuant to the joint IMF/World Bank initiative on the observance of standards and codes (‘ROSC’). The assessment has been undertaken on the basis of the ICR Standard. The conclusions in this assessment are based on a review of the legislation, and other regulations and procedures relevant to bankruptcy, restructuring, the creation and enforcement of pledges and other security interests over immovable and movable property, and debt enforcement. The Bulgarian legal framework governing creditor/debtor relationships provides several means for protecting credit and minimizing the risks of non-performance and default. However, the laws and institutions governing security rights over both immovable and movable assets need improvement. The bankruptcy legislation is rather comprehensive but in practice insolvency proceedings are not working effectively. This report tries to contribute to the authorities’ efforts aimed at continuing and further improving the laws and institutions related to credit relationships.
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, Revised 2015
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015-05-01) World Bank
Effective creditor/debtor rights and insolvency systems are an important element of financial system stability. The World Bank Group accordingly has been working with partner organizations to develop principles for insolvency and creditor/debtor rights systems. The Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Rights Systems (the Principles) are a distillation of international best practice on design aspects of these systems, emphasizing contextual, integrated solutions and the policy choices involved in developing those solutions.Based on the experience gained from the use of the Principles, and following extensive consultations, the publication has been thoroughly reviewed and updated in 2005, 2011 and 2015. The revised Principles contained in this document have benefited from wide consultation and, more importantly, from the practical experience of using them in the context of the Bank’s assessment and operational work.
Pakistan - Strengthening the Insolvency Regime : Non-Lending Technical Assistance Final Report
(Washington, DC, 2011-06) World Bank
The importance of a modern, binding and effective insolvency regime is undeniable. Nearly 90 countries around the world have reformed their bankruptcy codes since Second World War, and over half of them have done so during the last decade. One of the key aspects in the reform process is the delicate balance addressed by a modern insolvency system which encourages the organization of viable firms and liquidates unviable firms. The financial and macroeconomic crises, as recently experienced in Pakistan, provide an opportunity for bankruptcy reform, as the potential employment impact often places the issue of insolvent companies high on the policy agenda. The three fundamental goals of any insolvency law are: 1) transparency, including a system for publicizing and indexing judgments, an accessible method for registering securing interest and an effective notice of insolvency proceedings, 2) predictability - in terms of being fair, simple and clear, which if not achieved ends up costing more as financial institutions compensate the uncertainty with additional credit costs; and 3) efficiency, which conceptually is clear but empirically is difficult to measure.
Argentina - Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) : Accounting and Auditing
(Washington, DC, 2007-07) World Bank
Strengthening corporate financial reporting is important for Argentina, as the country seeks to foster confidence in the local business community in order to stimulate investments, both local and foreign. In addition, strong corporate accounting practices enable local banks and financial institutions to monitor adequately their businesses risks, credit and otherwise, which is essential at a time when the Argentine banking sector emerges from the crisis triggered by the events of December 2001. Sound accounting and auditing is therefore essential to the stability of Argentina's banking sector. This report analyzes Argentina's corporate financial reporting and auditing practices with a view to supporting the Government's strategy to: (a) improve the investment climate for Argentine companies; (b) foster trade competitiveness by aligning the standards of reporting and governance with practices that are prevalent among the country's main trading partners; and (c) ensure greater transparency in both the private and public sectors. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), International Standards on Auditing (ISA) and good international practice, particularly among the other large countries in Latin America, have been used as benchmarks for this exercise. A study of corporate governance practices was conducted in parallel, which findings complement those of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) accounting and auditing.
Chile : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
(Washington DC, 2004-06) World Bank
The legal and institutional framework governing creditor rights and insolvency proceedings in Chile reasonably complies with expectations of a modern, credit-based economy, although some shortcomings affect the full effectiveness of credit risk management and resolution: Financial institutions over-rely on real estate as collateral. Pledges are not enough developed because legislation on secured interests over movable assets is fragmented and the publicity and registration mechanism for pledges are not sufficiently reliable. Individual enforcement proceedings are lengthy and complicated, both for secured and unsecured creditors. Enforcement proceedings using executory instruments take 1 to 3 years, whereas creditors not enjoying such instruments use ordinary proceedings whose duration is even longer (3 to 5 years). Insolvency legislation is integrated into the country's broader legal and commercial system, providing a liquidation proceeding whose average duration, however, is 2 to 3 years. The Insolvency Law also governs judicial reorganization proceedings but classification of creditors for voting is not allowed, which may be a relatively significant rigidity in an environment where most financial credit is secured. Treatment of contractual obligations in insolvency is not sufficiently developed in the Insolvency Law, which also lacks clear provisions on how to deal with subordination debt agreements and financial contracts in bankruptcy. Provisions to deal with insolvency cases of a cross-border nature are fairly antiquated and not responsive to solve main problems typically present in those cases. Corporate workouts would be significantly increased if out-of-court plans approved by a majority of creditors were able to be converted into prepackaged restructuring plans that bind dissenting minorities. The judicial framework for commercial enforcement and insolvency proceedings is generally perceived as being independent and reliable, although most courts deal with an excessive number of processes. Notwithstanding, there are no commercial courts nor courts specializing in insolvency in Chile. Insolvency administrators are independent professionals supervised by the Bankruptcy Commission, a body meeting the requirements of an independent regulatory institution. The Bill on Second Capital Market Reform, submitted to Congress, is a relevant step in the right direction to make Chilean creditor rights and the insolvency system more effective.
Mauritius : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
(Washington DC, 2004-03) World Bank
The Bank assessed the Mauritius insolvency and creditor rights systems pursuant to a joint IMF-World Bank initiative to develop reports on the observance of standards and codes ("ROSC"), based on the Bank Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems during 2002. The assessment team interviewed a cross section of country stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of the legal infrastructure, and its implementation supporting debtor-creditor relationships, corporate insolvency and credit risk management and resolution practices. Conclusions in this assessment are based largely on a review of applicable legislation and information gathered through interviews conducted by the staff team, and other inputs provided by the Steering Committee on Insolvency and Creditor Rights set up by the Government of Mauritius in January 2003. In addition, five commercial banks provided responses pertaining to credit risk management and corporate recovery practices with respect to distressed assets. Policy recommendations include: creditors rights and enforcement areas, some fine tuning is required to broaden the use of security interests on movable and immovable property, and to ascertain the maximization of the value of the assets for sale upon seizure; enforcement procedures should be streamlined further by accelerated debt recovery rules and more efficient procedures for execution, enforcement and auctions; Credit Information Bureau should be established in Mauritius, and, the government should encourage the development of Credit Rating Agencies. On the legal framework for corporate insolvency, a global reform of the insolvency procedures should be pursued in order to provide Mauritius with a modern and efficient commercial insolvency law. It is also recommends the necessary amendments to the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rules to take care of both traders, non-traders and companies insolvencies, and, the harmonious and uniform recovery procedures for all debts, including amounts due to the State.
Slovak Republic : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
(Washington, DC, 2002-06) World Bank
The assessment team interviewed a cross section of country stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of the legal infrastructure, and its implementation supporting debtor-creditor relationships, corporate insolvency and credit risk management, and resolution practices, including among others, members of the Inter-Agency Commission for the preparation of a new insolvency law, and members of the drafting team for the new collateral law; and, various professionals serving as trustees, executors, lawyers and accountants also provided their input. The conclusions in this assessment are based largely on the above interviews, a review of applicable legislation, data and information, various reports prepared by the Bank between 1999-2001, and other reports or analyses pertaining to the areas assessed, including the project on the new collateral legislation, and registration system for pledges (charges). Some laws unavailable in English at the time were discussed in a number of meetings with institutions, and professionals in the public, and private sectors, and, translations have been requested for follow-up. In addition, at least three commercial banks provided responses to a questionnaire pertaining to credit risk management, and corporate recovery practices with respect to distressed assets. Policy recommendations on Creditors' rights and enforcement procedures need development as follows: rules or legislation on sufficiency of security/transfer/ownership documents should be promulgated to remove the discretion of the land registry, and prevent delay of transactions due to refusals of district land registry offices to register documents; auction procedures should be refined to allow for more realistic minimum bids, more transparent and corruption-resistant procedures, and less court involvement; debtor mechanisms for delaying enforcement of their creditors' rights should be reduced, and in many cases eliminated. Debtor's rights can be protected through summary proceedings, in a different forum dedicated to routine debt enforcement; and, enforcement of first, but not final judgments should be allowed subject to posting of appropriate bond. In addition; the Bankruptcy Law should be further amended to include mandatory deadlines, with time-bound procedures, to avoid the decimation of asset value over time. The moratorium on creditor action should be effective from the time of filing the petition, and the stay on secured creditors counter-balanced by safeguards to protect, and preserve the value of a separate creditors' interest in collateral from deteriorating in value. Creditors' committee meetings should be convened within 30 days of petition filing, and creditors' powers to supervise dealings of the trustee, should be better.
Argentina : Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
(Washington, DC, 2002-06-01) World Bank
In 1995, Argentina enacted a new modern insolvency law that substantially improved corporate liquidations and rehabilitations. After almost seven years of experience, some legal and institutional weaknesses persist: (1) corporate workouts are difficult in practice; (2) the unified insolvency regime causes severe problems in judicial interpretation of many legal provisions, causing court congestion with insolvency cases; (3) an uneven playing field discourages rehabilitation; (4) a lack of insolvency specialization among judges impedes efficiency and uniformity in large commercial centers; and (5) sindicos are perceived as lacking objectivity and sufficient expertise to manage complex restructurings. Liquidation proceedings take 1-5 years (depending on complexity), while reorganizations average 1½-2 years in jurisdictions with specialized judges (Mendoza, Cordoba) and 2-3 years in the others. To immediately improve the system, a new workout mechanism should be introduced to deal with systemic levels of corporate distress. In the medium term, other aspects of the legal and institutional framework should be improved.